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Abstract 
I present and defend a novel non-cognitivist theory of our moral thought and practices. 
It holds that moral judgements depend on the existence of broadly ‘social’ relationships 
among those who make them (among ‘moralists’, as I shall say). 
I am led to this position by observations about non-cognitive disagreement. 
Theorists can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of moral disagreement as a kind of 
non-cognitive disagreement only if they predict that it will have a property which I call 
‘robustness’. Roughly, a candidate disagreement is robust if its status as a disagreement 
is difficult to dispute. I argue that parties to a robust non-cognitive disagreement 
necessarily share a type of trust relationship. One party entrusts to the other a concern to 
accommodate a certain subset of her desires in his decisions. The ‘entrusted party’ can 
resist the relevant desires of the ‘entrusting party’ without violating her trust only if 
satisfying them would frustrate a certain subset of his desires. I call this an entrusted 
concern relationship. Robust non-cognitive disagreement exists when the parties to 
such a relationship have opposing preferences, based on their relevant desires, 
concerning how the entrusted party is to act. I call such preferences ‘voiceable 
preferences’. 
To explain moral disagreement and predict its robustness, non-cognitivists must 
posit the existence of entrusted concern relationships linking all moralists. I call the 
species of non-cognitivism which holds that the non-cognitive components of moral 
judgements are the voiceable preferences of parties to a network of entrusted concern 
relationships linking all moralists (a ‘moral trust network’) fiduciary non-cognitivism. 
This dissertation develops a non-cognitivist theory of this sort. I describe a form the 
moral trust network might take that would explain various elementary features of moral 
thought and talk, and defend the postulation of the described network. 
I argue that this postulation is not too extravagant by explaining how and why 
such a network might exist, and by giving plausible examples of smaller trust networks 
with similar properties. I also contend, following Philippa Foot, that approval and 
disapproval presuppose the existence of a social context entitling approving parties to 
voices in approved parties’ decisions, and argue that, in light of this, we need to posit 
something like a moral trust network to provide a wholly satisfactory explanation of 
moral approval and disapproval. 
 
 
Beyond moral disagreement and approval, my non-cognitivist theory offers at 
least partial explanations for the following phenomena: the use of moral judgements to 
justify and criticize actions; the rule-like character of moral requirements and the 
desirability of simplicity in moral theorizing; the changes of moral motivation that 
sometimes result from moral reasoning; moral uncertainty and its typical practical 
consequences; and the intuition that it can seem very odd to report that one has 
forgotten a moral truth. The theory’s explanations of features of moral thought and talk 
are fairly unified: they mostly derive from postulations about the shared ends of 
moralists, and the idea that the ‘terms’ of the relationships in the moral trust network 
would be shaped to serve these ends. 
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0 
Introduction 
In this dissertation I present and defend a novel non-cognitivist theory of our moral 
thought and practices. Its most distinctive feature is its insistence that moral judgements 
depend, in hitherto unrecognized or under-recognized ways, on the existence of broadly 
‘social’ relationships among those who make them. It boldly posits that all those who 
make moral judgements—all ‘moralists’—must be parties to a common network of trust 
relationships. To hold a moral judgement is necessarily to have a certain kind of desire-
like internal mental state. But having the requisite internal mental state amounts to 
holding a moral judgement only if one is a member of the ‘moral trust network’. Moral 
judgements have the distinctive practical significance that they have, as states that can 
be expressed in order to justify, criticize, or demand actions, only because the moral 
trust network confers this significance on them. 
The theory, which I call fiduciary non-cognitivism, has a number of significant 
virtues. Unlike most non-cognitivist theories, it avoids making our moral thought and 
practices appear very exotic, by characterizing them as more elaborate versions of 
certain familiar and humdrum kinds of deliberation and social interaction. It offers an 
account of what substantive moral reasoning involves that avoids reliance on the thesis 
that higher-order desires can (rationally) influence lower-order ones. It has a satisfactory 
psychology of moral uncertainty. Its explanation for the phenomenon of moral 
disagreement is superior to that of any rival non-cognitivist theory. The postulation of a 
potentially universe-spanning moral trust network is not as costly as it appears, and, as I 
argue, a non-cognitivist theory that doesn’t posit something like it will be unable to 
adequately account for some important phenomena. 
Throughout this dissertation, unless I specify otherwise, whenever I talk of 
‘rationality’ I have in mind rationality of a narrow and formal sort, which is broad 
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enough to encompass the more obvious and uncontroversial prescriptions of decision 
theory and formal (e.g. Bayesian) epistemology, as well as requirements of consistency 
among attitudes other than beliefs and preferences.1 It does not include ‘enkratic 
requirements’, requirements to respond correctly to one’s practical reasons, or 
requirements to do what ‘makes sense’, except insofar as these can be reduced to 
requirements of the ‘narrower’ sort I have outlined. I shall assume that the narrow 
rational requirements, or at least a large subset of them need not be construed as 
requirements of a richly normative sort, but rather may be understood as requirements 
of interpretive coherence or as entailed by a full description of the functional roles of 
attitudes.2 
In what follows I will say how I shall be using ‘non-cognitivism’ and related 
terms (0.1.1), briefly summarize some prominent existing versions of non-cognitivism 
(0.1.2), summarize the most common arguments for and against non-cognitivism 
(0.1.3), enumerate the metaethical desiderata that I shall be most concerned to meet in 
this work (0.2.1), say what fiduciary non-cognitivism is all about (0.2.2), give some 
indication of how fiduciary non-cognitivism meets the aforementioned desiderata 
(0.2.3), outline the scope of my project (0.2.4), make some comments in defence of my 
methodology (0.2.5), and summarize the contents of the thesis (0.2.6). 
0.1 Non-cognitivism and its Place in Metaethics 
0.1.1 Distinguishing Non-cognitivism from Cognitivism 
I will first say something about what non-cognitivism is and its place in metaethical 
debate. Usage of the term ‘non-cognitivism’ varies; it is sometimes taken to refer to a 
family of theories specifically about moral (or normative) language, including 
emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. However, I shall take moral non-
cognitivism to be a theory or family of theories of moral thought and talk which deny 
that moral judgements are cognitive attitudes. Non-cognitivism is thus not purely a 
theory in linguistics or the philosophy of language: a complete non-cognitivist theory 
will be a theory of mind as well as language (and may make various negative claims 
                                                 
1 Examples of the sorts of inconsistent combinations of attitudes I have in mind can be found in 
Derek Baker and Jack Woods, ‘How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency’, 
Ethics 125 (2015): 401-409. 
2 See Baker and Woods, ‘How Expressivists’, 402-403. 
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about ‘moral metaphysics’ too). By contrast, I shall regard expressivism as a purely 
linguistic theory, though one that is compatible with non-cognitivism. 
But it is not a trivial task to say exactly what it means to affirm or deny that moral 
judgements are ‘cognitive attitudes’. Part of the problem is that moral thought and talk 
has many features that would, from an orthodox philosophical point of view, seem 
characteristically ‘realist’ and ‘cognitivist’. For instance, in folk usage moral claims can 
be believed, and asserted; they can be true, and can state facts. It is difficult to say what 
non-cognitivism is without characterizing it as the denial that moral thought and talk has 
these ‘realist’ or ‘cognitivist’ features—as the denial that moral judgements are beliefs, 
for instance. And yet we should, at least to a certain extent, avoid characterizing non-
cognitivism in this way. This is because many non-cognitivists have adopted positions 
in the philosophy of language that purportedly allow them to avoid denying morality’s 
‘cognitivist’ appearances. They have embraced deflationary, minimalist construals of 
folk terms like true, believe, assert, proposition, and so on, that purportedly allow them 
to vindicate talk of moral truth, belief, assertion, and so on, while maintaining that 
moral judgements are desire-like mental states. The same considerations seemingly 
favour, and the same strategy would facilitate, the vindication of talk of moral claims 
describing and representing states of affairs. If a minimalist construal of these terms is 
correct, cognitivists and non-cognitivists alike hold that moral judgements and/or moral 
claims are truth-apt, doxastic, assertoric, propositional, descriptive, and so on. But this 
agreement makes it hard to give an account of the distinction between cognitivism and 
non-cognitivism.3 
As there is no generally accepted account of this distinction, I shall impose my 
own favoured account here. I think that there is a subset of ‘cognitivist-sounding’ folk 
terms of which the non-cognitivist does not need to give a minimalist construal. The 
subset includes the terms describe and information, and their cognates.4 These terms can 
certainly be used felicitously in connection with moral claims, as in the following: 
                                                 
3 James Dreier, ‘Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism’, Philosophical 
Perspectives 18 (2004): 23-44. 
4 The subset also includes the terms forget and remember, for reasons that I give in Chapter 9. It 
may include represent, depict, and portray. However, it is difficult to construct examples, along 
the lines of (1*) and (2*) below, with which to gauge the desirability of ‘deflating’ these terms. 
Such examples will often be confounded by an abundance of available interpretations. E.g. 
‘Practical Ethics portrays some instances of infanticide as permissible’ does not sound very 
odd, but this may just be because we can interpret it as meaning that the infanticides are 
presented in such a way as to encourage us to think them permissible. The non-cognitivist 
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(1) In Cliff’s Notes on Macbeth, Macbeth is described as a good man turned bad by 
ambition.5 
(2) I haven’t read Macbeth. But Cliff’s Notes on Macbeth contains the information that 
Macbeth was a good man turned bad by ambition. 
But in some contexts their use in connection with moral claims seems careless or odd: 
(1*) In Practical Ethics, failure to kill babies in some situations is described as wrong. 
(2*) I haven’t thought very hard about infanticide. But Practical Ethics contains the 
information that failing to kill babies in some situations is wrong. 
My intuition about (1*) is very much what we should expect, given a philosophically 
orthodox understanding of ‘describe’, if non-cognitivism were true. It seems like a 
mistake to talk of describing infanticide as morally required, because describing X as 
such-and-such is saying something about X—it is ruling out some ways X might be. 
But saying that X is permissible isn’t saying anything about X, and doesn’t rule out any 
ways that X might be.6 My intuition about (2*) is somewhat different. By calling the 
claims about infanticide in Practical Ethics ‘information’, (2*) places them in the same 
class as the mundane claims of an encyclopedia, a newspaper, or Cliff’s Notes, as things 
we might just accept without feeling any particular need to scrutinize them. It thus 
seems odd in much the same way that moral testimony seems odd.7 
The following explanation is available as an explanation for the difference 
between (1)-(2) and (1*)-(2*): we are inclined to interpret the first, but not the second, 
as, in part, claims about the description of non-moral facts that are presumed to be 
                                                                                                                                               
seemingly does not need to be a deflationist about ‘portray’ to vindicate this usage. But there is 
perhaps a sense of ‘portray as’ that is more like ‘describe as’ whose use in moral contexts could 
not be vindicated by the non-cognitivist without deflation. The example does not help to 
establish whether this usage deserves to be vindicated. 
5 I don’t know whether Cliff’s Notes says any such thing. These examples are based on an 
example from James Dreier (‘Creeping Minimalism’, 29). 
6 Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd edn. (New York: Dover, 1946), 107. 
7 There is a sizeable literature on why moral judgement-formation on the basis of testimony 
seems strange or defective, and whether this appearance is accurate, which largely proceeds on 
cognitivist assumptions (e.g. Sarah McGrath, ‘Scepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for 
Moral Realism’, Journal of Philosophy, 108, no. 3 (2011): 111-137; Sarah McGrath, ‘The 
Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference’, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 321-44; Alison Hills, 
‘Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology’, Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127; Robert Hopkins, 
‘What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 
3 (2007): 611-634; Karen Jones, ‘Secondhand Moral Knowledge’, The Journal of Philosophy 
96, no. 2 (1999): 55-78). Assuming the non-cognitivist does not want to go out of her way to 
make room for moral testimony, it is natural for her to explain these appearances by simply 
denying that coming to hold moral judgements on the basis of moral testimony, understood as a 
potentially rational way of acquiring moral judgements, is possible. It is far from obvious that 
there is any rational process by which we can communicate desire-like attitudes to one another. 
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morally relevant, or about non-moral information that is conventionally presumed to be 
morally relevant.8 For instance, we are inclined to interpret (1) as implying ‘Cliff’s 
Notes on Macbeth describes Macbeth as having non-normative properties that we all 
think would make him a good man turned bad by ambition.’ By contrast, we are not 
inclined to interpret (1*) merely as an implicit claim about how Practical Ethics 
describes the non-normative properties of infanticide in the relevant cases. No claim 
that infanticide is permissible is likely to be based purely on the principles of 
conventional morality, plus some interesting non-normative claims. If this explanation 
is right, and if it is only the availability of the elliptical explanation I have described that 
explains the felicity of (1)-(2), then there may well be no genuine talk of moral 
description or moral information that warrants vindication. 
I shall assume that this is correct, and that the non-cognitivist’s deflationary 
program stops short of positing a minimalist semantics for these terms. I shall therefore 
characterize moral non-cognitivism as the metaethical theory that moral judgements are 
non-descriptive, and that there is no moral information. I shall characterize cognitive 
attitudes as attitudes that are or purport to be information-bearing, and doxastic attitudes 
as the subset of these consisting of cognitive beliefs and degrees of belief. I shall 
generally assume that non-cognitivists take moral judgements to be non-cognitive 
attitudes of some kind, but I won’t treat this as a necessary feature of non-cognitivism.9 
I should acknowledge that the position I am adopting here is not wholly 
satisfactory, because the intuitions that (1*)-(2*) are infelicitous are subtle and fragile, 
and some readers may lack them altogether. I would be hesitant to adopt it if an 
alternative position were well established in the literature. 
Throughout this work, with the exception of Chapter 9, I will try to avoid saying 
anything whose truth either requires or is incompatible with minimalism about terms 
other than ‘describe’ and ‘information’. In accordance with metaethical tradition, I will 
                                                 
8 The idea that moral utterances communicate non-normative information is a familiar one, and 
we have ample reason to think that some version of it is true (see R. M. Hare, The Language of 
Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 111-23 on the ‘secondary’ descriptive 
meaning of evaluative utterances). I am suggesting that (1) and (2) are felicitous because we 
understand that it is the non-normative implications of Cliff’s Notes’ moral claims about 
Macbeth that they are characterizing as descriptive or as information. 
9 It may be possible for a theorist to be recognizably non-cognitivist while denying that moral 
attitudes exist and that moral utterances purport to express them. I have in mind a prescriptivist 
who holds that moral utterances are commands, and denies that there is any unified class of 
attitudes that they conventionally express. 
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use ‘moral judgement’ as a neutral term for the things that the folk ordinarily call ‘moral 
beliefs’ which implies nothing about their underlying psychological nature. 
0.1.2 Prominent Contemporary Non-cognitivist Theories 
Contemporary versions of non-cognitivism are almost invariably conjoined with 
expressivist theories of moral language. Important pre-expressivist theories, such as the 
emotivist theories of A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, and the prescriptivism of R. M. 
Hare, can (according to Mark Schroeder) be thought of as speech act theories. We can, 
with some interpretive licence, construe them as holding that the speech acts that 
declarative moral sentences are best-suited to perform constitute the primary meanings 
of those sentences. Expressivists, by contrast, are not reliant on hypotheses about the 
characteristic illocutionary force of moral sentences for their theories of meaning.10 
Moral expressivism is roughly the thesis that (i) declarative moral sentences express 
non-cognitive attitudes in the same way in which declarative descriptive sentences 
express cognitive beliefs, and (ii) the meaning of a moral sentence consists in its 
expressing the non-cognitive attitude it expresses.11 
The most prominent contemporary non-cognitivist theories are those of Simon 
Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. The central idea of expressivism was largely developed 
in Blackburn’s writings. Blackburn is a leading proponent of the ‘quasi-realist’ project 
of accommodating the ‘realist’ appearances of morality, in part by means of the 
minimalist program that I discussed in subsection 0.1.1. He has also made several 
somewhat piecemeal attempts at providing an expressivist account of normative 
language.12 These semantic proposals are historically important, but few if any 
expressivists now accept them.13 Blackburn seems to have focused more on the large 
meta-philosophical issues raised by expressivism, and on prosecuting the case against 
cognitivism, than on providing a detailed non-cognitivist account of moral thought and 
talk. 
Allan Gibbard’s non-cognitivist theorizing has been more detailed and systematic. 
In Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Gibbard presents ‘a theory of the meaning of moral 
                                                 
10 Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics (London: Routledge, 2010), 74. 
11 Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics, 72-3. 
12 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 189-96; Essays in 
Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 126-9, 186-97. 
13 Mark Schroeder, Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 10n.3; Noncognitivism in Ethics, 122. 
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terms’ that ‘rests on a psychology of norms’.14 His ‘norm-expressivist’ theory of 
meaning is, at its broadest, a theory about claims of rationality, or of what actions and 
mental states it ‘makes sense’ to do or have. Gibbard held that such judgements are non-
cognitive attitudes of norm acceptance (combined, perhaps, with relevant descriptive 
beliefs). To say that φ is irrational on this view is, roughly, to express one’s acceptance 
of norms forbidding φ. If one accepts a set of norms N one has some tendency to 
conform to N. Gibbard characterizes norm acceptance in part by contrasting it with 
other motivationally efficacious relations we can stand in toward norms, such as being 
‘in the grip’ of social norms, or as having ‘internalized’ norms; and by positing that it is 
the mental state that struggles against our appetites in cases of weakness of will, that we 
are disposed to avow in group deliberation, and that is capable of being shaped through 
such deliberation.15 Moral judgements are a subset of judgements of rationality 
according to Gibbard, and so fall within the scope of his theory of rational judgement. 
They are, roughly, attitudes of accepting norms concerning when to feel guilt and 
resentment.16 
To say that an action φ is irrational is to express a norm-acceptance and belief 
state that ‘rules out’ every pair consisting of a system of norms permitting some type of 
action and a world in which φ is an action of that type. A system of norms is a set of 
prescriptions dividing all actions into forbidden, permitted, and required subsets. 
Complex sentences in which atomic moral sentences are embedded work in a similar 
fashion. For instance (borrowing an example of Gibbard’s), to say, ‘Whenever Antony 
does anything irrational, he sticks to his purpose stubbornly’ is roughly to express a 
mental state that rules out every pair consisting of a system of norms forbidding 
something and a world in which Antony does that thing without sticking to his purpose 
stubbornly.17 
0.1.3 Standard Arguments For and Against Non-cognitivism 
The main reason to posit that moral judgements are desire-like rather than information-
bearing mental states is that this allows us to explain the intuition that there is a 
necessary connection between judging that one morally ought to φ and having some 
                                                 
14 Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 30. 
15 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 56-61; 68-71, 75 (internalization); 72-5 (group deliberation). 
16 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 52. 
17 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 96-7. 
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motivation to φ (‘motivational’ or ‘judgement internalism’), in a manner consistent with 
the Humean Theory of Motivation, which says that cognitive attitudes alone cannot 
rationally motivate action.18 
Many non-cognitivists also hold that their moral realist rivals face a dilemma 
which they themselves avoid. Moral realists claim that moral judgements are cognitive 
attitudes, that to say that an action is morally wrong, permissible, good etc. is to purport 
to give information about it, and that some non-trivial moral claims are true. Moral 
realists must take moral predicates to refer to either natural or non-natural properties. If 
moral properties are natural properties, it becomes unclear why people who differ 
greatly in the actions to which they apply and refuse to apply terms like ‘morally 
wrong’ (or as I shall vaguely put it, who ‘apply these terms to very different things’) do 
not simply mean different things by those terms. Yet people who, in their sincere 
assertions, apply these terms to very different things very often do seem to ‘mean the 
same thing’ by them, and thus to be in disagreement with each other when they apply 
them to different things. Explaining this apparent disagreement is thus alleged to be a 
challenge for the realist who takes moral predicates to refer to natural properties.19 
Those realists who hold that moral properties are non-natural properties, on the 
other hand, face a serious challenge when it comes to explaining the ‘supervenience of 
the moral on the non-moral’. I shall characterize the datum of moral supervenience 
psychologically: it is the thesis that one necessarily errs if one judges that one action is 
wrong, good, etc., and that another is not, while judging that these actions do not differ 
in their natural properties. To predict supervenience, the realist must posit that her 
hypothesized moral properties are such that, necessarily, two actions only differ in their 
                                                 
18 James Lenman provides exemplary defences of motivational internalism in ‘The Internalist 
and the Amoralist’, Philosophia 27 (1999): 441-457 and ‘Moral Deviants and Amoral Saints’, 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2003): 223-240, and of the Humean Theory of Motivation 
in, ‘Belief, Desire, and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics’, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1996): 291-301. 
19 Blackburn, Spreading the Word, 168. This objection is thought to be more compelling if (i) 
each speaker is from a different speech community, (ii) each applies the relevant word (e.g. 
‘wrong’) to the same sorts of things that others in her speech community tend to apply it to, and 
(iii) the word has the same sort of role in deliberative and critical discourse in each speech 
community as it has for us. It is the common practical significances of the word that is supposed 
to assure us that the speakers ‘mean the same thing’ by it. See Hare, Language of Morals, 148-
9; Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons, ‘Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The “Open 
Question Argument” Revived’, Philosophical Papers 21, no. 3 (1992): 153-175. For a readable 
overview of the topic, see Tristram McPherson, ‘Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism’, 
Philosophy Compass 8, no. 2 (2013): 126-136. 
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moral properties if they differ in their natural properties. This necessary relationship 
demands an explanation, and it is not clear that the non-naturalist realist can supply 
one.20 
How does non-cognitivism avoid these problems? Non-cognitivists claim to be 
able to explain moral disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes. Diversity in the 
normative content of moral judgements among different people and different cultures is 
no obstacle to this sort of explanation,21 save in extreme cases. Non-cognitivists have 
more options for explaining supervenience than non-naturalist realists do, because on 
their understanding moral judgements do no information-bearing duty. Non-cognitivists 
can posit that moral judgements are subject to a ‘supervenience constraint’ because this 
serves some broadly practical function.22 On cognitivist assumptions, this postulation 
would be implausible because, if (i) moral judgements purported to be moral-
information-bearing states tracking moral properties and (ii) moral properties did not 
supervene on natural properties, a ‘supervenience constraint’ would interfere with moral 
judgements’ purported information-bearing role. But the truth of this conditional is no 
embarrassment to non-cognitivists because they deny (i). So non-cognitivists avoid both 
horns of the dilemma facing realists. 
These are the oft-cited advantages of non-cognitivism. The theory also has 
weighty disadvantages. The weightiest is the so-called Frege-Geach problem. This is a 
problem for non-cognitivist theories of moral language. A non-cognitivist needs to 
supply such a theory: to give an account of what sentences containing moral terms 
mean, or of their linguistic purpose, that explains the way in which they are used. In 
ordinary use, some such sentences imply or are inconsistent with others, so the non-
cognitivist’s theory of moral language must explain this. The most significant attempts 
to explain this feature of moral language have been versions of expressivism.23 If two 
                                                 
20 Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, 114-123; see James Dreier, ‘The Supervenience 
Argument Against Moral Realism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, no. 3 (1992): 13-38 for 
a readable evaluation of Blackburn’s argument; for a recent discussion see Tristram McPherson, 
‘Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience’, in Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics Volume 7, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 205-
234. 
21 See e.g. Blackburn, Spreading the Word, 168. 
22 Blackburn, Spreading the Word, 186. 
23 Some non-cognitivists (broadly construed) advance expressivism as a metasemantic rather 
than a semantic thesis, and give a non-expressivist (e.g. truth-conditional) semantics for moral 
sentences. See Michael Ridge, Impassioned Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
esp. 8-9, 103ff. 
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sentences are inconsistent, the expressivist holds that this is owing, fundamentally, not 
to the fact that they cannot both be true, but to the fact that it is rationally inconsistent to 
simultaneously hold the attitudes they express. If one sentence ‘P’ implies another 
sentence ‘Q’, this is said to be because it is irrational to have the attitude expressed by 
‘P’ and the attitude expressed by the negation of ‘Q’, and because, in the right 
circumstances, it is rationally permissible or mandatory to ‘transition’ from holding the 
attitude expressed by ‘P’ to holding the attitude expressed by ‘Q’. (Something similar 
holds for relationships of inconsistency and implication among different sets of 
sentences.) 
Expressivist theories face no formidable and immediately apparent problems in 
accounting for the meanings of ‘atomic’ moral sentences, i.e. indicative sentences 
consisting merely of a subject and a moral predicate. But more complex sentences 
involving disjunction and negation, and ‘mixed’ sentences constructed from atomic 
moral sentences and non-moral sentences, are another matter. 
The Frege-Geach problem is roughly the problem for non-cognitivists of giving a 
constructive account of the meaning of moral sentences, both atomic and complex, that 
explains the inconsistency of intuitively inconsistent sets of sentences containing moral 
terms, and the validity of intuitively valid arguments containing moral terms. On most 
accounts, expressivists have thus far failed to provide a solution to the Frege-Geach 
problem that is not prohibitively costly in some respects.24 And, though the Frege-
Geach problem has engrossed the attention of non-cognitivists who have turned their 
attention to semantics, it is only one facet of the problem of providing an adequate 
expressivist semantics.25 
                                                 
24 Unwin’s ‘negation problem’ seems to refute the expressivist theories of Blackburn and 
Gibbard. Nicholas Unwin, ‘Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem’, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 49, no. 196 (1999): esp. 341-2; ‘Norms and Negation: A Problem for 
Gibbard’s Logic’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 51, no. 202 (2001): 60-75. James Dreier has 
levelled a similar and similarly compelling objection against Michael Ridge’s explanation for 
normative disagreement, which Ridge has conceded. James Dreier, ‘Truth and Disagreement in 
Impassioned Belief’, Analysis 75, no. 3 (2015): 457-8; Michael Ridge, ‘Replies to Critics’, same 
volume, 479. In Being For, Mark Schroeder develops an expressivist theory that solves the 
‘negation problem’, but which either cannot explain the logical properties of sentences with 
embedded atomic normative and non-normative sentences, or is incompatible with a plausible 
semantics for descriptive sentences. (Schroeder is of the opinion that no other expressivist 
theory can do better, and concludes that he has shown sufficient reason to reject expressivism. 
Being For, 179.) 
25 See Mark Schroeder’s Being For for an evaluation of the prospects for an expressivist 
account, both of normative logic, and also of tense, modality, and quantification, especially as 
they apply to descriptive sentences. 
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0.2 The Project 
0.2.1 Metaethical Desiderata that are Relevant to the Project 
I’ll now describe the explanatory challenges that I will be concerned with, and briefly 
comment on how well existing theories meet them, giving particular attention to non-
cognitivist theories. 
Disagreement. First, a moral psychology must explain why two people seem to 
disagree when they hold moral judgements that we would pretheoretically take to be 
inconsistent. And the predicted intuition of disagreement should be of the right sort. The 
intuition of disagreement elicited by such cases is not weak, impressionistic, or 
questionable, but plain and obvious, such as that elicited by ordinary cases involving 
inconsistent descriptive beliefs.26 A moral psychology should predict this. Among 
cognitivists, moral naturalists arguably have difficulties meeting this desideratum, as I 
noted above, and so do various sorts of relativist. Non-cognitivists certainly face 
challenges here. There are cases of ‘clashing’ (e.g. mutually unsatisfiable) non-
cognitive attitudes that seem clearly to be disagreements, but there are also plenty that 
don’t. Non-cognitivists need to supply a plausible theory of non-cognitive disagreement 
that will convince us that a clash of non-cognitive attitudes which, according to their 
theories, constitutes a moral disagreement would have the correct appearance of 
disagreement. A few non-cognitivists have tried to devise theories of roughly this sort, 
though none successfully.27 
Justification, criticism, and demands for grounds. Second, moral statements can 
be used to defend and criticize actions, and an account of our moral psychology and 
practices must explain this. There are difficulties here for various views in metaethics, 
including non-cognitivism. It is not clear why letting someone know that you have a 
desire-like attitude should have the upshot that we expect justificatory or condemnatory 
utterances to have. Suppose that someone objects to my having φ-ed, and I say in 
                                                 
26 There are admittedly clashes of descriptive belief that seem ambiguous. I discuss a few in 
1.1.6. 
27 Gibbard defends a theory of disagreement in plan in Thinking How to Live using an elaborate 
argument of a sort that Michael Ridge characterizes as ‘transcendental’. Allan Gibbard, 
Thinking How to Live, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), Chapter 14; Ridge, 
Impassioned Belief, 181. Ridge offers a summary and critique of Gibbard’s theory that I don’t 
think I can improve upon. He argues that Gibbard’s theory is unclear on crucial points and fails 
to explain all of the intuitive data (Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 179-85). I shall defer to Ridge on 
these points. I offer counterexamples to a theory of non-cognitive disagreement resembling 
Charles Stevenson’s in 1.1.3, and to Michael Ridge’s theory in 1.1.5. 
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defence of my action that φ-ing was the right thing to do. The expressivist theory that 
Gibbard defends in Thinking How to Live might characterize this as expressing a plan to 
φ in the circumstances in which I acted. T. M. Scanlon wonders, ‘why should this carry 
any weight with the person who has complained? It is already obvious that I plan to 
behave in these ways. That is what the person is objecting to.’28 The problem, or some 
version of it, remains, at least according to Scanlon, if we say that normative statements 
express ‘acceptance of norms’, imperatives, or approval rather than plans.29 
It seems desirable that an explanation of our justifying and criticizing practices 
should account for certain further phenomena. When someone uses a moral claim to 
condemn or justify an action by saying that it is or isn’t wrong, it is appropriate to 
respond by demanding that she say why it is wrong or not wrong. The justifying or 
condemning party then normally seems obliged to give such an explanation or withdraw 
her justification or criticism. There seem to be ways in which such an explanation can 
be more or less ‘successful’, and its ‘success’ can affect how seriously the attempted 
justification or criticism is taken. It would seem relatively easy for cognitivists to 
account for these further phenomena, assuming that they can account for the use of 
moral claims to justify and criticize, for it is uncontroversial that there are descriptive 
assertions for which explanations can be demanded, and that they can be explained 
more or less successfully. But it is not clear how non-cognitivists can account for it. 
Moral uncertainty. Third, moral judgements can be held with varying degrees of 
certainty, even by an agent who is perfectly certain about all empirical facts that she 
takes to be potentially morally relevant. Theories of moral psychology must explain this 
phenomenon. This is a problem for non-cognitivism because non-cognitive attitudes 
apparently cannot be held with differing degrees of certainty. According to one recent 
commentator, non-cognitivists have so far failed to supply a wholly satisfactory account 
of normative uncertainty.30 Cognitivists have no trouble saying what moral uncertainty 
is. But an account of moral uncertainty must make the right predictions about the 
consequences of moral uncertainty for rational action, and I will argue that some 
cognitivist theories struggle here. These theories either fail to explain why it is ever 
                                                 
28 T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic About Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 58. 
29 Scanlon, Being Realistic, 59. I am not convinced that the problem remains if we say that 
normative statements express states of approval and disapproval. But I think that non-
cognitivists should avoid postulating this until they can offer a convincing theory of what 
approval is. 
30 Krister Bykvist, ‘Moral Uncertainty’, Philosophy Compass 12, no. 3 (2016): 6. 
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rational to act on uncertain judgements of basic moral principle, or they have 
counterintuitive implications concerning how people will act under moral uncertainty. 
Moral reasoning and changes of motivation. Fourth, a moral psychology must 
explain how substantive moral reasoning can produce changes of moral judgement and 
hence changes in moral motivation. This is a challenge for cognitivists who, like 
Michael Smith, maintain that the motivational changes associated with changes of basic 
moral judgement (i.e. judgements of basic principle) are principally changes of basic or 
non-instrumental desire.31 Non-cognitivists typically characterize substantive moral 
reasoning as a mental activity aimed at making one’s non-cognitive moral attitudes 
better satisfy some subset of one’s higher-order non-cognitive attitudes (e.g. one’s 
desires concerning which non-cognitive moral attitudes one should have).32 This is an 
imperfectly satisfactory account because no very satisfactory explanation can be given 
as to how the changes in one’s first-order moral attitudes are brought about. The most 
natural story is as follows: it is rationally incoherent to have higher-order non-cognitive 
attitudes that are not satisfied, we have some sort of mental or neurological faculty for 
ridding ourselves of incoherence, and this faculty is what causes the changes of mind 
that are not uncommonly the upshot of moral reasoning. But it is far from clear that 
there is necessarily any incoherence involved in having frustrated higher-order non-
cognitive attitudes.33 
The existence of morality. Fifth, it is desirable that an account of our moral 
psychology and practices should be such that the existence of our moral psychologies 
and practices, as they are characterized by the account, should not be too empirically  
surprising.34 An account should avoid construing moral thought and practices as 
involving behaviours, mental states, or mental processes that both (i) do not manifestly 
occur, and (ii) could not be well explained given our existing knowledge in the social 
sciences, psychology, evolutionary biology, and so on, if they did occur. 
                                                 
31 See Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 72-76 on the underived 
character of moral desires. For Smith’s solution to the problem, see Chapter 5, esp. 159-161. 
32 I provide textual support for this point in Chapter 7. 
33 For a very brief survey of views on the rationality of having unsatisfied second-order 
preferences, see Alejandro Perez Carballo, ‘Rationality and Second-Order Preferences’, Nous  
(‘Early view’ version) (2016): 2-3. I discuss Carballo’s own explanation of how coherence can 
require the satisfaction of second-order preferences in Chapter 7. 
34 Of course, this is not a desideratum for the metaethicist who holds that moral thought and 
practices do not exist. Such a theorist is instead obliged to provide an error theory to explain 
why the folk have been misapplying moral-psychological (etc.) concepts. 
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Non-cognitivist views, it seems to me, typically meet this sixth desideratum 
poorly. They characterize moral thought and talk as quite different from kinds of 
thought and talk of which we have a better understanding, and postulate sui generis 
attitudes rather promiscuously (or tacitly rely on such postulations).35 Assuming that 
moral thought and talk are shaped fundamentally through evolutionary processes, this 
sort of characterization gives evolution a lot more work to do, so to speak. And non-
cognitivists have provided little independent evidence that evolution has done this work. 
So, for all non-cognitivists have said, the existence of morality in its familiar form is 
empirically more surprising given non-cognitivism than it would be given some rival 
theories.  
Allan Gibbard has, I acknowledge, gone to considerable lengths to provide an 
evolutionary explanation for the existence of normative—including moral—thought and 
talk construed in non-cognitivist and norm-expressivist fashion. But I don’t think he 
says enough to ameliorate non-cognitivism’s comparative shortcomings regarding this 
desideratum. According to Gibbard, our hunting and gathering ancestors faced many 
coordination problems, especially bargaining problems.36 An inability to coordinate in 
this environment tended to diminish an individual’s reproductive success. The chief 
biological function of normative thought and talk is to help us solve these problems—to 
coordinate our actions and emotions.37 Normative judgements motivate, and normative 
discussion tends toward consensus, so normative practices tended to give our ancestors 
shared ends. Coordination between people is more probable the more their ends align.38 
So our normative psychologies promoted our ancestors’ reproductive success. 
But however plausible Gibbard’s evolutionary story may be,39 it doesn’t seem to 
provide much support for norm-expressivism in particular. It seems to support any 
                                                 
35 On this last point, see Mark Schroeder’s repeated complaints in Chapter 3 of his Being For. 
36 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 67. Two parties face a bargaining problem if it would benefit both of 
them to reach any of a range of agreements and, within this range, the agreement that would 
most benefit one party differs from that which would most benefit the other. 
37 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 26. 
38 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 72-3. Gibbard does not explicitly talk about normative discussion’s 
tendency to give agents shared ends, but I think that this must be an important part of his story. 
39 My inexpert objection to the account, as it applies to morality, is this. (1) It is not very 
plausible that our practice of engaging in moral argument would have evolved because of its 
tendency to bring about consensus, for moral argument is notoriously intractable. Striking 
bargains is much easier than reaching moral agreement through argument, because moral 
judgments resist pragmatic compromise. (2) The phenomenon of non-rational moral influence—
e.g. the tendency of people’s moral judgements to ‘rub off’ on each other—might admittedly 
have evolved because of its tendency to produce shared ends. (‘Mutual influence’ is one of 
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naturalistic metaethical theory that predicts a fairly robust (though perhaps somewhat 
contingent) connection between moral judgement and motivation, that predicts a 
tendency toward consensus in moral discourse,40 that otherwise adequately explains the 
obvious facts about the subject matter of metaethics, and that is not premised on its own 
special (e.g. contractarian) story about why our moral practices exist. If I am right about 
this, Gibbard’s explanation for the existence of moral thought and talk is incomplete, for 
it does not explain the particular non-cognitivist form that morality takes. It thus does 
not make the existence of morality on a non-cognitivist construal much less surprising. 
Ubiquity of moral thought and talk. Most accounts of our moral practices meet my 
sixth desideratum effortlessly, but it poses a serious challenge for my theory. The 
desideratum concerns the fact that the capacity to participate in moral thought and talk 
is pervasive among humans. People almost everywhere seem to be capable of making 
moral judgements, and when they do so, they seem to be engaging in the same practice. 
Not just the same broad kind of practice; rather, they are all, in a sense, making moves 
in the same game. A person who, without explicit qualification, condemns abortion on 
what we would intuitively regard as moral grounds is condemning abortion all over the 
world, not just abortion performed by members of her own community. She disagrees 
with and opposes anyone in the world who judges abortion to be permissible (on 
intuitively moral grounds) and sides with anyone else who condemns it. Bracketing 
differences of language, two strangers from foreign cultures can engage in moral 
discourse with each other, whether they or members of their respective cultures have 
encountered each other before or not. 
A theory of moral thought and talk must explain this. The problem of meeting this 
desideratum is similar to the alleged problem, discussed above, for moral naturalists of 
explaining why people who apply ‘wrong’ to very different things seem to disagree 
instead of merely seeming to mean different things by the word. However, the present 
problem is in at least one respect more general, for it does not arise only in cases in 
                                                                                                                                               
morality’s consensus-creating mechanisms on Gibbard’s account (Wise Choices, 73).) But 
roughly the same result could have been achieved by the evolution of a simple propensity to 
desire the same states of affairs that those around you desire (whether through a ‘rubbing-off’-
type process, producing lasting changes in desire, or something more like empathy). It is thus 
implausible to posit that the elaborate edifice of morality evolved merely to serve this purpose. 
40 If predicting this were desirable, a cognitivist could do so fairly easily by pointing out (1) our 
willingness to accept testimony in descriptive matters, and (2) the tendency of arguments and 
evidence to reduce the diversity of opinions in certain descriptive domains. 
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which the parties (and their speech communities) apparently apply moral terms to quite 
different things. 
There are possible metaethical views that struggle to explain how people from 
different isolated communities could be morally agreeing, or participating in the same 
kind of practices, even when they and their communities apply a moral predicate to 
apparently very similar actions, and use the word with the same intended practical 
upshot. I don’t think cognitivists in general face a problem here, as they can plausibly 
maintain that these people are all participants in the same ‘game’, viz., that of 
describing how things are morally.  
For purposes of illustration, a theory that would face a challenge here is one that 
explained morality as arising from an actual social contract (rather than the more 
commonly-appealed-to hypothetical sort), and that characterized moral judgements as 
judgements about the terms of that contract.41 Such a theory would struggle to explain 
why people in diverse and non-interacting communities who used what were apparently 
moral terms in apparently the same way (applied to the same actions, and having the 
same justificatory force etc.) would be talking about the same social contract in doing 
so. How could they have ‘signed up’ to the same social contract when their 
communities were isolated from each other?42 Fiduciary non-cognitivism also struggles 
to meet this desideratum, for similar reasons. 
Rule-like character of moral requirements. There is a tendency among makers of 
moral judgements to think that particular moral requirements (and permissions etc.) can 
always be explained by general requirements. If someone says a particular action is 
wrong, for instance, it is always reasonable to ask why. And a paradigmatically 
appropriate answer will be a claim, for a somewhat simple natural property F, that all 
actions that are F are wrong, and that the action in question is F. In other words, there is 
a presumption that moral requirements will take the form of general rules. This 
                                                 
41 Jean Hampton puts the case for a view broadly resembling this in her Hobbes and the Social 
Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Cf. also Gilbert Harman, 
‘Moral Relativism Defended’, Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (1975): 3-22. Thanks to Nic 
Southwood for these references. 
42 Of course they might have ‘signed up’ to different contracts, and yet be talking about the 
same contract—party A might be talking about party B’s contract, and B might also be talking 
about B’s contract. But this creates a puzzle as to how A could be using moral words with any 
kind of justificatory or condemnatory ‘force’, for it would presumably have been only qua 
member of her own community’s contract that A could use these words with this kind of force. 
Plausibly, insofar as A was describing B’s social contract, she would be talking in a quasi-
anthropological fashion, not talking qua moralist. 
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presumption tends to survive the realization that there are few interesting, general, 
precisely specified, and non-gerrymandered moral rules that avoid making unpalatable 
prescriptions in some circumstances. The seventh desideratum on my list is that of 
explaining this tendency to think of moral requirements as consisting of general rules. 
This phenomenon does not seem to pose a problem for cognitivists, who can 
explain it as an instance of a more general human tendency to favour simple theories 
over complex ones in reasoning involving cognitive attitudes. We expect morality to be 
explained by simple laws just as we expect the world to be explained by simple laws. 
The desideratum is potentially more challenging for non-cognitivists. It is not clear, for 
instance, that humans have any particular tendency to form desires or preferences that 
are simple and ‘rule-like’ in character (it is in fact not clear to me what sort of desire 
would correspond to a judgement of moral requirement, where the requirement was of a 
‘rule-like’ character). This desideratum will pose a challenge for my non-cognitivist 
theory of moral psychology. 
Moral forgetting. The final two desiderata concern intuitive appearances that have 
received comparatively little attention from metaethicists. The eighth concerns our 
intuitions about moral forgetting.43 Cases in which people are presented as having lost 
moral beliefs through forgetting are apt to puzzle us, and an account of moral 
psychology should account for this. Establishing which views meet this desideratum 
and which do not is a large task, which I undertake later in this dissertation. But prima 
facie, non-cognitivist theories tend to meet it well, for they typically posit that moral 
judgements are attitudes of a sort that, at least intuitively, cannot be lost through 
forgetting. Cognitivist views will explain it better if they posit that moral facts are of an 
unusually ‘unforgettable’ sort, perhaps because they are intuitively obvious or 
discoverable through easy introspection. 
Moral approval and disapproval. Ninth, it is desirable that a metaethical theory 
should be compatible with a unified account of the phenomena of approval and 
disapproval. As Philippa Foot argued, approval and disapproval on non-moral grounds 
seems to be impossible in the absence of certain type of social setting. For instance, a 
parent can disapprove of her daughter’s engagement on the grounds that the prospective 
husband is not rich enough, or not well enough connected, but a stranger cannot 
                                                 
43 The classic discussion of this topic is Gilbert Ryle’s ‘On Forgetting the Difference Between 
Right and Wrong’, in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden ed. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1958), 147-59. 
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disapprove of the engagement on the same grounds. Foot proposes that this is because 
non-moral approval and disapproval require the existence of conventions entitling the 
approving or disapproving party to be listened to in the decisions of the approved or 
disapproved party. Convention, for instance, entitles a young woman’s parent, but not a 
stranger, to a voice in her marriage choices. It is prima facie desirable we should give a 
unified account of the conditions for approval and disapproval. So if we are persuaded 
by Foot’s intuitive data, as I think we should be, then it is desirable that we should say, 
as Foot does, that even a moral disapprover must enjoy an entitlement to be listened to 
in the relevant decisions of those of whose actions she disapproves. Meeting this prima 
facie desideratum would mean explaining how such entitlements could exist. (I call this 
a ‘prima facie desideratum’ because it may turn out that there is no way to give a 
unified account of the conditions for approval and disapproval that is not prohibitively 
costly.) 
This concludes my enumeration of the metaethical desiderata that are relevant to 
my present project. Fiduciary non-cognitivism deserves the reader’s attention because it 
meets them tolerably well—much better, on the whole, than any other extant non-
cognitivist theory—and at no detriment to its explanation for moral supervenience or the 
necessary connection between moral judgement and motivation. It is, moreover, a 
unified theory, which relies on a fairly small number of novel postulations, quite a few 
of which turn out to be independently plausible on scrutiny. The theory is incomplete, 
however, and has a few worrisome and distinctive commitments. (I mention most of the 
theory’s problems in 0.2.3 and 0.2.4 below.) I will now say a bit more about the nature 
of the theory defended in this dissertation. 
0.2.2 The Central Idea of Fiduciary Non-cognitivism 
If two people seem to disagree in virtue of having clashing non-cognitive attitudes, the 
appearance of disagreement will generally be weak and fragile unless there is a ‘matter 
to be settled’ between them. The ‘matter to be settled’ cannot be a mere conflict, in 
which each party regards the other merely as a threat to her interests. Rather, one (or 
each) party must have expectations, of a broadly normative sort, about how the other 
will behave, and the other must somehow acknowledge and aspire to meet these 
expectations. So I shall argue in this thesis. 
I hypothesize that these normative expectations, if they are justified, are explained 
by relationships of trust between the parties. Specifically, one party can be in ‘robust’ 
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non-cognitive disagreement with another—i.e. have a clash of non-cognitive attitudes 
with the other of a sort that elicits a robust intuition of disagreement—only if she shares 
with the other a certain kind of trust relationship. I call relationships of this sort 
‘entrusted concern relationships’. In an entrusted concern relationship, one party 
entrusts to another a concern to accommodate those of her preferences that meet certain 
criteria. The latter party violates her trust if he resists her preferences, unless he does so 
in conformity to preferences of his own that meet certain criteria. A clash among 
preferences that meet the relevant criteria for each party amounts to a robust non-
cognitive disagreement. The criteria are determined by the ‘terms’ of their trust 
relationship. 
Judgements are capable of ‘robustly’ disagreeing; a clash of judgements elicits a 
firm intuition of disagreement.44 This is a constraint on what could count as a moral 
judgement. A given attitude J could not be a moral judgement unless there were some 
other attitude K such that having J necessarily puts a person in ‘robust’ disagreement 
with any other person who has K. A non-cognitivist who hopes to meet this constraint 
must posit that the non-cognitive attitudes that constitute moral judgements require a 
special social context in order to exist—they require, roughly, the existence of a 
network of entrusted concern relationships connecting all those who make moral 
judgements. That moral judgements presuppose such a network, and that such a network 
exists, are the central claims of fiduciary non-cognitivism. 
The fiduciary non-cognitivist thus endorses a certain kind of externalism or anti-
individualism about moral judgements. There is no ‘internal’ mental state, the fiduciary 
non-cognitivist claims, such that having that mental state necessarily amounts to holding 
a moral judgement.45 Inhabitation of an appropriate social setting—specifically, 
membership of an appropriate network of trust relationships—is an essential ingredient 
of moral judgement. 
The idea that moral attitudes are dependent on social context is not new. Philippa 
Foot, as I described above, argued that attitudes of approval and disapproval can only 
                                                 
44 I discuss some possible counterexamples to this generalization involving descriptive 
judgement in 1.1.6. A weaker generalization excepting cases involving deception or inequalities 
of expertise would survive these counterexamples. 
45 This is supposed to be true even if we hold the language of any candidate moral judgement-
holder fixed. Thus the ‘externalism’ implied by fiduciary non-cognitivism is distinct from 
externalism about the contents of thoughts, of the sort that e.g. Tyler Burge’s famous arthritis 
example is supposed to establish (Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and the mental’, Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy 4 (1979): 77). 
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exist in a certain kind of social context.46 Simon Blackburn, commenting on Foot, 
concedes that the same is true of the non-cognitive attitudes that constitute moral 
judgements.47 However, we find no attempt in Blackburn’s writings to say what form 
such social contexts would take, or to determine, to any significant extent, the nature of 
their influence on our moral practices and psychologies. The novelty of the non-
cognitivist theory defended in this dissertation lies chiefly in the centrality it gives to 
social institutions. According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, the network of trust 
relationships that makes moral judgement possible is fundamental to the explanation of 
the nature of moral judgement, of the nature and point of moral reasoning, of the 
practical significance of moral claims, and of the very existence of our moral practices. 
It is my contention that studying the social conditions of moral judgement, on a non-
cognitivist construal, reveals the means to a unified explanation of many diverse 
features of our moral thought and practices. 
I’ll now briefly say what fiduciary non-cognitivism is, and flesh out somewhat the 
version of the theory that I will be defending. Fiduciary non-cognitivism, as I have said, 
posits that moralists are parties to a network of entrusted concern relationships. These 
trust relationships oblige them to be responsive to one another’s preferences insofar as 
those preferences meet certain criteria. Preferences meeting these criteria are the non-
cognitive attitudes involved in moral judgements. Each moralist is obliged to 
accommodate each other moralist’s relevant preferences unless her own relevant 
preferences are preferences for conformity to norms that prescribe doing otherwise. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism about morality is, at its broadest, the species of non-
cognitivism which holds that the non-cognitive attitudes involved in moral judgement 
are preferences which have this sort of significance—which oblige accommodation, or 
licence resistance to accommodation of others’ preferences—in the context of a network 
of entrusted concern relationships linking every moralist to every other moralist. I shall 
sometimes use the term ‘fiduciary non-cognitivism’ in a narrow sense, referring to the 
particular version of it that I defend in this thesis.48 
                                                 
46 In her essay ‘Approval and Disapproval’, in Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other 
Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 189-208. 
47 Simon Blackburn, ‘The Flight to Reality’, in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral 
Theory, eds. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 39. 
48 Why am I defending fiduciary non-cognitivism rather than fiduciary subjectivism? Why not 
posit that moral judgements are beliefs about people’s (idealized) preferences, where the 
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According to this particular version of the theory, the trust relationships that 
comprise the moral trust network all have the same terms. The preferences that are the 
non-cognitive components of moral judgements are preferences for conformity to 
norms. They concern which norms the moral judgement-holder herself should follow, 
and which norms other moralists should follow. The criteria that these preferences must 
meet guarantee that a moralist will have preferences, of the relevant sort, that she and 
others should follow exactly the same norms. Among the criteria imposed on the 
preferences that (partly) constitute moral judgements is a constraint on the desires that 
those preferences may be based on. With one exception, discussed below, the desires 
must all be broadly altruistic. 
0.2.3 Fiduciary Non-cognitivism and the Nine Desiderata 
I will now give highly abbreviated explanation of why my theory meets the ten 
desiderata, and in the process expand upon the brief summary of it that I have just 
given. 
Disagreement. Fiduciary non-cognitivism was developed from the outset with the 
aim of explaining moral disagreement in mind. And, although its explanation of moral 
disagreement is not complete, I believe that fiduciary non-cognitivism meets this 
desideratum better than any rival non-cognitivist theory. It does so because it predicts 
that interpersonal clashes of moral judgement will elicit a stable rather than a fragile and 
impressionistic intuition of disagreement, at least where the judgements concern matters 
of basic moral principle. My theory of non-cognitive disagreement (developed in 
Chapters 1 and 2) predicts that such an intuition will be elicited by clashes of preference 
among parties to an entrusted concern relationship, and fiduciary non-cognitivism holds 
that clashing moral judgements involve clashing preferences of this sort. 
Justification, criticism, and demands for grounds. Fiduciary non-cognitivism is 
well placed to answer Scanlon’s objection that communicating that one performed an 
action at the prompting of a certain non-cognitive attitude in no way answers an 
                                                                                                                                               
preferences involved are of the special sort that I have been describing? My decision to focus on 
fiduciary non-cognitivism is not based on a judgement that it is the superior theory. Frankly, I 
don’t know enough about sophisticated versions of subjectivism to be able to properly evaluate 
them. My focus on fiduciary non-cognitivism is due merely to constraints on time and wordage, 
my better familiarity with non-cognitivism, and personal taste. I needed to devise a theory of a 
certain degree of specificity in order to make a case that certain seemingly formidable 
difficulties could be met. Developing both a subjectivist and a non-cognitivist theory to this 
degree would have been hard. I hope that my labours in this work nonetheless make the 
prospects for fiduciary subjectivism easier to assess.    
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objection to one’s performance of the action. According to the theory, when a moralist 
says that φ-ing is right (or that not-φ-ing is wrong), she communicates that she has a 
preference that she (and everyone else) should follow norms requiring φ. And the 
preference is purportedly one such that her possession of it establishes that (i) she can 
follow norms requiring φ without violating the trust of any other moralist who prefers 
that she should follow norms forbidding φ; and (ii) any other moralist who not-φs will 
violate her trust, unless he has a relevant preference to follow norms forbidding φ. 
Thus when I am about to φ, and someone says to me, ‘φ-ing is wrong’, she 
communicates that she has a preference that I follow norms forbidding φ. Why should 
this preference be of any interest to me? Because, assuming it meets the relevant 
criteria, I have a trust-based obligation to acquiesce to it, unless I have a relevant 
preference to do otherwise. Because the speaker’s trust is at stake, the moral claim has 
the character of a demand, an objection, and a challenge to me to explain myself. When 
I respond by saying that φ-ing is the right thing to do, I communicate a preference that I 
should follow norms prescribing φ; if I genuinely have the preference, and it meets the 
criteria, this establishes that I did not violate the complainer’s trust by φ-ing. This is 
why my preference should be of interest to her. My moral claim has a justificatory 
character because it roughly amounts to a defence against an objection that I would 
violate her trust if I φ-ed. 
The relevance of our preferences to the question of whether I have violated trust 
explains why my interlocutor and I should each have some sort of entitlement to 
demand to know the grounds for the other’s preference. I might want to know whether I 
really am obliged to acquiesce to my interlocutor’s preference absent a relevant 
preference of my own to do otherwise, perhaps because I am afraid that my own 
preference will not survive scrutiny. My interlocutor might want to know whether my 
expressed preference really exists and gives me discretion to resist her demands. 
Explaining why we hold our judgements is a way of establishing whether the 
preferences they involve meet the relevant criteria, and so of establishing whether I will 
violate trust if I φ. Since the information is of significant interest to us, it makes sense 
that the terms of our trust relationship should in some way entitle us to demand of each 
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other that we should explain our moral judgements when we use them to criticize or 
justify.49 
Moral uncertainty. Fiduciary non-cognitivism gives an account of moral 
uncertainty that makes plausible predictions about the relationship between moral 
uncertainty and action.50 More specifically, it gives an account of degrees of confidence 
in moral claims, and an account of moral indecision. The account is impossible to 
summarize here without considerable distortion. But very roughly, my confidence in a 
moral claim is the expected utility of conformity to it—that is, the expected utility in 
terms of the satisfaction of my altruistic desires (and my ‘simplicity desire’, discussed 
below). If I am morally undecided about a moral claim J, the expected utility of 
conformity to it, in comparison to the expected utility of conformity to its negation ~J, 
is indeterminate—perhaps because my relevant credences are indeterminate or 
imprecise. The result of this indecision is that I lack a preference between conforming to 
J or ~J. This in turn means that I cannot act on J or ~J without violating the trust of other 
moralists. 
Moral reasoning and changes of motivation. As I noted above, explaining how 
moral reasoning can produce changes in motivation is a problem for moral psychologies 
that postulate that the motivations affected are basic or non-instrumental. Fiduciary non-
cognitivism is unusual among non-cognitivist theories in that it does not make this 
postulation. The theory characterizes reasoning about basic moral principles as a kind of 
means-end reasoning: moral reasoning is a quest to identify the set of norms conformity 
to which would best satisfy the set of desires specified by the terms of the moral trust 
relationships—chiefly altruistic desires, but also a desire that moralists should follow 
simpler rather than more complex norms. The process involves descriptive reasoning, 
which, for rather complicated reasons, is almost exclusively a priori. This descriptive 
reasoning concerns the consequences of following certain norms in certain possible 
circumstances (e.g. whether there are possible circumstances in which following 
utilitarian norms would mean committing judicial murder). 
                                                 
49 Or perhaps the terms of the trust relationship don’t need to stipulate this entitlement; perhaps, 
as a general matter, if someone makes a trust-based claim of me, she has a trust-based obligation 
to be cooperative if I am trying to establish whether she really has the claimed entitlement. If so, 
this might explain my entitlement to demand that she supply grounds for her judgement. 
50 It does not offer a corresponding semantics, however, to explain e.g. the significance and 
logical properties of sentences like ‘Abortion is probably wrong’. 
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What explains the reliable changes in motivation that result from changes in basic 
moral judgement is a moralist’s desire to avoid violating other moralists’ trust. If a 
moralist ever acts in violation of her preferred norms, she violates the trust of any 
moralist who prefers that she should do otherwise. Since there is sure to be some 
moralist whose trust she would violate in this way if she acted in violation of her 
preferred norms, her desire not to violate trust will bid her conform to these norms, 
whatever they may prescribe. A person must desire to live up to the trust of all other 
moralists if she is to be a member of the moral trust network, and she must be a member 
of the moral trust network if she is to be a moralist herself. 
Why morality exists. Fiduciary non-cognitivism makes what on the face of it is a 
wild empirical postulation, namely, that everyone in the universe who makes moral 
judgements is party to a rather complicated sort of trust relationship with everyone else 
in the universe who makes moral judgements, and that all of these trust relationships 
have nearly exactly the same terms. But it is at least possible to tell an evolutionary 
story that will explain why humans are disposed to form these sorts of trust 
relationships. The evolutionary story I offer is not independently plausible, and it is 
based purely on inexpert conjecture. But for all its scientific irresponsibility, it posits 
nothing as immodest as the more-or-less ad hoc hypotheses, made by all other 
psychologically detailed non-cognitivist theories, concerning our evolved propensities 
to form certain mental states when we have certain other combinations of mental states; 
or Gibbard’s hypothesis in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings that we evolved a novel, 
distinctively normative and ‘linguistically infused’ kind of mental state, viz. norm-
acceptance. My story requires only much more superficial changes in the way our brains 
are wired. 
The postulation of a disposition to form moral trust relationships is made less 
costly by the plausibility of the proposition that we do form entrusted concern 
relationships—the sorts of trust relationships connecting all moralists according to 
fiduciary non-cognitivism—in a tacit and spontaneous way in our interactions with 
other people outside of normative contexts. I argue for this proposition in the course of 
defending my theory of non-cognitive disagreement. I also explain why it would, in 
some non-moral contexts, serve people’s interests to form networks of entrusted 
concern relationships, like the moral trust network but confined to small interacting 
groups with shared ends. These networks would, I argue, share properties with the 
moral trust network that we might otherwise have thought were peculiar to the latter. 
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These arguments, I hope, convincingly assimilate moral thought and talk on a 
fiduciary non-cognitivist construal to thought and talk of a more humdrum and familiar 
kind, a kind involved in a many mundane instances of practical negotiation and joint 
deliberation. Since we are manifestly capable of engaging in these ordinary kinds of 
negotiations and deliberations, and since a construal of these negotiations and 
deliberations as presupposing tacit entrusted concern relationships between the parties is 
plausible, we should not find the costs of positing the evolution of dispositions to form 
the moral trust network altogether overwhelming. We evidently possess a large part of 
the cognitive machinery we would need to have if this postulation were true. 
There are devils in the details of my theory. Even if we are prepared to 
countenance a universe-spanning moral trust network, fiduciary non-cognitivism still 
has some empirically troublesome surprises in store on close scrutiny. For one thing, it 
requires moralists to effortlessly form preferences and make decisions based on 
fantastically small credences (3.3.3). It is not antecedently clear that we have the 
cognitive resources to do this.51 For another, it requires moralists to have certain desires 
which we do not obviously have, namely, altruistic desires and ‘simplicity desires’—
which, again, are desires that moralists should follow simple norms. Evolutionary 
mechanisms such as kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and group selection could 
credibly account for our possession of the posited altruistic desires. But I have, as of 
writing, failed to come up with an explanation for our possession of simplicity desires. 
These are certainly serious shortcomings of my theory, as it is presented in this work, 
but they are only evident because my theory of our moral thought and practices, and my 
explanation for their existence, is worked out more fully and explicitly than is typical 
for non-cognitivist theories. There are devils in the details of my accounts of moral 
disagreement and substantive moral reasoning because the accounts are detailed—more 
so than the rival accounts of Gibbard, Blackburn, and Ridge. It would be a mistake to 
reject fiduciary non-cognitivism because of its empirically costly postulation that moral 
reasoning involves fantastically small credences, and its empirically mysterious 
postulation of simplicity desires, before it has been shown that rival theories fare better 
when they have joined their dots to the same extent. 
                                                 
51 The rational outcomes of this instrumental reasoning involving minuscule probabilities could 
be arrived at by easy shortcuts, but if I posit that we typically exploit these shortcuts, I face 
pressure to posit that we evolved a special disposition to do so, which is also costly. 
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Ubiquity of moral thought and talk. As I have already more or less acknowledged, 
the fact that people almost everywhere seem to be capable of making moral judgements, 
whether or not they have interacted in the past, is a special problem for fiduciary non-
cognitivism. This is, of course, because fiduciary non-cognitivism posits that one cannot 
make moral judgements unless one shares trust relationships with everyone else who 
can make moral judgements, and it is prima facie implausible to suppose that 
geographically separated and non-interacting pairs of moralists will have formed the 
requisite trust relationships. A large portion of this thesis will be devoted to showing 
that meeting this desideratum is not so great a problem for fiduciary non-cognitivism as 
it appears. 
Rule-like character of moral requirements. Explaining our tendency to think of 
moral requirements as consisting of general rules is a challenge for fiduciary non-
cognitivism. The thoughts that put parties to non-moral entrusted concern relationships 
in disagreement are usually just ad hoc preferences concerning what someone is to do in 
a particular situation, and are not obviously voiced with a presumption that they will 
guide the agent’s decisions in similar circumstances in the future. So fiduciary non-
cognitivism must explain why its posited moral trust relationships are different. 
I explain the rule-based character of morality as arising from moralists’ need to be 
able to determine, as easily as possible, whether other moralists are abusing their trust 
by misrepresenting their true preferences. Such abuses can sometimes be detected by 
comparing the moral claims a person has made on different occasions, provided the 
actions in question are sufficiently similar. If there is a constraint on how complex the 
totality of a person’s moral judgements may be, a disparity between two claims made on 
different occasions will be stronger evidence of abuse, even where the actions in 
question are somewhat different. Thus it makes sense that there should be some sort of 
simplifying influence or constraint upon moral judgements. The most straightforward 
way to realize this, given that fiduciary non-cognitivist’s account of the nature and 
function of moral judgements is broadly true, is as follows: those preferences of 
moralists that oblige accommodation and licence discretion should be preferences 
concerning which rules to follow, and they should be based in part upon desires that 
moralists should follow simpler rather than more complex rules. 
Moral forgetting. I argue that the best explanation for our intuitions about moral 
forgetting is provided by certain types of non-cognitivism, for the reason given in 0.2.1, 
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and that fiduciary non-cognitivism fares no worse on this score than other non-
cognitivist theories. 
Moral approval and disapproval. Fiduciary non-cognitivism allows us to give an 
account of moral approval and disapproval that is consistent with Foot’s hypothesis that 
approval and disapproval depend on social context. The fiduciary non-cognitivist holds 
that the social context needed for approval and disapproval is an entrusted concern 
relationship between the approver or disapprover and the person of whose actions she 
approves or disapproves. Arguably, anyone is capable of moral approval and 
disapproval, and anyone who, or whose token actions, can be morally approved or 
disapproved of, will be someone who is capable of making moral judgements.52 
Because fiduciary non-cognitivism holds that membership of the moral trust network is 
a prerequisite for moral judgement, the fiduciary non-cognitivist predicts that anyone 
who morally approves or disapproves will be a party to an entrusted concern 
relationship with the approved or disapproved party. So she can hypothesize that such a 
relationship is what explains a person’s capacity to morally approve or disapprove, in all 
cases of moral approval and disapproval. 
0.2.4 Scope and Omissions 
The theory of moral reasoning and moral psychology that I develop in this thesis is 
incomplete. For the purposes of evaluating my theory, the questions and issues that I 
might have addressed but haven’t fall into three categories: (1) those that I have not 
tried to address because my ambitions are limited, and which do not obviously pose a 
special problem for fiduciary non-cognitivism; (2) those that I have not tried to address, 
and which do obviously pose a special problem for fiduciary non-cognitivism; and (3) 
those that I have tried but failed to address. 
The most important issue falling under (1) concerns moral language and deductive 
reasoning. Non-cognitivists have been excoriated for devoting their attention to grand 
metaphilosophical and programmatic questions, and traditional big-picture metaethical 
                                                 
52 Admittedly, it is not clear that we cannot morally disapprove of the actions of a professed 
amoralist. The fiduciary non-cognitivist may be forced to make the hard-to-test postulation that 
this is because we cannot shake the idea that deep down she is still a moralist. In support of this, 
it does at least require an unusual effort to imagine a normally socialized human who would not 
sincerely complain or at least feel wronged or appalled if she and her family were being 
subjected to some extreme cruelty, however adamantly she may have professed to amoralism 
when there was less at stake. It also seems plausible that one cannot morally disapprove of the 
token actions of an animal or an unsocialized ‘feral’ human. 
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questions, while neglecting to produce a detailed and empirically adequate theory of 
moral language.53 It may thus seem perverse that I have chosen to ignore linguistic 
questions entirely in this dissertation, and focus on broad questions about our moral 
psychology and practices. Although I developed my non-cognitivist theory with a 
certain strategy for solving the Frege-Geach problem in mind, carrying out that strategy 
turned out to be more than I could attempt in the present work. Predicting that moral 
judgements are capable of disagreeing, though doubtless easier, is as vital to the 
adequacy of a non-cognitivist theory as predicting that people use moral words in the 
way that they do. And when I turned my attention to the issue of disagreement, I found 
that a non-cognitivist could satisfactorily account for the phenomenon only by 
postulating a ‘moral trust network’, or something similarly extraordinary. Determining 
the costs and significance of such a postulation turned out to be the work of an entire 
dissertation. Doing this work seemed a more worthwhile contribution to non-cognitivist 
theory than attempting to solve the Frege-Geach problem, because it seemed less likely 
that other theorists would turn their attention to it. 
My linguistic reticence has required some psychological imprecision. If I were to 
give an account of moral language, it would be a broadly expressivist one. Since, 
loosely speaking, expressivists hold that moral sentences serve to express the non-
cognitive attitudes that constitute moral judgements, and that the logical properties of 
sentences are explained by the rational properties of moral judgements, my silence 
about moral language requires me to be silent about the exact psychological nature of 
moral judgements. So—disappointingly perhaps, given that moral psychology is my 
primary focus—I have not given a complete account even of simple judgements that 
actions are permissible or impermissible, let alone conditional and other complex moral 
judgements. For similar reasons, though I have said quite a bit about what substantive 
moral reasoning involves, I have omitted to give an account of deductive moral 
reasoning.54 
My failure to provide an account of moral language compatible with non-
cognitivism falls under (1) because, of course, the need to provide such an account is 
not peculiar to fiduciary non-cognitivism. Here are some other omissions in the same 
                                                 
53 See the Preface to Schroeder’s Being For. 
54 I do, however, offer an explanation for the irrationality of having basic moral principles that 
both permit and forbid an action. I could not have said much about moral disagreement without 
addressing this topic, and explaining moral disagreement is one of the central concerns of this 
work. 
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category. My account of moral judgement—incomplete as it its—applies only to 
narrowly normative judgements concerning actions; I say nothing at all about 
judgements of good and bad, and judgements concerning the propriety of emotions. I 
have not attempted to explain judgements concerning the gravity or weight of moral 
requirements, nor to account for judgements of pro tanto wrongness and requirement. I 
provide no account of blame and other reactive attitudes. My explanation of moral 
disagreement only concerns disagreement about what to do in possible future choice 
situations, not disagreement about past decisions or purely hypothetical decisions. I 
make no attempt to explain how the broad account of moral psychology and practices I 
defend could be extended so as to explain other kinds of normative thought and 
practices. 
Let us turn to category (2), which includes questions that I need to address if I am 
to show that fiduciary non-cognitivism does not face special problems, and which I have 
neglected to address in this dissertation. First, I do not address the question of whether 
we need to appeal to moral-psychological facts to explain the phenomenon of trust.55 
The viability of fiduciary non-cognitivism, at least in the form defended here, requires a 
negative answer to this question.56 Second, I do not fully address questions concerning 
                                                 
55 Margaret Walker makes the following observation which will be familiar to those acquainted 
with the literature on trust: if I expect you to do something that benefits me because you have 
often done so in the past, and not because you have given any assurance that you will do so, I do 
not (if I am reasonable) trust you to continue doing it. If you stop, I will not feel resentful or 
respond reprovingly, as I might if my trust had been disappointed. Walker diagnoses this as 
follows: ‘I’m only prone to these reactive feelings that blame and punish … when I rely on you 
to do what you should. I do not only expect that you will do it, I expect it of you. My 
expectation is a normative expectation. Normative expectations are not simply confident 
assumptions that people are likely to behave in particular ways; these expectations express 
instead a stance toward others that demands certain behavior of them, because it is what they are 
supposed to do.’ Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After 
Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 79-80. Setting aside Walker’s 
claim about ‘demanding stances’, this seems quite plausible to me, but as yet I see no reason to 
think that, if Walker is right, the normative judgements that are necessarily involved in trust are 
moral judgements, or normative judgements of any kind that is similarly perplexing to 
philosophers. They may just be judgements about what is required by the social norms that you 
and I are ‘in the grip of’, to invoke an idea of Gibbard’s (Wise Choices, 60). Assurances, 
promises, and the like, all create obligations according to social norms. If we take judgements of 
social-normative obligation to explain both a person’s ‘demanding stance’ toward another and 
(hence?) the possibility of trust between the two, we do not commit to anything insurmountably 
problematic for fiduciary non-cognitivism. (This view would commit the fiduciary non-
cognitivists to the idea that humans are ‘hard-wired’ to be in the grip of the terms of the moral 
trust network, and to expect all other humans to be in their grip, or something along these lines.)  
56 If it turned out that trust does depend on normative judgement of a problematic kind, it may 
be possible to provide a (quasi-)fiduciary non-cognitive analysis of moral judgment employing 
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the possibility and implications of failures of trust among moralists, and of deliberate 
withdrawal from the moral trust network. I discuss some such questions in 5.4, but I 
have failed to address others—e.g., why doesn’t someone cease to be a proper object of 
moral evaluation if she publicly declares her defection from the moral trust network? 
As for category (3) there is, to my knowledge, one main respect in which my 
theorizing has fallen short of my aims. As I acknowledged in 0.2.3, I have failed to 
provide an explanation of moralists’ simplicity desires—of why moralists desire 
conformity to simpler norms. Thus my attempt to show that a non-cognitivist can 
explain what is going on when we engage in substantive reasoning about basic moral 
principles without positing an important role for higher-order desires is not a complete 
success. 
0.2.5 Method 
I take my main project in this thesis to be one of conceptual analysis. I present the 
beginnings of an analysis of the concept of moral judgement (or rather, the concepts of 
judging that φ-ing is morally wrong and judging that φ-ing is morally permissible) and 
some related concepts, which aspires to explain our intuitions about moral thought and 
talk. However, a very large portion of this work is devoted to defending an empirical 
hypothesis, namely, that the moral trust network I describe exists.57 My defence of this 
claim is part of my defence of the conceptual analyses. Philosophers are perhaps not 
accustomed to thinking of the plausibility of conceptual analyses as depending on 
empirical propositions, aside from facts about language use and folk intuitions. So my 
preoccupation with this empirical question may require some explanation. 
The explanation is simple. If the things that fall under a concept play, or seem to 
play, an important role in our lives, an analysis of that concept will be less plausible if a 
credible explanation cannot be given as to why things that fall under the analysans play, 
or seem to play, an important role in our lives, even if it is only a contingent fact that 
they do so. Moral judgements seem to play an important role in our lives: we seemingly 
try to conform our behaviour to our moral judgements, we seemingly take pains to 
                                                                                                                                               
some notion of ‘reliance’ in place of trust. On the distinction between reliance and trust, see 
Annette Baier, ‘Trust and Anti-Trust’, Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 234; Richard Holton, ‘Deciding 
to trust, coming to believe’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 1 (1994): 64-9; Karen 
Jones, ‘Trust as an Affective Attitude’, Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 9. 
57 To avoid disappointment, I should say now that this defence will not draw on scientific 
evidence, but merely on common sense judgements about hypotheses and imaginary cases. I 
will say more about this approach and its reliability in the introduction to Chapter 3. 
31 
 
reason well when arriving at our moral judgements, we seemingly try to bring other 
people’s moral judgements into alignment with our own, sometimes through 
impassioned argument, and so on. There must be a reason for their seeming importance, 
and an analysis of moral judgements has implications for what that reason could be. For 
instance, if the analysis states that moral judgements are beliefs about what the Judaeo-
Christian God forbids, it will be hard to explain why moral judgements seem to have 
played an important role in the lives of people who have never heard of the Judaeo-
Christian God. So my sketchy analysis of moral judgements as (in part) voiceable 
preferences of parties to a moral trust network will be less plausible if I can’t show that 
it is compatible with a plausible explanation for the appearance that such preferences 
matter to us. 
One way to try to explain this would be to argue that we actually have these 
voiceable preferences, that we are tacitly aware that we have them, and that they would 
matter to us if we were aware that we had them. This approach would, if successful, 
vindicate the appearance that moral judgements play an important role in our lives. 
Another approach would be to allow that moral judgements perhaps don’t exist, and 
defend an error theory as to why they seem to play in important role in our lives 
nonetheless. I’ve chosen the vindicatory approach, because it is straightforward, and 
because I can’t think of an error-theoretic approach that would be more plausible. Both 
of these approaches seem to require defending empirical claims, because they are 
approaches to explaining a contingent phenomenon—the appearance that moral 
judgements seem to play an important role in our lives. 
0.2.6 A Look Ahead 
I’ll now summarize the contents of this dissertation. The work has two parts. Part I, 
‘Trust and Non-Cognitive Disagreement’, consists of Chapters 1-3, and concerns non-
cognitive disagreement in general and the relationships of trust that make it possible. In 
Chapters 1 and 2 I defend a theory of non-cognitive disagreement. Chapter 1 concerns 
disagreement between two people about what one of them is to do. Chapter 2 concerns 
disagreement between two people about what a third should do. In Chapter 3 I consider 
networks of entrusted concern relationships, why they would exist, and what forms they 
would take under normal circumstances. I argue that several of the apparently 
distinctive features of the moral trust network that fiduciary non-cognitivism posits are 
ones that we should expect to find in any trust network formed under circumstances that 
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are in certain respects similar, and I provide what I hope is a natural-seeming example 
of such a network. 
Part II, ‘Moral Psychology and the Moral Trust Network’ consists of Chapters 4-
9. It is focused specifically on describing and defending my theory of moral thought and 
practices. In Chapter 4 I present fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of the non-
cognitive attitudes that are involved in moral judgements of requirement, permissibility, 
and impermissibility, and present an explanation—somewhat limited in scope—of 
moral disagreement. Chapter 5 addresses my sixth metaethical desideratum (‘ubiquity 
of moral thought and talk’). I try to explain how a network as extensive as the moral 
trust network could exist, and give some reason for thinking that it does. Among other 
things, I argue, drawing on the observations of Foot that I discussed earlier in this 
introduction, that we must postulate something like the moral trust network if we are to 
explain the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval (i.e. to meet my ninth 
desideratum). In Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 I attempt to show that fiduciary non-cognitivism 
can meet my seventh, third, fourth, and eight desiderata (the ‘rule-like character of 
moral requirements’, ‘moral uncertainty’, ‘moral reasoning and changes of motivation’, 
and ‘moral forgetting’) respectively, and in some cases that fiduciary non-cognitivism 
does so better than rival theories. 
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PART I 
 
TRUST AND NON-COGNITIVE DISAGREEMENT 
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1 
Conditions for Robust Non-cognitive 
Disagreement 
Non-cognitivists about morality hold, roughly, that what we call ‘moral beliefs’ are not 
beliefs on an orthodox philosophical understanding but non-cognitive or desire-like 
attitudes. Thus they hold that moral disagreements are non-cognitive disagreements, 
involving ‘clashing’ desire-like attitudes of some sort rather than opposing cognitive 
beliefs. Moral disagreement (and normative disagreement in general) has a property, 
which I call ‘robustness’, that not all ‘clashes’ of non-cognitive attitudes possess. If the 
non-cognitivist theory of moral psychology that I develop in this thesis is to explain the 
robustness of moral disagreement, it must identify moral disagreement with a kind of 
non-cognitive disagreement that is robust. In this chapter, I try to identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions for robust non-cognitive disagreement, in a certain range of cases. 
The theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement that I develop in this chapter applies 
only to cases in which two parties disagree about what one of them is to do, or about 
what both of them are to do. I extend the theory to accommodate cases in which two 
people disagree about the choices of a third party in Chapter 2. My theory draws heavily 
on Philippa Foot’s observations concerning the social conditions for approval and 
disapproval.58 
In Section 1.1 I describe the phenomenon of ‘robust’ non-cognitive disagreement 
that I hope to explain; give examples of it; and evaluate some candidate explanations for 
the phenomenon, or accounts of the conditions for its occurrence, which I find wanting. 
In Section 1.2 I present and defend my favoured explanation. 
                                                 
58 I say more about my theory’s debt to Foot in 5.3.1. 
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1.1 The Phenomenon and Some Explanations 
1.1.1 Robust Non-cognitive Disagreement 
It is easy to think of cases in which different people seem to disagree, in some sense or 
other, in virtue of their non-cognitive attitudes. Unfortunately, of all such cases, few (if 
any) elicit intuitions of disagreement that are as strong and resilient as those elicited by 
straightforward cases of normative disagreement. We may be inclined to think, with 
Brian Weatherson, that ‘If A says “I like ice cream” and B says “I don’t like ice cream”, 
then there is a natural sense in which they are disagreeing’.59 But this is surely a 
contestable matter; it would not be unreasonable to think that A and B were not 
disagreeing. 
We can bring this out by imagining that A and B’s exchange of liking-reports is 
followed by a discussion of whether or not they disagree: 
Liking Conciliation 
A: I like ice cream. 
B: I don’t like ice cream. 
A: We disagree then. 
B: I don’t think we disagree. We just like different things. 
B makes what I shall call a conciliatory claim—a claim that their difference with 
respect to ice cream is something other than a disagreement. The conciliatory claim 
seems natural and appropriate in this context. By contrast, conciliatory construals of 
opposing normative (and evaluative) judgements are inappropriate: 
Nice Conciliation 
A: I believe that ice cream is nice. 
B: I believe that ice cream is not nice. 
A: We disagree then. 
B: I don’t think we disagree. We just believe different things. 
B’s conciliatory claim seems simply false. There is no plausible way to construe A and 
B’s reported difference of attitudes toward ice cream in this example as anything other 
than a disagreement (assuming their reports are sincere). Among those differences of 
attitude that (as they are described or reported) might be construed as disagreements, I 
shall call those whose status as disagreements cannot plausibly be denied—i.e. those 
that make conciliatory claims inappropriate—robust disagreements. 
                                                 
59 Brian Weatherson, ‘Conditionals and Indexical Relativism’, Synthese 166 (2009): 347. 
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Ordinary normative disagreements seem to be robust, and a non-cognitivist 
account of normative disagreement ought to predict this. So the non-cognitivist must 
model normative disagreement on a species of non-cognitive disagreement that is not 
susceptible to conciliation. I think some of Stevenson’s famous cases of ‘disagreement 
in attitude’ provide such a model: 
Suppose that two people have decided to go to a restaurant together. One suggests a 
restaurant where there is music; another expresses his disinclination to hear music and 
suggests some other restaurant. It may then happen, as we commonly put it, that they 
‘cannot easily agree on which restaurant to choose.’ … Mrs. A has social aspirations, and 
wants to move with the elite. Mr. A is easy-going, and loyal to his old friends. They 
accordingly disagree about what guests they will invite to their party.60 
Let’s test the robustness of these disagreements. Imagine the following exchange 
between the prospective diners. 
Restaurant 
A: Let’s have dinner together. 
B: Okay. Where do you suggest? 
A: I want to go to Minims. There’s a good piano trio playing there tonight. 
B: Do you? Because I’m not in the mood for music. I’d prefer somewhere quiet. 
A: We disagree then. 
B: I don’t think we disagree. We just prefer different things. 
Conciliation seems inappropriate here. Intuitively, it is made inappropriate by the fact 
that A and B have a decision to make, a decision to which each party’s preferences are 
clearly relevant. There is a matter that must be resolved between them, and it remains 
stubbornly unresolved after B’s attempt at conciliation. 
Now imagine the following exchange between Stevenson’s Mr. and Mrs. A: 
Invitation 
Mr. A: I’d rather we invited Mr. Chum. He’s an old friend. 
Mrs. A: But as you know, Mr. Toff’s connections are excellent. I want to invite Toff. 
Mr. A: We disagree then. 
Mrs. A: I don’t think we disagree. We just prefer different things. 
Again, conciliation seems inappropriate. Intuitively, Mr. and Mrs. A are in disagreement 
over whom to invite, and pointing out that this is owing to a mere difference in 
                                                 
60 Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), 3. 
Stevenson describes two further disagreements, one between a museum curator and his advisor, 
and another between a mother and her son. I don’t discuss the museum case I have found it 
difficult to present in such a way that we reliably interpret it as a disagreement in preference 
rather than belief. I discuss the mother and son case below. 
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preferences does not reveal it to be any less of a disagreement. Their difference in 
preferences must be a source of contention as long as it remains to be decided whom 
they will invite to the party. Their disagreement is robust. 
1.1.2 Type-of-Attitude Explanations 
Why are the non-cognitive disagreements Stevenson describes robust? It might be 
thought that this is explained by the nature of the opposing non-cognitive attitudes in 
Stevenson’s cases. The parties in Stevenson’s cases seem to have conflicting 
preferences, in contrast to the clashing likes and dislikes reported in Weatherson’s ice 
cream case. Perhaps preferences held by different people disagree whenever they are 
mutually unsatisfiable, or could not consistently be held by the same person. But the 
following example from Michael Ridge shows that mutually unsatisfiable preferences 
do not suffice for robust disagreement. 
Flat (Preferences). A flat F is available to rent, and both A and B want to rent F. (That is, 
there is a time t such that A prefers that A rather than B should rent F at t, and B prefers 
that B rather than A should rent F at t.)61 
A and B have preferences that are mutually unsatisfiable, yet they do not seem to 
disagree. Here is a different sort of counterexample, involving a conciliatory claim. 
Retail 
Shopkeeper: Do you want to buy this coat, sir? 
Customer: No. I’d prefer something cheaper. 
Shopkeeper: Well, I’d rather you bought it. We disagree. 
Customer: Pardon? 
Shopkeeper: I want you to buy the coat, you prefer not to. We disagree. 
Customer: I don’t think we disagree. We just prefer different things. 
Customer’s conciliatory claim seems appropriate here. An interpersonal clash of 
preferences does not suffice for robust disagreement. 
Another possibility is that robust non-cognitive disagreement is disagreement in 
plans or intentions. This idea derives some appeal from the observation that plans are 
more closely bound to practical deliberation than preferences are. You can have 
preferences for states of affairs (e.g. that Harold had won the Battle of Hastings) the 
realization of which cannot be the aim of your practical deliberations; the same is not 
true of plans. Stevenson’s cases—at least those I have quoted—all plausibly involve 
                                                 
61 This is borrowed (not quoted) from Michael Ridge, ‘Disagreement’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 86, no. 1 (2013): 46. 
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practical decision-making in one way or another, and it is prima facie plausible that the 
contending parties all disagree because they have mutually unrealizable plans. 
Nonetheless, it is a straightforward matter to modify Ridge’s flat example so that it will 
serve as a counterexample to this proposal: 
Flat (Plans). A and B both intend to rent the same flat at the same time. (That is, there is 
a time t such that A intends that she rather than B should rent it at t, and B intends that he 
rather than A should rent it at t.) 
A and B have plans that are mutually unrealizable, yet do not seem to disagree. I think 
that we can also imagine a version of Retail in which Shopkeeper reports an intention 
that Customer should buy the expensive coat, Customer reports a contrary intention, and 
Customer makes a felicitous conciliatory claim. 
There is a class of attitudes that seem to be more complex than attitudes like 
desiring, intending, or liking, and which seem to constitute excellent materials for a 
type-of-attitude explanation of the phenomenon of robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
This class includes attitudes such as approving and disapproving, being for and being 
against, favouring, endorsing, and opposing. The parties in Stevenson’s cases certainly 
seem to favour, and to be for, incompatible options. If I approve and you disapprove of 
the ‘Oxford comma’ in scholarly prose, or ‘emoticons’ in emails, who would deny that 
we disagree? And it is somehow odd or superfluous to think of either party in Ridge’s 
flat case as being against or opposed to the other party’s getting the flat, if they are 
merely in competition for it. 
However, I have reservations about relying on these materials for my theory of 
robust non-cognitive disagreement, because attitudes of approval etc. are not well-
understood mental states. There are widely-held and well-scrutinized views about the 
nature of desires and preferences—the dispositional theory of desires for instance,62 and 
the thesis that, necessarily, S prefers p to q just in case S desires p more than q 
(whichever side of this biconditional one takes to be explanatorily fundamental).63 
Intentions are more mysterious, but they have at least received a good deal of 
philosophical attention, and we have some idea of the available theoretical options and 
                                                 
62 E.g. Smith, The Moral Problem, Chapter 4, esp. 111-16; Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), 15. 
63 That the dispositional theory of desire, and the thesis about the relationship between desire 
and preference, are widely held: Tim Schroeder, ‘Desire’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Stanford University, 1997-, article published December 9, 2009; substantive revision April 9, 
2015. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desire/ 
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their merits. But approval, favouring, etc., are undertheorized,64 and the fact that they 
can put their possessors in robust disagreement itself demands an explanation. Even if it 
gets the facts right, an explanation of robust disagreement as the result of clashing 
attitudes of this sort, absent an account of those attitudes themselves, would be 
superficial and a case of obscurum per obscurius. 
Since my aim is ultimately to explain moral disagreement, it is especially 
worrisome that I cannot rule out the possibility that approval etc. involve or are 
explained by normative judgements.65 Suppose that I hypothesized that robust non-
cognitive disagreements consisted in clashing attitudes of approval and disapproval. 
And suppose that it turned out that to approve of φ-ing fundamentally involved judging 
that φ-ing was right, and that to disapprove of φ-ing involved judging that φ-ing was 
wrong. My hypothesis could not then, in conjunction with the thesis that moral 
judgements are attitudes of approval and disapproval, explain our intuition that two 
people disagree when one judges that φ-ing is right and the other that φ-ing is wrong.66 
1.1.3 Attitudes, Plus Attitudes about Attitudes 
Writers on non-cognitive disagreement often find that something more is needed to 
capture our intuitions of disagreement than the possession by different people of 
attitudes that are mutually inconsistent (or attitudes that a single person could not 
rationally hold simultaneously). A good theory of non-cognitive disagreement will, it is 
felt, predict that the disagreeing parties are in some sense in conflict.67 Disagreeing 
parties, one might suppose, should not be utterly indifferent to each other’s attitudes; 
neither should be entirely happy for the disagreement to persist; and each should prefer 
                                                 
64 I do present the beginnings of an analysis of approval and favouring in 3.3.2. 
65 Cf. David Merli, ‘Expressivism and the Limits of Disagreement’, The Journal of Ethics 12, 
no. 1 (2008): 31. 
66 If I provided an analysis of one of these complex attitudes (and the analysis did not use 
‘genuinely’ normative terms), then relying on it in my theory of robust non-cognitive 
disagreement would be unproblematic. Arguably this is what I end up doing. According to my 
theory, robust non-cognitive disagreements are clashes of voiceable preferences, and voiceable 
preferences (i.e. preferences that we voice in decisions, as opposed to merely reporting) might 
be thought of as ‘complex’ attitudes like approval. Much of the work of defending this theory 
can be thought of as a defence of my analysis of a voiceable preference, since it is already 
intuitively plausible that if two people voice opposing preferences in a decision, they disagree. 
(The incomplete analysis of approval that I present in 3.3.2 does not provide a shortcut to an 
explanation of robust non-cognitive disagreement, since it depends on my account of voiceable 
preferences.) 
67 E.g. Merli, ‘Expressivism and the Limits of Disagreement’, 30n.6; Paul Horwich, ‘The Frege-
Geach Point’, Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 86; James Dreier, ‘Relativism (and Expressivism) 
and the Problem of Disagreement’, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 103-4. 
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that the disagreement end with a ‘concession’ on the other’s part, rather than on her 
own. 
These ideas motivate the following theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
Mock-Stevensonian Hypothesis. A and B are in robust non-cognitive disagreement iff 
there is some agent S and some φ such that (i) A prefers that S should φ, (ii) B prefers that 
S should not-φ, (iii) A prefers that B should not prefer that S not-φ, and (iv) B prefers that 
A should not prefer that S φ. (S may be a group agent, and may be the same agent as A 
and/or B.) 
This seems to make the right predictions in Stevenson’s cases. I call it the Mock-
Stevensonian Hypothesis because it is inspired by Stevenson’s conditions for 
‘disagreement in attitude’: 
Two men will be said to disagree in attitude when they have opposed attitudes to the 
same object—one approving of it, for instance, the other disapproving of it—and when at 
least one of them has a motive for altering or calling into question the attitude of the 
other.68 
The Mock-Stevensonian Hypothesis rather than Stevenson’s conditions will be 
the target of my counterexample, because I’m not sure what Stevenson means by 
‘calling into question’ attitudes, and because Stevenson does not purport to be giving 
conditions for what I am calling robust non-cognitive disagreement. Here is the case: 
Rival Hostesses. Mrs. A prefers that Mr. Toff should attend her party at t; Mrs. B prefers 
that Mr. Toff should attend her party at t; neither wants competition, so each prefers that 
the other should prefer otherwise than she does. 
The Mock-Stevensonian Hypothesis predicts that Mrs. A and Mrs. B are in robust non-
cognitive disagreement, but they do not seem to disagree. The hostesses’ interest in 
changing each other’s preferences does not suffice to turn their clashing preferences into 
a robust disagreement. 
1.1.4 Is ‘Robust Non-cognitive Disagreement’ Really Non-Cognitive? 
I have already observed that normative disagreements are robust. Perhaps the parties in 
Stevenson’s cases seem to disagree robustly because we attribute disagreements in 
normative belief (understood as a cognitive attitude) to the parties. Call this the 
Normative Disagreement Hypothesis. On the most obvious version of this view, parties 
to an apparent non-cognitive disagreement disagree about what someone ought to do, 
and, if their disagreement takes verbal form, communicate their beliefs by reporting 
their preferences. They can communicate their ought-beliefs in this way because of our 
                                                 
68 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 3. 
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expectation (at least for some subset of our ought-beliefs) that someone who believes 
that an agent ought to φ will prefer that that agent φs. 
How well does the Normative Disagreement Hypothesis explain our judgements 
about the cases we have considered? It is quite plausible that Mr. and Mrs. A disagree 
about whom they ought to invite to their party, and it is at least superficially plausible 
that the parties in Restaurant disagree about where they ought to dine. These cases seem 
to support the hypothesis. By contrast, we are not much inclined to think that the parties 
in Flat (Preferences), Retail, and Rival Hostesses have normative beliefs of a sort that 
would put them in disagreement. 
It is not immediately clear why we attribute relevant normative beliefs to both 
parties in Stevenson’s cases (assuming that we do), but not to the parties in these other 
cases. This may be partly because we assume that people are more likely to go to the 
trouble of forming normative beliefs if they want to persuade other people to do things. 
This would explain most of the data: the parties in Stevenson’s cases seem interested in 
persuading each other to do things, whereas those in Flat and Rival Hostesses do not. 
(Retail is, I think, more complicated, but still raises no problems for the hypothesis.69)  
So far, so good. However, on closer inspection, the Normative Disagreement 
Hypothesis does not seem to give a credible explanation for our judgement that the 
parties in Restaurant robustly disagree. I take the following to illustrate the kind of 
disagreement the hypothesis requires us to attribute to the parties in this case: 
                                                 
69 Shopkeeper seems interested in persuading Customer to buy the expensive coat. Why don’t 
we attribute to Shopkeeper a belief that Customer ought to buy the coat, and to Customer a 
belief that it is not the case that he ought to buy the coat? Our explanation will differ depending 
on the flavour of the ‘ought’ in question. Consider the hypothesis that we attribute beliefs to the 
parties about whether Shopkeeper has a claim upon Customer that he buy the coat—the ‘ought’ 
thus has the flavour of an interpersonal demand. On this view it is fairly plausible that we 
ascribe a relevant ought-belief to Customer, namely, a belief that Shopkeeper has no such claim 
upon him. But we plausibly don’t attribute to Shopkeeper a belief that Customer ought to buy 
the coat in this sense of ‘ought’ because this proposition is incredible. Now consider the 
hypothesis that we attribute beliefs about a less interpersonally demanding sort of ‘ought’ to the 
parties. Perhaps we attribute to Shopkeeper a belief that Customer ought to buy the coat because 
it would be a fine thing if Customer possessed it and a pity if he did not (a belief of the sort she 
might express by saying, ‘You simply must buy this coat!’); and perhaps we attribute to 
Customer a contrary opinion. Now it is more plausible to suppose that we attribute to 
Shopkeeper the relevant belief (although: (i) it is not really the sort of normative belief one 
would communicate by reporting a preference, and (ii) we would have strong reason to doubt 
his sincerity if he did). But it is less plausible to suppose that we attribute a relevant belief to 
Customer. She might simply not have gone to the trouble of forming such an opinion, because 
she had no interest in persuading Shopkeeper to do anything. 
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Restaurant (Ought) 
A: We ought to go to a restaurant with music because I feel like listening to music. 
B: I disagree. We ought to go to a restaurant without music because I don’t feel like 
listening to music. 
This interpretation seems strange because the grounds the parties offer for their ought 
judgements are self-regarding. It is strange to suppose that either party is prescribing 
that they both should go to her preferred restaurant, when she has nothing better to say 
in favour of her prescription than that it is the restaurant she feels like going to, even 
though she knows that her interlocutor has an opposing inclination. This seems selfish 
and arrogant. And it is not plausible that our intuition that Stevenson’s parties robustly 
disagree depends on our having assumed that each arrogantly believes that the other is 
subject to a normative requirement to bend to her wishes. 
Intuitively, the Normative Disagreement Hypothesis ascribes the wrong 
prescriptive ‘force’ to the disagreeing thoughts of the parties in Restaurant. When the 
parties voice preferences, it sounds as though they are requesting that their preferred 
venue be chosen. Since requesting is a humble sort of action, the parties do not sound 
imperious and overweening when they cite their own self-regarding wants to explain 
their preferences. We fail to capture this quality of their disagreeing thoughts if we 
construe them as ought judgements, which require rather than request. 
A defender of the Normative Disagreement Hypothesis might propose instead that 
we attribute a different kind of broadly normative belief to the parties, one less 
prescriptive in character. For instance, she might suggest the following as a more 
plausible characterization of the underlying disagreement in Stevenson’s case: 
Restaurant (Good) 
A: It would be good to go to a restaurant with music, because I feel like listening to 
music. 
B: I disagree. It would not be good to go to a restaurant with music, because I don’t 
feel like listening to music. 
This does not have the implausibly prescriptive flavour of the ought case. But we are 
not in a position to infer from their preference reports that the parties in Stevenson’s 
case hold the evaluative beliefs reported in Restaurant (Good). This is true even if we 
assume that Stevenson’s parties very reliably form the desires that are appropriate given 
their evaluative judgements. Both parties in Stevenson’s case might think that going to a 
restaurant with music would be good (or not good), and both might think that going to 
one without music would be good (or not good); this is compatible with their having the 
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conflicting preferences they report, given that they reliably proportion their desires to 
their evaluative judgements. A party might think that neither option is good, or that both 
are good, and at the same time think that one is better than the other, and so prefer the 
former. 
If we are in a position to infer evaluative judgements from the preferences 
Stevenson’s parties report, they will be judgements about which restaurant is the better 
choice. But in the decision-making situation that Stevenson describes, any such 
betterness judgement would have a clear prescriptive upshot. Thus, if we interpreted the 
parties as disagreeing about which restaurant would be the better choice, the grounds 
each gave for her preference would be evidence of a surprising arrogance. I conclude 
that the Normative Disagreement Hypothesis cannot plausibly explain all of our 
intuitions of robust disagreement. 
1.1.5 Ridge’s ‘Disagreement in Prescription’ 
The observation we have made about the character of the disagreeing thoughts of the 
parties in Restaurant will be relevant to an evaluation of Michael Ridge’s theory of 
disagreement as ‘disagreement in prescription’. Two people disagree in prescription 
only if they are disposed to give contrary advice to someone under certain conditions: 
Disagreement in Prescription. Two people (or two stages of the same person at different 
times), A and B, disagree in prescription about D’s φ-ing in C just in case in 
circumstances of honesty, full candour, and non-hypocrisy, A would advise φ-ing in C 
and B would advise ψ-ing in C, where φ-ing and ψ-ing are incompatible.70 
To determine whether A and B disagree in prescription about D’s φ-ing, we are to ‘keep 
the states of mind of A and B fixed and ask, given those states of mind, what each of 
them would advise D to do if they had to advise D one way or the other, and moreover 
had to do so honestly, candidly, and without hypocrisy of any kind.’71 By ‘hypocrisy’, 
Ridge means advising actions that you would not perform yourself in the relevant 
circumstances.72 
The scope of Ridge’s theory is ambitious: he apparently aims to give necessary 
and sufficient conditions for disagreement of all kinds.73 It is thus a theory of 
disagreement as ‘disagreement in prescription’, not a theory about a particular species 
                                                 
70 Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 187. 
71 Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 187. 
72 Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 186. 
73 This is suggested by his remark in Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 169n.1. 
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of disagreement. With some modifications,74 it purports to explain why incompatible 
(cognitive) beliefs put their possessors in disagreement. I will only consider its 
adequacy as a theory of non-cognitive disagreement, however. Specifically, I shall 
consider its adequacy as a theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement. Ridge’s theory 
of disagreement is not, of course, explicitly a theory of robust disagreement, but that 
doesn’t mean that it will not serve as one. Ridge does not want his theory to predict that 
cases like the flat cases are disagreements; he would class these as cases of ‘mere 
difference without disagreement’. So the set of non-cognitive disagreements that fall 
under his explanandum might be similar in membership to the set of robust non-
cognitive disagreements. 
Ridge’s theory has intuitively correct implications concerning most of the cases 
we have considered so far. It fairly plausibly predicts disagreement in Stevenson’s 
invitation case: Mr. and Mrs. A are plausibly disposed to advise incompatible options in 
the choice of whom to invite to their party. It does not predict disagreement in, for 
instance, Flat (Preferences), because, though each party wants the other to forbear from 
renting the flat, neither would honestly advise the other to forbear. A party might be 
disposed to dishonestly or ‘hypocritically’ advise the other to forbear, in the hope of 
eliminating competition, but disagreement in prescription depends only on dispositions 
to honestly and ‘non-hypocritically’ advise. 
We find a pattern in the predictions of Ridges theory as it applies to candidate 
non-cognitive disagreements. It predicts disagreement when and only when it is 
plausible to suppose that the parties have conflicting relevant normative judgements. 
Mr. and Mrs. A seem to have conflicting judgements about whom they ought to invite; 
we are given no indication that each party in Flat (Preferences) has a judgement about 
which of them ought to get the flat, or about whether the other party ought to take it. 
The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Retail and Rival Hostesses. This is to be 
expected of course: we only tend to have the intuition that someone would (honestly 
etc.) advise a person S to φ when we take it that she judges that that S ought to φ. So if 
Ridge’s theory is true, we should not expect to find any plausible cases of (robust) non-
cognitive disagreement between people who do not plausibly share a relevant normative 
disagreement. 
                                                 
74 Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 190. 
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As I observed in the last subsection, this prediction seems to be false. It is not 
plausible that the parties in Stevenson’s restaurant case are in normative disagreement, 
and yet they robustly disagree. More specifically, it is not plausible that either party is 
disposed to advise a choice of one dining venue rather than another, given the self-
regarding grounds that she offers for her preference. Again, it is natural to think of the 
parties as requesting their preferred venues. Advising is quite different from requesting; 
it has a prescriptive flavour. Ridge’s theory thus seems to be false as a comprehensive 
theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement. At best it describes only true sufficient 
conditions for robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
The moral philosopher who hopes to explain moral judgement as a species of non-
cognitive disagreement will be more interested in knowing sufficient conditions for 
robust non-cognitive disagreement than in knowing necessary conditions. So Ridge’s 
theory may still be of interest. An evaluation of Ridge’s theory as an account of the 
sufficient conditions for robust non-cognitive disagreement is more than I can attempt 
here. Such an evaluation would need to take into account the success or failure of 
Ridge’s theory of disagreement in prescription as an explanation for our intuitions about 
doxastic disagreement, and several interesting arguments that Ridge offers in defence of 
the theory.75 But the failure of Ridge’s theory to provide true necessary conditions gives 
us enough reason to be dissatisfied with it to warrant a search for alternatives.76 
1.1.6 A Guiding Thought: The Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis 
I doubt that we can make progress in explaining the robustness of the disagreements 
Stevenson describes merely by hypothesizing that we interpret them as involving 
‘clashing’ attitudes of one type rather than another. Something is missing in these 
accounts. And Stevenson’s restaurant case suggests that the missing ingredient isn’t 
normative judgement or dispositions to advise. 
                                                 
75 These are listed and partly summarized in Ridge, Impassioned Belief, 188-191. 
76 Note a disappointing feature of Ridge’s account for the non-cognitivist. Someone advancing a 
non-cognitivist theory of advice might have hoped to have supported this theory by showing 
that it explains why people who give conflicting advice disagree. This would probably mean 
showing that the non-cognitive attitudes that are expressed in the giving of advice are capable of 
disagreeing, by showing that this is entailed by some independently plausible theory of non-
cognitive disagreement. If Ridge is correct, this potential avenue of support is lost, for the truth 
of his theory would make the plausibility of the claim that the relevant attitudes put their 
possessors in disagreement dependent on the plausibility of the claim that they dispose their 
possessors to give conflicting advice. 
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I will now offer a suggestion which I find promising though vague, and which 
may help to focus our investigation. There is some intuitive plausibility in the idea that 
two people whose thoughts are in disagreement must have some reason (perhaps very 
weak) to hear and give consideration to each other’s contrary thoughts, or else they 
would not robustly disagree. Call this the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis. It has prima 
facie plausibility as an explanation of the robustness of the disagreements Stevenson 
describes. The parties to Stevenson’s restaurant case have reason to hear and consider 
each other’s preferences regarding which restaurant they will dine in—each wants the 
other to remain favourably disposed toward dining with her, and this is more likely to be 
achieved if she maintains a polite level of attentiveness to the other’s wishes, and a 
limited willingness to accommodate them. There are various reasons why Mr. and Mrs. 
A might want to accommodate each other’s preferences, and hence to hear and consider 
them. They may desire to do so because they want each other to remain favourably 
disposed toward their shared project of holding a dinner party, or because a reciprocal 
willingness to accommodate each other’s preferences makes living together more 
tolerable, or because social norms require husbands and wives to give regard to each 
other’s wishes. Or perhaps mutual affection, of the sort we expect to find between 
husband and wife, prompts this sort of attentiveness. 
Charitably interpreted, the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis makes no false 
predictions about the other cases we have considered. The parties in Flat (Preferences) 
evidently have no reasons to hear and give consideration to each other’s preferences. 
Customer in Retail has no reason to give consideration to Shopkeeper’s preference 
when choosing whether or not to buy the expensive coat. For strategic reasons, each 
party in Rival Hostesses might be interested to know about the other’s preference, for 
this would be evidence that the other was working to frustrate her own. But this 
intuitively would not be a reason for the hostesses to hear and give consideration to 
each other’s preferences. 
Interestingly, we find some support for the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis when 
we consider disagreement in belief. Imagine the following exchange between a medical 
expert, Dr. Expert, and a layperson: 
Vaccine 
Dr. Expert: The measles-mumps-rubella vaccine does not cause autism. 
Mr. Layman: I believe it does. We disagree. 
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Dr. Expert: Disagree? How presumptuous! Your medical opinions are beneath my 
notice. 
Arrogant it may be, but Expert’s reply makes sense. Mr. Layman’s disagreement claim 
does sound presumptuous, which would be odd if all that were required for doxastic 
disagreement were contradictory beliefs. It seems that Expert could correctly reject 
Layman’s claim that they disagree, on the grounds that the latter’s belief does not merit 
her attention (assuming this was the case). Since Expert’s reply is ‘conciliatory’ in my 
stipulated sense, Vaccine seems to be a case of non-robust doxastic disagreement. The 
case thus supports, or at least is in harmony with, the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis. 
Consider a second case. Liar knows that ~p but says that p, causing Misled to 
believe that p. Liar and Misled now have conflicting beliefs about whether p, but it is a 
bit strange to say that they disagree. (It would certainly sound odd for Liar to say of 
Misled, ‘She disagrees with me about whether p.’) And Liar has no reason to hear and 
give consideration to Misled’s opinion that p, for Liar has seen to it that it is false. 
Finally, as Ridge observes, we intuitively don’t disagree with non-human animals 
whose beliefs differ from ours;77 perhaps this is because animals and humans can’t hear 
and give consideration to one another’s thoughts, or because we take animals’ 
‘opinions’ to be ‘beneath our notice’. It is noteworthy that, as in non-robust non-
cognitive disagreement cases, there is intuitively no ‘matter to be settled’, between 
Expert and Layman, between Liar and Misled, or between a cat and its owner when 
their beliefs are at odds. 
Whether or not we take into consideration these observations about doxastic 
disagreement, we have grounds to think that a version of the Reason-to-Consider 
Hypothesis can explain the phenomenon of robust non-cognitive disagreement. But I 
have only sketched it so far, and it needs to be stated more precisely before it can be 
properly evaluated. It raises several questions: (1) What does it mean to ‘hear and give 
consideration’ to a preference? (2) If someone is to be in robust non-cognitive 
disagreement with someone else’s preference, is it enough for her to have any kind of 
reason to hear and give consideration to that preference? (3) Does it make robust 
disagreement a fundamentally normative notion, or is the phrase ‘have some reason’, 
where it appears in the statement of the hypothesis, just shorthand for ‘be related in 
such-and-such a way to some member of a certain set of non-normative facts’, where 
                                                 
77 Ridge, ‘Disagreement’, e.g. 54. 
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these are facts that we would normally judge to be reasons in the relevant context? (4) 
Does (or should) the hypothesis provide sufficient or necessary conditions for an 
interpersonal clash of preferences to be a robust disagreement (or both)? 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to identifying a version of the 
Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis that answers these questions and explains the 
phenomena. 
1.1.7 The Coordination Hypothesis 
The prospective diners in Stevenson’s restaurant case face a ‘bargaining problem’. They 
have a common goal of dining together which they would best serve by coordinating 
their actions, and they apparently have indeed decided thus to coordinate their actions. 
But there are different ways in which they could coordinate to realize their shared end, 
and they have preferences for mutually incompatible courses of coordinated action. It is 
these preferences that put them in disagreement. And it might be hypothesized that they 
only put the parties in robust disagreement because they are preferences for mutually 
incompatible courses of coordinated action, in a context where the parties have together 
decided to coordinate their actions. We might say that such preferences in such a 
context suffice for robust non-cognitive disagreement. Call this the Coordination 
Hypothesis.78 
The Coordination Hypothesis can be seen as a way of giving substance and detail 
to the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis, as it applies to non-cognitive disagreement. It 
allows us to answer some of the questions that my sketch of the latter hypothesis raised. 
(1) To ‘hear and give consideration to’ a preference, one must be a party to an 
agreement to coordinate actions in pursuit of a common end. Hearing and giving 
consideration to a preference involves, we might say, hearing the preferences of the 
other parties for different courses of coordinated action, and deciding whether or not 
they require you to adjust your own demands, or the outcome of the negotiation that you 
are aiming for. It is plausible that any party to such an agreement has reason to hear and 
give consideration to the preferences of the other parties, when deciding on a 
coordinated course of action. She has this reason because she has a goal that would be 
furthered by cooperating with the others, and cooperation would potentially break down 
if she were not responsive in some degree to the other parties’ relevant preferences. (2) 
                                                 
78 Cf. Gibbard’s suggestion that it is an important feature of Stevenson’s examples that the 
parties disagree about ‘how to act jointly’. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 270. 
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Only reasons of this sort make a difference to the robustness of disagreements in 
preference (for all the Coordination Hypothesis says). (3) However there is no real need 
to rely on the normative notion of a reason here; fundamentally, it is being a party to an 
agreement of the relevant sort that matters. (4) At this stage I have only presented the 
coordination hypothesis as providing a sufficient condition for robust non-cognitive 
disagreement. 
The Coordination Hypothesis seems to make only true predictions about the cases 
we have considered. It would be natural to think of Mr. and Mrs. A in Stevenson’s 
invitation case as facing a coordination problem, just as the parties in the restaurant case 
do. They have a common goal of hosting a successful party which they would best serve 
by coordinating their actions, and they apparently have indeed decided thus to 
coordinate their actions. They disagree (on at least some plausible interpretations of the 
case) about which of two incompatible courses of coordinated action to pursue, each of 
which involves inviting a different guest. The Coordination Hypothesis does not falsely 
predict disagreement in Flat (Preferences), Retail, or Rival Hostesses. None of the 
parties in these cases appear to have decided to coordinate their actions, nor do they 
evidently have any common goals that would be served by cooperation. 
Despite these merits, the Coordination Hypothesis cannot explain all of our 
intuitions about robust non-cognitive disagreement. There are cases of robust non-
cognitive disagreement in which the parties cannot be assumed to have decided to 
coordinate their actions. Consider a third case from Stevenson: 
John’s mother is concerned about the dangers of playing football, and doesn’t want him 
to play. John, even though he agrees (in belief) about the dangers, wants to play anyhow. 
… [T]hey disagree.79 
I did not quote this case earlier because, although it is plausibly a case of disagreement, 
I don’t think Stevenson’s description is detailed enough to establish that the 
disagreement is robust. But imagine the following two exchanges, the first between 
John and his mother, and the second between two eavesdroppers who have overheard 
this exchange: 
Football (Mother and Son) 
Mother: Why are you wearing football shoes in here? You know I don’t 
approve of shoes in the house. And you’re leaving dirt everywhere! 
John: Sorry! I’ll take them off. 
                                                 
79 Stevenson, Ethics and Language, 3. 
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Mother: I’d prefer that you didn’t play football anyway. It’s dangerous. 
John: I know, but I want to play. I love football. 
Eavesdropper A: [To Eavesdropper B] Sounds like a disagreement. 
Eavesdropper B: [To Eavesdropper A] I don’t think they disagree. They just prefer 
different things. 
(The opening lines of this dialogue are meant to establish that a certain sort of 
relationship exists between John and his mother. I included the Eavesdroppers because 
putting the conciliatory claim in the mouth of John or his mother would have sounded 
odd.) 
Conciliation seems inappropriate here; John and his mother disagree robustly 
about whether John is to play football; there is intuitively an unresolved issue, a ‘matter 
to be settled’, between the two. And John and his mother do not face a coordination 
problem. Their disagreement cannot be about how to coordinate their actions, for, of the 
two parties, only the son is contemplating performing an action. It would not be 
unreasonable to assume that the parties have a common goal—a common desire to see 
their family flourish in one way or another. This would be a fairly normal goal for a 
mother and son to share. But it is far from clear that they are disagreeing about ways to 
achieve such a goal. John seems to see his playing football as a means of achieving a 
more private end, viz., his own enjoyment. The coordination hypothesis thus does not 
well explain our judgements about this case. 
1.2 The Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis 
The coordination hypothesis seems to be on the right track when it identifies the 
relationship between the parties to a robust non-cognitive disagreement as a determinant 
of its robustness, but it seems to give too narrow a specification of the sorts of 
relationships that suffice to make an opposition of preferences a non-cognitive 
disagreement. The robustness of John’s disagreement with his mother appears to depend 
on the nature or their relationship. 
Consider a similar exchange between John and Well-Wisher, a benevolent 
stranger who wants things to go well for John, and who is worried that John might get 
hurt playing football. 
Football (John and Well-Wisher) 
Well-Wisher:  Hello. My name’s Well-Wisher. 
John: Hi. I’m John. What’s up? 
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Well-Wisher:  I work for the Gas Company, and while I was checking your meter, I 
overheard you and your mother talking about football. And like your 
mother, I would prefer that you didn’t play. It’s dangerous. 
John: Well, as you may have heard me tell my mother, I know it’s 
dangerous, but I still want to play—I love football. 
Eavesdropper A: [To Eavesdropper B] Sounds like a disagreement. 
Eavesdropper B: [To Eavesdropper A] I don’t think they disagree. They just prefer 
different things. 
(The opening introductions are supposed to make vivid that the speakers are perfect 
strangers.) Eavesdropper B’s conciliatory claim is appropriate here. There is no ‘matter 
to be settled’ between John and Well-Wisher. John might indulge Well-Wisher by 
treating her preference as deserving his consideration, and then we might be inclined to 
think that they disagree; but presumably he is indifferent to it. The only important 
difference between this clash of preferences and that between John and his mother is a 
difference in the relationship between the parties. 
1.2.1 Relevant Features of John’s Relationship with his Mother 
In what follows I offer a conjecture as to the features of the relationship between John 
and his mother that explain the robustness of their disagreement. John’s mother 
evidently wants John to be safe. She also has power over John, so she could probably 
restrict his freedom to engage in dangerous activities to a greater extent than she in fact 
does if she wished. But, since she also presumably wants John to be happy, to enjoy a 
degree of freedom, and to take responsibility for his own actions, and since personally 
managing someone else’s behaviour can be a chore, it is plausible to suppose that she 
has instead partly entrusted or delegated her concern for John’s safety to John himself. 
She plausibly trusts John to have a special concern for his own safety, over and above 
the concern he would have for his safety if left to his own devices. 
‘Concerns’ need not be decisive in decision-making, and John plausibly has some 
discretion to resist his mother’s desire. He may weigh his special concern to 
accommodate his mother’s desire for his safety against his other more private concerns. 
He might thus knowingly risk bodily injury, in some circumstances and to some extent, 
and thereby risk frustrating his mother’s desire, without violating her trust. The trust 
relationship I have described would suit John, because of the greater freedom it would 
afford him, so we may assume that he accepts his mother’s trust and is committed to 
living up to it. 
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John’s concern to accommodate his mother’s desire that he be safe is plausibly 
just one of several such concerns his mother has entrusted to him. She probably has 
other desires concerning John’s welfare: desires for John to be healthy, to be educated 
and accomplished, and to have friends. She also probably has desires that are not 
focused on John in particular, but which she will want John to have some concern to 
accommodate, such as a desire to improve her family’s welfare. If this is right, it is 
plausible to suppose that she entrusts to John a concern to promote these ends.  
Moreover, she will want the special weight John gives to promoting these various 
ends in his decision-making to be proportionate to the strength of her corresponding 
desires, and this will be reflected in their trust relationship. If John must, in some 
instance, choose between health and accomplishment, and his mother has a preference, 
based purely on her desires that he be healthy and accomplished, that he choose the 
health-promoting option, this is the option his trust relationship will direct him toward. 
It will do so because the weight that John is to give to health and accommodation 
depends on the strength of his mother’s desires that he be healthy and accomplished 
respectively, and her preference is determined by the relative strength of these desires. 
So though it is correct to say that John has an entrusted concern to promote the 
satisfaction of some of his mother’s desires, it is also correct, and in some ways more 
informative, to say that he has an entrusted concern to accommodate those of her 
preferences that are based purely on those desires. 
John’s discretion to resist accommodating his mother’s preferences also plausibly 
depends on the motivations he would have for doing so. John might have discretion to 
continue playing football, in defiance of his mother’s preference, if he did so because he 
enjoys football and desires enjoyment, or because playing football keeps him fit and he 
wants to be fit. But he might not if he merely did so because all the popular kids play 
football and he wants to emulate the popular kids, or because the coach gives illegal 
steroids to team members and he wants to take steroids. 
It is not hard to imagine how the motivations of both John and his mother might 
have shaped the trust relationship between them, in such a way as to determine which of 
their desires John was expected to accommodate, and which he wasn’t. The power 
John’s mother has to induce John to make a commitment to accommodate her desires 
has limits, and she will thus want to make the demanded commitment relatively lenient, 
so that John will not find it too irksome. Given that it must be lenient and not too 
demanding, she will want it to be demanding only in the respects that matter to her the 
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most, and lenient in those respects that she finds most tolerable. She will want John to 
be committed to accommodating her desires that he be safe and healthy, that he should 
become educated and accomplished, and that he should promote their family’s welfare. 
But she will be willing to sacrifice her capacity to demand that he give consideration to 
most of her other desires. Likewise she will want John to have considerable discretion 
to indulge his more innocent desires, e.g., to have fun (both to make membership of the 
trust relationship attractive to John, and because she herself presumably wants him to be 
happy). But she will not want him to have discretion to resist accommodating her 
preferences if it is so that he may indulge those of his desires (e.g. his desire to emulate 
the popular kids, his desire to take steroids) such that his attempts to satisfy them might 
lead him to develop traits, motivations, and relationships inimical to his future success 
and happiness. 
I am going to argue that it is John’s resistance to his mother’s preference, in a 
context in which she trusts him to give consideration to this preference, that explains 
why the two robustly disagree in Football (Mother and Son). There is a gap between 
what his mother voices a preference that he should do and what he proposes to do, and 
this places strain on her trust. John’s resistance does not amount to an outright breach of 
her trust, but only because he resists her preference in accordance with a preference of 
his own that is based on motivations of the sort I have described. The strain he puts on 
her trust by disagreeing with her creates, I suggest, a sense of tension and conflict 
between the pair such as we expect to find between the parties to a disagreement. 
More generally, I will argue that robust non-cognitive disagreement requires the 
existence of a trust relationship between the parties similar to that which we find 
between John and his mother. It involves a clash of preferences between two parties, 
concerning what one of those parties is to do. The preference belonging to the non-agent 
party is based on desires that she has entrusted the agent to accommodate; the 
preference belonging to the agent is based on desires that licence him to resist 
accommodating the former desires without a violation of trust. I will call this view the 
Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. 
1.2.2 Entrusted Concern Relationships 
I’ll now introduce some terms and conventions with which to describe the features of 
the relationships that make robust non-cognitive disagreements possible, and at the 
same time try to give a better idea of how these relationships would work. This 
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discussion is more elaborate than it needs to be for my present purpose of explaining 
robust non-cognitive disagreement. But I will be talking about these relationships and 
their features throughout this dissertation, and all of the details I provide here will prove 
important at some point. 
I will call desires such as those that John’s mother trusts John to accommodate, 
and those that licence him to resist doing so, weighted desires. I call them this, not 
because they are given a weight that differs from the usual weight a desire of the same 
strength has in practical deliberation, but simply because they are, unlike other desires, 
allowed and required to weigh in the deliberations of people who occupy positions such 
as John occupies, in trust relationships such as John shares with his mother. It is partly 
in order to establish that the preferences that they voice are based on weighted desires 
that the parties to robust non-cognitive disagreements often report the grounds for their 
preferences. 
I call relationships of the sort that we find between John and his mother entrusted 
concern relationships. In such relationships the party who has entrusted to the other 
party a concern to accommodate her preferences (e.g. John’s mother) is the entrusting 
party; the other party (e.g. John) is the entrusted party. (By default, I will refer to an 
entrusting party as ‘she’ and an entrusted party as ‘he’.) Each party in an entrusted 
concern relationship is the other party’s ‘partner’. The weighted desires of parties to an 
entrusted concern relationship are desires that fall under weighted desire-types, which 
are specified by the terms of that relationship. I will call those preferences of an 
entrusting party that are based purely on her weighted desires—i.e. those preferences 
she would have if all non-weighted desires were omitted from her set of basic desires—
accommodation-obliging preferences; and those of entrusted parties discretion-
licencing preferences. These are preferences that the parties are entitled, according to 
the terms of their trust relationships, to voice in the entrusted party’s decision. Thus I 
will sometimes call accommodation-obliging and discretion-licencing preferences 
voiceable preferences. 
Just as it is possible to report a preference insincerely by knowingly reporting a 
preference that one lacks, it is possible to voice a preference insincerely. However, there 
is an unsurprising difference between insincerely reporting and insincerely voicing a 
preference. When a person voices a preference that p, she conventionally indicates that, 
qua party to some contextually salient entrusted concern relationship, she has a 
voiceable preference that p, i.e., one that is based on only a weighted subset of her 
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desires. To insincerely voice a preference that p is thus to (knowingly etc.) indicate that 
one has a voiceable preference that p when one does not, even if one has a preference of 
some other kind (e.g. an all-things-considered preference) that p—that is, even if one 
has a preference that p that one might sincerely report. 
When describing entrusted concern relationships it is very natural to use 
normative terms, and I will not try to avoid doing so. Thus, for instance, I shall say that 
entrusted parties are subject to trust-based obligations, and that both entrusted and 
entrusting parties enjoy trust-based entitlements. I don’t regard this usage as stipulative 
or loose; these are obligations and entitlements of the familiar sort that conventions and 
understandings can give rise to. I assume that they are not ‘genuinely’ normative in the 
elusive sense that moral obligations are;80 and that they are susceptible to a 
comparatively straightforward naturalistic reduction. The viability of my metaethical 
project depends on this. 
I have said that John strains his mother’s trust because he ‘proposes’ not to act in 
accordance with her accommodation-obliging preference. I will henceforth say instead 
that the strain an entrusted party puts on his partner’s trust results from his failure to 
yield to her accommodation-obliging preference. If John gave his mother his assurance 
that he would not play football, he would yield to her preference, and they would no 
longer disagree. He would, I suggest, also yield if he actually did as his mother 
preferred, without having given his assurance first. Entrusting parties may also yield. If 
John’s mother gave John her blessing to play football, she would yield to his discretion-
licencing preference. They would no longer disagree, and John could choose to play 
football without straining their trust relationship. 
Robust non-cognitive disagreement only exists when neither party has yielded. 
But I don’t think that yielding ends disagreement, save perhaps in odd cases. Rather, 
disagreement typically ends before the act of yielding has been performed, as soon as 
one party forms an intention to yield. Suppose that John’s mother formed an intention to 
                                                 
80 Here are some properties that these trust-based obligations have, but whose possession by 
moral (and other ‘genuinely’ normative) obligations is controversial: we can sensibly ask 
whether we ought to act on these trust-based obligations; their practical ‘authority’ over us is 
contingent—usually on our desire to remain parties to the agreements (etc.) that give rise to 
them; we almost always honour these obligations for instrumental reasons, or because doing so 
is habitual, or, more strongly, because we are ‘in their grip’, or have ‘internalized’ them, in the 
senses that Gibbard describes (Wise Choices, 60-61, 68-71); two people with the same beliefs 
about the non-normative facts (on a suitably narrow construal of ‘non-normative’) cannot hold 
quite different beliefs about these trust-based obligations unless at least one of them is confused 
or irrational. 
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yield to John’s preference for playing football; it seems that there would no longer be 
any disagreement—no ‘matter to be settled’—between John and his mother, even if 
John still thought there were. Thus our theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement 
needs to make mention of yielding intentions as distinct determinants of disagreement. 
Yielding need involve no change in preferences among options. If a party to an 
erstwhile disagreement intends to yield to the other party’s preference for some option, 
this does not necessarily mean she has come to prefer that option. The party’s 
accommodation-obliging or discretion-licencing preference may be unchanged. Indeed, 
in the case of yielding by entrusting parties, the party’s ordinary, ‘non-voiceable’, all-
things-considered preferences between the options may not have changed. John’s 
mother might intend to yield to John’s preference for playing football because she 
doesn’t want to make a fuss, even though her desires (weighted and otherwise) 
concerning his playing football remain unaltered. 
I find it very natural to think of the stance of refusing to yield to the selection of a 
certain option, when adopted by an entrusting party, as a stance of demanding that the 
alternative option be chosen. So henceforth, if I talk of entrusting parties ‘demanding’ 
actions, or describe an entrusted party’s stance of not yielding as one of ‘resisting 
demands’, this is what I mean by the word. Note that the ordinary meaning of ‘demand’ 
might give this usage misleading resonances, for an entrusting party’s refusal to yield 
may place only very gentle trust-based ‘pressures’ on the entrusted party to 
accommodate her preference. 
An entrusted party strains his partner’s trust by refusing to yield and relieves 
strain by yielding. If he places too much strain on her trust over a series of decisions, he 
will eventually violate it. Thus, if the entrusted party wants to honour his commitment 
and so preserve his trust relationship, he will generally want to avoid ‘accumulating’ too 
much strain; so he will want to yield from time to time. (I make a proposal concerning 
entrusting parties’ reasons for yielding in Appendix A.) 
Having introduced the notion of yielding, I’d better clarify my earlier 
characterization of voiceable preferences. Once an entrusting party has yielded to her 
partner’s preference in some decision, she is no longer entitled to voice a preference in 
that decision, and her preference is no longer one that her partner is obliged to 
accommodate. Despite this, I have found it convenient to keep referring to the 
preferences she is no longer entitled to voice as her ‘voiceable preferences’ and her 
‘accommodation-obliging preferences’. Likewise, I have found it convenient to keep 
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referring to an entrusted party’s preferences as his ‘voiceable’ or ‘discretion-licencing’ 
preferences, even if he has yielded, in the sense of giving his assurance that he will 
acquiesce. Thus, on my usage, a preference’s status as voiceable, accommodation-
obliging, or discretion-licencing does not depend on whether or not its possessor has 
yielded. 
A final hypothesis. I propose that weighted desires must be basic desires—
roughly, desires that do not derive from other desires in combination with beliefs about 
what would satisfy the latter desires. It would be counterintuitive to suppose that, in the 
entrusted concern relationship shared by John and his mother, John might be obliged to 
accommodate his mother’s desire that he be safe, if she only wants him to be safe so 
that she can win a bet. The hypothesis that weighted desires must be basic desires 
explains how this could be ruled out: the terms of the trust relationship between John 
and his mother might specify that John’s mother’s weighted desires are for things like 
promoting her family’s welfare, and since the weighted desires would be basic, if she 
had desires for promoting her family’s welfare (etc.) that derived from her desire to win 
a bet, these would not be weighted desires. If the hypothesis were not true, then, even if 
John’s mother’s weighted desires were only for things like promoting her family’s 
welfare, it would be possible that John might be obliged to accommodate one of these 
desires if it was derived from a desire to win a bet. For instance, if the hypothesis were 
not true, the following counterintuitive state of affairs would be possible: (i) John is 
obliged to stop playing football because football is dangerous, because an injury to John 
would diminish his family’s welfare, and because his mother has a weighted desire to 
improve her family’s welfare; and (ii) John’s mother has this desire merely because she 
wants to win a bet about whether or not she can improve her family’s welfare. 
Admittedly, I’m not sure that something weaker than the hypothesis that weighted 
desires must be basic desires could not explain these intuitions. This feature of my 
characterization of entrusted concern relationships should be regarded as relatively 
conjectural. 
I warn the reader that I shall not be very careful, when attributing token weighted 
desires to parties, about establishing that they really are basic (and hence possibly 
weighted) desires, instead of being derived from other genuinely weighted desires. 
There are some derived (i.e. non-basic) desires that are sufficiently robust with respect 
to ordinary changes in their possessors’ beliefs that they behave a lot like basic desires. 
It will sometimes be natural to treat such a desire as a weighted desire, or at least to call 
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a desire a weighted desire without first eliminating the possibility that it is one of these 
robust derived desires. If John’s mother has a desire that John should be safe, this desire 
might derive from a (weighted) desire that John should be happy and successful; 
nonetheless, I may, speaking loosely, call the former desire a weighted desire without 
worrying about this possibility, or bothering to rule it out. 
1.2.3 A Statement of the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis 
In a moment I shall present what I take to be an approximation of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for robust non-cognitive disagreement. But first, I shall introduce 
the notion of a W-based preference, and a definition of ‘entrusted concern relationship’. 
W-based preferences. For all S, all W, and all propositions p, S has a W-based 
preference that p iff W is a set of desire-types (typed solely by content, not strength, or 
any other property), and S would prefer that p if all of those basic desires of S that did not 
fall within the types in W were omitted from her set of basic desires. 
Entrusted concern relationship. For all trust relationships E, all A, and all B, E is an 
entrusted concern relationship in which A is the entrusting party and B the entrusted party 
iff there is some set of types of basic desires W (typed solely by content, not strength, or 
any other property), some set of types of basic desires X (also typed solely by content), 
and some class of decisions D such that 
(i) the terms of E require B to accommodate all and only A’s W-based preferences in 
his D-decisions (unless A consents to his doing otherwise81), while allowing B 
some discretion to resist doing so when this would frustrate his X-based 
preferences; 
(ii) A trusts B to comply with the terms of E; and 
(iii) B is committed to living up to this trust. 
Now the hypothesis: 
Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. For all persons A, all persons B, and all φ, A and B are 
in robust non-cognitive disagreement about whether B is to φ if and only if there is some 
E, some set of types of desires W (typed solely by content, not strength, or any other 
property), some set of types of basic desires X (also typed solely by content), some class 
of decisions D, and some ψ such that: 
(i) E is an entrusted concern relationship in which A is the entrusting party and B the 
entrusted party; 
(ii) E obliges B to accommodate A’s W-based preferences in all D-decisions B faces, 
while allowing B some discretion to resist accommodating A’s W-based 
preferences in D-decisions when and only when accommodating them would 
frustrate B’s X-based preferences; 
(iii) ψ and not-ψ are jointly exhaustive mutually incompatible options available to B; 
(iv) B’s choice between ψ and not-ψ is a D-decision; 
                                                 
81 If B’s X-based preferences oppose A’s W-based preferences, such consent will amount to 
yielding. Otherwise it will involve ‘waiving’, a notion I introduce in 2.2.1. 
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(v) A has a W-based preference that B ψ, and B has an X-based preference that B not-
ψ; 
(vi) neither A nor B has yielded, and neither intends to; and 
(vii) φ=ψ or φ=not-ψ. 
The characterizations of entrusted concern relationships and the Entrusted Concerns 
Hypothesis that I have presented thus far are somewhat lacking in detail, and are in 
some respects incorrect. Supplying some missing details and remedying the errors will 
prove important to my argument in this dissertation. But I have opted to postpone the 
necessary elaborations and corrections until I am ready to explain why they are of 
interest.82 We can make good progress in evaluating the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis 
by considering the version that I have presented in this chapter, despite its 
incompleteness. 
Like the Coordination Hypothesis, the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis can be 
regarded as a way of cashing out the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis. Let me briefly list 
the answers it offers to the questions that the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis raises. (1) 
According to the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis, hearing and giving consideration to 
the ‘disagreeing thoughts’ of someone with whom one is in robust non-cognitive 
disagreement involves being responsive to trust-based demands and entitlements. 
Entrusted party B has reason to hear and give consideration to a preference voiced by 
his partner A because he may be obliged to accommodate it. If B does not acquiesce, A 
has reason to hear and consider B’s voiced preference because it is this alone that could 
establish that B is licenced to resist her preference, and so would not violate her trust by 
doing so (assuming that B has not strained A’s trust to breaking point). Each, moreover, 
has reason to scrutinize the grounds the other offers for her preference, to determine 
how plausible it is that she truly has the accommodation-obliging or discretion-licencing 
preference that she purports to have. (2) These are the only sorts of reasons to ‘hear and 
give consideration’ that the parties may possess that are relevant to an assessment of 
whether or not they disagree robustly. 
(3) The Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis does not seem to make robust non-
cognitive disagreement judgements dependent on ‘genuinely’ normative judgements. 
The reasons the parties to such disagreements have to hear and give consideration to 
                                                 
82 They appear in 2.2.1 (‘waiving’), 3.1.4 (‘discursive entitlements’), 3.3.3 (more on waiving, 
‘admissible grounds’), 5.4.1 (‘objective trust’), 6.2.1 (fundamental and derived entitlements), 
and 8.2.1 (the Disparity Hypothesis); and Appendices A (‘debt’), B (‘conflict excuses’), and E 
(‘waiving’ again). 
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each other’s preferences are of an instrumental sort. The entrusted party’s reasons are 
explained by his desire to avoid straining and violating his partner’s trust, something he 
cannot do unless he heeds her voiced preferences. The entrusting party’s reasons are 
explained by her weighted desires, and the fact that she can expect these to be better 
satisfied by the entrusted party’s immediate decision if he does not enjoy discretion to 
resist her preference. We could apparently dispense with talk of reasons, and posit that it 
is this combination of desires and trust-based entitlements that explains why the parties 
disagree. So the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis does not turn ascriptions of robust non-
cognitive disagreement into normative judgements.83 (4) I have boldly formulated the 
Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis as a biconditional, giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for robust disagreement between mutually unsatisfiable preferences. We 
shall consider later whether I have been too bold in this regard. 
In the next two subsections I will evaluate the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. I 
will first consider whether it makes the right predictions about the cases I have already 
considered, and a few variations on these cases. I then consider whether disagreement in 
imperatives might pose a challenge to the hypothesis. 
1.2.4 Predictions of the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis in Other Cases 
The Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis can, unlike the Coordination Hypothesis, explain 
our intuitions about Football (Mother and Son). But I haven’t yet shown that it explains 
our intuitions about the other cases we have considered. It is easy to see that the 
Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis makes the right predictions about Flat (Preferences), 
Retail, and Football (John and Well-Wisher). These are not cases of robust non-
cognitive disagreement, and in none of them is it plausible that an appropriate trust 
relationship exists between the parties.84 It is less obvious that the hypothesis can 
explain our intuitions about Stevenson’s other cases. 
Among Stevenson’s cases, showing that the football case meets conditions (i)-
(vii) of the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis is a relatively simple business. For, in the 
                                                 
83 Two caveats. First, the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis does require that such ascriptions 
involve judgements of about the trust-based obligations and entitlements of the parties, and I am 
not able to completely rule out the possibility that these are ‘genuinely’ normative judgements. 
Second, it is still possible, that some version of the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis is what 
explains why the disagreements predicted by the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis seem to be 
disagreements, and that this version of the Reasons-to-Consider Hypothesis does turn 
disagreement judgements into normative judgements. 
84  The hypothesis makes no predictions about Rival Hostesses, for the clash of preferences in 
that case concerns the actions of a third party, not one of the parties to the disagreement. 
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football case, it is clear who must be the entrusting party and who the entrusted party. In 
the invitation and restaurant cases this is not clear. I propose that in these cases the 
parties share two entrusted concern relationships; each party stands in a relevant 
‘entrusting’ relation to the other. They disagree about two pairs of options: whether or 
not party X is to assent to party Y’s preferred course of action, and whether or not Y is 
to assent to X’s preferred course of action. 
I will start by testing the hypothesis against Stevenson’s invitation case. It is 
natural to suppose that Mr. and Mrs. A have entrusted various concerns to each other, 
because this is something husbands and wives generally do, and because it presumably 
makes living together more tolerable. Mr. A and Mrs. A plausibly entrust to each other 
concerns for their health and welfare, and for the prosperity of their household. It may 
not seem obvious that these are concerns to accommodate desires—our evidence for 
this is that it would seem natural for them to assert their demands as parties to these 
trust relationships by voicing wants and preferences. It is also plausible to suppose that 
they have entrusted to each other concerns to accommodate their more selfish desires, 
concerning choices affecting them both (e.g. choices about what furniture to buy). Thus 
it would not be far-fetched to suppose that Mr. A trusts Mrs. A to give weight to his 
desire that they should honour their old friendships in her decisions, or that Mrs. A 
trusts Mr. A to give weight to her desire that their social status be improved in his. 
Given the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis, it is easy to see how each of these trust 
relationships could make a robust disagreement of their clashing preferences in 
Invitation. 
When the prospective diners in Stevenson’s restaurant case agree to dine together, 
we plausibly assume that they entrust certain concerns to each other, and make 
corresponding commitments to give weight to these concerns in their decision-making. 
Prospective diner A plausibly entrusts to prospective diner B a concern to make their 
dinner pleasant and convenient for A, insofar as A desires such attentiveness from B; 
and vice versa. In other words, they trust each other to be considerate. B’s entrusted 
concern to make A’s dining experience a pleasant one gives her reason to listen to A’s 
preference to go to a restaurant with music (say), and to give it special weight when 
deciding which restaurant to agree to go to. This entrusted concern is, however, lenient, 
and permits B to give weight to her own preference not to hear music. The Entrusted 
Concerns Hypothesis thus plausibly predicts that A and B robustly disagree in 
preference when they voice mutually unsatisfiable preferences about where to eat. (Of 
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course all that I have just said regarding B’s relationship to A also applies in the other 
direction, for A’s preference and her entrusted concern mirror B’s in all relevant 
respects. But the hypothesis predicts robust disagreement even when this fact is 
ignored.) 
Could we think up versions of Stevenson’s restaurant and invitation cases that 
elicited intuitions of disagreement, but whose features discouraged us from attributing 
an entrusted concern relationship to the parties? We haven’t yet considered any cases in 
which two people who have little reason to trust each other nonetheless have strong 
motivation to reach an agreement on some coordinated course of action. Suppose that A 
is a blackmailer, and wants to meet B at a restaurant that she owns, late at night, so that 
she can exchange her scandalous photographs of B for money. B wants to make the 
exchange at a more public venue, perhaps because he fears that A will rob him of his 
money without giving him the photographs. We should not expect A and B to have 
much trust for each other. A and B do not agree about where to make the trade, and they 
cannot easily reach agreement. But do they disagree? I find it odd to suppose this; 
intuitively, the supposition represents their relationship as being implausibly civilized 
and respectful. 
What happens if we dramatize their clash of preferences in a dialogue, as I did 
with Stevenson’s cases? It is in fact hard to do this without giving the case distractingly 
odd features which would interfere with any intuitions of disagreement it might 
otherwise have elicited. We can easily imagine A and B demanding to meet at different 
places, and being unable to reach agreement. Consider:  
Restaurant (Blackmail I) 
A: Meet me at my restaurant after closing time, and we’ll make the trade. 
B: I don’t think so. It’s got to be a public place, somewhere neutral. Let’s meet at 
Minims at seven. 
A: This isn’t a negotiation. Come to my restaurant, or I send the pictures to the press. 
B: No way. We disagree. 
The exchange of demands, ultimatums, and refusals here seems natural enough, and I 
think that B’s disagreement claim seems odd. 
But suppose instead that A and B have the following exchange: 
Restaurant (Blackmail II) 
A: Meet me and we’ll make the trade. I’d prefer that we met at my restaurant after 
closing time. 
63 
 
B: I’d rather we met in a public place, somewhere neutral. How about Minims at 
seven? 
A: I’d really prefer that we met at my restaurant. 
B: We disagree. 
This whole exchange seems strange given its context. Why would the parties be 
reporting and listening to each other’s preferences as if they were concerned to 
accommodate them? Admittedly B’s disagreement claim is not the strangest feature of 
the case, and perhaps we lack a clear intuition that A and B don’t disagree. But this is, I 
suggest, partly because the general strangeness of the case is distracting, and partly 
because A’s and B’s exchange of preference reports gives us some evidence that, 
bizarrely, each party is concerned to accommodate the other’s opposing preferences. I 
can’t claim that Restaurant (Blackmail II) gives resounding support to the Entrusted 
Concerns Hypothesis, but I don’t think it undermines it either.85 
1.2.5 Are Cases of Imperative Disagreement Counterexamples to the Hypothesis? 
Cases in which two people utter conflicting imperative sentences can elicit strong 
intuitions of disagreement. Consider the following:86 
Drinks 
Cody: Let’s get a coffee. 
Sally: No, let’s get a beer. 
Cody: No, let’s get a coffee. 
Sally: We disagree. 
Cody: I don’t think we disagree. 
Cody’s conciliatory claim seems inappropriate. Sally and Cody seem to be in a robust 
disagreement, and it might be a non-cognitive one, for the parties do not (in the initial 
disagreement about what to get) express disagreeing beliefs. Indeed it is not absolutely 
clear that our intuition of disagreement is explained our attributing disagreeing thoughts 
                                                 
85 Ridge describes a variation on Stevenson’s restaurant case (as a counterexample to 
Stevenson’s conditions for disagreement in attitude, as Ridge interprets them) in which ‘[t]he 
two people hate each other, but have to eat together.’ Partly out of spite, each party X wants the 
other party Y to go Y’s dispreferred restaurant. Neither will acquiesce to the other’s wishes. 
Ridge thinks that this is a case of disagreement: ‘It hardly seems plausible that simply adding to 
Stevenson’s story that the two parties hate each other should explain their not disagreeing after 
all; indeed it seems perverse.’ (Impassioned Belief, 170-71). I find this case difficult to imagine 
without knowing why the parties have to eat together, but it is not obvious to me that the parties 
disagree. As our responses to the blackmail cases suggest, hostility can undermine rather than 
intensify disagreement; it can turn potential disagreers into mere antagonists. 
86 The first two lines of this example are from Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe, ‘Moral 
Disagreement and Moral Semantics’, Nous (‘Early View’ version) (2016): 4. 
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to them at all. Perhaps—though the idea seems far-fetched—this is a merely linguistic 
disagreement, which simply consists in the utterance of imperative sentences with what 
we take to be mutually unsatisfiable contents, or the performance of conflicting speech 
acts. Sally and Cody might not be in a state of disagreement at all; they might merely be 
engaged in the activity of disagreement.87 
Since the disagreement between Sally and Cody is robust, since it might be non-
cognitive, and since the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis lays down necessary conditions 
for robust non-cognitive disagreement, the case might be a counterexample to that 
hypothesis. A counterexample of this sort would not trouble me too much, for, given my 
metaethical ambitions, I am most concerned to identify sufficient conditions for robust 
non-cognitive disagreement. But if there were a kind of robust non-cognitive 
disagreement whose sufficient conditions differed from those stated by the Entrusted 
Concerns Hypothesis, I would certainly wish to explore it, for it might reveal new and 
better options for a non-cognitivist moral psychology. 
In what follows I shall argue that we do not have good reason to think that 
intuitions of robust disagreement elicited by cases in which different speakers utter 
conflicting imperatives (henceforth ‘prima facie imperative disagreements’) are, or are 
explained by, intuitions about a kind of non-cognitive disagreement that is not 
comprehended by the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. Intuitions of robust disagreement 
elicited by prima facie imperative disagreement only seem to exist where the parties’ 
utterances are plausibly explained by their having disagreeing thoughts of a (by now) 
familiar kind—conflicting descriptive beliefs, conflicting normative beliefs, or 
conflicting voiceable preferences. Admittedly my argument is far from conclusive 
because I only have the space to consider a limited range of cases. Part of my argument 
relies on a promissory note, namely, that the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis can explain 
our intuitions about third-party non-cognitive disagreements—disagreements between 
two people about the choices of a third party. I make good on this promise in Chapter 2. 
The first thing I want to establish is that we might be able to explain our intuitions 
about Imperative Disagreement by hypothesizing that we assume that the speakers (i) 
share entrusted concern relationships, and (ii) are making demands of each other qua 
                                                 
87 However, if we took Sally and Cody to be merely engaged in the activity of disagreement, we 
might perhaps find it infelicitous to say that the two disagree, rather than that they were 
disagreeing. On the state/activity distinction see Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne, 
Relativism and Monadic Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 60-61.  
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parties to those relationships. On this view, our natural interpretation of the case is very 
similar to that which I suggested we give to Restaurant. We assume that the speakers 
share two entrusted concern relationships, each giving one party a voice in the other’s 
decisions as to whether or not he will consent to go where the first party wants to go, 
and hence drink her preferred kind of drink. The parties make their demands by uttering 
imperatives instead of explicitly voicing preferences, but it is their opposing preferences 
that put them in disagreement. This explanation is at least apparently available. So we 
may now ask, can it be ruled out? Or if it can’t, is a better explanation nonetheless 
available? 
One way to rule out an Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis-style explanation would 
be to present a version of the case in which the parties could not plausibly be thought to 
share the required trust relationships, but which nonetheless elicited an intuition of 
robust disagreement. But this is unpromising as a method for undermining the Entrusted 
Concerns Hypothesis’s explanation for our judgements about Imperative Disagreement, 
and, more generally, for undermining the hypothesis’s explanation for our judgements 
about similar cases in which two people are enjoining each other to do different things 
together. This is because, as a general matter, the very fact that two people are enjoining 
each other to do different things together is evidence that they share some sort of 
understanding, some joint project, or some amicable relationship, in the context of 
which it would not be surprising if each expected the other to be somewhat responsive 
to her wishes. 
There are exceptions to this generalization—cases in which people have reason to 
jointly coordinate their actions despite apparently lacking any connection that could be 
construed as an entrusted concern relationship. I will discuss three cases which fit this 
description, and in which parties are in prima facie imperative disagreement. I consider 
whether they are counterexamples to the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. 
First, there are cases like the blackmail case that I considered in 1.2.4, in which 
wholly antagonistic parties have a motive to do something together. Indeed Restaurant 
(Blackmail I) is, I think, a prima facie imperative disagreement of just this sort. 
However, we are not inclined to think that the situation of Cody and Sally is of this sort; 
we would need to be given some new information about their context before it would 
even occur to us that their relationship was antagonistic. If we did interpret Drinks in 
this way, I presume that we would feel hesitant about supposing the parties to be in 
disagreement, as we are when we are presented with Restaurant (Blackmail I). 
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Second, suppose that a man has fallen into the sea, and sharks are closing in on 
him. Two perfect strangers see this, and have the following exchange. 
Rescue 
A: Let’s row out in that boat and rescue him. 
B: No, let’s look for a rope or a lifebuoy and throw it to him. 
This case is not at all puzzling, and the parties seem to disagree, even though we have 
reason to doubt that they share any special entrusted concern relationships. But now it is 
hard to rule out a different explanation which, like the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis, 
does not require us to posit a distinctive kind of non-cognitive disagreement. To wit, it 
is hard to rule out the hypothesis that we intuit disagreement merely because we take the 
parties’ conflicting imperatives to be explained by disagreeing beliefs—specifically, 
judgements about which course of action would achieve the greatest expected 
preservation of life and limb. 
A third exception: five trapped people will be crushed by a speeding trolley if two 
bystanders don’t cooperate to push a very large man into its path, killing the large man 
but saving the five. The bystanders, who are perfect strangers, have the following 
exchange: 
Trolley 
A: Let’s shove that big guy in front of the trolley before it kills them. 
B: No, let’s not push him to his death. 
Again this sounds natural, and sounds like a disagreement, notwithstanding the 
presumable lack of entrusted concern relationships between the speakers. But our 
intuition of disagreement here is plausibly explained by an assumption that the parties 
have conflicting moral judgements. Strangers seem to be willing to cooperate in pursuit 
of moral ends without having to form entrusted concern relationships (this, of course, is 
part of the explanation for the naturalness of the previous case too). This provides us 
with an explanation for A and B’s ‘mutual enjoinings’ that does not (obviously) 
attribute any entrusted concern relationships to them, but it also suggests an explanation 
for their disagreement that does not make it (obviously) non-cognitive, viz., the parties 
are in moral disagreement. 
Prima facie imperative disagreements like Drinks, in which two people enjoin 
each other to do different things together, seem quite reliably to elicit intuitions of 
robust disagreement. But I am unable to think of one in which we cannot naturally 
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attribute a descriptive disagreement, normative disagreement, or disagreement in 
voiceable preferences to the speakers. Antagonistic cases like Restaurant (Blackmail I) 
are an exception: the parties in such cases do not seem to be in one of these familiar 
sorts of disagreements, but neither do they clearly disagree. 
What about other kinds of imperative disagreement though? If we can find prima 
facie imperative disagreements of another kind which fail to elicit intuitions of robust 
disagreement when the disagreement cannot be explained as an intuition about a 
disagreement in normative judgements, descriptive beliefs, or voiceable preferences, 
this would cast serious doubt on the idea that prima facie imperative disagreements ever 
amount to non-cognitive disagreements of a distinctive kind. There are no natural-
seeming prima facie imperative disagreements which consist simply in one person 
resisting the demand of another (as John does, on my stipulative sense of ‘demand’, in 
Football (Mother and Son)). A person does not resist another’s command by giving a 
contrary command to herself. And I take it that an imperative disagreement requires the 
utterance of two or more mutually unsatisfiable imperatives. The only other kind of 
prima facie imperative disagreement that I am aware of is one in which two people give 
mutually unsatisfiable commands to a third party, i.e. prima facie third-party imperative 
disagreements. 
Disagreements of this sort that fail to elicit intuitions of robust disagreement are 
easy to come by. Suppose that rival hostesses Mrs. A and Mrs. B encounter Mr. Toff at 
the same time, and that the following discourse ensues: 
Rival Hostesses (Imperatives) 
Mrs A: [To Mr. Toff] Come to my party! 
Mrs B: [To Mr. Toff] No, come to my party! 
As in the earlier rival hostesses case, this seems to be a case of mere rivalry without 
disagreement. There is not plausibly any disagreement in moral judgements, descriptive 
beliefs, or voiceable preferences between Mrs. A and Mrs. B. And in the absence of 
such a disagreement they do not seem to disagree at all. 
It might be thought that Mrs. A and Mrs. B do not seem to disagree because, as a 
general matter, prima facie third-party imperative disagreements do not elicit intuitions 
of disagreement, or at least not unless they indicate a moral disagreement or a 
disagreement in descriptive belief. If so, our intuitions about Hostesses (Imperatives) do 
not support the view that our intuitions about Drinks must be explained by our tacit 
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attribution of a clash of voiceable preferences to the speakers. But I don’t think this is 
right. Imagine that a young woman, Penny, is deciding whether to marry the well-
connected Mr. Toff, or Mr. Lloyd, a man from a family that has shared a long alliance 
and friendship with Penny’s family. A marriage to Toff will improve the social standing 
of Penny’s family, but disappoint the Lloyds and weaken somewhat the ties between the 
families. Penny’s mother wants her family to rise in society; Penny’s aunt cares most 
about honouring and cementing their ties to the Lloyds. They address Penny thus: 
Marriage (Imperatives) 
Mother: [To Penny] Marry Mr. Toff! 
Aunt:  [To Penny] No, marry Mr. Lloyd! 
Penny’s mother and aunt do seem to disagree here. And this seems to be explained by 
the relationships between the parties, and their reasons for their injunctions. They are 
making demands in the service of ends that Penny and her mother and aunt presumably 
all have in common, even if they care about them to differing degrees. These features of 
the case support the thesis that the mother and aunt have a third-party disagreement in 
voiceable preferences, according to the theories concerning third-party non-cognitive 
disagreement and networks of trust relationships that I develop in Chapters 2 and 3.88 (I 
discuss this case specifically in Appendix D.) 
It might be conceded that, absent normative or descriptive disagreement, 
intuitions of robust disagreement elicited by prima facie imperative disagreements only 
occur where my conditions for disagreement in voiceable preferences are met. But why 
think that these intuitions are explained by a clash of preferences in the right social 
conditions rather than an opposition of imperatives in the right social conditions? 
Perhaps all apparent robust disagreements in preference are fundamentally 
disagreements in imperative. Reports of wishes often have the illocutionary force of 
commands—perhaps voicing preferences in the relevant circumstances is just a polite or 
mild way of giving orders. 
The main problem with this idea is that intuitions of disagreement elicited by 
cases like Football (Mother and Son) cannot be interpreted as disagreements in 
                                                 
88 There is, I concede, a kind of normative disagreement between Penny’s aunt and mother here: 
they disagree about what Penny should do. (As I argue in 2.1, all robust third-party non-
cognitive disagreements are or involve normative disagreements.) But I contend that this is a 
special kind of normative disagreement that only members of Penny’s family can participate in, 
and that is best explained by the postulation of special familial entrusted concern relationships 
among those involved. 
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imperative because, as I have already observed, one party to the disagreement fails to 
utter any imperative, or make any preference report that could be construed as an 
imperative. John merely says that he prefers to play football. What kind of command 
might this be? If we hypothesize that mutually unsatisfiable voiceable preferences 
(absent yielding etc.) suffice for robust non-cognitive disagreement, we can seemingly 
explain all intuitive cases of robust non-cognitive disagreement; whereas if we 
hypothesize that mutually unsatisfiable imperatives in certain social conditions suffice 
for robust non-cognitive disagreement, we cannot. Explaining all robust non-cognitive 
disagreement as disagreement in voiceable preferences is economical and gets the facts 
right.89 
                                                 
89 I also find it intuitively very plausible that parties to robust non-cognitive disagreements have 
disagreeing thoughts—that they are in a psychological state of disagreement; and that the 
hypothesis that robust non-cognitive disagreement is always disagreement in voiceable 
preferences, and never merely imperative disagreement, should be preferred because it explains 
this. But I won’t defend this intuition. 
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2 
Third-Party Non-cognitive Disagreement 
Two people S and T may be in moral disagreement with each other, not just about what 
S or T ought to do, but also about what a third party U ought to do. They can have moral 
disagreements about U’s actions, ones that do not boil down to mere disagreements 
about what they themselves should try and get U to do. In my terminology, they can 
have third-party disagreements. My non-cognitivist theory of moral psychology ought 
to predict this; it thus requires that people should be capable of having (robust) third-
party non-cognitive disagreements.  
Happily, such disagreements do seem to be possible. I have already argued that 
the intuition of disagreement elicited by Marriage (Imperatives) is explained by our 
assumption of an underlying disagreement in preferences. For a clearer example, 
consider a variation on Stevenson’s football case in which John’s father makes an 
appearance. 
Football (Parents I) 
Mother: John’s thinking about quitting the football team. 
Father: But playing for St. Matthew’s is a family tradition! 
Mother: I’d rather he quit. Football is dangerous. He could get injured. 
Father: Well I’d rather he didn’t quit. 
John’s parents seem to disagree. But while this appearance is encouraging, it at best 
shows that (absent yielding) moralists with opposing preferences might disagree, 
whereas my theory needs to predict that they would. I need to identify at least sufficient 
conditions for third-party non-cognitive disagreement, and these must be conditions 
such that I can credibly postulate that they obtain in moral contexts. 
My aim in this chapter is to give a plausible account of the conditions for third-
party non-cognitive disagreement. Explaining why, given this account, we expect these 
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conditions to be satisfied in intuitive non-moral cases of third-party-disagreement will 
turn out to be a very large task, and I will not address it until Chapter 3. In the present 
chapter 1 will proceed as follows. In Section 2.1, I will say a bit more about the 
phenomenon I aim to give an account of, to distinguish it from other apparently similar 
phenomena. In Section 2.2 I present my theory of third-party disagreement. 
2.1 Identifying Third-Party Disagreements 
A possible external symptom of third-party non-cognitive disagreement is that the 
parties will have exchanges whose form is some variation on: ‘I’d prefer that so-and-so 
did such-and-such’/ ‘I’d rather so-and-so did not do such-and-such’. However, 
exchanges of this sort, even when they elicit intuitions of disagreement, can also occur 
in the absence of true third-party non-cognitive disagreement. Suppose that John’s 
parents have the following exchange: 
Football (Parents II) 
Mother: John’s thinking about quitting the football team. 
Father: That means he’ll be around the house a lot more after school doesn’t it? I 
won’t be able to relax. 
Mother: I’d rather he quit. It means I wouldn’t have to keep driving him home after 
training. 
Father: Well I’d rather he didn’t quit. 
Mother: We disagree then. 
This seems to be a disagreement, and it seems to concern what a third party is going to 
do, yet it does not seem to be a case of third-party non-cognitive disagreement. This is 
because the grounds the parties give for their preferences have nothing to do with John’s 
concerns or interests; they are all about what would suit the parties themselves. The 
parties appear to be saying things they would be less likely to say while John was 
around. Parents can typically influence their children’s choices, and I am inclined to 
think that the intended upshot of the conversation is either that at least one of the parties 
would discourage John from quitting (if John’s father has his way), or that both would 
forbear from so discouraging him (if his mother has her way). And whatever the 
discouragement involved, it would probably not involve John’s father voicing the same 
preferences that John’s father voices here, with the same grounds, in John’s presence. If 
this is right, there is a sense in which what the parties are really disagreeing about is 
how they should influence John, rather than about John’s actions. 
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By contrast, the parties in Football (Parents I) give the same sorts of grounds for 
their preferences that they might give if they were talking to John. As in Football 
(Parents II), it is plausibly an intended upshot of the conversation that the parties should 
agree to discourage or forbear from discouraging John from quitting. But intuitively, 
they are not disagreeing about whether to discourage John from quitting—or not 
merely. They are disagreeing about John’s action. 
The following observation seems to support the view that Football (Parents I) is, 
and Football (Parents II) is not, a third-party disagreement. It is very natural to say that, 
in Football (Parents I), John’s parents disagree about whether John should quit the 
football team. This is not true of John’s parents in Football (Parents II). To disagree 
about what John should do is unambiguously to have a third-party disagreement. Of 
course, we might wonder whether it is really to have a non-cognitive disagreement. The 
‘should’ that John’s parents disagree about, so to speak, is normative, not like the 
hypothetical ‘should’ in ‘X prefers that Y should φ’. John’s parents are having a 
normative disagreement. Cognitivists about the normative will want to say that John’s 
parents disagree in (cognitive) normative belief, and may or may not think that they also 
disagree in preference. I contend that John’s parents have a disagreement in preference, 
and that this disagreement just is a normative disagreement. 
It will perhaps not come as a surprise that I have no quick way at my disposal to 
decide between these interpretations. I might suggest that the fact that the parties are 
explicitly voicing preferences rather than beliefs warrants a presumption that their 
disagreement is non-cognitive. And I might demand to know how a cognitivist would 
explain the apparent dependence of John’s parents’ disagreement on the relationship 
between them and John. Why is it that, if a well-meaning stranger were to chime in with 
his preference that John should not quit the team, on the same grounds that John’s father 
offers, he would not succeed in disagreeing with John’s mother? Can’t he make 
normative judgements about whether John should quit? Or is it that his preference-
reports don’t conventionally indicate such judgements? If so, why not? The cognitivist 
has some explaining to do here, but I have no reason to think that the explanation would 
prove difficult. 
So I am reduced to postulating that third-party disagreements such as that 
illustrated in Football (Parents I), which are normative and which have the appearance 
of disagreements in preference, are in fact non-cognitive disagreements. The proposition 
that they are non-cognitive is a claim of my metaethical theory, rather than a datum that 
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supports the theory. It is nonetheless, I think, quite a plausible proposition, considered 
in isolation from its broader philosophical implications. 
Let me return to my explanation of why the appearance that Football (Parents I) 
is and Football (Parents II) is not a disagreement about what John should do supports 
the view that only the former is a third-party disagreement. Take the set of 
disagreements that, like those depicted in Football (Parents I) and Football (Parents II), 
have the verbal form of third-party non-cognitive disagreements. I contend that, within 
this set, those disagreements that are genuine third-party non-cognitive disagreements 
are those that are about what the third party should do (or ought to do etc.). Intuitively, 
these are the only disagreements in the set that are really about the actions of third 
parties. We have no words with which to say precisely what third-party non-cognitive 
disagreements are about if we cannot use normative terms—no way of completing the 
sentence, ‘S and U disagree about whether T _____ φ or ψ’, which implies that S and T 
are in third-party disagreement, without using ‘ought to’, ‘should’, ‘must’, and so on. If 
two people disagree about what a third party is to do, they are seemingly disagreeing 
about what to make the third party do. This is not a normative disagreement (or needn’t 
be), but neither is it a third-party disagreement.90 I cannot think of a way to say what 
actions the disagreement between John’s parents in Football (Parents II) is about that 
makes it a disagreement about John’s actions rather than those of his parents, because 
the disagreement cannot be characterized as one about what John should do. 
Before I move on, another apparent distinguishing feature of third-party 
disagreements bears mentioning, although it is not a surprising one given the 
distinguishing feature I have already proposed, and doesn’t permit us to state the subject 
matter of such disagreements in non-normative terms. Observe that it is plausible that 
John’s mother in Football (Parents I) approves, and that his father disapproves, of 
John’s quitting the football team. Their preference reports seem to communicate 
approval and disapproval. By contrast, the preferences reported in Football (Parents II) 
do not seem to express approval or disapproval. I suspect that we will almost always 
find that the parties to third-party non-cognitive disagreements plausibly disapprove of 
                                                 
90 Cases of non-third-party non-cognitive disagreement can properly be described as 
disagreements about what the agent is to do, without any implication that it is not really that 
agent’s actions that are being disagreed about. This is because, although the parties to such a 
disagreement are disagreeing about what, between them, they will make the agent do, this very 
disagreement is a disagreement about the agent’s actions, since the agent is himself one of those 
parties. 
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their dispreferred actions, and tend to approve of their preferred options.91 (The sketch 
for an analysis of approval and disapproval presented in 5.3.2 suggests that parties to 
third-party disagreements might sometimes disapprove of their preferred as well as their 
dispreferred options.) 
2.2 A Theory of Third-Party Disagreement 
2.2.1 Waiving 
In Section 2.2 I will develop and defend my theory of third-party non-cognitive 
disagreement. According to the theory, all such disagreements involve non-third-party 
disagreements about conventional actions that I will call acts of ‘waiving’. These are 
actions that can be performed by entrusting parties in entrusted concern relationships. In 
this subsection I will say what waiving is, and why conventions permitting it would 
plausibly exist. Before I do so it will be helpful to introduce some more terms with 
which to categorize the desires and preferences that affect the choices of parties to 
entrusted concern relationships. I will call the desires an entrusted party has to avoid 
straining and violating his partner’s trust, his trust-based desires. I will assume that a 
person’s trust-based desires qua entrusted party in a certain entrusted concern 
relationship are never among his weighted desires in that relationship.92 
                                                 
91 Crucial to the prediction that third-party disagreements involve clashing attitudes of approval 
and disapproval is my claim that third-party disagreements only occur among parties to trust 
networks whose members have shared ends, where these shared ends are suitably reflected in 
their weighted desire-types. Following Philippa Foot, I maintain (5.3.2) that one of the marks of 
approval (in contrast to the attitude of ‘being for’, for instance) is that it is based on concerns 
that the approved is presumed to share with the approver. See Foot, Virtues and Vices, 200-201. 
92 If his trust-based desires were among his weighted desires, this would undermine the point of 
his having discretion-licencing preferences, which is to serve as a counterweight to his 
obligations, and make his membership in the trust relationship less burdensome. It would also 
make possible situations in which an entrusted party would be unable to relieve the strain he had 
put on his partner’s trust, no matter how often he acquiesced to her preferences. Recall 
Stevenson’s original football case. Suppose that John’s trust-based desires were among his 
weighted desires, and that he has strained his mother’s trust to the point that, if he resists her 
preferences again, he will violate her trust. If John is genuinely committed to living up to his 
mother’s trust, this means that he will have a trust-based desire to accommodate her preferences 
in his next decision that is strong enough to give him an actual, all-things-considered preference 
to do as she prefers, no matter what options his other desires might incline him to choose. Thus, 
since this trust-based desire is weighted, once he knows his mother’s accommodation-obliging 
preference, he would never have a discretion-licencing preference to do otherwise than his 
mother prefers. This means that he will never be able to yield to her preferences, for an 
entrusted party can only yield to a preference when he has a discretion-licencing preference to 
resist it. And since, normally, entrusted parties can only relieve strain by yielding, there is no 
way in which John could ever hope to return to a state in which he would sometimes enjoy 
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Because a party’s voiceable preferences may be (and, in the case of entrusted 
parties, must be) based on a proper subset of her actual desires, her voiceable 
preferences among a set of options may differ from her ordinary all-things-considered 
preferences among those options. An entrusted party’s voiceable preferences may also 
differ from those preferences he would have, taking account of all his desires except his 
trust-based desires. I shall call preferences of this last sort pre-trust preferences, because 
they are his preferences ‘before’ he takes considerations of trust into account. 
If, out of two mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive options, parties to an 
entrusted concern relationship both have voiceable preferences for the same option, they 
do not disagree, and the entrusted party must choose that option or violate his partner’s 
trust. This may sometimes be an unwelcome situation for both parties. The option for 
which the entrusting party has an all-things-considered preference and for which the 
entrusted party has a pre-trust preference may differ from the option they both voiceably 
prefer. To permit an escape from this situation, there would, I suggest, be a conventional 
action that the entrusting party could perform that would relieve the entrusted party 
from his obligation to accommodate her preference, and hence from his obligation to act 
in accordance with his discretion-licencing preference. I will not call this action a 
species of yielding, because I want to preserve the idea that yielding is acquiescing to a 
voiceable preference. Yielding by an entrusting party is acquiescing to her partner’s 
acting on his voiceable preference, but the sort of conventional action I am now talking 
about would typically involve allowing the entrusted party to act against his voiceable 
preference. So I will instead refer to it as waiving, in a particular decision, an 
entitlement to accommodation (or, more loosely, ‘waiving a demand’). 
I will assume that waiving can only be performed by an entrusting party when her 
voiceable preference and that of her partner are for the same option, or when her partner 
lacks a discretion-licencing preference. A party may lack a voiceable preference 
concerning a particular decision if she has indeterminate utilities among the options; or 
the expected utilities of the options, in terms of weighted desire satisfaction, are 
determinate but equal for her (i.e. she is in a ‘Buridan’s ass’ situation); or she has no 
weighted desires relevant to the decision. An entrusted party who lacks a voiceable 
                                                                                                                                               
discretion to resist his mother’s preferences, unless he renegotiates his trust relationship with his 
mother. 
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preference must act on his partner’s voiceable preference or violate her trust, unless she 
waives. I shall revise my account of waiving in 3.3.3, and again in Appendix E. 
2.2.2 The Four Relationships Hypothesis 
I should warn the reader that the material from this subsection until the end of Part I will 
be complicated and difficult, certainly the most difficult part of this dissertation. 
However, the material is vital to my case for the existence of the moral trust network, 
and my explanation of third-party disagreement, among other phenomena. 
I call my theory of the conditions for third-party non-cognitive disagreements the 
Four Relationships Hypothesis, because it posits that such disagreements can only occur 
where four entrusted concern relationships exist among the disagreeing parties and the 
agent whose actions are in dispute. This theory is based on the idea that part of what 
makes John’s parents’ clashing preferences in Football (Parents I) a disagreement about 
what John should do is that, as I observed above, these are preferences that they might 
also have voiced in John’s presence, on the same grounds, to urge him to act 
accordingly. If two people voice disagreeing non-counterfactual judgements about what 
someone else should do, then they voice judgements that they think the third party 
would recognize as applying to him, and as being of potential practical significance to 
him. They do not take themselves to be disagreeing about something of no interest to 
the agent whose actions they are talking about, like scientists discussing the behaviour 
of a beetle. Any account of third-party non-cognitive disagreement must save this 
appearance. The Four Relationships Hypothesis posits a network of entrusted concern 
relationships that explains why a disagreeing party voices a preference concerning what 
a third party should do, why this preference is of interest to the other disagreeing party, 
and why it is of practical significance to the agent. 
According to the Four Relationships Hypothesis, a state of third-party non-
cognitive disagreement differs qualitatively from a state of non-third-party non-
cognitive disagreement, in being a ‘higher-order’ state. If we hold trust relationships 
fixed, third-party non-cognitive disagreement supervenes on non-third-party non-
cognitive disagreement. Suppose that S prefers that U should φ, that T prefers that U 
should not-φ, and that these preferences put S and T in a state of third-party non-
cognitive disagreement. For this to be the case, U must be a common entrusted party to 
S and T—that is, U must be the entrusted party in two entrusted concern relationships, 
one with S, another with T—and two entrusted concern relationships must exist 
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between S and T, one with S as the entrusting party, the other with T as the entrusting 
party. The third-party non-cognitive disagreement between S and T is realized by a non-
third-party non-cognitive disagreement in one or the other of these relationships 
between S and T, depending on whether S or T disagrees with U about whether or not U 
is to φ. 
The following five criteria are intended to be necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for third-party non-cognitive disagreement. As usual, ‘prefer’, ‘preference’, 
etc. mean ‘voiceably prefer’, ‘voiceable preference’, etc. Since I shall have nothing to 
say about cognitive disagreements here, I won’t bother to specify that the disagreements 
I am discussing are non-cognitive. As I have mentioned, four entrusted concern 
relationships must exist for third-party disagreement to be possible, each with a 
different entrusted party/entrusting party pair. In what follows, Δ〈X,Y,Z,φ〉 stands for ‘the 
disagreement between X and Y about whether Z should φ’. I shall use the following 
notation to refer to the entrusted concern relationships posited by the Four Relationships 
Hypothesis to explain a third-party disagreement Δ〈X,Y,Z,φ〉: where V and W are different 
people; V is X, Y, or Z; and W is X, Y, or Z; ‘E〈V,W,Δ〈X,Y,Z,φ〉〉’ stands for the ‘the 
entrusted concern relationship in which V is the entrusting party and W the entrusted 
party, on whose existence disagreement Δ〈X,Y,Z,φ〉 depends’. I assume throughout that 
preferences are rational. 
Condition One. The third party whose options a third-party disagreement concerns 
must be a common entrusted party to the disagreeing parties. Weighted desire-types are 
the same for this common entrusted party in each relationship. 
That is: necessarily, if disagreement Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉 exists, then S is the entrusting party 
in an entrusted concern relationship (namely, E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉) with U entitling S to a 
voice in U’s choice to φ or not-φ, and T is the entrusting party in an entrusted concern 
relationship (E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉) with U entitling T to a voice in U’s choice to φ or not-φ; 
and the weighted desire-types for U in these two relationships are identical. 
Condition Two. There is a two-way entrusted concern relationship between the 
parties to a third-party disagreement entitling each to a voice in the other’s waiving 
choices in their relationships with the third party. Each disagreeing party has the same 
weighted desires in one relationship as she has in the other. 
Why, and under what circumstances, would one party X to a third-party 
disagreement want the other party Y to waive qua partner to the third party Z? In 
general, X will want Y to waive if Y prefers, and X disprefers, the option that Z prefers. 
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Suppose that X prefers that Z should not-φ, and that both Y and Z prefer that Z should 
φ. If Y hasn’t waived, then Z cannot yield to X’s preference without violating Y’s trust, 
because this would mean defying Y’s preference despite lacking a discretion-licencing 
preference to do so. If Y has waived, then Z can yield to X’s preference in defiance of 
Y’s without violating Y’s trust. The probability that Z not-φs will thus be at least 
slightly higher. This is why X will generally want Y to waive if X disagrees and Y 
‘agrees’ in preference with Z. 
A more precise statement of Condition Two: necessarily, if Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉 exists, there 
is an entrusted concern relationship (E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉) between S and T entitling S to a 
voice in T’s choice to waive or not waive qua U’s partner (when T has an entitlement to 
accommodation that T can waive, i.e., when T and U both have preferences for the 
same option in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 concerning U’s choice to φ or not-φ); and there is a 
second entrusted concern relationship (E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉) between them, of opposite 
direction, entitling T to a voice in S’s choice to waive or not waive qua U’s partner 
(when S has an entitlement to accommodation that S can waive, i.e., when S and U both 
have preferences for the same option in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 concerning U’s choice to φ or 
not-φ); and the desire-types that are weighted for S in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and 
E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are identical; and the desire-types that are weighted for T in 
E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are identical. 
Condition Three. A third-party disagreement between two people about the 
actions of a third is realized by pairs of non-third-party disagreements among those 
three people. At least one of these non-third-party disagreements must be between the 
parties to the third-party disagreement. 
More precisely: necessarily, if Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉 exists, then either 
(i) U has a discretion-licencing preference to φ or not-φ in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and 
E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and either 
 (a) S disagrees with U qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 about whether U is to φ, and 
S and T disagree qua parties to E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 about whether T is to waive 
in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; or 
 (b) T disagrees with U qua party to E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 about whether U is to φ, and 
S and T disagree qua parties to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 about whether S is to waive 
in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; or 
(ii) U lacks a discretion-licencing preference to φ or not-φ in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and 
E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and S and T disagree qua party to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 about whether T 
is to waive in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and S and T disagree qua party to E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 
about whether S is to waive in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉. 
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Condition Four. Weighted desires for the disagreeing parties qua parties to their 
two shared entrusted concern relationships are identical to their weighted desires qua 
partners to the common entrusted party. That is: necessarily, if S and T have a third-
party disagreement Δ about U’s choice to φ or not-φ, then the desire-types that are 
weighted for S in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are identical; 
and the desire-types that are weighted for T in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and 
E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are identical (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Trust relationships that must exist between, and weighted desire-types of, 
S, T, and U, if S and T are in non-cognitive disagreement about whether or not U 
should φ. Arrows between individuals indicate entrusted concern relationships, and 
point from entrusting party to entrusted party. W, X, and Y, are sets of desire-
types. Their placement at the beginning or end of an arrow indicates that they are 
weighted for the party at that end of the arrow in the relationship signified by that 
arrow. 
Condition Five. Where X and Y are parties to a third-party disagreement about 
what Z should do, X must have preferences concerning choices to waive or not waive 
qua Z’s partner that are ‘in harmony’ with X’s preferences regarding Z’s actions. It 
must not be possible for X to (rationally) both prefer, qua partner to Z, that Z should φ, 
and, qua partner to Y, to lack an accommodation-obliging preference that Y should 
waive if both Y and Z prefer that Z should not-φ; nor to lack a discretion-licencing 
preference to not-waive if both X and Z prefer that Z should φ. 
Note that the satisfaction of Condition Five is not guaranteed by that of Condition 
Four, because the considerations that explain X’s preference that Z should φ may not 
exhaust the considerations bearing on X’s preferences concerning whether or not to 
waive qua Z’s partner if Z also prefers φ, or on whether or not Y should waive qua Z’s 
partner if Y and Z prefer that Z should not-φ. For instance, even if we suppose that X’s 
waiving qua Z’s partner when (Z prefers to φ and Y prefers that Z not-φ) always raises 
the probability that Z not-φs, X might (for all Condition Four says) prefer to waive 
(despite her preference that Z should φ) because it would make X seem interestingly 
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unpredictable; this is a consideration that does not bear upon X’s preference that Z 
should φ. In light of these observations, it will not be clear what it would take to satisfy 
Condition Five. I will address this question in 3.3.3. 
Here is a more careful statement of the condition. Necessarily, if Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉 exists, 
then the terms of E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and 
E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are such that, necessarily (holding fixed everything except S’s and T’s 
beliefs and desires), if U prefers to φ qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, 
and S and T have voiceable preferences qua parties to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 or 
E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, then either 
(i) (a) S qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U φ, and 
 (b) T qua party to E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U not-φ, and 
 (c) S prefers qua party to E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that S not waive in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, 
and 
 (d) T prefers qua party to E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that S waive in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; or 
(ii) (a) S qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U not-φ, and 
 (b) T qua party to E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U φ, and 
 (c) S prefers qua party to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that T waive in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and 
 (d) T prefers qua party to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that T not waive in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; or 
(iii) (a) S qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U φ, and 
 (b) T qua party to E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U φ; or 
 (c) S prefers qua party to E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that S not waive in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, 
and 
 (d) T prefers qua party to E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that T not waive in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; or 
(iv) (a) S qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U not-φ, and 
 (b) T qua party to E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 prefers that U not-φ. 
(Lines (i) and (ii) describe states in which S and T have a third-party disagreement; lines 
(iii) and (iv) describe states in which they do not.) This concludes my statement of the 
conditions for third-party disagreement. 
Condition Three ensures that the parties to a third-party disagreement actually 
disagree with each other according to the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis. Because of 
this condition, cases of third-party disagreements ought to elicit intuitions that the 
putative disagreers actually disagree. But the main challenge I face in accounting for the 
phenomenon of third-party disagreement is to explain why the things that count as third-
party disagreements according to the Four Relationships Hypothesis can properly be 
said to be disagreements about the actions of the third party. To meet this challenge I 
must complete two tasks: I must show that the things that the Four Relationships 
hypothesis counts as third-party disagreements are intuitively disagreements about the 
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third party’s actions. And I must show that, if the parties to one of these things were to 
express their disagreeing preferences, they would plausibly voice preferences that were 
about the entrusted parties’ actions, rather than about the waiving choices of one or the 
other party. 
One obvious point I can make with regard to the first task is that, according to the 
Four Relationships Hypothesis, if S and T have a third-party disagreement about 
whether U should φ, they necessarily have conflicting voiceable preferences about 
whether or not at least one of S and T should waive qua U’s partner. Condition Three 
requires this; Condition Two guarantees that they share the trust relationships that 
entitle them to voice these preferences. So some of their preferences have something to 
do with bringing it about that U is more or less likely to φ. I don’t think that this suffices 
to make their disagreement one about whether U should φ, but it intuitively brings it 
into a closer resemblance to such a disagreement than it would have had, had their 
preferences been about something completely unrelated, or about (e.g.) whether or not 
they themselves should φ in U’s situation. Condition Two explains how S and T could, 
at least in some sense, be at odds with each other about U’s actions; Condition Three 
requires that they would. 
The network of trust relationships required by Conditions One and Two, and the 
‘harmony’ among the preferences of the parties in each of the relationships required 
particularly by Conditions Four and Five, allows me to address the second task. These 
explain why a third-party disagreement can properly be described as a clash among 
preferences concerning what the third party should do,93 and hence why the parties 
would express their disagreement by voicing preferences concerning what the third 
party should do. 
Suppose that S has a third-party disagreement Δ with T about whether U should φ. 
In accordance with Condition Three, S and T are parties to one or two (if U lacks a 
preference) non-third-party disagreements about whether or not one of them is to waive 
qua U’s partner. (Call the one- or two-member set of these disagreements D.) But 
common sense tells us that if two people disagree in preference about the actions of a 
third party, the preferences they voice will be preferences about those actions, not about 
the waiving choices of one of the parties to the disagreement. Why, if they are in 
disagreement(s) D, should S and T voice preferences about whether U should φ, rather 
                                                 
93 This is a non-normative ‘should’. 
82 
 
than about whether S or T should waive qua U’s partner? Let’s start by explaining why 
S and T can communicate to each other the preferences that put them in D by voicing 
preferences concerning whether U should φ, then consider why they would.  
The ‘harmony’ required by Conditions Four and Five among S’s and T’s 
preferences in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 
means that if S voices a preference that U should φ, T can infer that S has the preference 
that opposes T’s in D, whatever D is about. If U prefers to not-φ, then D is a 
disagreement about whether T should waive (qua U’s partner, of course), and T can 
infer that S prefers that T should waive. If U prefers to φ, then D is a disagreement 
about whether S should waive, and T can infer that S prefers not to waive. If U lacks a 
preference between φ-ing and not-φ-ing, then D is a set of two disagreements, one about 
whether T should waive, the other about whether S should waive, and T can infer that S 
prefers that T should waive in the first, and that S should not waive in the second. So S 
and T can communicate to each other the preferences that put them in D by voicing 
preferences concerning whether U should φ—the preferences that put them in third-
party disagreement. 
Why would they voice these preferences? D is a disagreement about what S 
and/or T is to do; surely it would be weirdly indirect to voice preferences concerning 
what U should do instead. But in a way, the specific actions that D is about are not what 
put S and T at odds with each other. Suppose the following. U prefers to not-φ; D is 
thus a disagreement about whether T should waive. U subsequently changes her mind, 
and comes to prefer to φ. Now S and T are no longer in D; they no longer disagree 
about whether T should waive. But they are still in non-third-party disagreement—this 
time about whether S should waive. And exactly the same desires, and the same 
considerations concerning U’s actions, put them in disagreement. So voicing 
preferences concerning what U should do is not really indirect—rather, it avoids 
complications about who is to waive qua U’s partner, and places the focus on what 
robustly puts S and T at odds. Thus for most purposes, S’s and T’s disagreement is most 
aptly described as a disagreement about what U should do.94 
The robustness of third-party disagreements, according to the Four Relationships 
Hypothesis, with respect to changes in the third party’s preferences is thus an important 
                                                 
94 I shall be forced to revise this part of my explanation of third-party non-cognitive 
disagreement. See Appendix E. 
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part of what makes them third party disagreements. It is to predict this robustness that 
the hypothesis requires there to be four entrusted concern relationships connecting the 
two disagreers and the third party, even though a non-third-party disagreement only 
ever exists in two of these relationships at a time. Why wouldn’t three relationships 
suffice instead of four? Suppose that each of S and T is an entrusting party in an 
entrusted concern relationship with U (call these E〈S,U〉 and E〈T,U〉), that T is an 
entrusted party in an entrusted concern relationship with S (call this E〈S,T〉) which gives 
S a voice in T’s waiving choices qua U’s partner. These are the only entrusted concern 
relationships connecting the three; importantly, T does not have a voice in S’s waiving 
choices. For simplicity’s sake, suppose that the weighted desire-types for S, T, and U in 
all of these relationships are the same, and that there is a ‘harmony’ constraint, similar 
to that imposed by Condition Five, that prevents S from preferring that T should not 
waive when S disagrees with U in E〈S,U〉 and T ‘agrees’ with U in E〈T,U〉, etc. 
Now suppose the following: in E〈S,U〉 and E〈T,U〉, U prefers to φ; in E〈S,U〉 S 
prefers that U should not-φ; in E〈T,U〉 T prefers that U should φ; and in E〈S,T〉 S 
prefers that T should waive qua U’s partner (as ‘harmony’ requires). No one has yielded 
or waived. S and T disagree. What is wrong with the hypothesis that this is a third-party 
disagreement? The problem is that this disagreement is specifically about whether T 
should waive, for it persists only as long U’s preferences are such that T’s waiving 
would increase the likelihood that U would not-φ—only as long as U has a preference in 
E〈T,U〉 and E〈S,U〉 that ‘agrees’ with T’s and disagrees with S’s. If U’s preference 
changes, then S and T are no longer at odds, for T’s waiving would not affect U’s 
choices, and, though S’s waiving might, T lacks a voice in S’s waiving choices. 
I said above that the Four Relationships Hypothesis aims to capture a necessary or 
at least typical feature of normative disagreements about the actions of third parties, 
namely, that if people voice disagreeing judgements about what someone else should do 
(or ought to do, etc.), then they voice judgements that they think the third party would 
recognize as applying to him. It will perhaps be obvious by now how the hypothesis 
purports to do this. I have already explained why the parties S and T to a third-party 
disagreement Δ would voice preferences concerning what the third party U should do 
rather than what about what waiving choices they themselves should make. The 
‘harmony’ required by Conditions Four and Five among S’s and T’s preferences in 
E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈T,S,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, and E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 means that these 
preferences are also S’s and T’s accommodation-obliging preferences in their 
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relationships with U. Thus the preferences two people will voice qua parties to a third-
party disagreement are the same preferences that the third party is obliged to 
accommodate if he is to live up to their trust, unless he has discretion-licencing 
preferences of his own. Thus he would recognize the preferences the disagreers voice as 
applying to him. 
In summary, the Four Relationships Hypothesis predicts that we would have an 
intuition of robust non-cognitive disagreement when we are presented with a case of 
third-party disagreement, because it requires that there should be at least one robust 
non-third-party non-cognitive disagreement between the parties to a third-party 
disagreement. It explains why S and T would, in at least a vague sense, be at odds with 
each other concerning U’s φ-ing, by requiring that they be in non-third-party 
disagreement about whether one or both of them should waive their entitlement to 
demand that U should φ or not-φ. It explains why, despite the fact that this non-third-
party disagreement concerns whether one or both of S and T should waive their 
entitlement to a voice in U’s φ-ing, it is nonetheless most apt, for normal purposes, to 
describe them as being in disagreement about whether U should φ, and as so disagreeing 
in virtue of holding conflicting preferences concerning whether U should φ. And it 
explains why S and T would assume that the preferences that put them in third-party 
disagreement are ones that would have practical significance for U himself. Because of 
this, and assuming that we tacitly infer that Conditions One to Five hold in any intuitive 
case of non-cognitive third-party disagreement, I contend that these features suffice to 
explain the phenomenon of non-cognitive third-party disagreement. 
Of course this is a big assumption, and as long as it remains just an assumption I 
can’t claim to have adequately explained the phenomenon. In the next chapter 1 will try 
to explain, for at least a small range of apparent third-party disagreements, why it is 
reasonable to assume that the four requisite relationships among the disagreers and the 
agent would obtain. Because my aims are metaethical, and because I am postulating that 
moral judgements are possible in virtue of moralists’ membership of what I call ‘dual-
order fully connected networks’, I will focus my attention on third-party disagreement 
in networks of entrusted concern relationships of this sort. I address the question of why 
we plausibly assume that the four appropriate relationships exist in Football (Parents I) 
and Marriage (Imperatives) in Appendices C and D, but my explanations assume 
knowledge of Chapter 3. 
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3 
Networks of Trust 
In Part II I will argue that moralists are members of a certain kind of network of 
entrusted concern relationships. Each member is an entrusted party and an entrusting 
party in an entrusted concern relationship with each other member. The weighted 
desire-types for all parties in all these relationships are identical. The relationships are 
different from those we considered in Chapter 1, for if a member of this network wants 
to change another’s behaviour, she could rarely if ever hope to do so by simply 
demanding, qua entrusting party, that he do as she prefers; usually, the best strategy 
available to her will be to change the reasoning behind his discretion-licencing 
preferences. Partly because of the homogeneity of weighted desire-types among 
moralists, if she succeeds in changing his discretion-licencing preferences, she will 
change his accommodation-obliging preferences too, and so will change the demands he 
makes of others. Moralists engage with the reasoning behind the preferences of other 
moralists even when they are not contemplating performing any actions. They will 
reason with each other about the actions of others, and have third-party non-cognitive 
disagreements. 
These features of the moral trust network are supposed to explain, or partly 
explain, basic facts about our moral practices: moralists reason with each other about 
what they should do instead of merely making demands of each other; they argue 
together about what others should do; and they demand that all other moralists perform 
(or forbear from performing) the same behaviours, and strive to exhibit these behaviours 
themselves. My aim in this chapter will be to explain why a network of trust 
relationships with these particular features of my postulated moral trust network would 
exist and how it would work, and also to show, where I can, that I am not postulating 
anything too unfamiliar. 
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I shall thus have three concerns in this chapter: to identify a type of trust network 
that permits its members to have third-party disagreements according to the Four 
Relationships Hypothesis defended in Chapter 2, and has the other features of the moral 
trust network that I have mentioned; to identify the conditions under which we should 
expect such a trust network to exist; and, along the way, to give examples of trust 
networks with some or all of these features where possible. 
I shall start by considering a simple kind of trust network, whose members consist 
of a single entrusted party and multiple entrusting parties. I call this a ‘common 
entrusted party network’. The relationships among the members of a common entrusted 
party network can make competing demands of the common entrusted party, potentially 
making the network unstable. In Subsection 3.1.2 I identify two ways in which in which 
this problem can be avoided. The application of one of these solutions to the problem of 
instability produces common entrusted party networks that have important features in 
common with the moral trust network. I identify an example of such a network in 1.3. In 
3.1.4 I describe the features of a salient version of this sort of network, which I call a 
‘uniform weighted desires network’. I explain why we should expect such networks to 
exist. Trust networks more elaborate than uniform weighted desires networks are 
needed to allow entrusting parties to disagree about the actions of a common entrusted 
party. In 3.2.3 I identify a kind of trust network consisting of many ‘overlapping’ 
uniform weighted desires networks which does permit third-party non-cognitive 
disagreement, and has all of the features of the moral trust network that I alluded to 
above. I describe the circumstances in which we should expect to find these networks. 
Throughout these sections I largely ignore the problem of how Condition Five of the 
Four Relationships Hypothesis could be met—of how ‘harmony’ could be achieved. I 
finally address this problem in Section 3.3. 
Before proceeding, I must say something about my methods and assumptions in 
this chapter, and the breadth of my brush. Throughout this chapter 1 shall be making 
empirical claims about the trust relationships that tend to exist among human beings in 
various circumstances. I shall appeal to two types of considerations to support these 
claims: facts about what would serve the interests of members of the hypothesized 
relationships; and intuitions—mainly about disagreement, about who has voices in 
whose decisions, and about what sorts of grounds certain people can appropriately cite 
in support of their voiced preferences. These intuitions support my empirical hypotheses 
only if certain other propositions are credible. These include the theories about 
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disagreement and the social bases for having a voice a decision that I defended in 
Chapters 1 and 2. They also include the proposition that our intuitions about 
disagreement and about voiceable preferences are accurate. That is, such intuitions, 
concerning a certain case, are well correlated with the facts about who would actually 
disagree with whom, and who would actually have voiceable preferences in whose 
decisions, if the case were real. I shall assume that our intuitions are accurate in this way 
in what follows. This is a plausible assumption: it would be odd if our intuitions about 
who has voices in whose decisions were very inaccurate, given the importance that 
these sorts of social facts presumably have for our welfare and reproductive success. 
Not all of the assumptions I have made in this chapter are plausible. Some are 
most likely false, and are moreover inconsistent with claims I have committed to 
elsewhere. The material in this chapter is very complicated—it is the most difficult part 
of the thesis. I have chosen to make simplifying assumptions to avoid complicating it 
further. The most important of these will only become apparent late in this dissertation, 
when I revise my account of the obligations and entitlements of entrusted parties.95 
These revisions are relevant to the success of the arguments I make in this chapter, but I 
have chosen to postpone them and ignore them here for simplicity’s sake. In Section 
3.3, I have also chosen to ignore certain complications arising from the fact that 
entrusted parties in large networks will be ignorant of many of their partners’ 
preferences. 
3.1 Conditions for Stability in Common Entrusted Party Networks 
3.1.1 The Main Source of Conflict 
A person may, of course, be an entrusted party in more than one entrusted concern 
relationship at the same time (my Four Relationships Hypothesis presupposed this). He 
may have decisions to make in which several entrusting parties have voices. For 
instance, a young woman who wants to marry a certain man may find that this 
preference puts her in disagreement with various relatives who would rather she married 
someone else. Where multiple entrusting parties have a common partner, and both have 
                                                 
95 In 8.2.1 I argue, very roughly, that entrusted parties are only obliged to do what their evidence 
indicates would best satisfy their partners’ weighted desires, and that they only have discretion 
to resist doing this if it is to perform the actions that their evidence indicates would best satisfy 
their desires. 
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voices in the same decisions of that common partner, they and he are members of what I 
will call a common entrusted party network. 
Common entrusted party networks will be unstable unless the terms of the trust 
relationships are constrained in certain ways. An example will illustrate the main source 
of instability. Suppose that A1 and A2 are entrusting parties who share the same partner 
B, and have voices, qua B’s partner, in the same set of decisions. A1 prefers that B 
should φ; A2 prefers that B should not-φ; neither entrusting party is willing to yield. 
Presumably, different desire-types might be weighted for B in B’s relationships qua 
partner to A1 and A2. Accordingly, B may have discretion-licencing preferences 
favouring different options in these relationships. Here are the possible combinations of 
B’s preferences between φ and not-φ: 
 Qua A1’s partner Qua A2’s partner 
(1) B prefers φ  B prefers φ 
(2) B prefers φ  B prefers not-φ 
(3) B prefers not-φ B prefers φ 
(4) B prefers not-φ B prefers not-φ 
Let’s consider the consequences of these possible combinations. 
In situation (1), B must either φ or violate A1’s trust. He has a discretion-licencing 
preference to φ in both relationships. He could yield to A2’s preference that he not-φ, 
but if he does so, he will defy A1’s preference despite lacking a discretion-licencing 
preference to not-φ, which violates the terms of his trust relationship with A1. In (2) B 
cannot avoid violating either A1’s trust or A2’s. His preferences in each trust 
relationship agree with those of his partner, but he cannot satisfy both of these 
preferences, because they are for incompatible actions. If he φs he defies both A2’s 
preference, and his own discretion-licencing preference qua A2’s partner. If he not-φs 
he defies both A1’s preference, and his own discretion-licencing preference qua A1’s 
partner. There are no problems in situation (3). B can yield to either A1 or A2 without 
defying her discretion-licencing preferences in the other relationship. Situation (4) 
mirrors situation (1); B must either not-φ or violate A1’s trust. If he yields to A2’s 
preference and not-φs, he defies both A1’s preference and his own discretion-licencing 
preference. 
These outcomes are summarized in this expanded version of the table above: 
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 Qua A1’s partner Qua A2’s partner Outcome 
(1) B prefers φ  B prefers φ  B must not yield (he must φ) 
(2) B prefers φ  B prefers not-φ B must violate someone’s trust 
(3) B prefers not-φ B prefers φ  B must yield to either A1 or A2 
(4) B prefers not-φ B prefers not-φ B must not yield (he must not-φ) 
In situation (2) one of B’s trust relationships is imperilled no matter what B does. If (2)-
type situations are possible in a common entrusted party network, the network is 
unstable. It does not make sense for both entrusting parties to trust the common 
entrusted party (assuming they know of each other’s relationship with him), nor for the 
entrusted party to commit to accommodate both entrusting parties’ preferences. So we 
should expect actual common entrusted party networks, if they exist, to rule out (2)-type 
situations somehow. 
3.1.2 Two Ways to Rule Out (2)-Type Situations  
As far as I can see, there are two options for ruling out (2)-type situations. First, (2) can 
only occur if B can have different discretion-licencing preferences qua A1’s partner and 
qua A2’s partner. This possibility would be ruled out if the terms of B’s relationships 
with both A1 and A2 counted exactly the same desire-types as weighted for B. Under 
this arrangement, if A1 and A2 had opposing preferences, the trust network would not 
necessarily be threatened, for B could act on his discretion-licencing preference in both 
relationships without violating anyone’s trust. B could not yield to either party however. 
Or rather, he could never yield to one party in such a situation without violating the 
other’s trust. Every choice situation he faced qua entrusted party, when A1’s and A2’s 
preferences were for incompatible options, would resemble possibility (1) or (4). The 
acceptability of this sort of arrangement might depend on how many entrusting parties 
were sharing the same partner. The more entrusting parties there were, the less likely it 
would be that they would ever all have preferences for the same option, and the less 
likely it would be that the common entrusted party would ever yield to any of them. Call 
this the uniform discretion-licencing desires solution, and call a common entrusted party 
network employing this solution a uniform discretion-licencing desires network. 
(‘Discretion-licencing desire’ is not part of my established terminology; it refers to a 
weighted desire of an entrusted party. I shall not use it except in the labels introduced 
above.) 
According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, (2)-type situations are prevented from 
arising in the moral trust network by means of this solution. Since I do not want my 
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postulated moral trust network to seem exotic in this regard, I shall try to provide 
evidence that non-moral trust networks employing this solution also exist. One of my 
aims in this subsection will be to establish what would constitute evidence of this sort.  
Consider now the second way of preventing (2)-type situations. B presumably has 
trust-desires not to violate A1 and A2’s trust. These desires could be weighted for B; 
they could be, as I shall say, weighted trust-based desires. In 1.2.2 I argued that, as a 
general matter, entrusted parties’ trust-based desires are not weighted. But by this I 
meant that an entrusted party’s trust-based desires in a particular entrusted concern 
relationship would not be weighted for him in that relationship. The possibility that I 
am now broaching is that the entrusted party in a common entrusted party network 
might have trust-based desires qua party to one relationship in the network that are 
weighted for him in other relationships in the network. 
Actually, talk of ‘weighted trust-based desires’ is a bit broad for our purposes. Let 
me introduce a distinction among trust-based desires. An entrusted party’s 
accommodative trust-based desires are, I shall say, those of his trust-based desires that 
incline him to accommodate his partner’s preferences. An entrusted party’s discretional 
trust-based desires are those of his trust-based desires that incline him not to exceed his 
discretion (i.e. not to do anything beyond what his rational discretion-licencing 
preferences licence him to do).96 Thus his accommodative desires incline him to act on 
his partner’s voiceable preferences, and his discretional desires incline him to act on his 
own voiceable preferences (rather than defy both them and his partner’s preference). 
Note that an entrusted party does not exceed his discretion when he yields to his 
partner’s voiceable preference in defiance of his own, so his discretional trust-based 
desires will never incline him to resist yielding. Accommodative and discretional 
desires need not be basic, and may be derived from substantially the same more-basic 
desires, such as the entrusted party’s desire to preserve his trust relationship. (Thus the 
idea that B might have weighted trust-based desires contradicts my hypothesis that 
weighted desires must be basic—more on this shortly.) 
According to the second solution to the instability problem, B would have 
weighted discretional desires. More precisely, B’s desire not to violate A1’s trust by 
                                                 
96 ‘Discretional desires’ are not to be confused with ‘discretion-licencing desires’. I am avoiding 
the more familiar word ‘discretionary’ to avoid the suggestions, which it seems to encourage, 
that these desires are (i) desires that an entrusted party possesses because he has discretion to 
possess them, (ii) desires that he is permitted act upon because he enjoys discretion, or (iii) 
desires he has to exploit his discretion. 
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exceeding his discretion might be weighted for him qua A2’s partner, and his desire not 
to violate A2’s trust by exceeding his discretion might be weighted for him qua A1’s 
partner. If this were the case, then (2)-type situations would be impossible. Suppose that 
a prima facie (2)-type situation eventuated—that is, a situation in which A1 preferred φ, 
A2 preferred not-φ, and B, bracketing his weighted discretional desires, preferred φ qua 
A1’s partner and not-φ qua A2’s partner. ‘Unbracketing’ B’s weighted discretional 
desires, we find that B would have a weighted desire qua A1’s partner not to violate 
A2’s trust, and a weighted desire qua A1’s partner not to violate A1’s trust. These 
would suffice to give B discretion-licencing preferences in each relationship to do what 
the entrusted party in the other relationship wanted him to do. As a consequence, B 
would find himself in an unproblematic (3)-type situation rather than a genuine (2)-type 
situation. Call this the weighted discretional desires solution. 
Note that my claim that this solution makes (2)-type situations impossible was 
based on the assumption that B’s weighted discretional desires would be strong enough 
to turn any prima facie (2)-type situation into a (3)-type situation. This assumption will 
admittedly not always hold. But the weighted discretional desires solution resolves the 
problems raised by (2)-type situations even if it does not rule those situations out. (2)-
type situations initially seemed problematic because they forced B to violate trust no 
matter how much he desired to avoid it. B would suffer the (e.g. reputational) penalties 
for untrustworthiness, no matter how trustworthy he was, and this would make 
becoming a common partner to A1 and A2 an ill bargain to B. By contrast, the 
possibility that B might be ‘forced’ to violate someone’s trust because he didn’t care 
enough about living up to that trust seems far less problematic. If B suffers a loss of 
reputation through violating trust where this is the result of a lack of trust-based 
motivation, this loss of reputation does not seem arbitrary, for this lack of motivation is 
indeed evidence that B is not trustworthy (or, in less normatively loaded terms, that 
trusting B is risky). If B knew himself to be trustworthy, the possibility of his ending up 
in (2)-type situations would appear to him too remote to inhibit him from becoming a 
common partner to A1 and A2. So although the weighted discretional desires solution 
does not eliminate the possibility of (2)-type situations entirely, it does make this 
possibility less counterproductive. 
Variations on the weighted discretional desires solution are possible. We might 
call the version of the solution described above the symmetrical weighted discretional 
desires solution, for it proposes that B’s desires to live up to each entrusting party’s trust 
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would be weighted for him qua each other entrusting party’s partner. Asymmetrical 
versions of the solution are possible too. Perhaps B’s desire not to violate A1’s trust 
would be weighted in his relationship with A2, but his desire not to violate A2’s trust 
would not be weighted in his relationship with A1. If so, B would always be obliged to 
yield to A1, never to A2, in prima facie (2)-type situations. This would turn prima facie 
(2)-type situations into (1)-type situations, rather than (3)-type situations, as the 
symmetrical version of the solution does. The asymmetrical version would make sense 
if B had an incentive to be more deferential to A1 than A2, e.g., if A1 were B’s parent, 
and A2 were a more distant relative. In groups where the number of entrusting parties 
with a common partner exceeds two, various mixtures of asymmetrical and symmetrical 
versions of the weighted discretional desires solution are possible. 
What are the drawbacks of the weighted discretional desires solution? Although I 
intend to find fault with this solution in order to establish a place for the uniform 
discretion-licencing desires solution, there is one ‘problem’ with the weighted 
discretional desires solution that I wish to ignore. This is that, whereas weighted desires 
must, as I argued in 1.2.2, be basic, trust-based desires may be (and I think typically are) 
derived from other more fundamental desires. I don’t want to reject the weighted 
discretional desires solution on this ground because my argument that weighted desires 
must be basic is too weak to lean on. Moreover, even if this argument were correct, 
there might be a way to capture the spirit of the weighted discretional desires solution 
by identifying the basic desires from which discretional desires are derived, and 
hypothesizing that these would be weighted.97 
A genuine problem of the symmetrical versions of the weighted discretional 
desires solution is that they may seem to give too much licence to entrusted parties. 
Suppose that John’s mother and father both have voices in John’s decision as to whether 
he plays football, and that they have opposing voiceable preferences: John’s father 
prefers that he play; John’s mother prefers that he not play. Suppose further that this is a 
prima facie (2)-type situation: bracketing weighted discretional desires, John has a 
discretion-licencing preference qua his father’s partner to do as his father prefers and a 
discretion-licencing preference qua his mother’s partner to do as she prefers. John also 
                                                 
97 These basic desires might need to specified in such a way as to ensure that they would not 
influence B’s preference otherwise than by the support that they gave to his discretional desires. 
Restrictions on admissible grounds, such as I discuss in Section 3, might be of use in this 
regard. 
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has a non-weighted desire to play football because he wants to emulate the popular kids. 
Because of this desire, he has a pre-trust preference to play football (he would not have 
had such a preference otherwise). Finally, the symmetrical weighted discretional desires 
solution is in effect: John has weighted desires to live up to his mother’s trust qua his 
father’s partner, and to live up to his father’s trust qua his mother’s partner. This means 
that John is free to choose which of his parents he will yield to (as in a (3)-type case). 
This choice is unconstrained by trust-based considerations, so he can, and presumably 
will, choose to play football so that he can emulate the popular kids. It might seem 
undesirable to John’s parents that he should be free to make his choice on these sorts of 
grounds, whenever they had opposing preferences concerning what he should do. The 
uniform discretion-licencing desires solution might seem preferable here, because it 
would mean that John would at least have to choose on the basis of his weighted 
desires. 
This problem of the weighted discretional desires solution does not strike me as 
very serious in contexts in which only a few entrusting parties share a common partner 
(and have voices in the same decisions). It becomes more serious as the number of 
entrusting parties increases. For as it increases, the number of differing sets of desire-
types that are weighted for B in his different relationships increases, and the probability 
that different entrusting parties in the network will have mutually unsatisfiable 
voiceable preferences increases. And so the likelihood that B will find himself in a 
prima facie (2)-type situation increases. That is, there will be an increasing likelihood 
that, bracketing B’s weighted discretional desires, there will be some A1 and some A2 
among B’s partners, and some φ, such that A1 prefers that B should φ, B prefers qua 
A1’s partner that he should φ, A2 prefers that B should not-φ, and B prefers qua A2’s 
partner that he should not-φ. If this ever occurs, then B will be free to choose to φ or 
not-φ on the basis of his pre-trust desires, and his weighted discretional desires will 
licence him to do so in all of his relationships. The end result is that B’s actions will 
only occasionally be constrained by his discretion-licencing preferences or by the 
demands that particular entrusting parties make of him; he will very often be able 
simply to act on the promptings of his pre-trust desires, without fear of violating trust. 
Thus the trust relationships between B and his partners will influence his behaviour only 
to a limited degree, and only in a haphazard way. 
I may seem to have exaggerated the problems of the weighted discretional desires 
solution a bit here, by ignoring the fact that, when B exploits the licence that this 
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solution gives him in prima facie (2)-type situations, he strains the trust of at least one 
of his partners. The implementation of the weighted discretional desires solution gives 
B a discretion-licencing preference to resist whichever demands he wants to resist in 
prima facie (2)-type situations, but, as ever (at least in the kinds of entrusted concern 
relationships we have considered so far), resisting entrusting parties’ accommodation-
obliging preferences involves straining their trust. So B is not freed from trust-related 
pressures altogether in these situations. 
This would be a stronger point in favour of the weighted discretional desires 
solution were the influence of ‘strain’ on an entrusted party’s situation not itself rather 
problematic in contexts in which a large number of entrusting parties shared a partner. 
For such entrusting parties will frequently have preferences for the common entrusted 
party to choose incompatible options, and the entrusted party has no choice in these 
situations but to act on her discretion-licencing preferences qua partner to some subset 
of the entrusting parties, and so strain the trust of this subset. And, no matter how 
judiciously the entrusted party chooses, he is bound, over the course of a long enough 
series of decisions, to violate some entrusting party’s trust. This is counterproductive. 
Trust violations diminish one’s reputation, and if being a partner to all of these 
entrusting parties means being unable to avoid violating trust, occupying this role will 
be unattractive. The obvious way to overcome this problem is to greatly weaken the 
entrusted parties’ obligations to accommodate the preferences of (most of) the 
entrusting parties, so that he can defy them again and again, in conformity to his 
discretion-licencing preferences, without significantly straining their trust. But this 
move means that the entrusted party will once again have too much licence if the 
weighted discretional desires solution is in effect.98 
Giving the common entrusted party licence to indulge his pre-trust preferences to 
a large extent might not always be unsatisfactory. If the entrusting parties in a common 
entrusted party network lack the power to induce the entrusted party to accept stringent 
terms, they might content themselves with permissive terms, as long their trust 
                                                 
98 In 1.5 below I postulate that entrusted parties may have ‘conflict excuses’ for resisting 
preferences, permitting them to defy their partners’ preferences without straining their trust 
when those preferences are for incompatible options. This would eliminate the need for 
entrusted parties to have only very weak obligations to avoid straining their partners’ trust. But 
it would also eliminate, on most occasions, the strain-based constraint on an entrusted party’s 
behaviour, that we supposed might mitigate the ‘too much licence’ problem I have raised for the 
symmetrical version of the Weighted Discretional Desires solution. 
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relationships give them a modicum of influence over the entrusted party. But there are 
better and worse ways to be permissive. And in a common entrusted party network that 
relied wholly on the symmetrical version of the weighted discretional desires solution to 
avoid the problems posed by (2)-type situations, the entrusted party would enjoy great 
latitude under circumstances that were quite fortuitous and unpredictable. If 
permissiveness was called for, it would be better to achieve it by diminishing the range 
of decisions in which the entrusting parties had voices, rather than by making the 
circumstances of his freedom random. So the symmetrical version of the weighted 
discretional desires solution seems wanting. In common entrusted party networks with 
many entrusting parties, we should expect the problem posed by (2)-type situations to 
be addressed by either the uniform discretion-licencing desires solution or an 
asymmetrical version of the weighted discretional desires solution. 
I am not aware of any general problems facing asymmetrical versions of the 
weighted discretional desires solution. It may make sense in some common entrusted 
party networks, if the entrusting parties have different levels of power over the common 
entrusted party. In such contexts, an asymmetrical version of the weighted discretional 
desires solution would allow the entrusting parties a degree of influence over the 
entrusted party that approximately reflected the varying degrees of their underlying 
power over him. 
I am now in a position to say what it would take to provide evidence that uniform 
discretion-licencing desires networks exist ‘in the wild’ rather than as a mere 
possibility. If each party in a network had equal underlying power over the common 
entrusted party, the asymmetrical weighted discretional desires solution would give 
entrusting parties unequal influence over him in an arbitrary way, and so would, I 
presume, be unsatisfactory. A symmetrical version of the solution would not have this 
problem, but would have the defect I discussed earlier: it would give the entrusted party 
too much freedom to do as he pleased, only occasionally constraining him to act on his 
discretion-licencing preferences or defer to his partners’ preferences. So I can provide 
evidence for the existence of common entrusted party networks exploiting the uniform 
discretion-licencing desires solution by giving a plausible example of a largish common 
entrusted party network all of whose entrusting parties have equal underlying power 
over the entrusted party. 
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3.1.3 Uniform Discretion-Licencing Desires Networks in the Wild 
The following elaborate case is supposed to meet these conditions. 
The Seymours are an old, wealthy, and prominent family in a certain rural 
locality. They traditionally organize and partly finance an annual spring fair involving 
maypole dancing. Pete Seymour, a crowd-pleasing man and a former professional 
sportsman, presides as the chair of the Spring Fair Planning Committee. Pete’s lack of 
concern for family tradition and his perceived commonness have earned him the 
resentment of many Seymours. When he announces his plan to remove the maypole 
dance from the fair programme and replace it with a cricket match, his continued role as 
chair of the of the Spring Fair Planning Committee becomes all but intolerable to the 
other Seymours. His great popularity in the area makes his removal from the Committee 
difficult to engineer, however. Bertie Seymour happens to acquire photographs of Pete 
behaving scandalously while drunk. Bertie could send the photos to the press. Doing so 
would make it easy to get Pete fired from the Committee, but would embarrass the 
Seymour family. 
Bertie is a Seymour in more than name: he is a proud member of the family, 
hospitably disposed towards its members and friends, and ill-disposed toward those who 
threaten it. He is a financially independent adult. Things will go better for him if the 
other Seymours think well of him, but none of them enjoys any special power over him. 
The Seymours, or at least a large subset of them, would plausibly enjoy voices in 
Bertie’s choice of whether or not to send the photographs to the press. If we imagine 
various Seymours approaching him, telling him they know about the photos, voicing 
preferences for him to do one thing or another, and citing as grounds for their 
preferences facts about the reputation and traditions of the Seymour family, their 
utterances will not seem presumptuous. If we imagine Bertie voicing contrary 
preferences in reply, citing similar facts, he will seem to disagree. This supports the 
hypothesis that a common entrusted party network would exists among the Seymours 
with Bertie as the common entrusted party if the case were real. (This line of support 
depends on the assumptions, discussed in the introduction to this chapter, that my 
theories about entrusted concern relationships and non-cognitive disagreement are 
correct and that our intuitions about who has voices in whose decisions are accurate.)  
My stipulation that none of the Seymours has a special degree of power over Bertie 
should discourage the idea that an asymmetrical version of the weighted discretional 
desires solution was in play. So it is reasonable to infer that, if Bertie’s case were real, 
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there would probably be a common entrusted party network among the Seymours 
centred on Bertie, and that (2)-type situations would be prevented in this network 
exclusively by means of the uniform discretion-licencing desires solution. 
3.1.4 The Properties and Salience of Uniform Weighted Desires Networks 
In this subsection I will describe a class of uniform discretion-licencing desires 
networks. I call the networks in this class uniform weighted desires networks, because 
their essential distinguishing feature is that the weighted desire-types of all members in 
all relationships are the same, not just the entrusted party’s ‘discretion-licencing’ 
desires. I will also argue that this class is salient among uniform discretion-licencing 
desires networks: a disproportionate range of these will be uniform weighted desires 
networks. This is because situations favouring the formation of uniform discretion-
licencing desires networks very commonly also favour the formation of uniform 
weighted desires networks. As I shall argue, the common entrusted party network that 
we assume exists in Bertie’s case is a uniform weighted desires network, and I shall 
refer to this case extensively, both as an illustration of the properties of uniform 
weighted desires networks and in my argument for their salience. I am interested in 
uniform weighted desires networks because according to fiduciary non-cognitivism the 
moral trust network is a complex of uniform weighted desires networks. By giving 
evidence for the existence of non-moral uniform weighted desires networks, I show my 
postulation of the moral trust network to be less exotic. As usual, ‘prefers’ (etc.) means 
‘voiceably prefers’ (etc.) in what follows, unless I indicate otherwise. 
Before I discuss uniform weighted desires networks specifically, let me point out 
two (typical) properties of uniform discretion-licencing desires networks. The first is a 
necessary feature of such networks, the second is a property we should contingently 
expect them to have. Here is the first: 
UDLD1. The entrusted party can never yield to any of his partners’ preferences without 
violating someone’s trust, unless each one of his partners either prefers the option that the 
entrusted party disprefers, or has waived her entitlement, or lacks a relevant voiceable 
preference. 
Suppose that, in his relationships, a common entrusted party in a uniform discretion-
licencing desires network, B, prefers to φ. (He must, of course, prefer the same option in 
all his relationships, since his weighted desires are the same in all of them.) One and 
only one of the following must be true: among B’s partners, there is 
(i) some partner who (prefers that B not-φ and has not yielded), and 
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 some partner who (prefers that B φ and has not waived); or 
(ii) some partner who (prefers that B not-φ and has not yielded), and 
 no partner who (prefers that B φ and has not waived); or 
(iii) no partner who (prefers that B not-φ and has not yielded), and 
 some partner who (prefers that B φ and has not waived); or 
(iv) no partner who (prefers that B not-φ and has not yielded), and 
 no partner who (prefers that B φ and has not waived). 
I contend that B can yield without exceeding his discretion only if either (ii) or (iv) is 
true. In (i) B can yield but would violate the trust of at least one partner who has not 
waived. In (ii) B can yield, and would not exceed his discretion in any of his 
relationships by doing so. In (iii) and (iv) B cannot yield because there is no one for him 
to yield to. So B can yield without exceeding his discretion only if (ii) is true. A fortiori 
he can yield without exceeding his discretion only if (ii) or (iv) is true. Thus, as I have 
claimed, the entrusted party in a uniform discretion-licencing desires network cannot 
yield without violating someone’s trust, unless each one of his partners either prefers the 
option that the entrusted party disprefers, or has waived her entitlement, or lacks a 
relevant voiceable preference. 
What this means is that yielding by an entrusted party will be a relatively unusual 
thing in a uniform discretion-licencing desires network. And it will tend to be rarer the 
larger the network is, because situations in which there is no partner who both prefers 
the same option as the entrusted party and has not waived will be less likely in larger 
networks. 
I’ll now turn to the second, contingent, property of uniform discretion-licencing 
desires networks: 
UDLD2. The terms of the trust relationships in the network are such that the entrusted 
party cannot significantly strain his partners’ trust by failing to yield to their preferences, 
unless each one of his partners either prefers the option that he disprefers, or has waived 
her entitlement, or lacks a relevant voiceable preference. 
I foreshadowed my claim that uniform discretion-licencing networks would have 
UDLD2 in 3.1.2 when I argued that the influence of ‘strain’ on entrusted parties in 
common entrusted party networks would be a source of instability. I explain in 
Appendix B why I have included the ‘unless…’ exception clause;99 we can ignore it for 
                                                 
99 In brief: I will postulate that the terms of the trust relationships among members of a uniform 
weighted desires network (a kind of uniform discretion-licencing desires network) may be such 
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present purposes. Let us consider why the network among the Seymours in Bertie’s case 
would probably have this property—why Bertie could not significantly strain trust by 
failing to yield.100 I shall assume in the remainder of this subsection the conclusion I 
argued for in the last: that the common entrusted party network centred on Bertie is a 
uniform discretion-licencing desires network. 
It follows from this assumption that the network has UDLD1: Bertie cannot yield 
to his partners’ preferences without violating someone’s trust, unless those preferences 
are unanimously opposed to his, Bertie will rarely have the opportunity to yield. Most 
of the time he will just have to act in accordance with his discretion-licencing 
preferences, which will often involve resisting his partners’ preferences. If repeatedly 
resisting his partners’ preferences strains and eventually breaches their trust, he will 
‘accumulate strain’ by consistently acting on his discretion-licencing preferences, and 
eventually breach some partner’s trust. This might occur even if he has never had the 
opportunity to relieve strain by yielding (without at the same time violating some 
party’s trust by defying both his own preferences and those of that party). As a general 
matter, the possibility of ending up in such a situation would make being the entrusted 
party in a large common entrusted party network unattractive, so it is reasonable to 
suppose that if a person occupied this role, the terms of his trust relationships would be 
such that he would not significantly strain trust by resisting his partners’ preferences 
(though he would, of course, violate trust by simultaneously defying his voiceable 
preferences and those of any partner).101 
Because uniform weighted desires networks are uniform discretion-licencing 
desires networks, uniform weighted desires networks will necessarily have UDLD1 and 
typically have UDLD2. I’ll now introduce the distinctive properties of uniform 
weighted desires networks, then argue for the ‘salience’ of these networks through a 
consideration of Bertie’s case. A network must have UWD1 if it is to count as a uniform 
                                                                                                                                               
that the common entrusted party strains trust by resisting the preferences of his partners, though 
only when these partners all either have preferences opposing his or have waived. This 
‘unanimity condition’ ensures that the entrusted party will not find himself in a situation in 
which he cannot avoid violating trust. 
100 In what follows, when I talk about ‘Bertie’s relationships’, ‘Bertie’s partners’, etc., I have in 
mind only the relationships Bertie shares, and the partners he has, qua member of the common 
entrusted party network I have been discussing, and not any other e.g. more personal trust 
relationships he might be a party to. 
101 My postulation of ‘conflict excuses’ in Appendix B will require a qualification of this 
generalization, but that postulation is not important to my arguments in this chapter. 
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weighted desires network; UWD2 is merely a property that we should contingently 
expect it to have given that it has UDLD2 and UWD1. 
UWD1. The weighted desire-types for all the entrusting parties in the network are the 
same as the weighted desire-types for the entrusted party. 
UWD2. Entrusting parties aspire to influence the entrusted party’s behaviour by moving 
him to change his discretion-licencing preferences rather than by inducing him to yield to 
their preferences. 
I’ll defend simultaneously the propositions that UWD1 and UWD2 would be true of 
Bertie’s case, since the plausibility of each of these propositions depends at least to 
some extent on the plausibility of the other. An obvious upshot of my assumption that 
the network centred on Bertie is a uniform discretion-licencing desires network, and my 
observation that UDLD1 holds in such networks, is that entrusting parties in Bertie’s 
case are less likely to affect Bertie’s choices by getting him to yield the more of them 
there are, because unanimity of preferences is less probable in larger groups. This raises 
the question of why anyone would want to be one of a large number of entrusting 
parties in this network, and why such parties would bother to voice preferences. 
Part of the attraction of being an entrusting party in Bertie’s network is that it 
gives one what I shall call ‘discursive entitlements’. Entrusting parties in a network of 
this sort are like all entrusting parties in that they are entitled to demand that their 
partners state what preferences they are acting upon, and their grounds for holding those 
preferences. Entrusting parties in general have this entitlement partly so that they can 
better detect abuses—so that they can better determine whether their partners’ voiced 
preferences are sincere, or whether they have just been voiced opportunistically to 
defend actions that serve the entrusted parties’ private interests. Knowing the history of 
an entrusted party’s voiced preferences, and his professed grounds for those 
preferences, an entrusting party can form a theory about his beliefs and desires in light 
of which to assess the likely sincerity of the preferences he voices subsequently. By this 
means she may better ensure that he is, to the required degree, acting to serve the 
interests that their trust relationship was formed to promote. 
An entrusting party is also entitled to have her accommodation-obliging 
preferences heard and given consideration by the entrusted party. If she voices her 
preference and supplies grounds for it, the entrusted party must be able to explain why 
the reasoning behind her preference does not make it rational for him to hold a 
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preference of the same sort.102 The stronger the similarity between the weighted desire-
types of the entrusting party and the entrusted party; and the greater the extent to which 
entrusting and entrusted parties, among the weighted desire-types that are common to 
both, may be assumed to have desires of these types that are similar in strength; the 
stronger the expectation will be that the reasoning behind the entrusting party’s 
preference should hold good for the entrusted party’s. Thus, where these similarities of 
type and strength are known to exist, the entrusting party’s ‘discursive entitlement’ to 
have her partner give consideration to her accommodation-obliging preferences 
becomes a means—albeit a highly fallible one—of influencing the entrusted party’s 
discretion-licencing preferences, and hence his actions, so as to bring them into line 
with the entrusting party’s accommodation-obliging preferences. For entrusting parties 
in common entrusted party network such as the one centred on Bertie, this is really the 
only ‘institutional’ means available (the ‘institution’ here being the common entrusted 
party network) of changing the entrusted party’s behaviour, save when he faces a 
decision concerning which all entrusting parties who have preferences and have not 
waived are unanimous in their preferences. 
We come at last to my case for UWD1 and UWD2. That UWD2 is true of Bertie’s 
case is the point I’ve just made. Bertie’s partners won’t generally hope to get him to 
yield, because this option will not usually be available to him unless he is willing to 
violate someone’s trust. Rather they will aspire to change his discretion-licencing 
preferences by exercising their discursive entitlements. They will scrutinize his 
preferences, and challenge him to show that the reasoning behind their preferences is 
mistaken, or otherwise to explain why it does not give him the same preference. 
We should expect UWD1 to be true in Bertie’s case because, as I have said, this 
sort of challenge will be more effective if potential differences between Bertie’s and the 
entrusting parties’ preferences arising from differences in their weighted desire-types 
are eliminated. The equality between Bertie’s and the entrusting parties’ weighted 
                                                 
102 It will turn out that it is because of this entitlement that my metaethical theory can partly 
accommodate Stevenson’s intuition that, ‘When you tell a man that he oughtn’t to steal, your 
object isn’t merely to let him know that people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting, 
rather, to get him to disapprove of it.’ (Charles L. Stevenson, ‘The Emotive Meaning of Moral 
Terms’, Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 19); Stevenson himself could not well explain how moral 
utterances were supposed to change people’s non-cognitive attitudes (Dreier, ‘Relativism’, 103). 
On my theory, telling someone that he ought not to steal is voicing a preference qua entrusting 
party in a uniform weighted desires network that he should follow norms forbidding stealing. It 
is because of one’s entitlement that he should heed the reasoning behind one’s preference that 
one can hope to change his preference by so doing. 
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desire-types would be brought about by fitting the latter to the former rather than vice 
versa. Because Bertie’s weighted desire-types are the most important determinants of 
his behaviour qua entrusted party, we should expect them to be shaped by the 
underlying interests of and power relationships between Bertie and the entrusting 
parties. The entrusting parties’ accommodation-obliging preferences are comparatively 
unimportant, because of the obstacles to Bertie’s yielding to them, so they can be 
shaped to serve the more inconsequential end of facilitating the use of discursive 
entitlements to influence Bertie’s preferences, at no significant cost. 
My argument for UWD1 and UWD2, applied to Bertie’s case, relies on the idea 
that being one of Bertie’s partners gives you a special entitlement to demand that Bertie 
give consideration to your preferences and their grounds, and explain his own 
preferences, so that the reasoning behind them could be examined. What exactly do I 
have in mind when I talk about the ‘reasoning’ behind the preferences of an entrusted or 
entrusting party? I mean at least the instrumental reasoning behind those preferences, 
which in this case involves the coherent proportioning of one’s voiceable preferences to 
one’s credences and weighted desires, approximately in accordance with the 
prescriptions of decision theory. 
Factual reasoning about, for instance, the consequences of sending or not sending 
the photographs to the press, also seems to be relevant here. In general, an entrusting 
party seems to be entitled to demand that her partner explain the factual reasoning 
behind his preferences, and give consideration to the factual reasoning behind her 
preferences. Suppose that John from Stevenson’s football case tells his mother that he 
wants to play football, in defiance of her preferences, for some surprising reason—say, 
because he believes it will improve his schoolwork. John’s mother seems entitled to 
demand that he explain why he thinks that playing football will improve his 
schoolwork. 
It is less clear to me that an outsider to their trust relationship lacks any similar 
entitlement. Recall Football (John and Well-Wisher). If John told Well-Wisher that 
playing football improved his schoolwork but, when asked, refused to explain why he 
believed this, he might seem to have violated a conversational norm obliging speakers 
to back up their assertions when certain conditions are met. Still, John’s mother’s 
entitlement to an explanation certainly seems stronger, and this ought to give her greater 
power to alter John’s discretion-licencing preferences through scrutinizing his reasoning 
than Well-Wisher enjoys. Moreover, while participants in a conversation might be 
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under some sort of obligation to back up their assertions, they aren’t necessarily obliged 
to make those assertions in the first place. Suppose that Well-Wisher has the same 
entitlement that John’s mother has to demand that John lay bare the reasoning behind 
the assertions he makes to explain his preferences, and hence the same capacity to 
change those preferences by pointing out flaws in his reasoning. Well-Wisher’s capacity 
to change John’s preference by scrutinizing John’s factual reasoning is nonetheless 
smaller than John’s mother’s, because Well-Wisher is not entitled to demand that John 
assert his relevant beliefs. 
In this subsection I have argued that we have reason to think that UWD1 would be 
true of the trust network in Bertie’s case, and hence that the common entrusted party 
network centred on Bertie would be a uniform weighted desires network. My arguments 
for this conclusion have not depended on any peculiar features of Bertie’s case, but 
merely on two facts which ought to hold in any uniform discretion-licencing desires 
network: namely, that the common entrusted party would not be willing to put himself 
in a situation in which he could not help but over-strain trust (my case for UDLD2 
applied to Bertie’s case), and that the entrusting parties would want their discursive 
entitlements to be more rather than less useful (my case for UWD2 applied to Bertie’s 
case). So we should expect uniform weighted desires networks to be disproportionately 
common among uniform discretion-licencing desires networks. 
3.2 Trust Networks Permitting Third-Party Disagreement 
In remainder of this chapter, my focus will be on establishing that there is a certain kind 
of uniform weighted desires network that plausibly exists, and that has the properties it 
must have for its members to have third-party non-cognitive disagreements about what 
other members should do, given the truth of the Four Relationships Hypothesis 
defended in Chapter 2. This kind of trust network is of interest because it subsumes the 
moral trust network I postulate in Part II. In the course of making this argument I hope 
to show that certain other properties of my proposed moral trust network would have 
precedents in smaller and humbler non-moral trust networks. 
In this section I will first argue that, for all I’ve said so far, it is not clear that we 
should expect the conditions for third-party non-cognitive disagreement to typically 
obtain in uniform weighted desires networks. Second, I argue that there is nonetheless a 
certain subset of uniform weighted desires networks in which we should expect these 
conditions to obtain, and argue, of some uniform weighted desires networks whose 
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members seem capable of having third-party non-cognitive disagreements, that they 
belong to this subset. I will not complete this task in Section 3.2; an explanation of how 
the ‘harmony’ condition could be satisfied will be postponed until Section 3.3. 
3.2.1 Why Might Conditions One to Five Be Met? 
Entrusting parties in a uniform weighted desires network with opposing 
accommodation-obliging preferences concerning the actions of their common entrusted 
party are not necessarily in third-party disagreement, even if no one has yielded or 
waived, because they need not share the two-way entrusted concern relationships 
required by the Four Relationships Hypothesis. But they could share such relationships. 
And the possibility that they do must be one that we are quite willing to entertain, if the 
Four Relationships Hypothesis is correct, since we can easily imagine entrusting parties 
in Bertie’s case having such disagreements. Suppose that Bertie’s cousin Agnes 
Seymour wants the Seymour name to be more highly esteemed, and that his aunt 
Augusta Seymour cares a great deal about honouring the family’s traditions. Imagine 
the following conversation: 
Photographs 
Bertie: I could send these photos to The Local Gazette. Then we could get 
Pete ousted for certain. 
Cousin Agnes: The scandal wouldn’t just embarrass Petey; it would embarrass us all. 
Aunt Augusta: You’re right Agnes. But scrapping the maypole dance! It’s a local 
tradition—a Seymour tradition! I want Bertie to send the photos. 
Cousin Agnes: Well I’d rather he didn’t. We disagree. 
Cousin Agnes and Aunt Augusta are plausibly in non-cognitive disagreement about 
what Bertie should do. 
I argue that there is an important subset of uniform weighted desires networks in 
which we should expect to find entrusting parties who are capable of having third-party 
disagreements about their common entrusted parties’ choices, but that in these cases we 
should also expect to find much ‘thicker’ networks of entrusted concern relationships 
than just those required by individual uniform weighted desires networks. I focus my 
attention on a salient subset of these, which I will call fully connected networks, to 
borrow a term from the field of network topology.103 (On my metaethical theory, the 
                                                 
103 E.g. Stan Zachary, ‘Control of Stochastic Loss Networks, with Applications’, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, 50, no. 1 (1988): 62, 66; Terrence W. Deacon, ‘Rethinking 
Mammalian Brain Evolution’, American Zoologist, 30, no. 3 (1990): 657. What I am calling 
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moral trust network is an example of such a network.) Having explained why we should 
expect members of these networks to be capable of having third-party disagreements, I 
then explain why we expect the network among the Seymours to be a fully connected 
networks, and hence why Photographs elicits an intuition of disagreement. 
I will call the facts about a group of individuals G and their environment that 
causally influence the arrangements of entrusted concern relationships we would find 
among G base conditions with respect to G. These will be facts about the desires of the 
individuals, especially the extent to which these desires would be satisfied by the same 
states of affairs (as I shall say, the extent to which they are common desires); the 
capacities of the different members of G to satisfy or frustrate these desires; and the 
distribution of ‘power’ within G. We can perhaps crudely think of a member’s ‘power’ 
as her relative capacity to satisfy or frustrate other members’ desires (i.e. any of their 
desires, not just common desires) without thereby frustrating her own. I’ll make quite a 
few simplifying assumptions about the features of a set of base conditions with respect 
to G in what follows. For instance I shall generally assume that members of G are able 
to communicate with one another, that they are not violently hostile to one another, and 
that their social setting is not of a very unusual sort. Note also that I will mainly be 
concerned with largish groups, comprising, say, ten or more individuals. 
As a foil to my account of the base conditions for fully connected networks, let 
me describe what I take to be base conditions conducive to the development of a mere 
uniform weighted desires network, one whose members would not be able to disagree 
with each other about what the entrusted party should do. The conditions, among a 
group G, are as follows: (i) G has significant common desires W; (ii) there is only one 
agent S in G who can significantly affect the extent to which W are satisfied; (iii) non-B 
members of G collectively have some power over B (though not enough collectively to 
dictate her choices); and (iv) power (over each other and over B) is fairly evenly 
distributed among non-B members. 
For all A such that A is a non-B member of G, we should expect A to entrust to B 
a concern to accommodate her W-type desires, when B’s preferences based on his W-
type desires do not give him discretion to do otherwise, and we should expect B to 
commit to do so, because of A’s power over her. Because B would be the entrusted 
                                                                                                                                               
‘fully connected networks’ are sometimes called ‘mesh networks’, though usage of the latter 
term seems to vary considerably. 
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party in an entrusted concern relationship of this sort with each other member of G, 
situations in which B has no choice but to violate some entrusting party’s trust are 
possible, unless the terms of B’s relationships are ‘designed’ to prevent such situations. 
Because the possibility of such situations is counterproductive, and because the 
alternative ways of avoiding them are flawed (for reasons that I discussed especially in 
3.1.2), at least in common entrusted party networks whose entrusting-party members 
enjoy roughly equal power, we should expect the network of trust relationships centred 
on B to be a uniform weighted desires network. (Condition (iv) makes the existence of 
an entrusting party with disproportionate influence over B unlikely, and hence makes it 
unlikely that B would have discretional desires in any relationship that were weighted 
for him in his other relationships.) 
We should not, I argue, expect B’s partners to form entrusted concern 
relationships amongst themselves giving them voices in each other’s waiving choices 
qua partners to B. This is not because it would not be in the interests of an entrusting 
party to have a voice in the other entrusting parties’ waiving choices. This would have 
advantages, though very slight ones. First, that party’s demands that other entrusting 
parties should waive might occasionally be successful, and thus, on rare occasions, she 
might be able to change a circumstance in which the common entrusted party could not 
yield to her preferences without violating other entrusting parties’ trust, into one in 
which the common entrusted party could yield to her preferences. By this means she 
could increase the probability that he would so yield. More importantly, having a voice 
in other entrusting parties’ waiving choices would give her discursive entitlements that 
they should lay bare the reasoning behind their preferences, and heed her own 
preferences and the reasoning behind them. This would allow her to bring their 
preferences into better alignment with her own by identifying flaws in their reasoning. It 
might also allow her to detect abuses on the part of entrusting parties whose voiced 
preferences opposed her own. By revealing that such parties had been deceitfully 
voicing mere pre-trust preferences as if they were accommodation-obliging, she could 
bring about their ostracism from the network, and so bring the possibility of the 
common entrusted party’s yielding to her preferences closer to reality. 
The reason why we should not expect B’s partners to share two-way trust 
relationships of a sort that would make third-party disagreement possible is simply that 
they would have no real incentive to commit to accommodate each other’s preferences 
in their waiving choices. What does an entrusting party gain by granting other entrusting 
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parties the small advantages that I have cited, so that she might have the same 
advantages herself? Why would she give rival entrusting parties the means to slightly 
improve their chances of swaying the common entrusted party, so that she might have 
the same means at her disposal? There is little to be gained by such an arrangement. 
Let’s now consider what I take to be the salient base conditions for a fully 
connected network among group G: (i) G has significant shared desires W, though there 
is considerable variation in the strengths of W-type desires among members of G; and 
(ii) all members of G can significantly affect the extent to which W are satisfied. 
All members want to avoid frustrations of their W-type desires, but the ability of 
each member to frustrate these desires makes all vulnerable. They will thus want to 
form some sort of agreement whereby they will reciprocally forbear from frustrating W-
type desires. The diversity in the strengths of W-type desires within G means that 
members will not all be willing simply to commit to follow a common comprehensive 
set of rules conformity to which would inhibit frustrations of their W-type desires. 
Rather, we would expect each member of G to entrust to each other member a concern 
to accommodate her W-type desires. Each member of G would be the common 
entrusted party in a uniform weighted desires network whose membership was G. They 
would form what I am calling a fully connected network. 
Before I consider whether the members of G would have voices in one another’s 
waiving choices, let’s consider what form such entitlements would take if they did exist. 
One issue that must be addressed initially is whether they would enjoy these 
entitlements as parties to the network of trust relationships that I have just described, or 
as parties to an additional fully connected network concerned, presumably exclusively, 
with waiving choices. I shall proceed on the assumption that that an additional (‘second-
order’) fully connected network is required. It might be possible to dispense with this 
second network, but showing this would require further argument, and perhaps a 
modification of the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis that I would not otherwise need to 
commit to. 
I will call the composite of a first-order and a second-order fully-connected 
network, of the sort that I am going to argue would exist among members of G, a dual-
order fully connected network. The ‘first-order’ network within a dual-order network is, 
of course, the network that is concerned with concrete actions; the ‘second-order’ 
network is concerned with waiving choices. (By ‘concrete actions’ I mean actions other 
than the conventional actions such as yielding and waiving that can only be performed 
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by members of entrusted concern relationships.) This vocabulary may naturally be 
extended to particular entrusted concern relationships, and particular parties in those 
relationships. Thus a first-order entrusted concern relationship is one that is concerned 
with concrete actions; a second-order entrusted concern relationship is one concerned 
with waiving choices. An entrusting party in a first-order relationship is a first-order 
entrusting party, an entrusted party in a second-order relationship is a second-order 
entrusted party, and so on. 
What desires would be weighted for parties to the second-order trust network? I 
suggest that the weighted desires for both entrusted and entrusting parties in this 
network, as in the first-order network, would be their W-type desires. W-type desires 
are, again, the desires that members of G hold in common. Exercises of entitlements by 
second-order entrusting parties would occasionally result in changes in a first-order 
entrusting party’s waiving choices, and the members of G would, I suppose, prefer that 
these waiving choices be made out of a concern to accommodate desires belonging to 
their common desire-types. 
A much more important consideration supporting my claim that weighted desires 
in the second-order network would be W-type desires is the fact this would make 
‘harmony’ among members’ preferences concerning both waiving choices and choices 
among concrete actions easier to achieve. ‘Harmony’ is desirable because it facilitates 
the scrutiny of preferences. It is generally useful for members of G if the preferences 
voiced by members of G in the first-order network are subjected to a good deal of 
scrutiny, both to determine that they are not means-end irrational, and to determine that 
they are genuinely voiceable preferences, and not ‘biased’ so as to serve members’ 
private interests. This is mainly because, if members act on instrumentally rational, 
‘unbiased’, voiceable preferences, this will tend to serve the common desires of 
members of G better than acting on instrumentally irrational or biased preferences. 
Members will also be less willing to make the sacrifices the trust network requires of 
them to the extent that they believe other members are voicing and acting on ‘biased’ 
preferences and getting away with it. Abusive members are less likely to get away with 
their abuses to the extent that the reasoning behind their preferences is well-scrutinized. 
If ‘harmony’, of the sort required by Conditions Four and Five, obtains among 
members’ preferences, then the amount of scrutiny of members’ preferences in the first-
order network is increased. The second-order network increases members’ opportunities 
to scrutinize other members’ preferences, and ‘harmony’ ensures that the additional 
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scrutiny that it enables amounts to scrutiny of parties’ preferences in the first-order 
network, and not merely in the second-order network. Whenever parties to the second-
order network scrutinize one another’s ‘waiving preferences’, they will effectively be 
scrutinizing one another’s preferences qua parties to the first-order network as well, for, 
if ‘harmony’ is guaranteed, a flaw in the reasoning behind a party’s waiving preferences 
entails a flaw in the reasoning behind her preferences among concrete actions. 
I have said that the second-order network increases members’ opportunities to 
scrutinize other members’ preferences. By having ‘opportunities to scrutinize others’ 
preferences’ here, I really mean enjoying discursive entitlements that others should lay 
bare the reasoning behind those preferences, and heed one’s criticisms of that reasoning. 
The first-order network only entitles a given member S to scrutinize the voiceable 
preferences of those of whom S is demanding certain actions, and those who are 
demanding certain actions of S. It does not entitle S to scrutinize the preferences of 
those who are making demands of others, or whose preferences oppose the demands 
that S makes of others. The second-order network does permit this. The second-order 
network increases the amount of scrutiny of preferences that is going on, and if 
‘harmony’ is established, this will all amount to scrutiny of first-order entrusted parties’ 
preferences, which are the preferences that influence members’ concrete choices. 
Equality of weighted desire-types for all in G, qua parties to the first- or the second-
order network is useful as a step toward achieving ‘harmony’, and hence to increasing 
the scrutiny of first-order entrusted parties’ preferences. 
(It will not be entirely clear yet why, as I have asserted above, a flaw in the 
reasoning behind a party’s waiving preferences entails a flaw in the reasoning behind 
her preferences among concrete actions. My argument in subsection 3.3.3 will explain 
this entailment.) 
Greater scrutiny of first-order entrusted parties’ preferences would be to the 
advantage of all. But why would it be to the advantage of an individual member S of G 
to go to the bother of scrutinizing fellow members’ preferences? S wouldn’t have any 
trust-based obligation to scrutinize anyone’s preferences, only to defend the reasoning 
behind her own preferences when challenged. I have already alluded to one motive for 
scrutiny: by correcting defects in the reasoning behind another member’s preferences, S 
can potentially bring them into better alignment with her own. If first-order entrusted 
party U prefers to φ and S prefers that he not-φ, it might be worth S’s while to look for 
faults in U’s reasoning. But S’s motive for scrutiny here does not interest us, because 
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the discursive entitlements that facilitate S’s scrutiny do not depend on the second-order 
network; S can demand that U explain his reasoning because S has a voice in U’s 
decision qua first-order entrusting party. 
Of some interest is the possibility that, if S could not change U’s preference, she 
would scrutinize the preferences of those first-order entrusting parties who preferred 
that U should φ, in the hope of changing all of their preferences, and so permitting U to 
yield to S’s preference without violating anyone’s trust. This strategy will be more 
promising if few of U’s partners preferred that he should φ, and if the terms of their 
trust relationships were such that U would significantly strain S’s trust if he did not have 
conflict excuses for resisting her preferences. 
But even if, as would normally be the case, S had no hope of changing any 
particular decision of a first-order entrusted party, S might hope to bring the preferences 
of other members of G into better alignment with hers in a general way, by scrutinizing 
those preferences that she disagreed with. If S managed to change a member T’s 
preference that U should φ to a preference that U should not φ, S would raise the 
probability that, if, at some point in the future, T qua first-order entrusted party faced a 
decision that was similar to U’s, T’s discretion-licencing preference would be in 
alignment with S’s preference. (And perhaps in that future decision S wouldn’t have the 
time or opportunity to scrutinize T’s preference.) This would give S a motive, albeit a 
fairly weak one, to engage in many disagreements (in the activity sense of 
‘disagreement’) even when winning would have no foreseeable practical issue. 
The final and perhaps most important motive for scrutinizing preferences is glory. 
Just as a person may earn a reputation for cleverness by finding errors in other people’s 
theoretical reasoning, S might do the same by finding errors in the reasoning behind her 
fellows’ voiced preferences.104 (S might also hope to discredit her rivals by this 
activity.) This incentive to scrutinize would exist even if the discovery of error would 
produce no expected change in anyone’s behaviour. 
Now that I have explained what I think the second-order network would look like 
if it existed, it should be relatively easy to see why I think it would exist. The members 
of G would be members of a second-order network because this would increase the 
                                                 
104 S will earn gratitude as well as esteem if her scrutiny reveals foul play, or a misjudgement 
that would have resulted in a serious frustration of common desires, though I think that this is 
relatively unlikely to occur if her scrutiny is of the sort that is enabled by the second-order 
network. 
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extent to which first-order parties’ preferences were scrutinized, by allowing members 
to scrutinize other members’ preferences qua parties to the second-order network. It 
would allow them to scrutinize the preferences voiced by entrusting parties in the first-
order trust network, even if those preferences did not apply to any decision that they 
were to make. This scrutiny, and the threat of it, would reveal and deter abuses, and give 
parties a greater incentive to reason carefully when forming their accommodation-
obliging and discretion-licencing preferences. The presence of this second-order 
network would permit any two members of G to have third-party disagreements, if they 
had opposing voiceable preferences concerning how another member of G should act. 
Entrusting parties in a mere uniform weighted desires network lack this reason to 
form a second-order network. They don’t have much incentive to scrutinize one 
another’s preferences because they are not themselves common entrusted parties, and 
such scrutiny won’t change their behaviour. And though it might reveal bias in their 
voiced preferences, such bias is not a serious concern anyway, for the common 
entrusted party’s behaviour will rarely be affected by the particular preferences voiced 
by entrusting parties anyway. 
3.2.2 Explaining Third-Party Disagreement in Photograph 
In this subsection I will consider first whether my hypotheses concerning the base 
conditions for fully connected networks, in conjunction with the Four Relationships 
Hypothesis, predicts that Bertie’s extended family members can disagree with each 
other about whether he should send the photographs of Pete Seymour to the press. I will 
also touch on the question of why the conditions for third-party disagreement between 
Penny’s mother and aunt in Marriage (Imperatives) might be met. 
My assumption that our intuitions about disagreement are accurate means that, 
when we judge that people in a described case disagree, we recognize that their 
circumstances are of a sort in which the social settings for disagreement would normally 
obtain. So if my account of the base conditions for dual-order fully connected networks 
is correct, and if I can make a plausible case that these conditions would obtain in 
Photograph if it were a real-world case, I will have explained our intuition of 
disagreement, given the assumption. 
I contend that the base conditions for a dual-order fully connected network would 
indeed probably obtain in that case. First, the Seymours desire to see their family’s 
traditions honoured, and its prosperity and social status promoted. Different family 
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members will care more about some of these ends than about others. Thus they have 
common desires which they cannot serve, in a manner satisfactory to all, simply by 
following a common set of rules. Second, it is very plausible that Bertie is not the only 
Seymour who can satisfy or frustrate these common desires through his actions. Anyone 
could tarnish the family’s honour by involving herself in a scandal, or revealing the 
family’s embarrassing secrets; anyone could violate the family’s traditions; many in the 
family could damage their heirs’ chances of marrying well by squandering money, or 
engage in competition damaging to the family businesses. So it is very plausible that all 
or most adult Seymours would be entrusted parties in uniform weighted desires 
networks involving the other adult Seymours. 
Thus there would plausibly be at least a subset G of Seymours such that the base 
conditions with respect to G would be conducive to the formation of a first-order fully 
connected network among G, and, if my argument above is correct, a second-order 
network entitling members to voices in one another’s waiving choices qua members of 
the former network. This second-order network would be useful, because it would 
facilitate more extensive scrutiny of members’ preferences. And it might very well 
permit Cousin Agnes and Aunt Augusta to disagree in preference about whether Bertie 
should send the photographs to the press. 
An explanation of our intuitions about Marriage (Imperatives) will begin along 
the same lines as my explanation of our intuitions about Photographs, but it could be 
completed in more than one way, and I’m not sure which of these is best. We could say, 
to start with, that there is plausibly a fully connected trust network comprising Penny, 
her mother, and some subset of Penny’s extended family. Penny’s family is clannish 
like the Seymours; its members have common ends which all members could potentially 
frustrate, so forming a fully connected network would be useful to them as a means to 
discourage such frustrations. Greater scrutiny of voiced preferences would serve their 
interests too, so forming a second-order network would also be to their advantage. 
Complications arise when we try to account for the presumed disproportionate 
power that Penny’s mother has over her. In general we should expect a trust network to 
be less appealing to its members, and so less likely to exist, if if it does not give them a 
degree of conventional influence in one another’s choices that reflects their underlying 
power relationships. A fully connected network tends to constrain everyone’s choices in 
roughly the same way, not in a way that especially satisfies the desires of the 
powerful—or rather, not in a way that tends to ensure that, for all network members S, 
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T, and U such that S has power over U and T does not have power over U, U’s choices 
are constrained in a way that tends to satisfy S’s desires more than T’s. (If there are a 
few members who have power over almost everyone, this may influence the initial 
terms of the trust network: the desire-types that are counted as weighted might be 
skewed in order to constrain behaviour in ways that serve the interests of the powerful. 
But this is not presumably relevant to Penny’s case: we don’t assume that Penny’s 
mother is the matriarch of her extended family.) Up to a certain point, I think that this is 
an unavoidable feature of fully connected networks—its unavoidability explains, 
according to fiduciary non-cognitivism, why (as is plausibly the case) morality is a more 
irksome constraint on the powerful than on the powerless. But in Penny’s case it would 
be a bit surprising if everyone in Penny’s extended family had a voice in Penny’s choice 
of spouse that was equal in strength to that of Penny’s mother. 
I offer some suggestions in Appendix D as to how Penny’s mother’s 
disproportionate power might be reflected in the arrangements of trust relationships 
among Penny’s family. In the meantime, I have found it convenient to use Penny’s case 
as a source of examples throughout the next section. To avoid the complications raised 
by Penny’s special relationship with her mother, I shall rely on a variation of the case 
which only involves Penny’s extended family. We may presume that an ordinary dual-
order fully connected network exists among Penny’s family in this case, granting 
Penny’s relatives voices in her marital choice. 
3.3 ‘Harmony’ and the Reaction Problem 
I will now finally address the problem of how Condition Five of the Four Relationships 
Hypothesis can be satisfied. My solution is unfortunately rather radical, but it will allow 
me to solve another problem as well, which I call the Reaction Problem. The latter 
problem seems to provide better motivation for my radical solution than the former, so I 
will begin by discussing the Reaction Problem, then show how its solution provides the 
means for the terms of entrusted concern relationships to guarantee ‘harmony’ between 
a person’s voiceable preferences among concrete actions and her preferences among 
waiving choices, as required by Condition Five. 
Suppose that (i) Penny has a pre-trust preference to marry Mr. Beau and a 
discretion-licencing preference not to marry him, (ii) Penny’s uncle, Arthur, has an 
accommodation-obliging preference that Penny should not marry Beau; (iii) if Penny 
goes ahead and marries Beau anyway, Uncle Arthur will avenge this violation of his 
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trust by disinheriting her; and (iv) Penny’s resulting poverty would embarrass the 
family. Penny’s cousin, Andrew, thinks that a marriage between Penny and Beau (a 
talented and promising young man from a family whose reputation has recently been 
marred by scandals) would improve the family’s standing in the long run, assuming 
Arthur did not exact his reprisal. Thus, on this assumption, Andrew would have an 
accommodation-obliging preference that Penny should marry Beau. But, since Arthur 
will condemn Penny to scandalous poverty if she marries Beau, Andrew’s preference, 
based on his weighted desires, is that Penny should not marry Beau. 
Now it seems to me that the preference we would expect Arthur to voice, in a 
disagreement with Penny or Andrew or any other member of Penny’s extended family 
about whom Penny should marry, is not this second preference, but the former—the 
preference that he would have if he did not take into consideration Arthur’s reaction to 
Penny’s breach of trust. Suppose that Arthur said, ‘I’d prefer that Penny didn’t marry 
Beau: his family is in disgrace’, and Andrew replied, ‘Yes, I’d also prefer that Penny 
should reject Beau’s suit, because if she married him you would condemn her to 
scandalous poverty, though I think that the marriage would otherwise have improved 
our family’s standing.’ This reply sounds odd or perhaps ironic, not like the sincere 
voicing of a preference. Intuitively, Andrew and Arthur really disagree about whether 
Penny should marry Beau. It seems to me that Arthur would form those preferences he 
might sincerely voice without taking account of the likely reactions of the other 
entrusting parties, as such, to Penny’s marrying or not marrying Beau. Vaguely put, it 
seems that he would consider the marriage ‘on its own merits’. 
The Reaction Problem, as it relates to entrusting parties’ preferences, arises when 
we take these appearances at face value, as I shall. It is the problem of explaining how it 
could be the case that entrusting parties in uniform weighted desires networks, and other 
similar trust networks, rationally hold voiceable preferences that they could only hold 
because they are disregarding facts about other entrusting parties’ reactions (qua 
entrusting parties) to the entrusted party’s actions. This defies the characterization of 
accommodation-obliging preferences that I have given previously, according to which 
they are simply preferences based on a certain subset of the entrusting party’s desires, 
those specified as weighted by the terms of her entrusted concern relationship. 
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3.3.1 The Admissible Grounds Hypothesis as it Applies to Entrusting Parties’ 
Preferences 
My solution to the problem is simple. I shall present a revised characterization of 
accommodation-obliging preferences, according to which a preference, based solely on 
weighted desires, can fail to be accommodation-obliging if it does not omit to take 
account of certain grounds. I call this the Admissible Grounds Hypothesis as it relates to 
accommodation-obliging preferences (I will later extend it to apply to discretion-
licencing preferences). I will use a stipulative notion of ‘grounds’ for preferences in my 
characterization of this hypothesis, which is supposed to broadly approximate our 
commonsense notion. The stipulative notion is defined below. The first definition, that 
of a ground relative to a probability function, is fundamental; the latter two depend on 
it. 
Ground relative to a probability function. Proposition q is a ground for an agent S to 
hold a preference that p based on a set of desire-types W relative to a probability function 
Pr iff, for S, the rational expected utility in terms of W-type desire-satisfaction of p on the 
supposition that q would be greater than that of p on the supposition that ~q, if S’s 
probability function were Pr. 
Ground ‘simpliciter’. Proposition q is a ground simpliciter (i.e. not relative to any 
specified probability function) for an agent S to hold a voiceable preference that p based 
on a set of desire-types W iff (i) q has some positive objective probability, and (ii) q is a 
ground for S to hold a preference that p based on W relative to the objective probability 
function. 
Ground of an agent. Proposition q is one of agent S’s grounds for holding a preference 
that p based on a set of desire-types W iff (i) S has some positive credence that q, and (ii) 
q is a ground for S to hold a preference that p, based on W, relative to S’s probability 
function (i.e. her credal state). 
According to the Admissible Grounds Hypothesis, an entrusting party’s 
accommodation-obliging preference that p is a preference that is based on all and only 
her weighted desires, taking into account all and only a certain subset of her grounds for 
preferring that p and ~p—her admissible grounds, as I shall call them. (If a ground is 
not admissible, then it is inadmissible.) An entrusting party’s admissible grounds are 
those of her grounds that fall under a set of ground-types, which I will call her 
admissible ground-types. These are specified by the terms of her entrusted concern 
relationship. 
This proposal, once refined, will allow us to solve the Reaction Problem. How is 
it that entrusting parties in uniform weighted desires networks can rationally hold 
voiceable preferences that they could only hold because they are disregarding facts 
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about other entrusting parties’ reactions to the entrusted party’s actions? Because 
propositions concerning reactions of entrusting parties as such to the entrusted party’s 
actions are not admissible grounds for accommodation-obliging preferences. 
I will present some refinements of the Admissible Grounds Hypothesis shortly. 
Before doing so, I will state an assumption that I will be making concerning admissible 
ground-types. This is a ‘virtuous’ assumption, because by making it, I avoid committing 
to claims about admissible grounds beyond those I need to make in order to explain the 
appearances that I adduced above in support of the Admissible Grounds Hypothesis. It 
roughly concerns the extent to which mutually inconsistent grounds with the same 
‘subject matter’ can differ in whether they do or do not fall under admissible ground-
types. Having thus clarified my commitments, I will defend a hypothesis concerning 
what the process of omitting to ‘take into account’ grounds actually involves. 
The assumption about admissible ground-types that I shall make has two parts. 
First, if any proposition falls under an admissible ground-type, then so does its negation; 
and if a complex proposition, composed of atomic propositions joined by logical 
connectives, falls under an admissible ground-type, then so do all the variations on that 
complex proposition that we get by negating different combinations of its 
components.105 Second, if any proposition whose content contains gradable predicates 
falls under an admissible ground-type, then so does any otherwise identical proposition 
whose content contains gradable predicates of the same sort but which pick out different 
values, or ranges of values. Thus if Mr. Beau has high social status falls under an 
admissible ground-type, so does Mr. Beau has low social status. 
This is a complicated assumption, and one that doesn’t serve my broader ends, for 
it makes explaining ‘harmony’ more difficult, and is unnecessary for my metaethical 
theory. Beyond the fact that working within its constraints is a way to avoid ad hoc 
commitments, I make this assumption because it rules out certain possibilities that I find 
counterintuitive. To wit, it would allow that certain specifications of admissible ground-
types might ‘skew’ entrusting parties’ accommodation-obliging preferences in certain 
directions, not just by forcing them to disregard certain subject matters, but by forcing 
                                                 
105 What has just been said of atomic propositions applies also to the ‘predications’ of quantified 
variables, regardless of the scope of the quantifiers. Suppose that the following proposition falls 
under an admissible ground-type: For all x such that x is a suitor of Penny, there is some y such 
that (y has a knighthood and y is related to x) if and only if x is not Mr. Beau. This being so, the 
variations on the proposition that we get from negating its various predications (e.g. y has a 
knighthood, y is related to x) also fall under an admissible ground-types. 
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them to disregard all and only those propositions on certain subject matters that 
favoured certain preferences. 
For instance, take the following proposition: 
(1) If Penny marries Mr. Beau, the family will lose money. 
Suppose that Cousin Andrew has a weighted desire that his family should be richer, and 
believes that Penny’s marrying Beau will increase his family’s wealth. And suppose 
that, contrary to my second postulation, (1) is the only ground concerning the effects of 
Penny’s marrying Beau that makes a prediction about the consequences of the marriage 
for the family’s wealth that falls under an admissible ground-type. The proposition that 
Penny’s marriage will make the family richer is thus not among Andrew’s admissible 
grounds for preferring that Penny marry Beau. However, (1) is among Andrew’s 
admissible grounds for preferring that Penny not marry Beau, for Andrew will have 
some credence in (1). So his desire that the family should be richer will end up 
supporting a preference that Penny not marry Beau, even though he believes that the 
marriage will make the family richer. If he ended up with an accommodation-obliging 
preference that Penny should not marry Beau, and were asked to give the reasons for his 
preference, we might expect him to cite his fears that the marriage would make the 
family poorer, even though he believed the contrary proposition. This strikes me as odd. 
To the extent that accommodation-obliging preferences are skewed in this way, the 
correctness of calling them preferences seems doubtful (even on my admittedly elastic 
usage); and I am not sure that non-cognitive ‘clashes’ involving thusly skewed 
preferences would elicit intuitions of robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
Given my present assumption, however, this sort of skewing should not happen, 
or at least not in cases like the one I have just described. If (1) fell under an admissible 
ground-type then so would the following (among others): 
(2) It is not the case that, if Penny marries Mr. Beau, the family will lose money. 
(3) If Penny does not marry Mr. Beau, the family will lose money. 
(4) If Penny marries Mr. Beau, it is not the case that the family will lose money. 
(5) If Penny marries Mr. Beau, the family will gain money. 
The first part of my assumption, concerning negations of propositions falling under 
admissible ground-types, ensures that (2)-(4) fall under admissible ground-types. The 
second part, concerning gradable predicates, ensures that (5) falls under an admissible 
ground-type. Since (5) is an admissible ground for Andrew, the strength of his 
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preference will reflect his desire that his family should be wealthier and his belief that 
the marriage will make it wealthier, just as we would expect. 
I have said that I have made this assumption because I find the sort of ‘skewing’ 
that it apparently prevents counterintuitive. I should admit, however, that ‘skewing’ of a 
not-too-dissimilar kind is possible even given my assumption. The terms of entrusted 
concern relationships can, by craftily making certain ‘subject matters’ inadmissible, 
block off certain paths of inference that would have supported beliefs in admissible 
grounds, while permitting inferences supporting inferences in their negations. (My 
proposal in 3.3.3 about how ‘harmony’ would be guaranteed might amount to an 
example of this sort of counterintuitive skewing.) It is not clear to me whether these 
latter kinds of ‘skewings’ are as counterintuitive as the kind I described above. 
Now I shall make a proposal concerning the adjustments an entrusting party must 
make to the representation of the world that she entertains when she disregards a 
proposition because it is inadmissible. According to my proposed interpretation of the 
original example of Penny and Mr. Beau, Cousin Andrew must disregard the following 
proposition, which I will label q, when forming his preference: Uncle Arthur will 
disinherit Penny if and only if Penny marries Beau. She must do so because 
propositions concerning reactions of members of the familial trust network as such to 
the entrusted party’s actions are not admissible grounds. But it is not clear why this 
means that q must be disregarded. q does not imply that Arthur’s action would be the 
reaction of a network member as such to an entrusted party’s actions. Its truth could 
have any number of explanations. Perhaps the following is true: Arthur only plans to 
leave part of his estate to Penny because he lacks children of his own; if Penny marries 
Beau, this will put Arthur himself in a mood to marry, with the result that he will 
produce offspring and make them his sole heirs. If this were the reason why Andrew 
believed q, we would not expect him to disregard q when forming his preference. Thus I 
don’t want to hypothesize that q falls under an inadmissible ground-type. I want to 
hypothesize that Andrew would disregard it because of what he knows about the 
reasons why Arthur would disinherit Penny. 
I propose that Andrew would have to disregard q because q is derivatively 
inadmissible—because he could not explain why he believed it without citing beliefs or 
credences in propositions that fell under inadmissible ground-types, or fundamentally 
inadmissible propositions. To ‘explain’ here is to give a justifying explanation, or—to 
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use a less obviously normative term—an explanation of the sort that would establish, or 
contribute to establishing, that his belief in q was rationally coherent. 
Now suppose that Andrew’s belief in q is supported by exactly two distinct chains 
of inference. He has some credence in the proposition that Arthur would disinherit 
Penny if she married Beau as a reprisal for her abuse of his trust, but also has some 
credence in the proposition that he would disinherit her because her marriage would put 
him in the mood for marriage himself, with the result that he would have children and 
make them his sole heirs. I propose that in this case q is inadmissible insofar as 
Andrew’s belief in it is based on the ‘reprisal’ inference, because this cites 
fundamentally inadmissible propositions concerning the reactions of network members 
as such; and that q is admissible insofar as it is based on the ‘mood’ inference. When 
forming his preference, Andrew must not take the support his belief in q gets via the 
‘reprisal’ inference into account, and must ‘hypothetically’ proportion his credence in q 
to the support it gets via the ‘mood’ inference alone. (The ‘part’ of his credence in q that 
is supported by the latter inference alone is, I shall say, his admissible credence in q.) In 
general, I propose that, roughly, an entrusting party’s preference is accommodation-
obliging if and only if it is based on all and only her weighted desires, and on her 
grounds just to the extent that they are admissible.106 
3.3.2 The Hypothesis Applied to Discretion-Licencing Preferences 
I think that there is a version of the Reaction Problem that pertains to entrusted parties’ 
preferences (whether or not it also pertains to entrusting parties’). It has nothing in 
particular to do with networks of trust relationships. I might have mentioned it in 
Chapter 1 and used it to support a postulation of admissible and inadmissible grounds in 
that chapter, but it seems an obscure and untroubling issue when considered in isolation 
from other instances of the Reaction Problem. 
The extent to which an entrusted party strains his partner’s trust has practical 
significance, and it can affect the extent to which his weighted desires are satisfied. If 
John yields in Football (Mother and Son), he relieves strain on his mother’s trust,107 and 
increases his scope to resist her preferences without violating her trust in the future. 
                                                 
106 This biconditional is not to be interpreted as a strict definition; it is not meant to answer 
every question we might have about conditions for accommodation-obligingness, such as 
whether very irrationally formed preferences can be accommodation-obliging. 
107  Or discharges ‘debt’, as discussed in Appendix 1. I ignore the distinction between strain and 
debt in what follows. 
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Suppose that John wants to stay with a friend who lives on the coast in the summer and 
learn how to surf, because he thinks that he will enjoy surfing. He knows that his mother 
would rather he didn’t, because surfing is dangerous—indeed more dangerous than 
football. John knows that if he strains his mother’s trust by playing football in the 
winter, he won’t be able to resist her preference that he not surf in the summer without 
violating her trust. She will forbid him from staying with his friend in the summer if he 
doesn’t relieve the strain he has already placed on her trust, by being acquiescent in the 
meantime—she will feel free to do this, in accordance with their mutual understanding, 
because he will have reached the limit of his discretion. Thus, all things considered, 
John doesn’t want to play football in the winter, because he wants to relieve his 
mother’s trust so that he may learn to surf in the summer. The trouble is that learning to 
surf would satisfy his weighted desires—specifically his desire for enjoyment. Since he 
wants to forbear from playing football as a means to bring it about that he surfs, and 
since this is explained almost entirely by his weighted desire for enjoyment, John has a 
discretion-licencing preference not to play football. But if he has a discretion-licencing 
preference not to play football, then he does not relieve strain on his mother’s trust by 
forbearing from playing football. He would simply violate her trust by playing football, 
because he lacks discretion to do so. 
Now, I think, we encounter a paradox: since John’s forbearing from playing 
football would no longer serve its purpose, John would no longer want to forbear from 
playing football, and so he would once again have a discretion-licencing preference to 
play football. So once again, if he refrained from playing, he could bring it about that he 
surfed in the summer. But he would want to do this for reasons of enjoyment, and so he 
would have a discretion-licencing preference not to play football. Then his forbearing 
from playing football would not serve its purpose, and he would instead prefer to play 
football. And so on.108 
If this is a genuine paradox, then we should abandon any theory that entails its 
possibility. Even if it is not a paradox, it is bizarre to suppose that John would be unable 
to relieve strain on his mother’s trust just because doing so was a means to satisfying his 
weighted desires rather than his unweighted desires. The problem arises because, on my 
                                                 
108 It is not clear to me whether the option of yielding to his mother’s preference on the football 
question by verbally giving her his assurance that he will not play football, rather than by 
merely not playing football, provides a way for John to relieve strain on his mother’s trust. But 
if it does, we could preserve the apparent paradox by stipulating that yielding in this fashion is 
not an option for John in his circumstances. 
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present characterization of discretion-licencing preferences, John must take account of 
his beliefs about his mother’s reactions, qua entrusting party, to his actions when 
forming discretion-licencing preferences. It is a version of the Reaction Problem. 
We can avoid these unhappy predictions by extending the Admissible Grounds 
Hypothesis so that it applies to discretion-licencing preferences. We make the following 
two postulations. First, an entrusted party B’s discretion-licencing preference that p is a 
preference that is based on all and only his weighted desires, taking into account B’s 
grounds for and against this preference only to the extent that they are admissible. A 
ground of B’s is not admissible (it is ‘fundamentally inadmissible’) if it does not fall 
under an admissible ground-type, the set of which is specified by the terms of his 
entrusted concern relationship. A ground is also not admissible to the extent that B’s 
belief in it depends on inferences from beliefs in propositions that are fundamentally 
inadmissible (to that extent, it is ‘derivatively inadmissible). Second, propositions 
concerning the reactions of an entrusting party as such to her partner’s actions are 
(typically, and in the relationship between John and his mother at any rate) 
fundamentally inadmissible grounds for the latter’s discretion-licencing preferences. 
3.3.3 Predicting ‘Harmony’ 
I will shortly offer an explanation as to how ‘harmony’ might be realized. But for this 
explanation to work I need to make a somewhat ad hoc postulation about how waiving 
works. When I introduced the idea of waiving in 2.2.2, I said that it was a conventional 
action, but I did not say what kind of action it was. I did not say, for instance, that it was 
a speech act that an entrusting party performed in the presence of her partner. Now I 
need to postulate that it is not an action of this sort. Rather it is the act of adopting a 
certain kind of conventional ‘stance’ which affects an entrusted party’s obligations, and 
places certain obligations on the waiving party. The defining properties of the waiving 
stance are as follows. For all φ, an entrusting party A can waive her demand that her 
partner B should φ just in case A voiceably prefers that B should φ. If A adopts a stance 
of waiving with respect to B’s φ-ing, then, as long as she continues in this stance: 
(i) if B not-φs despite lacking a voiceable preference to not-φ, then B does not violate 
A’s trust by doing so (even if B does not know that A has waived); and 
(ii) if a suitable occasion arises, and if A thinks that it will make a difference to 
whether or not B φs, A must communicate to B that she has waived with respect to 
B’s φ-ing. 
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Note that I have dropped my earlier postulation that an entrusting party can only 
waive if she and her partner voiceably prefer the same option, or her partner lacks a 
voiceable preference. An entrusting party can assume a waiving stance regardless of her 
partner’s preference, but her waiving will only have practical significance if her partner 
does not disprefer her preferred option. The obligation stated in (ii) is of course purely 
conventional, like the other norms governing entrusted concern relationships; the 
penalty for violating it is just a possible diminution in one’s esteem or one’s reputation 
for being a cooperative entrusting party. I will assume that the waiving stance is one that 
an entrusting party may adopt or forswear at any time without any necessary 
impropriety. However if she has waived out of deference to the accommodation-
obliging preferences of a second-order entrusting party, then her abandoning the stance 
will presumably strain that party’s trust. 
Although this postulation concerning waiving is somewhat ad hoc and 
burdensome, it is not one I am making purely so that I can explain how ‘harmony’ 
might be realized. In some dual-order fully connected networks, like the moral trust 
network, and perhaps the trust network to which Penny and her extended family belong, 
it is implausible to suppose that waiving should necessarily involve the performance of 
a speech act in the presence of an entrusted party. Suppose that two moralists disagree 
and argue about whether another moralist on the far side of the world should φ. It is not 
plausible that one moralist expects that if he wins the argument, the other moralist will 
traverse the globe to meet the third-party moralist and perform a speech act in his 
presence, or even perform the same act by email or telephone. Likewise, if Uncle Arthur 
wins an argument with Cousin Andrew about whom Penny should marry, Arthur would 
not necessarily expect Andrew to go and perform a speech act in Penny’s audience, if he 
doesn’t think that it will affect her choice either way. 
We can explain the ‘harmony’ between preferences among waiving choices and 
preferences among concrete actions required by Condition Five of the Four 
Relationships Hypothesis, by positing that entrusted concern relationships in the 
second-order network would make (virtually) any grounds that would interfere with this 
‘harmony’ inadmissible. And since we have independent support for the view that there 
can be admissible and inadmissible grounds for entrusting and entrusted parties’ 
preferences in some entrusted concern relationships, we can do so at a smaller cost to 
the plausibility of the Four Relationships Hypothesis. Importantly too, we do not have 
to posit ‘harmony’-preserving admissible ground-types merely in order to get my theory 
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of third-party non-cognitive disagreement to explain the facts. The ‘harmony’ we 
predict by doing so would serve the interests of parties to fully connected networks by 
facilitating more extensive scrutiny of preferences. (These considerations 
notwithstanding, my explanation as to how ‘Harmony’ would be guaranteed will require 
me to make some quite costly commitments.) I’ll now expand upon these points. 
First, let’s consider more specifically which ground-types for parties in second-
order entrusted concern relationships need to be inadmissible if harmony is to be 
achieved. Suppose that S and T have a third-party disagreement Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉 about whether 
or not U should φ. U prefers to φ; S prefers, qua U’s partner, that U should not-φ, and T 
prefers, qua U’s partner, that U should φ. Let’s suppose that S, T, and U share the four 
relationships in virtue of which S and T disagree about whether U should φ because 
they are parties to a dual-order fully connected network N. Thus all parties in all 
relationships have the same weighted desire-types W. 
It must be possible for S to influence U’s actions via the following route: (i) S 
voices her preference to T that U should not-φ; T is moved to waive by his desire not to 
strain S’s trust; this increases (minutely) the chance that all entrusting parties who prefer 
that U should φ waive; if they do all waive, U will then have to not-φ in order to avoid 
straining S’s trust, and will be motivated to do so by his accommodative desires. Of 
course, unless N is quite small, S will never voice her preference to T that U should not-
φ out of a forlorn hope of changing U’s behaviour in the way just described. She will 
normally do so as part of an effort to change T’s own preferences by challenging him to 
explain why the reasoning behind her preferences does not give him preferences for the 
same option, with the end of changing T’s own behaviour, or for the glory of defeating 
T in argument. But it is because of the availability of this unlikely means of influencing 
U’s actions that S will prefer that T should waive when she prefers that U should not-φ, 
and T and U prefer that U should φ. (So strain must matter, albeit nominally, in all 
networks of trust permitting third-party disagreements; entrusted parties must have some 
motivation to avoid it.) 
Some ground-types are (fundamentally) inadmissible in the first-order 
relationships E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 and E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉. These include what I will call ‘N-
grounds’, which are a class of propositions concerning N. N-grounds include 
propositions concerning the conventional roles and actions that people occupy and 
124 
 
perform qua members of N;109 the consequences of occupying and performing these 
roles and actions, the conditions of trust among members of N as such (e.g. how much 
strain they have accumulated); the reactions of members of N to the straining, 
honouring, or violation of their trust by other members of N as such; the trust-based 
desires of members of N as such, the voiceable preferences of members of N; and so on. 
Colloquially, members of N are to ‘forget all about N’ when forming their preferences 
concerning the actions of entrusted parties in N’s first-order entrusted concern 
relationships. 
I don’t think that the terms of the relationships in dual-order fully-connected 
networks in general need be as sweeping as those of N are in ruling grounds relating to 
the trust network itself inadmissible. (Indeed, the moral trust network is a dual-order 
fully connected network, and it allows members to form judgements about the moral 
propriety of being morally hypocritical and ‘judgemental’. If N were the moral trust 
network, propositions about being hypocritical and judgemental would be inadmissible.) 
But I am merely providing an idea of how ‘harmony’ in dual-order fully connected 
networks is possible, and stipulating that all N-grounds are inadmissible in N’s first-
order relationships makes this simpler. 
There is one class of propositions that are not N-grounds but which I shall also 
have to postulate would be fundamentally inadmissible—for all members of N in fact, 
regardless of their roles. I will give the details of this postulation at a later point, when I 
am ready to explain why it is needed. 
To predict ‘harmony’ among S’s preferences, we can hypothesize that the 
admissible ground-types for S in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 are equal to the admissible ground-
types for S in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, plus some additional types of N-grounds. These N-
grounds include a proposition, which I will call the N-conclusion, and some premises in 
an argument implying that proposition, which I will call N-premises. In the toy example 
of such an argument that I set out below, the N-conclusion is the proposition that U will 
not-φ if and only if T waives. The N-conclusion is supposed to be, under virtually all 
circumstances, the only N-ground that S needs to have in mind when she reasons about 
her accommodation-obliging preferences in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉; the other admissible N-
                                                 
109 Propositions concerning acts of yielding by entrusted parties N, where the yielding is done 
through the performance of concrete actions rather than through giving assurances of 
acquiescence, are admissible. But they are only admissible if they do not imply that the concrete 
actions constituted yielding by N-members. 
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grounds merely provide an inferential route via which she can form a positive 
admissible credence in the N-conclusion. The content of the N-conclusion is supposed 
to be such that, if it is the only N-ground S has in mind (i.e. that influences her 
reasoning), and if it is admissible, and if S has a positive credence in it, ‘harmony’ will 
obtain: S will prefer in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that T should waive his demand that U should φ 
when and only when S prefers in E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 that U should not φ. It should be 
evident that the content of the N-conclusion from my example has this property at least. 
The argument whose conclusion is the N-conclusion must be a means by which B 
can always find some epistemic support for the N-conclusion—that is, the essential 
premises in the argument must be such that S always has some positive credence in 
each, if she is rational. The premises that are not deducible from other premises must be 
ones that S can believe because they are implied by the ‘standardized’ terms of the 
relationships in N (i.e. the terms that all relationships in N have in common), or because 
they are implied by assumptions S must make if she is to be a trusting and committed 
member of N (e.g. the assumptions that U and other members are minimally 
trustworthy, have appropriate trust-based motivations, and know the terms of the trust 
relationships to which they are parties qua members of N), or because believing them 
does not require any obvious inference. This last category includes propositions that are 
platitudinous; or else are ‘directly’ supported in some way by S’s present observations, 
by her intuitions, or by introspection. These platitudinous or ‘directly-supported’ 
propositions must fall under admissible ground-types if they are to play a role in the 
argument. Not all of the premises in the argument must be N-grounds, but all must fall 
under admissible ground-types, and so must the N-conclusion itself. 
There are other admissible N-grounds apart from the N-conclusion and the N-
premises needed to support it. For, as the reader will recall, if a proposition q falls under 
an admissible ground-type, then so must all the variations on q that we get when we 
negate q, or modify q by negating combinations of its atomic-proposition components 
or altering the values of its gradable predicates. I’ll call these variations proposition-
variants. The admissible N-grounds consist exclusively of the N-conclusion, the N-
premises supporting it, and the proposition-variants of these. One of the challenges of 
explaining ‘harmony’, on my assumptions, is to show that there is no argument from the 
proposition-variants of the N-premises to a proposition-variant of the N-conclusion 
which is inconsistent with the N-conclusion, where this argument will sometimes lend 
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greater credence to the N-conclusion-variant than the N-premises do to the N-
conclusion.110 This would result in a failure of ‘harmony’. 
Below I offer an example argument to illustrate what the argument for the N-
conclusion might look like. The example is merely illustrative. It would not serve the 
purposes of any real trust network. It ignores the realistic possibility that U might be 
unaware of what the other members of N prefer that he should do, and of whether those 
who prefer that he should φ are willing to waive. Taking account of these possibilities 
would make the argument quite a bit more complex. I have also not stated the argument 
very rigorously,111 because this would hinder readability, and because I do not aspire at 
this stage in my theorizing to a high degree of precision. A final cause for wariness 
about my argument is that it only provides a route by which S can form a positive 
admissible credence in the N-conclusion if we make the following very controversial 
assumptions about degrees of belief: first, that (positive) infinitesimal credences are 
possible; second, that it is irrational to have a credence of zero in any contingent 
proposition (a property of ‘regular’ probability functions);112 and third, that infinitesimal 
credences can affect what one may rationally prefer. 
The argument consists of two distinct arguments for lemmas L1 and L2, which 
respectively imply the right-to-left and left-to-right parts of the biconditional C. A ‘pro-
φ entrusting party’ (see P4-P11) is a member of N who has an accommodation-obliging 
preference that U should φ. 
P1 U has some trust-based desire not to strain S’s trust 
P2 If U has some trust-based desire not to strain S’s trust, then U will not strain S’s 
trust 
P3 U will not strain S’s trust [P1 & P2] 
P4 If all pro-φ entrusting parties in N waive and U φs, then U will strain S’s trust 
P5 If all pro-φ entrusting parties in N waive, then U will not-φ [P3 & P4] 
P6 For all x, if x is a pro-φ entrusting party in N, and x is not T, x will have some 
positive credence that there is some y such that y is a member of N who prefers that 
x should waive 
                                                 
110 The sort of credence I have in mind here is what I call below a ‘difference-making credence’. 
111 It mixes ordinary language and formalism, glosses over changes in tense, and relies on some 
unstated premises. 
112 See Alan Hajek, ‘What Conditional Probability Could Not Be’, Synthese 137 (2003): 280-81 
and 292-3 on the vices of infinitesimal credences; 280-81 also addresses the rationality of 
regular and irregular probability functions. For endorsements of infinitesimal credences and of 
regularity as a ‘condition of reasonableness’, see David Lewis, Philosophical Papers Volume II 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 88, and Brian Skyrms, Causal Necessity (Chelsea, 
Mass.: Yale University Press, 1980), 177-87. 
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P7 For all x, if x is a pro-φ entrusting party in N, and x is not T, and x has some 
positive credence that there is some y such that y is a member of N who prefers that 
x should waive, then x will have some positive credence that there is some z such 
that z is a member of N and x would strain z’s trust by not waiving 
P8 For all x, if x is a pro-φ entrusting party in N, and x is not T, and x has some 
positive credence that there is some y such that y is a member of N and x would 
strain y’s trust by not waiving, then x will have some trust-based desire to waive 
P9 For all x, if x is a pro-φ entrusting party in N, and x is not T, and x has some trust-
based desire to waive, then x will waive 
P10 All pro-φ entrusting parties in N except T will waive [P6-P9] 
P11 If T waives, then all pro-φ entrusting parties in N will waive [from P10] 
L1 If T waives, then U will not-φ [P5 & P11] 
P12 U will not violate T’s trust 
P13 If T does not waive and U does not φ, then U will violate T’s trust 
L2 If T does not waive, then U will φ [P12 & P13] 
C U will not-φ if and only if T waives. [L1 & L2] 
The conditionals in this argument are material conditionals. Thus a person might 
rationally believe one of them merely because she had a sufficiently low credence in its 
antecedent or a sufficiently high credence in its consequent, despite lacking any beliefs 
about correlations or relations of dependence between the truth of the antecedent and 
that of the consequent. However I am not interested in S’s beliefs in any of the 
conditional lines of this argument to the extent that they are based merely on 
unconditional credences in the antecedents or consequents. Credences in conditional 
lines arrived at in this way will not make any difference to S’s rational preference 
between T’s waiving and T’s not-waiving. To the extent that her beliefs in the 
conditional premises are explained in this way, she cannot coherently change her 
credences in their consequents or antecedents through modus ponens or modus tollens 
inferences involving those conditionals. To the extent that her beliefs in L1 or L2 are 
explained in this way, these beliefs will not affect her preference qua T’s partner. 
Except in extreme cases, S’s degree of confidence that T will waive or that U will φ is 
beside the point when she is forming her preferences as to whether T should waive as a 
means to affecting whether U φs. I will only be interested in S’s credence in any of the 
conditional lines to the extent that it is based on what I will call her difference-making 
credences, such as her conditional credence in the consequent given the antecedent, or 
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her beliefs about the modal relationship between the truth of the consequent and that of 
the antecedent.113 
Before I consider the sources of S’s justification for believing the premises of this 
argument, I want to say something about the overall plausibility of the argument from 
S’s point of view, and how we should expect it to affect her preference qua T’s partner. 
The argument for L1 is very weak because it relies on premises P2 and P9. P9 will 
presumably be very implausible, and increasingly so the larger N is. P2 will also be very 
doubtful in typical cases. Because of the implausibility of these premises, I shall need it 
to be the case that there is no argument with admissible premises and an admissible 
conclusion, that would undermine a difference-making credence in L1. As far as I can 
see, the only such argument would be one whose conclusion was the following L1-
variant:  If T waives, then U will φ. Call this L1′. 
Unfortunately, for all I have said so far, L1′ does enjoy some support from a 
source that is admissible because it is not an N-ground. This is what I shall call the 
Contingency Platitude, the proposition that if p is a contingent proposition, there is a 
positive probability that p. Since L1′ is itself a contingent proposition, and since it is 
implied by admissible contingent propositions (e.g. variants of the N-premises), the 
Contingency Platitude gives a (very small) degree of support to L1′. Of course it also 
gives a similar degree of support to L1. But this may not actually improve the 
plausibility of L1. The support L1 gets from P1-P11 may be infinitesimal, as will any 
support it gets from the Contingency Platitude; thus the combined support of both will 
remain infinitesimal. Since the Contingency Platitude will not increase the plausibility 
of L1, the best I can do is to avoid predicting that it would increase the plausibility of 
L1′. I shall thus postulate that some versions of the Contingency Platitude are 
fundamentally inadmissible for all members of N. I might say, for instance, that any 
version that implies that any N-ground has a positive probability of being true does not 
fall under an admissible ground-type. 
If this postulation is true, then there are no admissible premises supporting L1′. 
This is because the line of support that P1-P11 gives to L1 concerns facts about whether 
pro-φ entrusting parties have trust-based motivations to waive, and whether U would 
                                                 
113 The N-conclusion is also to be to be interpreted in the standard truth-functional way, which 
means that one might believe it merely because one believes the propositions on both sides of 
the biconditional, or disbelieves them both. What I say about being interested only in S’s 
‘difference-making’ credences in conditionals applies also to biconditionals such as the N-
conclusion and its proposition-variants. 
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have trust-based desires not to strain S’s trust if they did waive. Any arguments for the 
L1-variant based on the P1-P11-variants will thus have to rely on the same sorts of 
facts. But if we confine our attention to these sorts of facts, we do not find any support 
for L1′. All pro-φ entrusting parties will have some trust-based motivation to waive. 
None has a trust-based motivation to not-waive. These facts give no support to the 
(otherwise very plausible) proposition that some pro-φ entrusting parties will not waive. 
If pro-φ entrusting parties do all waive, then U will have some trust-based motivation 
(qua party to E〈S,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 at least) to not-φ, and no trust-based motivation to φ. So 
as long as S is considering these sorts of facts alone, she will not give difference-making 
credence to L1′. L1 is not wholly derivatively inadmissible; L1′ plausibly is. 
This illustrates my general strategy for ensuring that the N-conclusion is the only 
distinctive admissible ground for S that will influence S’s preferences qua second-order 
entrusting party. We locate a set of questions or subject matters a consideration of 
which will robustly yield such a difference-making credence in the N-conclusion. Then 
we hypothesize that propositions concerning all other questions and subject matters that 
might lead S to have higher difference-making credences in propositions that contradict 
the N-conclusion would be fundamentally inadmissible, along with any that might lead 
her to believe that T’s waiving choice would have weighted-desire-satisfying properties 
beyond its effects on U’s choice. The more closely the ‘admissible’ questions and 
subject matters are confined so as to permit only the desired line of thought, the less 
likely is the occurrence of a deviation from harmony. 
In contrast to the argument for L1, the argument for L2 is quite strong. At least, it 
is one that S must find somewhat plausible, as a committed party to N herself, and as 
someone who trusts U.114 There is no credible argument with admissible premises that 
will lower S’s difference-making credence in L2. This is, I think, just to say that there is 
no credible argument with admissible premises by means of which S could raise her 
difference-making credence in the L2-variant If T does not waive, then U will not-φ. I’ll 
                                                 
114 Even if S does not have a very high difference-making credence in L2, I find it plausible to 
suppose (i) that S must proceed as if L2 were a certainty, as an expression of her trust in U as a 
committed member of N; and (ii) that, if S’s voiced preference depended on her making this 
‘trusting presumption’, this would not disqualify it from being accommodation-obliging. I might 
have to rely on this sort of idea more if I were offering a more rigorous explanation of 
‘harmony’, on less forgiving assumptions. On the related idea that trust involves an attitude of 
optimism that ‘restricts … the kinds of inferences we will make about the likely actions of 
another’, see Jones, ‘Trust as an Affective Attitude’, 11. 
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call this conditional L2′. Here are the deductive arguments for L2′ make use of variants 
of the premises supporting L2: 
P12′ U will violate T’s trust 
P13′ If T does not waive and U φs, then U will not violate T’s trust 
L2′ If T does not waive, then U will not-φ 
P12 U will not violate T’s trust 
P13′′ If T does not waive and U φs, then U will not violate T’s trust 
L2′ If T does not waive, then U will not-φ 
An inference involving the first argument will fail to give S an admissible credence in 
L2′ because P12′ is derivatively inadmissible. P12 is admissible only to the extent that it 
is entailed by S’s assumptions about U as a party to N. P12′ is not supported by this 
route, and has no non-inferential support—its truth is not intuitive or directly observable 
or introspectable. An inference involving the second argument will similarly fail 
because P13′′ has no non-inferential support and is contradicted by the standardized 
terms of the relationships in N. (Similar arguments using variants of P12 and P13 to 
support L1′ face similar problems.) 
S should have a positive (and typically fairly high) admissible difference-making 
credence in L2, and a positive (though perhaps infinitesimal) admissible difference-
making credence in L1, and no admissible difference-making credence in L1′ and L2′. 
Thus it will presumably be rational for her to prefer that T should waive when and only 
when she rationally disprefers an option of U’s that both T and U prefer. I say 
‘presumably’ because, if she has very unusual desires, and those desires are weighted in 
N, failures of harmony are possible. For instance, if S has a basic desire that T should 
not waive, and this desire is weighted, then this might move her to prefer that T should 
not waive even when she prefers an option available to U that is incompatible with the 
option T and U prefer; and the limitations on admissible N-grounds that are present in 
my example would not prevent this.115 
I haven’t yet explained why S is justified in believing all of the premises of my 
argument for the N-conclusion, to the extent that she is. Premises P3, P5, P10, and P11 
                                                 
115 It might be thought that if S had an unusual belief, such as that God would destroy the world 
if T did not waive, S would (weighted desire-types permitting) have admissible grounds to 
prefer that T should waive even when she and T preferred the same options in E<S,U,Δ<S,T,U,φ〉> 
and E<T,U,Δ<S,T,U,φ〉>. But this is not the case (at least in the God example). Remember that the 
consequences of T’s waiving, with the exception of those specified by the N-premises and N-
conclusion, are inadmissible N-grounds for S. 
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are deductively inferred from other premises. P1, P8, and P12 are premises in which S 
must have some credence given that she knows the obligations of the other members of 
N, holds them to be somewhat trustworthy, and hence holds them to be motivated to 
some degree to live up to their obligations.  
P2, P9, and P6 are supported by psychological platitudes. P6 is also supported 
partly by an assumption that the members of N are rational, which I take to be implicit 
in the assumption that they are trustworthy. P6 is supported by a platitude about belief, 
which is that a rational person will have a positive credence in any contingent 
proposition. P2 and P9 are supported—albeit very weakly—by a platitude about 
motivation, which is that if someone can do something, she is more likely to do it if she 
has some desire to than if she has none. 
P4 and P13 are entailed by the standardized terms of the relationships in N. The 
support that S gets for believing P7 also depends on S’s knowledge of these terms, and 
her ‘trusting’ beliefs that the other members of N know these rules and are rational. 
These admissible grounds licence S to infer, from the proposition that pro-φ entrusting 
party ‘x’ has a positive credence that ‘y’ prefers that x should waive, that x herself 
would rationally infer that there is some z (i.e. y) whose trust she would strain by not 
waiving. 
Thus far I have been talking only about how ‘harmony’ among S’s preferences 
might be guaranteed. But ‘harmony’ among T’s preferences might be guaranteed in the 
same way. The set of admissible ground-types for T in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉 could be 
identical to the set of admissible ground-types for S in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉. T would have a 
discretion-licencing preference not to waive because T would prefer that U not be 
exposed to pressure from S to not-φ, and T’s waiving would increase (minutely) the 
likelihood that this would happen. In fact, the same argument (P1-C) that explained S’s 
preference in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, would give T the admissible difference-making credence 
in the same N-conclusion that T needed to prefer not to waive in E〈S,T,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉, as 
long as T preferred that U should φ in E〈T,U,Δ〈S,T,U,φ〉〉. 
Given the problematic and oversimplifying assumptions that my explanation for 
the realization of ‘harmony’ has relied upon, this explanation cannot be regarded as a 
complete success. The oversimplifying assumptions could, I think, have been avoided 
had I used a more elaborate argument as my example, but I know of no way to avoid a 
commitment to infinitesimal credences and regularity. At any rate, I think that I have 
made a tolerably plausible case for the possibility of guaranteeing ‘harmony’, and at 
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least given readers an idea of the challenges my project faces so that they may better 
evaluate it. 
One cost of my account of how ‘harmony’ would be guaranteed that I have not 
addressed yet is that it requires the terms of the trust relationships shared by the parties 
to be quite complex. It might seem that the degree of complexity they require is 
unrealistic. People are capable of having third-party disagreements with each other who 
do not seem to have spent a lot of time together figuring out which ground-types they 
need to count as admissible in order to ensure ‘harmony’. This isn’t too puzzling 
though, for the measures needed to ensure ‘harmony’ will almost always be the same. 
We can, after all, say roughly which ground-types need to be admissible for members of 
N for this purpose without paying much attention to the content of members’ weighted 
desires, or the contingent circumstances in which they find themselves. 
We can thus explain the ease with which we form dual-order fully connected 
networks, and other third-party-disagreement-enabling networks, by postulating that we 
have a pre-formed template for terms of such networks in our heads that we tacitly and 
easily apply in the base conditions in which we find ourselves. Such a template would 
remove the need, when forming trust networks, for careful design to guarantee 
‘harmony’, though it would not remove the need for negotiation and bargaining with 
other (would-be) members. The template may be customary and learned, or we may 
possess it as part of a special disposition to form, or facility for forming, entrusted 
concern relationships and trust networks, acquired through biological evolution. I think 
that an evolved facility must be part of the explanation for our possession of the 
template, for when we teach our children about trust and about how to get on with 
others, we don’t seem to be teaching them how to design dual-order trust networks with 
a view to preserving ‘harmony’. 
If this is right, our possession of the template would not make sense if forming 
‘harmony’-preserving dual-order networks were not fitness-enhancing. But I think the 
story I have already supplied about the advantages of ‘harmony’ goes some way toward 
explaining why it would be. In networks that are formed to serve the common desires W 
of a largish group, in which each member is an entrusted party in an entrusted concern 
relationship with each other member, and the set of each member’s weighted desire-
types qua entrusted and entrusting party is W, it is to the advantage of the group that 
members’ voiced preferences should be examined for bad reasoning and foul play. And 
it is to the advantage of individual members to scrutinize the reasoning behind other 
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members’ voiced preferences if they are able to, as a means to changing their discretion-
licencing preferences and hence their behaviour in desired ways, and as a way to win 
esteem. 
A second-order network will give them a more extensive ability to scrutinize one 
another’s preferences, and hence will increase overall levels of scrutiny. But this 
additional scrutiny will only amount to an increase in scrutiny of first-order parties’ 
preferences to the extent that flaws in a second-order party’s voiceable preferences are 
correlated with flaws of the same kind in a corresponding set of her voiceable 
preferences qua first-order party. ‘Harmony’ virtually guarantees this—it virtually 
guarantees that, for all φ, all network members S, all second-order entrusted parties T, 
and all first-order entrusted parties U, there are flaws in S’s preferences that T should 
waive (or not waive) her demand that U should φ, if and only if there are flaws in her 
preference that U should not-φ (or φ). (S may be the same person as T.) 
Thus, if membership in largish groups with some shared ends was a circumstance 
in which ancestors of modern humans commonly found themselves, it is not too far-
fetched to suppose that a facility for forming trust relationships that would serve these 
ends—trust relationships of the complex sort that I have been describing—would have 
been fitness-enhancing. 
Conclusion 
In this long chapter I have tried, for certain features of the moral trust network, to 
explain why trust networks with these features might exist, and to show that they are not 
entirely foreign to our experience. These features of the moral trust network are as 
follows: each member is both an entrusted party and an entrusting party in an entrusted 
concern relationship with each other member; the weighted desire-types of all parties in 
all these relationships are identical; members of this network try to change other 
members’ behaviour chiefly by changing the reasoning behind their preferences rather 
than by inducing them via trust-based pressures to yield to their preferences; members 
will be concerned to engage with the reasoning behind preferences even of members 
who are not themselves going to perform relevant actions; and members can have non-
cognitive disagreements with one another about what other members should do. I have 
described a kind of trust network with all of these properties, viz., a dual-order fully 
connected network. I have given what I take to be a plausible example of such a 
network (the Seymours’ familial trust network). And I have explained why we should 
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sometimes expect such networks to exist. Specifically, I argued that concerns to avoid 
conflict between relationships in common entrusted party networks would motivate 
people to form uniform weighted desires networks; and, later, that concerns to promote 
the satisfaction of common desires and facilitate scrutiny of preferences would motivate 
people to form dual-order fully connected networks composed of many overlapping 
uniform weighted desires networks. 
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PART II 
 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MORAL TRUST 
NETWORK 
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4 
Moral Judgement 
In Part II I develop and defend fiduciary non-cognitivism, my novel non-cognitivist 
theory of moral psychology. The definitive feature of this theory is that it holds that 
moral judgements at least partly consist of the voiceable preferences of members of a 
network of trust relationships linking all moralists. In the chapters that follow this one I 
will make the best case I can for the existence of the moral trust network, and try to 
explain the apparent rule-like character of moral requirements, the nature of substantive 
moral reasoning, the changes in motivation produced by moral reasoning, and the 
phenomenon of moral uncertainty, among other things. 
In this chapter I will present the beginnings of a fiduciary non-cognitivist account 
of moral judgement. It is limited in the following ways: it concerns only judgements of 
basic moral principle, as opposed to ‘derived’ moral judgements whose rationality 
straightforwardly depends on contingent beliefs; it concerns only judgements of the sort 
that are expressed by simple indicative ‘atomic’ sentences predicating wrongness or 
permissibility; and it merely concerns the non-cognitive attitudes involved in moral 
judgements, not any cognitive components they may have. The basic account is set out 
in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 explains why inconsistent judgements of basic moral 
principle put people in disagreement. 
4.1 The Non-cognitive Attitudes Involved in Moral Judgements 
4.1.1 Moralists’ Voiceable Preferences 
The account of moral judgements that I present in this chapter will have to rely on some 
assumptions about moralists’ voiceable preferences that I don’t defend until later 
chapters. I will describe these here, and introduce some related terminology. 
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The moral trust network is a dual-order fully connected network. In 3.2.1 I argued 
that one of the typical conditions for the formation of such a network was that 
prospective members should have certain desires in common, and that these are 
typically the desires that would count as weighted for network members. The relevant 
common desires of moralists are altruistic desires. These are desire, for instance, that 
people should not harm, deceive, make others suffer, treat others unfairly, and the like. 
Moralists’ weighted desires consist chiefly of these altruistic desires. 
Unusually, for all I’ve said so far, the moral trust network does not simply give 
first-order members voices in one another’s choices of which actions to perform. 
Rather, it gives them voices in one another’s choices of which rules or ‘norms’ to 
conform to. I’ll say more about norms and what it means to conform to or follow them 
in Chapter 6. For now the following will suffice. A norm is a set of prescriptions either 
forbidding or requiring all actions with a certain set of properties. The extension of a 
norm is a set of ‘action-circumstance pairs.’ An action-circumstance pair is a pair of an 
action and a possible circumstance in which it is performed. An action-circumstance 
pair is ‘maximally specified’—it is compatible with exactly one possible world. Action-
circumstance pair 〈φ1, C1〉 and action-circumstance pair 〈φ2, C2〉 are numerically 
identical just in case every detail about the actions, and about the circumstances in 
which they occur, is exactly similar. For all action-circumstance pairs 〈φ, C〉 and all 
norms N, 〈φ, C〉 is in the extension of N just in case N either forbids or requires φ-ing in 
C. 
An agent follows a norm if and only if she performs no action that it does not 
require of her.116 Thus she fails to follow the norm if she either performs an action it 
forbids, or because she acts in a circumstance that falls outside of its extension. This 
means that a norm that only forbids actions cannot be followed. Readers may treat 
‘follows’ and ‘conforms to’ as interchangeable for present purposes; in Chapter 6 I will 
make my usage of ‘conforms to’ more specific, and this precisification will apply 
retrospectively to the present chapter. 
Norms N and O make incompatible prescriptions in some circumstance C just in 
case either N requires an action in C that O forbids or N forbids an action in C that O 
                                                 
116 This is a technical usage. It is meant to avoid an ambiguity in the ordinary English phrase 
‘follow a norm’. The English phrase could mean ‘do nothing that the norm does not 
require/permit’ (e.g. it makes sense to say, ‘How can I follow traffic rules when I’m not even on 
the road?’), or ‘do nothing that the norm forbids’ (e.g. it makes sense to say ‘I haven’t failed to 
follow traffic rules—how could I have when I wasn’t even on the road?). 
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requires (otherwise they make compatible prescriptions in C). N is incompatible with O 
just in case there is some circumstance in which they make incompatible prescriptions. 
The moral trust network is a dual-order fully connected network, in which 
weighted desire-types for all parties in all roles are the same and ‘harmony’ is 
preserved. This means that, for all moralists S, all moralists T, and all moralists U, such 
that S≠T≠U, and S is rational, among the following statements, (1) and (2) are 
equivalent, and (1) and (2) each entail (3) and (4): 
(1) S has a discretion-licencing preference qua first-order moral entrusted party that S 
should conform to N when in circumstances C. 
(2) S has an accommodation-obliging preference qua first-order moral entrusting party 
that U should conform to N when in C. 
(3) If U has a discretion-licencing preference to conform to N when in C and U has not 
yielded, S has a discretion-licencing preference qua second-order moral entrusted 
party that S should not waive her demand that U should conform to N when in C. 
(4) If U has a discretion-licencing preference not to conform to N when in C and has 
not yielded, and T has an accommodation-obliging preference that U should not 
conform to N when in C and has not waived, S has an accommodation-obliging 
preference qua second-order moral entrusting party that T should waive her 
demand that U should conform to N when in C. 
Note that a preference for conforming to N when in C is a conditional preference. I 
discuss conditional voiceable preferences, and their capacity to put people in 
disagreement, in Section 4.2 below. 
I will sometimes say that a moralist prefers, or has a preference for, a norm, as a 
shorthand for saying that she has a preference for conforming to that norm. I will call 
the set of norms N such that a moralist S has a voiceable preference that moralists 
should conform to them whenever such conformity is possible, S’s norms.  
4.1.2 How Much I Need to Say about Moral Judgements 
I will not be giving a complete account of moral judgement, because there are some 
properties of moral judgements about which I wish to remain agnostic. What account a 
non-cognitivist gives of moral judgements will affect her theory of the semantics of 
moral statements—it may affect her capacity to solve the Frege-Geach problem, for 
instance. I don’t know what sort of account of moral judgement a non-cognitivist must 
give if she is to provide an adequate moral semantics. So I don’t want to say more about 
the nature of moral judgement than I have to, given my more limited aims of explaining 
moral disagreement in matters of basic principle, certain types of moral reasoning, and 
certain features of our moral practices. Specifically, I don’t want to take a stand on the 
question of whether moral judgements consist merely of non-cognitive attitudes, or 
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whether (as I suspect) they consist of combinations of cognitive and non-cognitive 
attitudes. And I don’t need to take a stand on this issue given my aims. 
Although I shall not be giving a theory of the semantics of moral sentences or of 
deductive moral reasoning, I do need to ensure, as best I can, that what I say about the 
nature of moral judgement is compatible with some adequate theory of both of these 
subject matters. This means, among other things, that I don’t want to give an account of 
the non-cognitive attitudes that are involved in judgements of permissibility that would 
leave non-cognitivists unable to solve the negation problem.117 This is the problem of 
explaining why it is rationally incoherent to simultaneously judge that φ-ing is wrong 
and that φ-ing is permissible, and hence why it is inconsistent to say that φ-ing is wrong 
and that φ-ing is permissible, while preserving a distinction between judging that φ-ing 
is permissible and being unopinionated about the morality of φ-ing. 
I also have a reason to be concerned with this problem that falls squarely within 
the scope of the present work: unless, on my account, it is rationally incoherent to judge 
that φ-ing is wrong and that φ-ing is permissible, where these are judgements of basic 
principle, my theory of non-cognitive disagreement will not predict that two such 
judgements, when held by different people, put those people in disagreement. This is 
because (i) I presume that, for the non-cognitivist, disagreement in matters of basic 
moral principle necessarily involves robust disagreement in preferences rather than 
mere cognitive disagreement; (ii) my theory of robust non-cognitive disagreement says 
that people disagree in preference robustly only if they have mutually unsatisfiable 
preferences; and (iii) when mutually unsatisfiable preferences are held by the same 
person, that person will be rationally incoherent. So I need to ensure that intuitively 
inconsistent pairs of permissibility and wrongness judgements, held by the same person, 
are genuinely incoherent, if I am to explain disagreement in basic principle. 
I shall in large part adopt a solution to the negation problem proposed by Jeremy 
Schwartz and Christopher Hom.118 The following summary of their solution is rough, 
and also skewed in a particular direction, for I am treating it as a solution to the negation 
problem understood as a problem for non-cognitivist moral psychology, whereas the 
authors are focused on the negation problem as a problem for expressivist semantics. I 
                                                 
117 Unwin, ‘Norms and Negation’; Schroeder, Being For, 44-9. 
118 Jeremy Schwartz and Christopher Hom, ‘Why the Negation Problem is Not a Problem for 
Expressivism’, Nous (2015): 824-45. 
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thus disregard some features of the proposal which according to the authors make it 
semantically virtuous. 
4.1.3 The Negation Problem, and ‘Arrangements of Desires’ 
Schwartz and Hom propose that non-cognitivists should construe judgements of moral 
requirement, permissibility, and impermissibility as attitudes of the same type held 
toward different objects. A judgement that φ-ing is required is some sort of pro-attitude 
(call it a ‘pro-attitude*’) toward φ-ing under all ‘arrangements of desires’.119 
Intuitively, this can be interpreted as φ-ing whether one wants to or not. A judgement 
that φ-ing is permitted is a pro-attitude* toward φ-ing under some arrangements of 
desires.120 The authors sometimes suggest φ-ing if one wants to as a more specific 
account of the object of the pro-attitude* involved in judging that φ is permissible.121 A 
judgement that φ-ing is wrong is a pro-attitude* toward φ-ing under no arrangement of 
desires.122 (To judge that φ-ing is merely permissible, i.e. permissible and not required, 
is presumably to have pro-attitudes* both toward φ-ing if one wants to and toward not-
φ-ing if one wants to not-φ.) 
How do Schwartz and Hom propose to solve the negation problem? That is, how 
do they give an account of (1) judging that φ is permitted, (2) judging that φ is wrong, 
and (3) being undecided about the permissibility of φ, that predicts that an agent who 
does both (1) and (2) at the same time is irrational, and that preserves a distinction 
between (1) and (3)? This requires that pro-attitudes* be attitudes that a person cannot 
rationally hold toward both φ-ing and not-φ-ing. Suppose that this desideratum is met. It 
is then irrational to simultaneously judge that φ-ing is permissible and impermissible 
because it is irrational to simultaneously have a pro-attitude* toward φ-ing under some 
arrangement of desires and a pro-attitude* toward φ-ing under no arrangement of 
desires. To be undecided about the propriety of φ-ing is to lack both a pro-attitude* 
toward φ-ing under some arrangement of desires and a pro-attitude* toward φ-ing under 
no arrangement of desires. This mental state is clearly different from the state of 
judging that φ-ing is permissible on their account. 
                                                 
119 Throughout their discussion Schwartz and Hom treat what I am calling ‘pro-attitudes*’ as 
attitudes of approval, but they do not commit to an account of their nature (‘Why the Negation 
Problem’, 835). It is not important that the attitude type that figures in the theory should be a 
pro-attitude; a con-attitude would work just as well mutatis mutandis. 
120 Schwartz and Hom, ‘Why the Negation Problem’, 832. 
121 Schwartz and Hom, ‘Why the Negation Problem’, 834, 843n.19. 
122 Schwartz and Hom, ‘Why the Negation Problem’, 832. 
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I shall posit that the non-cognitive attitudes that are involved in all moral 
judgements, and that explain the irrationality of holding basic moral principles that are, 
intuitively, inconsistent, are voiceable preferences of members to the moral trust 
network as such. They are in fact combinations of voiceable preferences held by 
moralists in each of their roles qua parties to the network, i.e. as first- and second-order 
moral entrusted and entrusting parties. But I won’t worry about moralists’ preferences 
qua parties to the second-order network for the moment. And I needn’t distinguish 
between a moralist’s preferences qua entrusted and entrusting party. These ought both 
to be voiceable preferences for conformity to the same norms, so I can talk simply of 
‘moralists’ preferences’, without specifying whether they are accommodation-obliging 
or discretion-licencing. 
As I have indicated, to solve the negation problem in the way that Schwartz and 
Hom propose, a non-cognitivist theory must characterize pro-attitudes* in such a way 
that they meet the following desideratum: that one cannot coherently hold a pro-
attitude* toward both φ-ing and not-φ-ing. Voiceable preferences meet this 
desideratum: one cannot coherently voiceably prefer conformity to norms requiring φ 
and norms forbidding φ. 
I must also give a characterization of the ‘arrangements of desires’ that, if I avail 
myself of Schwartz and Hom’s proposal, figure in the content of, and serve to 
distinguish, the non-cognitive attitudes that are involved in judgements of requirement 
and permissibility. As a first approximation, I propose that ‘arrangements of desires’ are 
circumstances of having some pre-trust preferences rather than others. Thus a 
judgement that B is required to φ is, roughly, a voiceable preference that B should 
follow norms requiring φ-ing whether one pre-trust prefers to φ or not. A judgement 
that it is permissible for B to φ is, roughly, a voiceable preference that B should follow 
norms requiring φ-ing if one pre-trust prefers to φ. A judgement that it is wrong for B to 
φ is, roughly, a voiceable preference that B should follow norms requiring not φ-ing 
whether one pre-trust prefers to φ or not. 
Why not characterize ‘arrangements of desires’ as states of having some all-
things-considered preferences rather than others? There is a problem with this view. 
Suppose that a moral entrusted party B has not yet formed a discretion-licencing 
preference between norms forbidding and norms requiring φ. He has an all-things-
considered preference to φ. But B is, as I shall say, scrupulous: he is a moralist who 
complies with the terms of his trust relationships qua member of the moral trust 
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network. He thus does not exceed his discretion qua moral entrusted party. This means 
that he would lose his all-things-considered preference to φ if he formed a discretion-
licencing preference to follow norms forbidding φ. He has a conditional all-things-
considered preference to not-φ if and only if he has (i) a trust-based obligation to not-φ 
and (ii) no trust-based obligation to φ. He only has an all-things-considered preference 
to φ because (ii) is false: the current state of his voiceable preferences is such that to 
avoid exceeding his discretion he must, impossibly, both φ and not-φ. Given that he 
cannot avoid violating trust, he prefers, for non-trust-related reasons, to φ. 
Suppose that B comes to judge that φ-ing is merely permissible—he comes to 
form a voiceable preference for norms requiring him to φ iff he all-things-considered 
prefers to φ. Do his preferred norms require him to φ? It might seem obvious that they 
do. B had an all-things-considered preference to φ before he formed his judgement that 
φ is permissible, and nothing seems to have changed that would alter this preference. 
However, what B has an all-things-considered preference to do determines what he has 
a trust-based obligation to do, and (since B is a scrupulous moralist) whether or not B 
has an all-things-considered preference to φ depends on whether or not he has a trust-
based obligation to φ. So actually, we can’t establish that B would have an all-things-
considered preference to φ in this situation without presupposing that B has an all-
things-considered preference to φ. The view that ‘arrangements of desires’ are all-
things-considered preference states thus seemingly makes scrupulous moralists’ 
obligations indeterminate in some sense. The hypothesis that ‘arrangements of desires’ 
are pre-trust preference states avoids this sort of muddle. 
However, this hypothesis seems to be defective for a different reason, at least 
given my other commitments. I am committed to the idea that preferences can be 
indeterminate—my explanation for the phenomenon of moral indecision depends on 
this (see 6.4.1 and Chapter 8 below)—and so I am committed to the possibility that pre-
trust preferences can be indeterminate. If ‘arrangements of desires’ are pre-trust 
preference states, it is not clear whether my account of the non-cognitive attitudes 
involved in permission, requirement, and prohibition judgements will be compatible 
with any intuitively satisfactory account of those judgements insofar as they pertain to 
agents with indeterminate pre-trust preferences. 
For instance, suppose that Oliver faces a choice between stealing to relieve 
extreme hunger or refraining from doing so, and that his pre-trust preferences do not 
discriminate between these options due to indeterminacy. Further, suppose that 
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(a) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is permissible is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms requiring 
an agent to steal to relieve extreme hunger if she pre-trust prefers to; and 
(b) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that not stealing to relieve 
extreme hunger is permissible is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms 
requiring an agent to refrain from stealing to relieve extreme hunger if she pre-trust 
prefers to so refrain. 
Here are two options for characterizing the attitudes involved in the judgement that 
stealing to relieve extreme hunger is wrong: 
(c) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is wrong is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms forbidding an 
agent to steal to relieve extreme hunger if she either pre-trust prefers to steal to 
relieve extreme hunger or pre-trust prefers not to steal to relieve extreme hunger. 
(c′) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is wrong is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms forbidding an 
agent to steal to relieve extreme hunger if she either pre-trust prefers to steal to 
relieve extreme hunger or does not pre-trust prefer to steal to relieve extreme 
hunger. 
Observe that if (c) is true, and Oliver judges that stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is wrong, he would take this judgement to be irrelevant to his decision. This is 
because the non-cognitive attitude involved in this judgement is a preference for 
following norms forbidding agents with determinate pre-trust preferences from stealing, 
and he lacks such preferences. But intuitively his wrongness judgement should be 
relevant to his decision. 
Now suppose instead that (c′) is true, and that Oliver judges that stealing to relieve 
extreme hunger is merely permissible—that is, he judges that both stealing and not 
stealing to relieve extreme hunger are permissible. The non-cognitive attitudes involved 
in this judgement are the voiceable preferences described in (a) and (b). Oliver will thus 
take his permissibility judgement to be irrelevant to his choice; he is not in the 
circumstances these voiceable preferences apply to. Indeed, he will be forced to violate 
trust, either by resisting the accommodation-obliging preferences of those who judge 
that stealing in his situation is required, or by resisting the accommodation-obliging 
preferences of those who judge that stealing in his situation is wrong, without a 
discretion-licencing preference to do so. This also seems unsatisfactory. Intuitively, he 
ought to be able avow his permission judgement in defence of whichever choice he 
makes when other moralists raise objections. But this would only make sense, according 
to fiduciary non-cognitivism, if by avowing this judgement he were voicing a 
144 
 
discretion-licencing preference for his chosen option, and on our present assumptions he 
would not be doing so. 
There might be, or might seem to be, ways to avoid these problems on the pre-
trust preferences account, but at best they create similarly bad problems of their own. 
For instance, one might take the non-cognitive attitude involved in judging that φ-ing is 
permissible to be a preference for following norms requiring you to φ if you don’t have 
pre-trust preferences not to φ. This would avoid making permissibility judgements 
inapplicable to people with indeterminate pre-trust preferences. But it would also make 
rational judgements of mere permissibility impossible. On this view (a) and (b) would 
need to be revised thus: 
(a′) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is permissible is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms requiring an 
agent to steal to relieve extreme hunger if she does not pre-trust prefer not to steal. 
(b′) the non-cognitive attitude involved in a judgement that not stealing to relieve extreme 
hunger is permissible is a voiceable preference for conformity to norms requiring an 
agent to refrain from stealing to relieve extreme hunger if she does not pre-trust prefer to 
steal. 
To judge that stealing to relieve extreme hunger is merely permissible is to hold both of 
these preferences. But they are rationally inconsistent: they are preferences for 
following norms that make conflicting prescriptions in Oliver’s case, for instance. 
The problem with taking ‘arrangements of desires’ to be arrangements of pre-trust 
preferences among available options is that it is possible to lack such preferences. 
‘Arrangements of desires’ must be unavoidable features of any agent’s circumstances. I 
shall instead characterize ‘arrangements of desires’ as one’s psychological dispositions 
to act or behave before one’s moral judgements are taken into account. Even if an 
agent’s preferences are indeterminate, she must still do something, even if that thing is 
dithering or standing in a state of rational paralysis while torn between options. It may, 
perhaps, also be possible for an agent whose preferences are indeterminate, or equally 
balanced between two options, to voluntarily and non-rationally ‘plump’ for one option 
rather than another. I take it that, if these processes and behaviours—these agential 
‘doings’—occur, they occur as a result of psychological dispositions of some sort. (Such 
dispositions to behave and plump seem to differ from desires in at least the following 
respect: they are not capable of combining with beliefs in rational ways to form other 
dispositions.) 
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So there seems to be a broad class of ‘agential dispositions’ (as I shall call them) 
that includes but is not limited to preferences, and which have the desirable property 
that pre-trust preferences lack: necessarily, if it is up to an agent whether she φs or not-
φs at t, that agent has a (determinate) agential disposition to φ or not φ at t. Let me 
relabel the things I have been calling ‘arrangements of desires’ as ‘dispositional 
circumstances’, so that it will not seem odd for me to posit that they can differ with 
respect to changes in non-conative agential dispositions. The agential dispositions that 
dispositional circumstances consist of on my theory are what I will call pre-trust 
agential dispositions. These are the agential dispositions a moralist has ‘before’ her 
trust-based desires qua moralist are taken into account. 
Now I must make a postulation about the way we ordinarily talk about 
circumstances when we describe or state the content of moral judgements. I must say 
that when in ordinary talk we say that φ-ing in a circumstance C is permissible, and C is 
what we prereflectively think of as a specific circumstance, C is typically not really a 
specific circumstance. It will be specific in most respects, but typically it will 
underdetermine the agent’s dispositional circumstances. More precisely, C will 
typically be a set of possible circumstances that are all exactly similar, except as regards 
what the agent is pre-trust disposed to do. 
I will call circumstances like C, which we prereflectively think of as specific, but 
which on my theory do not determine the agent’s pre-trust dispositions, dispositionally 
non-specific circumstances. I posit that normally when we make moral requirement and 
impermissibility judgements about actions in what we take to be specific circumstances, 
the circumstances in question are dispositionally non-specific (except insofar as the 
explicitly specified circumstances ‘rule out’ certain dispositionally specific 
circumstances—that is, except insofar as the proposition that the explicit circumstances 
obtain entails that the dispositionally specific circumstances do not obtain). And I posit 
that when we make more general moral judgements about φ-ing in explicitly non-
specific circumstances (e.g. when I judge that lying when doing so will save a life is 
always wrong, rather than wrong in a particular case), the circumstances in question can 
normally be construed as consisting exclusively of sets of dispositionally non-specific 
circumstances (e.g. the set of all dispositionally non-specific circumstances in which 
lying will save a life). So the more general circumstances that figure in statements of 
moral principles are normally—to use my jargon elastically—dispositionally non-
specific too. Dispositionally non-specific circumstances differ from the sorts of 
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circumstances that figure in the action-circumstance pairs that make up the extensions 
of norm-partitions. The latter circumstances do specify the agent’s pre-trust 
dispositions—they are ‘dispositionally specific’. 
I will now give my more thorough account of the non-cognitive attitudes that are 
involved in judgements of moral requirement, permissibility, and impermissibility. The 
account applies only to judgements of basic principle. This is indicated by the 
specification that they are judgements about what is necessarily required, permitted, and 
wrong. The account also applies only to judgements about actions in ‘specific’ (but 
perhaps dispositionally non-specific) circumstances. In what follows, ‘C’ is a ‘specific’ 
circumstance of this sort. All ‘parties’ are, of course, parties to moral entrusted concern 
relationships. A set of circumstances C1 entails a set of circumstances C2 just in case the 
proposition that C1 obtains implies that C2 obtains (i.e. C1 is a subset of C2). 
Requirement. S judges that φ-ing in C is necessarily required only if, for all C* such that 
C* is a dispositionally specific circumstance that entails C, S has 
(i) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusted party to follow norms requiring φ-
ing in C*, 
(ii) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusting party that first-order entrusted 
parties should follow norms requiring φ-ing in C*, 
(iii) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusted party not to waive her 
entitlement to demand that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate her 
preference that they should follow norms requiring φ-ing in C*, and 
(iv) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusting party that second-order 
entrusted parties who have voiceable preferences qua first-order entrusting parties 
that first-order entrusted parties should follow norms forbidding φ-ing in C* should 
waive their entitlements that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate 
these preferences. 
Permissibility. S judges that φ-ing in C is necessarily permissible only if, for all C* such 
that C* is a dispositionally specific circumstance that entails C, and C* specifies that the 
agent is pre-trust disposed to φ, S has 
(i) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusted party to follow norms requiring φ-
ing in C*, 
(ii) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusting party that entrusted parties should 
follow norms requiring φ-ing in C*, 
(iii) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusted party not to waive her 
entitlement to demand that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate her 
preference that they should follow norms requiring φ-ing in C*, and 
(iv) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusting party that second-order 
entrusted parties who have voiceable preferences qua first-order entrusting parties 
that first-order entrusted parties should follow norms forbidding φ-ing in C* should 
waive their entitlements that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate 
these preferences. 
Impermissibility. S judges that φ-ing in C is necessarily wrong only if, for all C* such 
that C* is a dispositionally specific circumstance that entails C, S has 
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(i) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusted party to follow norms forbidding φ-
ing in C*, 
(ii) a voiceable preference qua first-order entrusting party that entrusted parties should 
follow norms forbidding φ-ing in C*, 
(iii) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusted party not to waive her 
entitlement to demand that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate her 
preference that they should follow norms forbidding φ-ing in C*, and 
(iv) a voiceable preference qua second-order entrusting party that second-order 
entrusted parties who have voiceable preferences qua first-order entrusting parties 
that first-order entrusted parties should follow norms requiring φ-ing in C* should 
waive their entitlements that first-order entrusted parties should accommodate 
these preferences. 
4.1.4 The Presumption of Dispositional Non-specificity 
According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, moral judgements about actions in what we 
normally take to be ‘specific’ circumstances are, in part, and presumptively, preferences 
for conformity to sets of norms making prescriptions about what to do in circumstances 
that do not fully specify the agent’s pre-trust dispositions, but which are maximally 
specific in all other respects. I now wish to say something about the ‘presumptively’ 
qualifier. This is supposed to signify that it is not a necessary feature of a moral 
judgement about an action in a ‘specific’ circumstance that these circumstances are 
dispositionally non-specific. The ‘specific’ circumstances to which such moral 
judgements apply may actually be as specific as the circumstances to which moralists’ 
preferred norms apply—that is, they may fully specify the agent’s pre-trust dispositions. 
If they concern what to do in circumstances of this sort, judgements permitting and 
requiring the same action will be identical and indistinguishable. Alternatively the 
relevant ‘specific circumstances’ may not be fully specific as regards pre-trust 
dispositions, but may still be more specific in this regard than is conventionally 
presumed. They may narrow down the range of dispositional circumstances of the 
actions they apply to, instead of being entirely silent about them. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism needs to allow this if it is to account for the diversity of 
our moral judgements. The prescriptions that preference utilitarians give an agent could 
potentially vary depending on that agent’s own preferences. On some views, whether 
someone is permitted or required to torture a terrorist for information about a ticking 
bomb might depend on whether or not the agent desires to torture the terrorist—having 
such a desire might make the action wrong. An accurate characterization of the 
dispositions that are part of the circumstances of the actions to which these judgements 
apply would presumably not say anything about pre-trust dispositions specifically, but it 
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would presumably narrow down the possible dispositional circumstances that the parties 
can occupy. The torture example points toward an odd possibility, namely, that a 
moralist might judge that a moralist S is required to φ just in case S is pre-trust disposed 
to not-φ. On my account, this is not a special kind of judgement (e.g. an ‘anti-
permission’ judgement); it is merely a set of requirement judgements applying to 
dispositional circumstances that are more fully specified than usual. 
We could exhaustively describe any moralist’s voiceable preferences by talking 
only of the requirement and impermissibility judgements she accepts, where those 
judgements pertain to genuinely fully specified circumstances. Permissibility 
judgements are thus reducible to requirement judgements applying to genuinely fully 
specified circumstances. Our conceptual schemes make room for permissibility 
judgements as a salient category of moral judgement because this facilitates more 
efficient moral discourse (and perhaps moral thinking as well). Most of the time, the 
efficient reporting and voicing of voiceable preferences is made easier if (a) moralists 
all presume that the circumstances to which moral judgements explicitly apply are 
dispositionally non-specific, and (b) when more specific information about the 
dispositional circumstances to which moral judgements apply needs to be 
communicated, this is normally done, not by elaborating on the explicit circumstances, 
but by specifying that the judgement is of a certain kind, viz., a permission judgement. 
Why is the information about dispositional circumstances that is communicated 
by specifying that a moral judgement is a permission judgement of such special interest 
that it warrants being communicated in this peculiar way? Relatedly, why is it relatively 
unusual for moralists to want to communicate any sorts of information about the 
dispositional circumstances of the actions to which their voiceable preferences apply, 
unless it is the information that they communicate by talking of permissions and 
permission judgements? I cannot provide an independently plausible answer these 
questions; all I can do is postulate and hypothesize. Accordingly, I hypothesize that the 
answer lies in the content of our altruistic desires. The extent to which an agent S’s φ-
ing satisfies our altruistic desires does not, ordinarily and in most respects, depend on 
facts about the agential dispositions S has when she φs. But there is one possible feature 
of S’s dispositional circumstances that would be fairly likely to affect the extent to 
which her φ-ing satisfies our altruistic desires, viz., her having a pre-trust disposition to 
φ. S’s φ-ing is less likely to frustrate our altruistic desires if she does it in accordance 
with a pre-trust disposition than if she does it out of a desire not to violate trust. Perhaps 
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our altruistic desires are generally frustrated to some degree by instances in which trust-
based obligations induce people to do otherwise than they would be disposed to do if 
left alone—that is, by trust-based impositions. Unfortunately this somewhat intuitively 
appealing suggestion would, if true, create complications that I cannot address at 
present, so I must leave it undeveloped. 
To reiterate, I have hypothesized that altruistic desires are in many cases less well 
satisfied by deeds done contrary to pre-trust dispositions, and largely unaffected by the 
dispositional circumstances of actions in other respects. This hypothesized fact does not 
necessarily mean that moralists will prefer conformity to norms that disproportionately 
require people to perform actions that they are pre-trust disposed to perform, but whose 
prescriptions do not depend on pre-trust dispositions in other respects. This will only be 
a tendency; and considerations of simplicity will sometimes favour norms that defy this 
tendency. Certain altruistic desires may militate against this tendency too—for instance, 
the desire that people shouldn’t indulge their (pre-trust) desires to torture. But the 
tendency, if strong enough, would explain the special place of permission judgements 
among moral judgements. 
4.2 Disagreement in Matters of Basic Principle 
Moralists as such can disagree about what people ought to do in purely hypothetical 
situations, and about what people should have done in the past. Fiduciary non-
cognitivism must offer an explanation for these sorts of disagreement if it is to be 
plausible, but this is beyond the scope of the present work. I only aspire to explain more 
obviously practical disagreements, those that have some ‘direct’ relevance to 
deliberation and planning. I hope nonetheless to predict the truth of the following claim, 
which I shall call Necessary Rational Disagreement: rational people with conflicting 
fundamental moral principles necessarily disagree. This means predicting that they 
disagree even when no probable choice situation is in the offing about which their 
principles give conflicting prescriptions. In such cases, as I shall argue, their principles 
must nonetheless put them in robust non-cognitive disagreement about what to do in 
situations that are highly improbable. 
In order to predict this, I need the following thesis to be true: that rational people 
with opposing voiceable preferences concerning a choice situation that they believe is 
extremely unlikely to eventuate, are necessarily in (robust) non-cognitive disagreement, 
these beliefs notwithstanding. I cannot think of natural-seeming cases with which to 
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thoroughly test this thesis—that is, cases involving fantastically small positive 
probabilities. Nonetheless, I can at least test it against cases in which people disagree 
about what to do in circumstances that they find improbable. Consider a variation on 
Stevenson’s invitation case. As before, Mr. and Mrs. A are deliberating about whom to 
invite to their party. 
Invitation (Conditional Disagreement) 
Mrs. A: It’s possible that Mr. Toff will be back from India tomorrow. 
Mr. A: That’s very unlikely. 
Mrs. A: I know. But if he does get back, we could invite him. 
Mr. A: I’d still rather we invited Mr. Chum. He’s an old friend. 
Mrs. A: But as you know, Mr. Toff’s connections are excellent. I’d prefer that we 
invited Toff. 
Mr. A: We disagree then. 
Mrs. A: I don’t think we disagree. We just prefer different things. 
Like the original version, this seems to be a case of robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
So mutually unsatisfiable voiceable preferences about what to do in highly improbable 
situations do seem to suffice for non-cognitive disagreement. 
If the thesis I have just argued for is true, it must be the case that people can be in 
robust non-cognitive disagreement even if the anticipated choice situation about which 
they disagree never actually eventuates. Suppose that Mr. Toff will not be back from 
India tomorrow, but, being unaware of this, Mr. and Mrs. A nonetheless have the 
voiceable preferences reported in Invitation (Conditional Disagreement). I need it to be 
the case that these preferences put them in disagreement, despite the fact that they won’t 
have the option of inviting Mr. Toff anyway. But this seems very plausible. Our 
intuition that Mr. and Mrs. A disagree in Invitation (Conditional Disagreement) doesn’t 
seem to depend on our assuming that Mr. Toff might return from India. 
Now I shall spell out why it is that rational moralists with conflicting basic 
principles necessarily disagree. Suppose that S prefers that B should follow norms NS, 
that T prefers that B should follow norms NT, and that NS and NT make incompatible 
prescriptions in a circumstance CI and compatible prescriptions in circumstance CC. (B 
might be the same person as S or T.) Observe that S’s and T’s preferences are not 
mutually unsatisfiable, because if B is in CC he can accommodate both of them—he can 
follow both NS and NT. Since it is always possible that B will be in CC, and since S and 
T might be certain that he will always be in CC, S and T do not necessarily disagree 
about what B should do at any point in time. Indeed, for all I’ve said, and holding fixed 
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their voiceable preferences, they don’t necessarily disagree about anything. However, if 
S and T have some positive credence that T will find himself in CI, the voiceable 
preferences of S and T will put them in disagreement about what B should do in CI, at 
least if they have proportioned their preferences to their credences as rationality 
requires. This is an implication of the thesis that opposing voiceable preferences put 
people in disagreement even if they take the choice situation they disagree about to be 
extremely improbable. 
S and T rationally must have some positive credence that B will be in CI, because 
this is not an impossible state of affairs. Indeed, they rationally must have some positive 
credence that, for all C such that C is a circumstance in which NS and NT give 
incompatible prescriptions, and all B* such that B* is a moral entrusted party, and all 
future times t, B* will find himself in C at t. And they will disagree about whether any 
given B* should follow NS or NT in C at t. So every point of incompatibility between 
their norms must be a point of disagreement between them. 
This is one way in which fiduciary non-cognitivism predicts that rational people 
with conflicting fundamental moral principles necessarily disagree. As I noted above, 
fiduciary non-cognitivism must, if it is to be plausible, also predict that moralists with 
conflicting fundamental principles disagree about what should be done in merely 
counterfactual and ‘past-tense’ choice situations. Such an explanation will imply 
Necessary Rational Disagreement, and hence might seem to make the argument I gave 
above as to how fiduciary non-cognitive predicts Necessary Rational Disagreement 
redundant. But the argument may still play an important role in explaining this datum. It 
may reduce the work that the fiduciary non-cognitivist has to do to explain moral 
disagreement about counterfactual actions. Since it is hard to see how anything could be 
a counterfactual moral judgement unless it were capable of disagreeing with other 
things of the same kind, the argument may reduce the work of explaining why moral 
thought and talk about counterfactual actions exists at all. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have postulated that the non-cognitive attitudes involved in moral 
judgements are voiceable preferences. Among judgements of basic principle, I have 
distinguished permissibility judgements from requirement judgements by positing that, 
in dispositionally non-specific circumstances, the former involve voiceable preferences 
for performing an action whenever the agent has a pre-trust disposition to do so, while 
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that latter involve voiceable preferences for performing an action regardless of the 
agent’s pre-trust dispositions. I have proposed that the salient category of permission 
judgements exists because our altruistic desires have a peculiar tendency to be 
frustrated, or less well satisfied, when certain actions are done in defiance of pre-trust 
dispositions. And I have explained why rational people whose judgements of basic 
moral principle are incompatible necessarily disagree. 
153 
 
5 
Moral Universality 
In this chapter I try to account for the apparent universality of morality: the apparent 
fact that anyone—any sane and intelligent human of a sufficient age at least—can 
sensibly make judgements about how any similar person morally ought to behave.123 In 
the context of my theory, this means defending my postulation of a moral trust network 
linking everyone who makes moral judgements. This postulation faces two main 
challenges. The moral trust network is of an extraordinary size. It links people who are 
and will always be complete strangers to one another. It links members of populations 
who may never have been in contact with one another even indirectly—for instance, it 
links moralists on Earth to extra-terrestrial moralists, if such exist. The first challenge, 
and by far the more pressing, is to explain how any such institution could exist—how it 
could have come about, and why it would persist and acquire new members. 
The moral trust network has some features that are not shared by the fully 
connected networks that I discussed in Chapter 3. This is a cost if I cannot provide 
evidence that there are other trust networks with similar properties. I am plausibly 
committed to the empirical claim that there are constraints on the forms that trust 
networks are likely to take. This is because I have posited (3.3.3) that humans’ 
dispositions to form trust networks are partly explained by their possession of a special 
                                                 
123 Another proposition which we might want to label ‘moral universality’ is that a moral 
judgement about how one person ought to behave is implicitly a judgement about how anyone 
else ought to behave in the same circumstances. (Cf. Hare on the ‘covert universality’ of ought 
sentences. Hare, The Language of Morals, 154.) If I can fully account for moral universality of 
the sort mentioned in my opening sentence, I should be able to account for moral universality of 
this latter sort, provided that (i) ‘anyone’ is not understood too inclusively, (ii) my unfinished 
account of moral judgements is completed in a sensible way, and (iii) my argument in Chapter 
6, especially 6.3.2, that the moral trust network would satisfy the condition which I call 
‘Invariance’ is successful. 
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evolved facility for forming them. The varieties of trust networks this facility might 
dispose us to form is probably limited (just as variety among natural languages is 
presumably constrained by the features of humans’ evolved facility for linguistic 
communication). Thus a second challenge for the theorist who posits a moral trust 
network is to show that its novel features have non-moral precedents, and so to avoid ad 
hoc implications concerning the nature of our evolved facility for forming trust 
networks. 
I only partly meet these challenges in this chapter, and indeed in this dissertation 
as a whole, so my postulation of the moral trust network does make ad hoc predictions 
about the nature of our evolved facility for forming trust relationships and trust 
networks. However, I attempt to address the first challenge in Section 5.1. There I argue 
that the ‘base conditions’ for a dual-order fully connected network exist among 
moralists, and suggest a very brief and speculative evolutionary explanation for the 
advent and persistence of the moral trust network among humans. In 5.2 I partly address 
the second challenge, giving examples of what I contend (on the basis of admittedly 
meagre evidence) are non-moral dual-order fully connected trust networks whose 
members, like those of the moral trust network, promiscuously extend their trust and 
commitments to anyone who meets certain conditions, even if they are perfect strangers. 
Since my responses to the two challenges are not wholly compelling, the plausibility of 
my postulation of the moral trust network depends rather heavily on an independent 
argument for the existence of the network that I offer in 5.3. There I argue that we need 
to postulate the moral trust network, or something similarly extravagant, if we are to 
provide a satisfying explanation of the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval. 
In 5.4 I consider some objections to my explanation for moral universality. 
5.1 Why Would the Moral Trust Network Exist? 
In 3.2.1 I proposed that the salient base conditions for a fully connected network among 
a group G were these: (i) G has significant shared desires W, which vary in strength 
among members of G; and (ii) all members of G can significantly affect the extent to 
which W are satisfied. I also proposed that any fully connected network was likely to be 
a dual-order network. If the arguments I gave for these proposals were credible, then the 
plausibility of my proposal that there is a dual-order fully connected network linking all 
moralists will be improved if I can plausibly claim that the base conditions for fully 
connected networks obtain among moralists. 
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When I gave this account of the base conditions for fully connected networks in 
3.2.1, I was, as I admitted then, assuming that the members of a fully connected network 
were all able to communicate with one another. This assumption does not hold for the 
moral trust network. The failure of this assumption must complicate any explanation I 
might give for the existence of the moral trust network. But before I grapple with these 
complications, let us falsely assume for the time being that all moralists are able to 
communicate with one another, and would have been able to communicate with each 
other prior to the advent of the moral trust network. 
As I foreshadowed in the last chapter, I propose that the set of desire-types that 
are shared by the group M of potential moralists, and that largely explain their 
participation in the moral trust network are what we might broadly call altruistic desires. 
They desire, for instance, that sentient creatures should not suffer, that intelligent 
creatures that knowingly cause sentient creatures to suffer should not benefit from doing 
so, and that intelligent creatures should not deceive other intelligent creatures. Indeed, 
they have altruistic desires corresponding to all our ‘moral intuitions’. 
Thus, for any given member of M, and for every φ such that (i) φ is describable in 
non-moral terms, and (ii) the claim ‘φ-ing is necessarily morally wrong’ is intuitively 
plausible to most people, the M-member desires that intelligent creatures should never 
φ. According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, these altruistic desires are the things that 
philosophers call intuitions of moral wrongness. They are basic desires. They are also 
‘universal’, by which I mean that a statement of the content of an altruistic desire will 
contain no proper nouns or indexicals, and hence no references to particular times, 
people, or places. M-members’ altruistic desires vary in strength from member to 
member just as moral intuitions vary from person to person. 
Members of M also have altruistic desires corresponding to intuitions of moral 
permissibility, although the correspondence here may not be quite as straightforward as 
in the impermissibility case. These are also basic and universal. In the context of the 
moral trust network, they give rise to derived desires that people should not do 
otherwise than they are pre-trust disposed to do qua moral entrusted parties, in certain 
matters. These derived desires more closely correspond to intuitions of permissibility—
on my account, they are the things that philosophers call intuitions of moral 
permissibility. I am not quite sure what to say about the content of the basic altruistic 
desires they are derived from; they may, as I suggested in 4.1.4, be desires that people 
should not be subject to trust-based impositions in certain circumstances; or they may 
156 
 
have nothing to do with trust in particular. (When I talk of ‘altruistic’ desires in what 
follows, I have in mind only basic desires, not any desires that are derived from them, 
unless I indicate otherwise.) 
By simply postulating altruistic desires, I give an extremely superficial 
explanation of a phenomenon for which other metaethicists have felt obliged to give a 
deep explanation, namely, the appearance of human altruism.124 Whether the 
superficiality of my explanation for human altruism is a cost for my theory depends on 
whether or not biology supplies a deep explanation that is compatible with my 
superficial one—that is, whether my posited altruistic desires are well explained by 
evolutionary mechanisms like reciprocal altruism, kin selection, and group selection.125 
It is worth pointing out though that fiduciary non-cognitivism does provide a deep 
explanation for a part of our altruistic motivations. It predicts that humans will be 
moved to greater altruistic exertions by a desire to live up to others’ trust, and hence to 
avoid various social penalties. This perhaps diminishes the fiduciary non-cognitivist’s 
biological commitments to a degree. 
Virtually every M-member has the power to frustrate the altruistic desires of every 
other member. This is partly because altruistic-desire-frustrating actions are easy to 
perform. It is easy to hurt, to lie, to steal, and so on, assuming there are living creatures 
around that can be hurt, lied to, and so on. Also, because altruistic desires are universal, 
such an action performed in one part of the world will frustrate the relevant altruistic 
desires of moralists in every other part of the world, no matter who they are or whom 
they know. 
Thus base conditions (i) and (ii) are met. It would potentially serve the interests of 
‘proto-moralists’ to form a network of entrusted concern relationships in which 
altruistic desires would be weighted for both entrusted and entrusting parties. But the 
satisfaction of (i) and (ii) is not enough to generate a very strong prediction that they 
would form such a network. Being a member of such a trust network and honouring 
one’s obligations as such would be costly. It would mean, roughly, acting only on the 
bidding of your altruistic desires, in all of the decisions in which the terms of the trust 
network give entrusting parties voices. Which decisions would these be? To get the 
                                                 
124 E.g. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
125 For relevant defences of psychological altruism, see Elliott Sober’s ‘Did Evolution Make Us 
Psychological Egoists?’ in his From a Biological Point of View (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) 8-27; and Armin W. Schulz, ‘Sober & Wilson’s evolutionary arguments 
for psychological altruism: a reassessment’, Biology and Philosophy 26 (2011): 251–260. 
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facts about our moral thought and talk right, I must postulate that the terms of the moral 
trust network would give entrusting parties voices in virtually all decisions that 
entrusted parties face, since we seem to be able to make judgements about the moral 
propriety of almost any act.126 Forming or joining the moral trust network might thus be 
a prohibitively demanding undertaking. 
Whether it would actually serve moralists’ interests to form a network giving 
members such pervasive presumptive influence on one another’s decisions depends 
largely on the following factors: (i) the strengths of their altruistic desires relative to 
their non-altruistic desires; (ii) the extent to which acting in accordance with their 
altruistic desires would mean acting in defiance of their non-altruistic desires; (iii) the 
size of the group; (iv) the costs of being either a non-member or an unscrupulous 
member. 
Regarding (iii), the size of the network matters because greater participation 
means, for each member, a greater satisfaction of altruistic desires in exchange for the 
same frustration of non-altruistic desires. Thus the larger the network would be if it 
were formed, the greater would be the utility of its existence. Unfortunately, however, 
the benefits of the network’s existence would be the same for a person whether she was 
a member of it or not. A non-member would enjoy the benefits of members’ efforts to 
refrain from frustrating altruistic desires just as a member would. 
I think that I can plausibly postulate that (a), if the members of the moral trust 
network were to form some sort of agreement to, or were disposed to, impose heavy 
costs on non-members and unscrupulous members, then, as a result, it would typically 
be instrumentally rational for proto-moralists to join the moral trust network in order to 
avoid these costs; and (b), given this, it would be instrumentally rational for proto-
moralists to form the moral trust network (perhaps in conjunction with an agreement to 
punish defectors etc.) in the first place. The costs in question might involve any sort of 
ill-treatment; violence, ostracism, and disparaging gossip seem likely candidates. So I 
shall posit this, and rely on factor (iv) to explain the rationality of forming and 
participating scrupulously in the moral trust network, despite the heavy sacrifices 
involved in being a scrupulous moralist. 
                                                 
126 Or rather, it gives them voices in each other’s choices of which norms to conform to in 
virtually all decisions that they face. But for my present point this is unimportant. Being obliged 
to accommodate others’ preferences in one’s choices among norms to conform to is not 
generally less demanding than being obliged to accommodate their preferences in one’s choices 
among actions. 
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Difficult questions still remain, of course, about why a (possibly) universe-
spanning moral trust network exists. I have been artificially assuming that 
(proto-)moralists everywhere are able to communicate with each other, and so might 
have negotiated an agreement to form the moral trust network. How could it come about 
absent such communication? The following just-so story would explain the all-
encompassing pretensions of the moral trust network, and I suspect that I am committed 
to the truth of something like it. 
At some stage in pre-history, there existed a population of hominins from which 
we are all at least in part descended, who possessed altruistic desires, and who were 
capable of forming networks of entrusted concern relationships. The population was 
divided into somewhat separate but sporadically interacting and inter-breeding groups. 
By suitably gradual and haphazard processes, the groups formed moral trust networks, 
or proto-types of moral trust networks, because it was instrumentally rational for them 
to do so for the sorts of reasons I have described. The same sorts of considerations that 
favoured forming moral trust networks within a group would also have favoured 
forming a broader trust network spanning all of the groups. Altruistic-desire-frustrating 
actions performed in one group would frustrate the altruistic desires of members of 
other groups. If a moral trust network existed in group A and not in group B, members 
of A could defect to B, and so enjoy the benefits of the sacrifices made by members of 
A without reciprocating. So it would have helped to preserve the moral trust network in 
A if the members of A made life miserable for B, by making war on them etc., and so 
deterring defection from their own group. Thus it would have served the interests of 
each group to have had a moral trust network of its own, not just to inhibit frustrations 
of members’ altruistic desires, but also as a means of avoiding the hostility of other 
groups with moral trust networks. 
There would, moreover, have been pressures toward homogenizing the moral trust 
relationships of different groups into one. First, if group B had a more lenient moral 
trust network than group A, requiring smaller sacrifices of its members, members of A 
would still have a reason to defect to B, and so A would have a reason to be hostile to B. 
So we should expect different moral trust networks to have tended to be similarly 
demanding. Second, it would have helped to minimize conflict if the discretion-
licencing preferences of a moralist in B were discretion-licencing for him in A too. That 
way, members of A would have had fewer suspicions about whether members of B 
were getting away with altruistic-desire-frustrating actions that they wouldn’t have got 
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away with had they been in A. They could have relied on members of B to police each 
other’s behaviour, without feeling the need to intervene themselves. Moreover, if some 
act of great cruelty had been performed by a member of B, and A was poised to engage 
B in a crusading war to, as it were, punish them for permitting it, it would have been 
helpful if the same facts that convinced the members of B that the agent was acting on a 
discretion-licencing preference could also have been adduced to convince the members 
of A of the same. 
Third, it would have helped to resolve conflicts if members of A had had the same 
discursive entitlements to demand that members of B explain the reasoning behind their 
preferences that members of B had, and vice versa. If a member of A were temporarily 
living amongst the members of B, it would have been helpful if the members of B could 
have scrutinized and policed his behaviour in just the same way in which the members 
of A could, so that if they ‘punished’ his action, they could have explained this 
‘punishment’ in a way that would have satisfied members of A that this was not done 
out of hostility toward A. Fourth, if the members of A and B were parties to the same 
moral trust network, they could have more easily shared information about who was and 
who wasn’t unscrupulous, and so avoided misplacing their trust qua moralists. 
There would presumably have been ample opportunities for members of the 
population to ‘experiment’ with moral trust networks spanning multiple groups. 
Whenever a large group split into two smaller groups, the possibility of maintaining the 
original trust network amongst all the members of the original group, rather than 
dividing it, would have presented itself. Whenever there was a lot of trade, cooperation, 
and back-and-forth migration between two groups, it would presumably have been 
convenient and easy for the members of each to extend the trust and commitments to 
one another that they extended to members of their own groups.127 
Let us suppose that these counterfactual claims are all correct, and boldly continue 
our story chiefly in the indicative mood. Unsurprisingly, a moral trust network spanning 
the entire population eventually developed. Members of the population were able to 
                                                 
127 According to Gibbard’s summary of anthropological research on present-day hunter-
gatherers, interaction among groups is common. ‘Current hunter-gatherers camp temporarily in 
small groups, with about twenty adults. The groups keep splitting into smaller groups and 
reforming in new ways, depending on such things as season and social tensions. As a result, 
kinship within a camp is not always close, and yet people in the camp share food and cooperate 
extensively. Intercamp relations are cultivated, perhaps as a kind of insurance.’ Gibbard, Wise 
Choices, 258n.2. 
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safely assume that anyone they encountered was a member of the moral trust network, 
whether the encountered parties were members of their own groups or strangers. They 
could extend their trust and commitments qua moralists indiscriminately to everyone in 
the world who would reciprocate, and who met a threshold of trustworthiness, and this 
lack of discrimination would bring with it almost no costs. 
This situation persisted long enough to affect the evolutionary trajectory of the 
population. Natural selection favoured members who could participate scrupulously in 
the network with ease; who had an intuitive and unreflective facility for the sort of 
reasoning that produced voiceable preferences, and the specialized language with which 
such preferences were voiced, discussed, and scrutinized; and who were disposed to 
indiscriminately extend their trust and commitments qua moralists to strangers and 
acquaintances alike. The result was that these dispositions and this facility became at 
least partly innate (since having a fitness-enhancing trait innately means having it more 
reliably and cheaply) and ubiquitous in the population and the modern humans who 
descended from it. This is the sort of story I must tell to explain why the moral trust 
network does not seem, like many other trust networks, to be confined to any particular 
community, family, or organization, and why I am capable of having moral 
disagreements with unknown moralists on cannibal islands and on Moral Twin Earth.128 
I shall elaborate a little on this story when I consider some objections to my explanation 
for ‘moral universality’ in Section 5.4. 
                                                 
128 Hare, Language of Morals, 148-9; Horgan and Timmons, ‘Troubles for New Wave Moral 
Semantics’, esp. 164-6. I discuss Hare’s cannibal case briefly in 5.4.4. I believe that fiduciary 
non-cognitivism can vindicate our intuitions about Moral Twin Earth, in spite of the fact that 
Twin Earthlings are beings whose evolution was separate from that of terrestrial humans, 
because they are described as being extremely similar to terrestrial humans. They seem to differ 
from us only in ‘temperament’, or in the relative strengths of some of their non-cognitive 
attitudes (165). Assuming that my empirical claims about entrusted concern relationships and 
trust networks are true with regard to humans, it is reasonable to infer from Horgan and 
Timmons’s description that Twin Earthlings possess the same facility for forming, and tendency 
to form, trust networks that humans possess. This being so, it is reasonable to infer from the 
description of the role played by terms like ‘wrong’ in their thought and talk that they are parties 
to the moral trust network. Thus fiduciary non-cognitivism vindicates an intuition of moral 
disagreement in this case. Fiduciary non-cognitivism might very well be unable to vindicate 
similar intuitions about cases involving less humanlike extraterrestrials, and may have to rely on 
an error theoretic explanation (attributing the intuition to an irrational human tendency to 
anthropomorphize, or something similar). 
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5.2 Non-moral Precedents for Some Novel Features of the Moral Trust 
Network 
The moral trust network, on my theory, has several novel features. Some of these 
features are not apparently shared by any other trust network. Thus my postulation that 
the moral trust network has these features is somewhat ad hoc. However, I shall now 
argue that some of the novel features I wish to postulate are plausibly shared by some 
non-moral trust networks, if people’s capacities to have third-party disagreements in 
preference is an indicator of the existence of those networks. By so arguing, I hope to 
glean skerricks of plausibility for my postulation that the moral trust network possesses 
these features.  
Since it is not concerned with the moral trust network specifically, this section of 
Chapter 5 can be regarded as a continuation of the general discussion of trust networks 
that appeared in Chapter 3. It makes sense to include the material below in the present 
chapter rather than Chapter 3, firstly because it is tangential to the central concern of 
that chapter, which was to argue for the existence of networks of entrusted concern 
relationships permitting third-party non-cognitive disagreement; and secondly because 
the new material is more narrowly focused on supporting the particular claims of my 
metaethical theory. 
The novel features whose independent existence I wish to argue for are saliently 
exemplified by what I will call community-specific trust networks. These are dual-order 
fully connected networks whose membership robustly approximates that of a particular 
community, rather than, say, a family or an organization. A community-specific trust 
network is thus somewhat exclusive—it consists of only a proper subset of all 
‘trustworthy’ people. But it may be quite large, large enough so that many of its 
members are strangers to each other. Its members will tend to have some sort of shared 
identity. The weighted desires of its members will be desires that the members of the 
community tend to have in common, and that outsiders are less likely to have. These 
will typically be desires concerning the community’s distinctive interests, including 
desires concerning the honouring of its traditions, the preservation of its culture and 
language, its engagement with outsiders, and the improvement of its reputation and 
welfare. 
Here are some examples of communities amongst whom, I contend, we normally 
find community-specific trust networks: those large subsets of the populations of 
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democratic states who in a suitably strong sense ‘identify’ as citizens or nationals of 
those states; the similar but smaller subsets of the populations of non-democratic states 
who have some sort of influence on how they are governed and a stake in preserving the 
status quo; classes within states that have strong group identities; and groups unified by 
a common and distinctive culture or religion, with strong group identities, in states that 
are not culturally or religiously homogeneous. These examples should give an idea of 
the sense of ‘community’ that I have in mind in this discussion: it is not so much the 
sense that we associate with small country towns, but rather is the sense used in talk 
about e.g. ‘the Vietnamese community’ in a particular country. 
My evidence for the existence of community-specific dual-order fully connected 
networks is the fact that there are disagreements in preference in which members of a 
certain community generally can participate, while non-members cannot. That this fact 
constitutes such evidence depends, of course, on the plausibility of theoretical claims I 
made in Chapters 2 and 3. Here’s an example of a disagreement in preferences between 
two members of a disadvantaged and historically oppressed black community in a 
democratic country with a majority white population. The speakers are not well 
acquainted, and do not have any shared projects, so they are presumably not parties to 
any personal entrusted concern relationships. (Readers may imaginatively situate the 
following exchange in a possible world in which the attitudes attributed to the parties do 
not ring too false.) 
News Anchor 
B. I’ve applied for a job as an anchor at the X News network. 
A. Why do you want to work there? They’re part of the white establishment. They 
always present black people as criminals. You’ll be supporting them. 
B. If people see me on TV reading the news, they’ll see a black woman who’s well-
spoken, well-dressed, has a respectable job, and holds a position of authority. It 
might help to change people’s opinions, especially people who watch X News, 
whose stereotypes are rarely challenged. 
A. Listen to yourself. ‘Well-spoken’, ‘well-dressed’! You mean by white people’s 
standards. 
B. Yes, by white people’s standards. I take it you’d rather I didn’t work there. 
A. You’re right. I’d rather a black woman didn’t throw her support behind a biased 
news network, in order to make black people seem more pleasing to white people. 
B. Well I’d rather I did work there. It’s a chance to make progress in overcoming 
prejudice. 
This seems like a disagreement. It seems like a normative disagreement, which I 
daresay it is. But the parties communicate their disagreeing attitudes by reporting 
163 
 
mutually unsatisfiable preferences, so the disagreement is a prima facie disagreement in 
preference, whatever else it may be. And, like all of the robust non-cognitive 
disagreements that I’ve discussed so far, it plausibly relies on the existence of a certain 
kind of relationship between the speakers. A member of the white population couldn’t 
chime in with her own preference report, siding with A or B, and citing the same sorts 
of grounds as those that A and B offer, without seeming presumptuous. Her preference 
would not be one that A or B would feel obliged to give consideration to, and would not 
seem to put her in disagreement with A and B. 
There is a complication here. If a member of the white population reported a 
preference and gave obviously moral grounds for it, then her contribution might not 
seem presumptuous. Everyone, seemingly, has a voice in everyone else’s decisions, 
insofar as they are treated as moral decisions.129 So when we consult our intuitions 
about the presumptuousness of a voiced preference, and its capacity to put the voicer in 
disagreement with others, for evidence about the existence of non-moral trust networks, 
we must be careful about how we characterize the grounds that the voicer gives for her 
preference. 
Our intuitions about News Anchor support the hypothesis that there is an entrusted 
concern relationship between the interlocutors. They don’t specifically support the 
claim that the interlocutors are members of a dual-order fully connected network. But 
we can get more specific evidence by imaginatively elaborating on the case. For 
instance, if we imagine other members of the relevant black community chiming in with 
their own preferences, and if the preferences have the right sorts of ‘community-
specific’ grounds, their contributions will not seem presumptuous, and they will seem to 
disagree with the parties whose preferences oppose theirs. This is reason to think that A 
and B are part of a network of trust relationships with a common set of weighted desires 
rather than a mere dyadic entrusted concern relationship. And since some of the 
disagreements will be third-party disagreements, this, together with the arguments I 
gave for the Four Relationships Hypothesis in 2.2.2, give us reason to think that the 
interlocutors are parties to second-order entrusted concern relationships as well as first-
order ones. 
                                                 
129 Cf. Philippa Foot’s observation that, in contrast to other kinds of approval, ‘anyone can 
approve or disapprove’ on grounds that ‘come within the sphere of public manners and morals’ 
(Virtues and Vices, 192). The present section borrows from Foot’s account of the conditions for 
approval and disapproval. I discuss this account in Section 3.1. 
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Finally, we can imagine the discussion straying from the practical decision at hand 
to cases in which any other members of the black community face decisions similar to 
those of B. (It is tempting to imagine discussions of counterfactual decisions here, 
though perhaps we had better not, as I have not given an account of non-cognitive 
disagreements about counterfactual decisions.) It is intuitively plausible that parties who 
disagreed about the original case would disagree about the new cases too, if those cases 
were sufficiently similar to the original case. This suggests that the network of trust 
relationships of which A and B are members is not merely one in which B is the sole 
common first-order entrusted party, but rather is one in which every member is an 
entrusted party in an entrusted concern relationship with every other member. If we 
have all of these intuitions, then the hypothesis that A and B are members of a 
community-specific dual-order fully connected network is probably the simplest way to 
account for them. 
The property of community-specific trust networks that explains their possession 
of the novel features that I am interested is that their members need not all have met or 
communicated with one another. Community-specific trust networks are typically, in 
part, networks of strangers. Thus their members will typically have entrusted concerns 
to, and be committed to accommodate the preferences of, complete strangers. 
One consequence of this is that we should expect these trust networks to have 
what I shall call ‘standardized default terms’. Since the weighted desire-types for all 
parties in a dual-order fully connected network are the same, and since in each of the 
first- and second-order networks the admissible ground-types are the same among all 
members, it is easy to imagine that the terms of the relationships in some dual-order 
fully connected networks might be ‘standardized’. That is, the terms of the relationships 
in each of the first- and second-order networks might all be identical. Thus, for instance, 
there would be no difference in the extent to which one party strained another’s trust by 
resisting her preferences (and if one entrusted party in the first-order network could 
make what in Appendix B I call ‘conflict excuses’, then all could). This is more 
plausible in the case of community-specific trust networks, because any two members 
who have never met each other will not have had the chance to negotiate special terms 
for their shared relationships in the network. And it seems unavoidable that there should 
be at least some standardized default terms, which every member of the network must 
(tacitly) know, and which must determine the sort of trust and commitments that she 
extends to strangers in the network. (It is of course compatible with this hypothesis that 
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the network also includes entrusted concern relationships whose terms deviate 
somewhat from the default.) I shall posit that the moral trust network shares with 
community-specific trust networks the property of having standardized default terms. 
If members of a trust network don’t know each other, the trust and commitments 
they extend to each other must be generic—by which I mean undifferentiated, save 
perhaps in degree,130 from the trust and commitments that they extend to other unknown 
members—and impersonal. The trust relationships that they form by reciprocating each 
other’s generic and impersonal trust and commitments must also be generic and 
impersonal. There is nothing surprising about the idea of impersonal trust relationships 
whose terms are determined by convention rather than negotiation. We trust the 
strangers around us to obey conventional rules all the time. When I drive I trust my 
fellow motorists to obey traffic laws. (This sort of trust is generic as well as 
impersonal—I trust all unknown motorists alike to follow the same rules.) That actual 
entrusted concern relationships are ever impersonal is a more surprising supposition. 
This is because an entrusted concern relationship is a fairly complicated sort of trust 
relationship; and because it obliges one party to be responsive to the mental states of the 
other, unless his own mental states licence him to do otherwise, and this sensitivity of 
trust-based obligations to publicly inaccessible mental states makes conformity to those 
obligations difficult to police. But our reasons for believing that community-specific 
trust networks exist are reasons for believing that impersonal entrusted concern 
relationships exist. I shall posit that the entrusted concern relationships among members 
of the moral trust network as such are (predominantly if not uniformly) generic and 
impersonal. Up to a point, the more plausible it is that community-specific trust 
networks exist, the more plausible this postulation is. 
The possibility of fully connected networks of entrusted concern relationships 
some of whose members are strangers to each other raises a question about what could 
qualify a person for membership in the first place, if this qualification potentially earns 
one the trust of perfect strangers. There seem to be two main possibilities, as well as 
arrangements involving elements of both. First, it might suffice for membership in the 
whole network to be accepted into it by a proper subset of its members, at the discretion 
                                                 
130 By ‘degree’ I mean degree of trust and strength of commitment. I am inclined to say that 
generic trust is trust in each member of a group of people to do the same thing or adhere to the 
same rules, whether or not the degree of trust is uniform across the group; and that generic 
commitment is commitment to each member of a group of people to do the same thing, whether 
or not the strength of commitment is uniform across the group.  
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of that subset, assuming the would-be member reciprocates the trust of all the other 
members. Second, there may be some ‘objective’ criteria, specified by the terms of the 
trust network, such that if a person meets them, and is sufficiently trustworthy, and is 
willing to reciprocate the trust and commitments to accommodation of all other 
members,131 she automatically becomes a member of the network and enjoys the trust of 
all its members. 
I am going to postulate that membership of the moral trust network is determined 
wholly in the latter way. It will improve the plausibility of this postulation if I can give a 
real-world non-moral precedent for this sort of arrangement. If they exist, community-
specific trust networks provide such a precedent, for people become members of these 
networks at least partly by meeting certain criteria, rather than merely by being admitted 
into the network by some of its members. Members of a country’s ‘Greek community’, 
and hence of the corresponding trust network, must be of Greek descent, and have some 
cultural ties with Greece. If an Australian voices a preference about whether Australia 
should become a republic (or rather, about whether certain people should take steps to 
bring this about), on grounds of national pride or tradition or the national interest, no 
one can have a voiceable preference, based on non-moral grounds, that puts him in 
disagreement with her unless he too is an Australian citizen. 
The moral trust network would be still less exotic if I could show that there were 
community-specific networks whose memberships depended only on their satisfying 
certain ‘objective’ criteria (and making the requisite commitments etc.). Unfortunately, 
however, it does not seem implausible to me that some sort of voluntary acceptance or 
acknowledgement by members of a community-specific trust network is always a 
necessary condition for membership of such a network. If this is right, then my 
postulation that the membership of the moral trust network does not depend on any such 
acceptance is, I admit, regrettably novel. 
                                                 
131 The trustworthiness and ‘willingness to reciprocate trust and commitment’ criteria may or 
may not be among the criteria specified by the terms of the trust network, depending on whether 
or not it is within the scope of the terms of a fully connected network of entrusted concern 
relationships to specify such things. 
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5.3 Independent Evidence for the Existence of the Moral Trust Network 
5.3.1 Philippa Foot on Approval and Disapproval 
We have a reason to posit the moral trust network that is independent of the plausibility 
of non-cognitivism, and the slender evidence that I have adduced for its existence so far 
in the course of arguing for the existence of trust networks with similar properties. As I 
shall argue, we must posit something like the moral trust network if we are to explain 
the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval. In what follows I will sometimes use 
the term approbation as an umbrella term for approval and disapproval, and 
approbative attitude as an umbrella term for an attitude of approval or disapproval. 
Philippa Foot argues that approval and disapproval can, as a general matter, only 
exist in an appropriate social context. This is at least very plausible in non-moral cases. 
Parents may disapprove of their daughter’s marriage on non-moral grounds, for 
instance, ‘because the man is too old for her, or not rich enough, or not well enough 
connected; they may disapprove because they think that the marriage will not work out 
well, or because the family’s honour or pride is at stake.’ A stranger may have the same 
‘opinions’, yet cannot disapprove of the marriage on non-moral grounds, even if she 
genuinely cares ‘about the girl’s fortunes, or the fortunes of the family.’132 If ‘an elderly 
couple are thinking of retiring to some seaside resort, and the evidence is against the 
success of the venture’, a ‘relative or friend … may therefore disapprove of the idea’, 
but a stranger or a neighbour may not, even if she cares more about the couple’s welfare 
than their friends and relatives do.133 Participants ‘in a particular enterprise, like giving 
a dinner party, or robbing a bank’, may have a capacity to approve or disapprove of 
actions aimed at furthering the goals of the enterprise, which outsiders lack.134 There are 
policies of countries that people can only approve or disapprove of if they are citizens of 
those countries, unless they do so on moral grounds, or possess relevant recognized 
expertise.135 Foot argues that the attitudes of favouring, being for, and being against, are 
similarly dependent on social context.136 A stranger, she observes, would be 
                                                 
132 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 192-3. 
133 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 193. 
134 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 194. 
135 ‘I … can approve of a measure of taxation only in my country.’ Foot, Virtues and Vices, 197. 
136 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 200-202. 
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presumptuous if he said to the elderly couple who were thinking of moving to the 
seaside, ‘I’m against your going’.137  
Some of Foot’s examples, and her general thesis, may remind readers of my 
examples and thesis in Chapter 1 regarding robust non-cognitive disagreement. This is 
no accident. My explanation for the robust non-cognitive disagreements described by 
Stevenson, and my use of examples involving ‘well-wishers’, were directly inspired by 
Foot’s examples and argument. My account of the conditions for non-cognitive 
disagreement owes a debt to Foot’s account of the social conditions for approval and 
disapproval. She holds ‘that approval and disapproval can, logically speaking, exist only 
against a background of agreement about the part that other people’s views shall be 
given in decision-making.’ To approve or disapprove of some option in a decision, it 
must be recognized that one is entitled to be listened to138—that one ‘has a voice in the 
matter’.139 My claim that preferences robustly disagree only if they are based on the 
right kinds of desires (evidenced by the grounds given for them) is another echo. 
According to Foot, even when a social setting exists which permits a person to approve 
or disapprove of an option on non-moral grounds, she may still only be able to approve 
or disapprove on grounds of a specific sort. She writes: 
A parent cannot disapprove of the marriage of one of his children on the grounds that a 
neighbour, with no particular standing in the matter, will be annoyed by it …. If he 
disapproves he must hold an opinion about the way the marriage will work out for his son 
or daughter, or about the way the family fortunes will be affected by it.140 
My Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis, and more particularly the Reason-to-Consider 
Hypothesis of which the former hypothesis is a precisification, draw on Foot’s diagnosis 
of approval and disapproval. My account of the conditions for non-cognitive 
disagreement is more specific than Foot’s account of the conditions for approval and 
disapproval, however. Foot says nothing about trust. 
If, as I am persuaded, non-moral approbation requires some kind of social 
relationship between the approver and the approved, then we must assume that moral 
approbation does too, or explain why it does not. What would this require? According to 
Foot, there must be ‘social practices’ establishing ‘that anyone is to listen to anyone 
                                                 
137 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 200. 
138 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 198-9. 
139 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 203 (Foot is discussing moral approval here; cf. 201 for a similar 
usage in connection with favouring and being for). 
140 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 194. 
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when considerations are brought forward which are moral considerations.’141 It is 
perhaps ‘the custom of every society in the world, to take matters such as killing, 
stealing, and lying as a concern of the community. Everyone has a voice in the matter of 
whether or not these things are to be done.’142 Because the existence of specific ‘social 
practices’ and ‘customs’ is a rather contingent matter, and because they tend to 
distribute entitlements parochially within a particular society or culture, Foot has 
difficulty explaining how it is that we can morally disapprove of actions performed by 
members of communities that have had little or no contact with our own, and why we 
are confident that they can morally disapprove of our actions. 
5.3.2 Reason to Think that Entrusted Concern Relationships Enable Approbation 
It is a virtue of fiduciary non-cognitivism’s otherwise embarrassing postulation of a 
universe-spanning moral trust network that it can explain these phenomena, as I will 
now argue. Entrusted concern relationships, as I shall argue in a moment, provide the 
‘social context’ that approval and disapproval require. If the moral trust network exists, 
then every moralist shares entrusted concern relationships (at least four) with every 
other moralist. So fiduciary non-cognitivism explains the existence of the social 
contexts that enable moral approval and disapproval. Moreover, despite the 
implausibility of positing the moral trust network, the postulation is not utterly 
implausible, and it is hard to think of another way of explaining the phenomena that is 
very dissimilar from that offered by fiduciary non-cognitivism that is any more 
plausible. So the postulation of the moral trust network is, all things considered, not 
nearly as implausible as it at first appears. (Note, however, that the ‘second-order’ of the 
moral trust network is not needed to explain moral approval; fiduciary non-cognitivism 
therefore incurs a special cost by positing it.) 
I am not going to defend a complete analysis of approval and disapproval. But I 
do need to say something about the nature of these states if I am to claim that entrusted 
concern relationships plausibly provide the social contexts that make approval and 
disapproval possible. To start with, I propose that approval and disapproval are attitudes 
of entrusting parties, not entrusted parties. An entrusted party as such can’t approve or 
disapprove, because he only has a voice in his own decisions, and approval and 
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142 Foot, Virtues and Vices, 203. 
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disapproval seem to be directed at other people and their actions. I further propose the 
following first-pass analyses: 
Approval (first pass). An entrusting party approves of an option φ if and only if she has 
a voiceable preference that her partner should φ, and does not intend to yield or waive in 
the matter of his φ-ing. 
Disapproval (first-pass). An entrusting party disapproves of an option φ if and only if 
she has a voiceable preference that her partner should not-φ, and does not intend to yield 
or waive in the matter of his φ-ing. 
These first-pass analyses contradict a datum that Baker and Woods have pointed 
to concerning consistent combinations of approval and disapproval states. Those writers 
consider the following examples: 
(1a) Joe disapproves of dancing. 
(1b) Joe disapproves of not dancing. 
(2a) Joe disapproves of dancing. 
(2b) Joe approves of dancing. 
According to Baker and Woods, ‘It should be clear that the pair (1a) and (1b) is not 
discordant [i.e., roughly, inconsistent]; it is simply the attitudes of someone who is 
mean spirited. The pair (2a) and (2b) is, however, discordant.’143 However, if my partial 
hypothesis is correct, we should not intuit this difference between (1a)-(1b) and (2b)-
(2b). These sentences would merely imply the following about Joe’s mental state: 
(1a′) Joe has a voiceable preference for not dancing. 
(1b′) Joe has a voiceable preference for dancing. 
(2a′) Joe has a voiceable preference for not dancing. 
(2b′) Joe has a voiceable preference for dancing. 
While I share the intuition that Baker and Woods report, I am not sure what to 
make of it. Suppose that a curmudgeonly person at a dance expressed disapproval of 
dancing and disapproval of not dancing, and someone asked ‘What would you have us 
do?’ I can think of nothing sensible she might say that wouldn’t involve contradicting or 
reversing one of her expressions of disapproval. Or rather, not quite anything: I can 
imagine her saying, ‘Well since you’ve gone to the trouble of organizing this frivolous 
event, you’d better dance. But you should never have organized it in the first place.’ If 
she said this, we would be allowed to interpret her as disapproving of dancing in a 
sense, and disapproving of not dancing in a (perhaps different) sense. And it would 
                                                 
143 Baker and Woods, ‘How Expressivists’, 409. 
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seemingly be odd to suppose that she approves of dancing in any sense. So, apparently, 
disapproving is more easily done than approving. Approval of an action φ in a choice 
situation C requires approval (or at least non-disapproval) of the choices that put the 
agent in C; whereas it suffices for disapproval of φ that one disapproves of the choices 
that put the agent in C. At least, this seems to be true of some cases. 
It would be beside my purpose to try to give a thorough account of this backward-
looking character of approbation. I shall instead confine my attention to cases in which 
‘historical’ factors do not intrude, e.g. cases in which the agent is not in her choice 
situation by choice. As far as I can see, my first-pass ‘accommodation-obliging 
preference’ analysis does not fall afoul of intuitions of the sort that Baker and Woods 
elicit in these cases. 
However, it is defective for another reason. Observe that it does not sound quite 
right to say that the parties in Stevenson’s restaurant case approve of their preferred 
options, and it sounds wrong to say that they disapprove of their dispreferred options. 
Yet my first-pass analysis implies that they have these approbative attitudes. I 
mentioned above that Foot thinks that attitudes of favouring as well as approval depend 
on ‘social practices’; this, I suggest, is a case in which the parties’ entrusted concern 
relationship permits them to favour options. But their accommodation-obliging 
preferences do not amount to attitudes of approval and disapproval.  
As I observed in 1.1.4, it is more plausible to say that the parties in Stevenson’s 
restaurant case are making requests of each other than that they are prescribing their 
preferred options. This may partly explain why they do not amount to approbative 
attitudes. Approval and disapproval have a prescriptive flavour. They are not attitudes 
we associate with mere requesting. However, it would be unsatisfactorily vague and 
superficial to analyse approving as ‘voiceably preferring with a prescriptive flavour’. 
Let us see if we can do better. 
What explains why the preferences voiced in Stevenson’s restaurant case seem to 
be mere favouring, and not approbative attitudes? Here are three hypotheses: 
(1) Voiceably preferring is approving only in ‘non-joint-action contexts’, i.e., 
only when the entrusting party’s voiceable preference is not for an option in a decision 
about how she and her partner are to coordinate their actions in pursuit of a common 
goal. Since the context in which the preferences voiced in Restaurant is a ‘joint-action 
context’, this hypothesis would explain why neither party disapproves of the other’s 
preferred option. 
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(2) Voiceably preferring is approving only when the entrusted party has a 
sufficiently strong trust-based obligation to accommodate the entrusting party’s 
preferences. The parties in Restaurant presumably have only weak trust-based 
obligations to accommodate each other’s preferences, so their accommodation-obliging 
preferences don’t, as we might intuitively say, have the force and gravity of approbative 
attitudes. 
(3) Voiceably preferring is approving only when the entrusting party’s 
preference doesn’t depend on weighted desires that she and her partner do not share 
(i.e., desires that would not be satisfied by the same outcomes). Since each party in 
Restaurant is voicing a preference based on desires that she does not share with her 
partner, neither preference amounts to an approbative attitude. 
This roughly corresponds to Foot’s own proposed explanation for the difference 
between approving and favouring: cases of merely favouring or merely ‘being for’, 
rather than approving, are ones in which the relevant social arrangements that entitle the 
relevant parties to voices do not have the exclusive purpose of furthering some common 
ends, and in fact give each potential favourer a voice in the other parties’ decisions on 
private and self-regarding grounds.144 Foot, however, also thinks that approval and 
favouring involve different kinds of internal mental states: approval involves having an 
‘opinion’ that is to be given consideration, favouring involves having a ‘wish’ that is to 
be given consideration.145 
Among hypotheses (1)-(3), I think that (3) is the most plausible. Against (2), 
observe that I, an Australian, can disapprove of the actions of an Australian prime 
minister on non-moral grounds (perhaps with respect to a ‘national identity’ issue, e.g., 
whether Australia should become a republic). Yet the prime minister’s trust-based 
obligation, qua member of the community-specific trust network consisting of the 
Australian citizenry, to accommodate my preferences is surely very weak indeed. 
Here is a case that tells against (1) but supports (3). Suppose that A and B have 
agreed to go to a movie after dinner, and A voices a preference that they should dine at 
En Route, a restaurant which they will pass on their way to the cinema, because she 
doesn’t want them to be late for the movie. B shares this concern. But he nonetheless 
prefers that they dine at Détour, because it serves one of his (B’s) favourite dishes, even 
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though getting to that restaurant would take them out of their way, and so delay them. It 
seems fairly plausible that A could disapprove of going to Détour, given the grounds for 
her preference, and very plausible that B could not disapprove of going to En Route, 
given the self-regarding grounds of his preference. A favours going to En Route; B 
favours going to Détour; but A and only A might disapprove of her dispreferred option. 
This case undermines (1) because it suggests that approbation is possible in a joint-
action context. It supports (3) because it is a case in which the fact that an option serves 
ends that the parties are presumed to share seems to explain why a preference for that 
option can put its possessor in a state of disapproval. 
If (3) is correct, the version of fiduciary non-cognitivism that I defend seems to be 
well positioned to explain why moralists as such are capable of approving and 
disapproving of actions rather than merely favouring or disfavouring them. For the 
voiceable preferences of moralists are based chiefly on altruistic desires, which all may 
be presumed to share in varying degrees, so they are preferences for options that tend to 
serve shared ends. 
Setting aside the ‘backward-looking’ conditions for approval and disapproval, I 
propose that the following is approximately true: 
Approval (second-pass). A person A approves of a person B’s φ-ing in circumstances C 
just in case A has an accommodation-obliging preference that B should φ in C, and A has 
not yielded or waived in the matter of B’s φ-ing in C, and A’s preference is explained by 
the fact that there is some subset D of A’s weighted desires such that 
(i) D suffices to explain A’s preference that B should φ in C, and 
(ii) the desires in D fall under desire-types that are weighted for B as well as A, and 
(iii) the desires in D are ones that A and B have in common (albeit perhaps differing in 
strength). 
Disapproval (second-pass). A person A disapproves of a person B’s φ-ing in 
circumstances C just in case A has an accommodation-obliging preference that B should 
not-φ in C, and A has not yielded or waived in the matter of B’s φ-ing in C, and A’s 
preference is explained by the fact that there is some subset D of A’s weighted desires 
such that 
(i) D suffices to explain A’s preference that B should not-φ in C, and 
(ii) the desires in D fall under desire-types that are weighted for B as well as A, and 
(iii) the desires in D are ones that A and B have in common (albeit perhaps differing in 
strength). 
Condition (iii) in each of these partial analyses should perhaps say that the desires in D 
are ones that A and B recognize that they have in common, or more strongly, that there 
is a mutual understanding between A and B that satisfying the desires in D would serve 
ends that they share, or some other variation on this idea. 
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This account of approval and disapproval is incomplete, not just because it ignores 
‘backward-looking’ conditions, or because of my indecision about how condition (iii) 
should be formulated, but also because I have devised it without taking into account the 
complications that may arise when we consider the relationships between morally 
approving or disapproving of φ-ing on the one hand (a two-way distinction) and, on the 
other, judging that φ-ing is morally required, permissible, or impermissible (a three-way 
distinction). I am not sure whether the account makes the right predictions about these 
relationships, in part because I am not sure what I my account ought to predict. 
Plausibly, wrongness judgements ought to be correlated with disapproval and 
requirement judgements ought normally to imply approval. But what about mere 
permissibility judgements? I shall set these issues aside, however, and content myself 
with having provided the beginnings of a satisfactory account of approval and 
disapproval. 
The account, incomplete though it is, explains, or at least is not challenged by, 
most of our intuitions about the cases I have discussed so far. For a start, its prediction 
that an approving or disapproving party must be the entrusting party in a relevant 
entrusted concern relationship with the disapproved party seems accurate. The parties in 
Flat (Preferences), Retail, Rival Hostesses, Football (John and Well-Wisher), and 
Restaurant (Blackmail I) presumably do not share relevant entrusted concern 
relationships, and do not seem to be voicing approbative attitudes (or attitudes of 
favouring for that matter).146 
The following are cases in which an entrusted concern relationship between the 
parties that would make their reported preferences voiceable plausibly exists: 
Restaurant, Invitation, Football (Mother and Son), Drinks, Marriage (Imperatives), 
Football (Parents I), Football (Parents II), Photographs, and News Anchor.147 Among 
these, those in which one or more parties might be thought to be voicing approval or 
disapproval are Football (Mother and Son), Football (Parents I), and News Anchor, and 
possibly also Invitation and Marriage (Imperatives). In Football (Mother and Son) and 
Football (Parents I), John’s mother plausibly disapproves of John’s playing football 
because of its dangers, and in the latter John’s father plausibly disapproves of John’s 
                                                 
146 Flat (Preferences) and Retail can be found in 1.1.2, Rival Hostesses in 1.1.3, Football (John 
and Well-Wisher) in the introduction to 1.2, and Restaurant (Blackmail I) in 1.2.4. 
147 Restaurant and Invitation can be found in 1.1.1, Football (Mother and Son) in 1.1.6, Drinks 
and Marriage (Imperatives) in 1.2.5, Football (Parents I) in the introduction to Chapter 2, 
Football (Parents II) in 2.1, Photographs in 3.2.1, and News Anchor in 5.2. 
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quitting the football team because doing so defies a family tradition. In News Anchor, A 
plausibly disapproves of B’s becoming a newsreader because she takes X News to be 
part of the white establishment. And the preferences these entrusting parties report are 
based on desires that they expect their relevant partners to share. 
It is only somewhat plausible that the parties in Invitation approve of their 
preferred options and disapprove of their dispreferred options. It is more plausible that 
Mr. A disapproves of inviting Toff than that Mrs. A disapproves of inviting Chum, 
perhaps because we detect a tincture of moral judgement in Mr. A’s reported preference 
for staying loyal to an old friend. I suggest that we are not much inclined to think that 
Mrs. A disapproves of inviting Mr. Chum because we suspect that Mr. A does not share 
Mrs. A’s social aspirations, and thus we are not inclined to suppose that the pair take 
rising in society to be a common end. Mrs. A’s preference thus has more of a favouring 
than an approbative character. We have a stronger inclination to think that both Mother 
and Aunt in Marriage (Imperatives) have approbative attitudes, because we take their 
entrusted concern relationships with Penny to be part of a familial trust network in 
which (it is generally assumed that) members have the common ends of both improving 
the family’s social standing and preserving its traditions. We would, it seems, have a 
stronger intuition that the parties in Invitation have approbative attitudes if it were 
suggested that their trust relationship was part of a familial network. Since we are 
allowed to think of it as a merely personal trust relationship, we are allowed to suppose 
that the parties will have weighted desires of a more idiosyncratic and self-regarding 
nature. 
The parties in Restaurant, Drinks, and Football (Parents II) seem obviously to be 
voicing preferences based on private (though weighted) desires. They thus seem to 
merely favour their preferred options. In Football (Parents II), John’s parents seem to 
be voicing preferences qua parties to a private entrusted concern relationship that is not 
part of any trust network of which John is a member. Although the parties voice 
preferences ostensibly concerning what John is to do, we must suppose that they are in 
fact elliptically favouring options that they themselves can choose, presumably options 
of encouraging John to choose one way or another. 
Photographs is a difficult case. It seems to me that both Cousin Agnes and Cousin 
Augusta both favour and approve of their preferred options, and that Cousin Agnes 
disapproves of Bertie’s sending the photographs to the press, because she thinks that his 
doing so would tarnish the Seymour name. But it does not seem to me that Aunt 
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Augusta disapproves of the option Bertie does not send the photos to the press, even 
though this option would prevent the destruction of a family tradition. Curiously, I think 
that this is because it does not seem that Bertie could have a sufficiently strong kind of 
trust-based obligation to send the photographs to the press when this would ruin the 
reputation of a fellow Seymour. Augusta’s preference seems to have the flavour of a 
request rather than a demand, or the flavour of a judgement of supererogatory value 
rather than a judgement of perfect duty. 
If my intuition on this point is not idiosyncratic, it reveals that my characterization 
of the network of trust relationships among the Seymours was too simple, and that I 
have underestimated the complex normative character of the demands and pressures that 
the Seymours can make of and impose on each other, even when we ignore their 
intimate and personal relationships. Complicating my account of the trust network 
among the Seymours so that it will fully accommodate my intuitions about disapproval 
is more than I can attempt in this work. Does the intuition about Augusta’s preference 
reveal a defect in my analysis of approbation? None, I think, that I have not already 
acknowledged. My analysis only gets the wrong result here because, as a general matter, 
it is not equal to the challenge of explaining the correlations between approbative 
attitudes and the more complex kinds of normative judgement (involving permission, 
and in this case perhaps, supererogation). 
5.3.3 That Something Like the Moral Trust Network is Needed to Explain Moral 
Approbation 
Although the analysis of approval and disapproval that I have offered is only half baked, 
its match with our intuitions is auspicious. This intuitive support licences optimism that 
a true analysis of approval and disapproval, according to which entrusted concern 
relationships constitute the social-contextual ingredients for these attitudes, is waiting to 
be discovered. Moreover, it seems that such an analysis would provide the basis for an 
explanation of the phenomena of moral approval and disapproval that was at least as 
plausible as the explanation allowed by any rival analysis, if that rival analysis 
recognized social contexts as necessary for approval and disapproval. For the ‘social 
context’ that would be necessary for moral approbation must be one that entitles every 
moralist in the universe to a voice in every other moralist’s decisions. And among those 
arrangements of social institutions that would provide this social context, the first order 
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of fiduciary non-cognitivism’s moral trust network is one whose existence can be 
posited with a comparatively high plausibility. 
Here are three propositions and an argument. 
(1) I can apparently morally disapprove of the actions of a moralist on Approbia, a 
planet in a distant galaxy that has never been in contact with Earth. 
(2) A moralist on Approbia can apparently disapprove of my actions. 
(3) Person A can only approve or disapprove of person B’s φ-ing if social practices or 
customs or trust relationships exist entitling A to a voice in B’s decision to φ or 
not-φ. 
((3) is a disjunction of Foot’s and my proposed necessary conditions for approval and 
disapproval.) Fiduciary non-cognitivists can account for (1)-(3) because they posit a 
necessary connection between being a moralist—even an Approbian moralist—and 
being a party to a network of trust relationships that gives members a voice in the 
decisions of all other moralists. Cognitivists (and traditional non-cognitivists) can’t 
account for (1)-(3) unless they posit something similar. 
I don’t claim that cognitivists need to make the same postulation (i.e. a universe-
spanning fully connected network, and a necessary connection between being a maker 
of moral judgements and being a member of such a network) in order to explain (1) and 
(2) given (3). They could, for instance, postulate that there is a universe-spanning social 
contract, entitling every moralist to a voice in every other moralist’s relevant decisions 
(or that our approval attributions assume this). Or they could postulate that there are 
local conventions in every society in the universe conferring similar entitlements (or 
that our approval-attributions assume this). All I claim is that they have to postulate 
something like this in order to give a completely satisfactory explanation of (1) and (2), 
and that none of the cognitivist-friendly alternatives to my proposed network of trust 
relationships is significantly less costly. 
Postulating the network of trust relationships required for the non-cognitivist to 
give a wholly satisfactory explanation of moral disagreement seemingly does not 
require postulating anything more extravagant than what everyone in metaethics must 
postulate to give a wholly satisfactory explanation of moral approbation. Does this 
mean that the there is no net cost for fiduciary non-cognitivism in postulating the first 
order of the moral trust network? Probably not. Cognitivists probably won’t want to 
give a completely satisfactory explanation of moral approbation if it means making such 
a postulation. They might well do better to simply reject Foot’s intuitive claims, or 
postulate that ‘approval’ and ‘disapproval’ are used in different senses in moral and 
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non-moral contexts, or insist that some sort of counterfactual social contract suffices to 
make approbation possible. But the plausibility of (1)-(3), and the obligation of all 
metaethicists to explain (1) and (2) given (3) if they are true, greatly lightens the burden 
of positing the moral trust network. 
Michael Smith thinks that we can satisfactorily explain moral approbation while 
rejecting (3). Smith presents an account of approval and disapproval that, like mine, was 
directly inspired by Foot’s account and the striking observations that she adduces in 
support of it. Like Foot, he sets out to explain what it is that distinguishes approving 
from attitudes like wanting and liking. Here is his proposal: 
to say that I disapprove of your behaviour, as opposed to merely dislike it, signals the fact 
that, as I see it, your behaviour transgresses the standards in terms of which you and I 
both acknowledge your behaviour is to be judged. In other words, disapproval 
presupposes that your behaviour is contrary to my legitimate expectations; my belief 
about how you will behave. Disliking your behaviour presupposes no such thing.148 
One party must have ‘legitimate expectations’ about how another will act if she is to 
disapprove of his actions. What exactly is a ‘legitimate expectation’? This much is 
clear: ‘expectation’ is not meant in a normative sense. Smith explicitly rules out a 
normative interpretation.149 A legitimate expectation regarding your behaviour is, as 
Smith says in the quote above, just a (suitably grounded) ‘belief about how you will 
behave’. (Elsewhere he implies that the prediction is about how you will behave ‘at 
least all things being equal’.150) Where do ‘legitimate expectations’ come from? On 
Smith’s view, social conventions can give rise to ‘legitimate expectations’ about how 
others will behave, but so can the requirements of rationality, ‘[f]or we all expect of 
each other that we will decide what to do on rational grounds’.151 In the non-moral cases 
that Foot drew our attention to, it is social conventions which explain the possibility of 
disapproval. In moral cases, the requirements of rationality (the ‘expansive’ sort of 
rationality favoured by moral rationalists) explain the possibility of disapproval. They 
do so because the moral rationalist’s thesis that moral requirements just are 
requirements of rationality is correct.152 Thus we can spare ourselves the embarrassment 
                                                 
148 Smith actually presents this as an interpretation of Foot, though he evidently endorses it 
himself. The Moral Problem, 89. 
149 Smith, The Moral Problem, 85-6. 
150 Smith, The Moral Problem, 87. 
151 Smith, The Moral Problem, 89. 
152 Smith, The Moral Problem, 85, 90. 
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of postulating that moralists are all parties to an agreement of some sort by embracing 
moral rationalism.153 
I am not sure how to interpret Smith’s claim that ‘my’ disapproval of ‘your’ 
behaviour requires that ‘as I see it, your behaviour transgresses the standards in terms of 
which you and I both acknowledge your behaviour is to be judged’. I am not sure, for 
instance, what Smith means by ‘acknowledge’, or whether ‘is to be judged’ means 
‘ought to be judged’ or ‘is planned to be judged’, or whom the judge is supposed to be. 
But the idea of predicted conformity to ‘commonly acknowledged standards’154 must be 
important to Smith’s explanation. He would fail to explain Foot’s observations if he 
merely proposed the following: 
P. What distinguishes disapproval of S’s φ-ing from simple dislike of S’s φ-ing is merely 
that disapproval involves (justifiedly) predicting that S will, all things being equal, 
conform to standards forbidding φ. 
Suppose that a young woman is planning to marry, and that one of her parents 
disapproves on the ground that the man’s poverty would embarrass their family. 
Intuitively, a benevolent stranger with the family’s best interests at heart cannot 
disapprove of the woman’s choice on the same ground. Presumably, if the truth of P 
explains our intuitions that the parent can and the stranger cannot so disapprove, it must 
be the case that we assume that the parent can, and the stranger cannot, justifiedly 
predict that the daughter would, all things being equal, follow standards forbidding 
marrying a man whose poverty would embarrass the family. But there is no reason I can 
think of why the stranger could not justifiedly make such a prediction, or why we would 
assume that she couldn’t. So presumably Smith rejects P. 
Everything hinges, then, on the nature of the common acknowledgement 
condition. But Smith’s characterization of it is underspecified in multiple respects. I 
cannot easily see a way to precisify it that wouldn’t either fail to explain Foot’s 
observations or create pressure to posit that moral approbation requires a social context. 
And I don’t think I am obliged to evaluate Smith’s account of approval for every 
remotely plausible precisification of the common acknowledgement condition. 
I can perhaps give an idea of the general difficulty facing attempts to provide 
analyses of approbation that neither contradict Foot’s observations nor imply that moral 
                                                 
153 Smith, The Moral Problem, 90. 
154 This phrase appears in Smith, The Moral Problem, 90. 
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approbation requires a social context, by evaluating the following much simpler 
proposal: 
Q. What distinguishes disapproval of S’s φ-ing from simple dislike of S’s φ-ing is merely 
that disapproval involves judging that S ought not to φ. 
Q is underspecified, but manageably so. It merely omits to specify the kind of ought 
judgement that is involved in disapproval. 
If Q is to explain why the parent can and the stranger cannot disapprove in the 
marriage case I described above, it must be the case that the parent can and the stranger 
cannot judge that the young woman ought not to marry the man (presumably on the 
grounds that his poverty would embarrass the family), in whatever sense of ‘ought’ is 
relevant. There is, as far as I can see, no way to explain this difference that does not 
make the parent’s capacity to make the ought judgement dependent on her relationship 
with the young woman. So there is an approbation-enabling kind of ought judgement 
that is relationship-dependent. Now we must ask: if we know that one kind of 
approbation-enabling ought judgement requires a certain relationship between the judge 
and the agent whose actions are the object of the judgement, what grounds do we have 
for thinking that all kinds of approbation-enabling ought judgements do not require such 
a relationship? The fact that moral ought judgements, for instance, are approbation-
enabling and that it would be far-fetched to posit social relationships of the relevant sort 
linking all pairs of moral judges and morally judged parties is certainly a good ground. 
But if this is the only ground that can be offered, the explanatory advantage that I have 
claimed for fiduciary non-cognitivism concerning approbation is secured. There is 
apparently no way of cashing out Q that allows us to provide a similarly parsimonious 
and unified explanation of approval (or the judgements that enable it) which does not 
also posit something like fiduciary non-cognitivism’s moral trust network. 
5.4 Objections 
I’ll now consider some objections to my explanation for moral universality. This 
explanation involved the postulation of entrusted concern relationships linking all 
agents who met certain criteria—criteria that were supposed to be satisfied by all and 
only those whom we take to be capable of making moral judgements, among other 
things. The first three are versions of the objection that the postulation of some of the 
required trust relationships is deeply implausible. They contend that there are possible 
moral disagreements (or ‘approver-approvee’ pairs) whose parties do not plausibly trust 
181 
 
each other in the required way. The first objection concerns disagreements one of whose 
parties falsely believes that the other does not meet the ‘objective criteria’ required for 
membership in the network. The second concerns disagreements one of whose parties 
has demonstrated extreme untrustworthiness through extreme unscrupulousness (e.g. 
inveterate hypocrisy). The third concerns disagreements whose parties share extremely 
antagonistic relationships (e.g. a Nazi commandant and a Jew in Auschwitz). The 
postulation of the moral trust network is costly even if these objections are wholly 
unsuccessful, so the objections must be understood as charging the postulation with a 
greater degree of implausibility than I have acknowledged. The fourth objection 
concerns the possibility of moral disagreement involving agents who lack altruistic 
desires. 
5.4.1 Lack of Trust Owing to False Beliefs 
The first objection that I’ll consider is by no means the most pressing. But it is a simple 
challenge that I can address fairly quickly, and doing so gives me an occasion to make 
my position a bit more precise, and eliminate possible sources of confusion. 
Members of the moral trust network posited by fiduciary non-cognitivism extend 
their trust indiscriminately to everyone who meets certain criteria specified by the terms 
of the moral trust network. Not everything meets these criteria: non-human animals, 
Daleks,155 psychopaths, and unsocialized feral humans, and others who do not ‘get’ 
morality,156 probably do not. This seems to mean, according to fiduciary non-
cognitivism, that such creatures cannot make moral judgements or have moral 
approbative attitudes, that they cannot be parties to moral disagreements, that they 
cannot be (morally) disapproved of, and that their token actions cannot be judged 
morally wrong or disapproved of.157 It is not obvious to me that this implication creates 
any problems for fiduciary non-cognitivism. But suppose that moralist A judges that 
abortion was wrong, that moralist B judges that abortion was permissible, and that A 
falsely believes that B did not meet the criteria. (Perhaps B uses a vocal prosthesis and 
                                                 
155 Daleks are intelligent extraterrestrials from the Doctor Who television series. They are 
violent and ruthless and bent on conquest. They seem to lack any ‘universal’ altruistic 
motivations. 
156 The fiduciary non-cognitivist will include in this category some of the ‘amoralists’ that 
figure in debates about judgement internalism.  
157 I hope to leave open the possibility that we can judge their actions wrong if we are thinking 
in terms of act-types; such judgements would involve preferences about what other moralists 
should do, not about what the creature in question should do. 
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A mistakes him for a Dalek.) It obviously would be a problem if fiduciary non-
cognitivism predicted that, as a result, A would not extend her trust and commitments to 
B, and so would not disagree with B about the permissibility of abortion. The first 
objection to fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of moral universality is that it cannot 
plausibly explain moral disagreement between two people one of whom believes that 
the other does not meet the conditions for being a moralist. 
This objection only succeeds if I take a certain view about the nature of the 
generic trust attitudes that moralists must extend to other moralists. I’ll explain what this 
view is, and why I have good reason to reject it. I wish to take the view that the trust 
between moralists as such is not trust that moralists extend to those whom they believe 
meet the criteria specified by the terms of the moral trust network. Nor is it a more 
liberal version of this sort of trust, according to which moralists presumptively trust 
everyone whom they believe might meet the criteria, until they learn better. Rather, the 
trust between moralists as such is extended toward all and only those who actually do 
meet the criteria, regardless of the trusting parties’ contingent beliefs about who meets 
the criteria. This being so, A’s false beliefs about B are irrelevant to the question of 
whether or not they disagree about abortion. 
There is nothing puzzling about the idea that someone might trust someone else 
without realizing it, and while having beliefs about that person (picked out in a certain 
way) that do not incline her to trust him. Superman and Clark Kent are the same person. 
But Lois can trust Superman to rescue a certain man from the top of a burning 
skyscraper, while not trusting Clark Kent to do so, if she does not realize that they are 
the same person. Similarly, a person may have generic trust in firefighters (or ones who 
meet certain criteria, e.g., being non-psychopathic) to rescue people from burning 
buildings that are near them, while failing to trust the person she sees next to her to 
rescue someone from a nearby burning building, because she is unaware that he is a 
firefighter.158 
It is true that such a person may properly say ‘I didn’t trust him to rescue the man, 
because I didn’t realize that he was a firefighter.’ And yet it also seems correct to say 
that she did trust the man who he really is to perform the rescue, because she trusts 
firefighters to rescue people in his situation, and he is a firefighter. We don’t take the 
                                                 
158 I include this similar example to show that the special relation of numerical identity is not 
important here, as it is for many cases involving Superman in philosophy of mind and 
philosophy of language. 
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fact that Lois, upon learning that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person, can 
properly say, ‘I didn’t trust Clark to rescue the man because I didn’t realize he was 
Superman’ to imply that she did not trust the man who Clark Kent really is to perform 
the rescue. 
We might say that Lois’s failure to trust Clark Kent before she learned his true 
properties is a failure of subjective trust, which we may say is a kind of trust that is 
relativized to an agent’s contingent beliefs. Objective trust, by contrast, is trust relative 
to the objective facts. Subjective trust is, I take it, a mental state with the behavioural 
and phenomenological symptoms that we typically associate with trust; for instance, if 
A subjectively trusts B to φ, she will feel disappointed or betrayed if she thinks that B 
did not φ, and might chastise B for the perceived failure. Objective trust does not in 
itself have any behavioural or phenomenological symptoms, although it does involve  
dispositions to form or lose subjective trust attitudes, depending on the trustor’s beliefs 
about the identity of the objectively trusted party. 
Objective trust is, I think, what is important to an explanation of robust non-
cognitive disagreement. Suppose that John and his mother have the preferences they 
report in Football (Mother and Son), and that neither has yielded or waived. If John 
(and only John) is chatting with the lady from the Gas Company, and John’s mother 
doesn’t realize that ‘the boy who is chatting with the lady from the Gas Company’ is 
John, John’s mother nonetheless disagrees with the boy who is chatting with the lady 
from the Gas Company about whether he is to play football. (Although we cannot use a 
‘conciliation test’ to determine the robustness of her disagreement with this boy, it is 
obvious that her disagreement with him is of the same kind as her disagreement with 
John in the original case.) Subjective trust is not among the conditions for robust non-
cognitive disagreement, though it is relevant to explaining why a person does or does 
not take herself to be a party to what I am calling a robust non-cognitive disagreement. 
I shall retroactively stipulate that the entrusted concern relationships that figure in 
the Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis are relationships of objective trust.159 The moral 
                                                 
159  I don’t think I need to stipulate that entrusted parties who participate in robust non-cognitive 
disagreements must have ‘objective commitments’ to live up to their partners’ trust. An 
‘objective commitment’ would be a commitment that does not depend on the committer’s 
beliefs. We do not seem to need the notion of an objective commitment, because there doesn’t 
seem to be such a thing as ‘subjective commitment’. Lois can say, ‘I didn’t trust Clark because I 
didn’t realize he was Superman.’ But a person cannot properly say, ‘I didn’t have a commitment 
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trust network posited by fiduciary non-cognitivism is a network of ‘objective’ entrusted 
concern relationships. Both the trust and the commitments of moralists as such are 
extended to everyone who in fact meets the criteria specified by the terms of the moral 
trust network, rather than to those whom they believe or presume meet those criteria. 
What this means is that, according to the fiduciary non-cognitivist, the convinced 
Nazi who (atypically, I imagine) believes that Jews are literally subhuman vermin will 
still have moral disagreements with Jews, because his belief is false. Likewise the 
Seventeenth-Century Iberian who buys slaves from Africa so that he can work them to 
death in his South American mines, and who regards these slaves merely as cattle, will 
probably have moral disagreements with his slaves. Or at least, the false beliefs of the 
Nazi and the slave-owner do not stand in the way of disagreement. There are certainly 
other reasons to worry that the parties will lack the trust relationships required for 
disagreement in voiceable preference; I discuss one of these reasons in 5.4.3. 
5.4.2 Moralists’ Trust is Implausibly Insensitive to Trustworthiness 
To account for moral universality, the fiduciary non-cognitivist is forced to postulate 
that the threshold of trustworthiness for membership in the moral trust network is 
extremely low, and that the trust of moralists as such is surprisingly indiscriminate. The 
second objection to fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of moral universality is simply 
that this postulation is highly implausible. 
Since we can have moral disagreements with inveterate hypocrites (at least if they 
are human, non-psychopathic, non-feral, and so on) and the persistently ‘weak-willed’, 
and disapprove of their token actions, it must be the case that being highly unscrupulous 
does not make one an outcast from the moral trust network. Everyone must (tacitly etc.) 
trust the hypocrite, to some degree. Trusting the highly akratic in this way doesn’t seem 
particularly wise, and it is prima facie implausible to posit that we all do it. To support 
this postulation, I would need to defend some further evolutionary hypotheses. I need it 
plausibly to be the case that a moral trust network with very permissive membership 
criteria would have served the interests of early moralists. This would explain, given my 
earlier conjectures, why we would have evolved dispositions to trust that were highly 
indiscriminate with respect to trustworthiness. Properly defending the relevant 
hypotheses would of course involve showing that they fit the evidence. But as before, I 
                                                                                                                                               
to Clark yesterday, because I made my promise to Superman, and I didn’t know then that Clark 
was Superman.’ 
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shall at this point merely content myself with stating the hypotheses and showing that 
they do not defy common sense. 
Imagine again the situation of our ancestors prior to the evolution of our innate 
and unconscious disposition to form moral entrusted concern relationships. I have 
conjectured that members of early moral trust networks would have induced people to 
join and stay in the network by making life unpleasant for outsiders.160 Because of this, 
I have supposed, it is very plausible that most people in this situation would have 
wanted to have been members. It is also somewhat plausible that people would have 
been willing to have been members even if they were not willing to do much of what 
membership required of them. For one thing, if they were members they would not have 
been the object of ill-treatment due to the mere fact that they were outsiders; in the 
normal course of events moralists actually have to be suspected of either 
unscrupulousness or perceived moral wrongdoing before being the object of ill-
treatment at the hands of moralists as such. (By ‘perceived moral wrongdoing’ I mean 
doing what people judge to be morally wrong, whether or not this involves failing to 
live up to one’s obligations qua party to moral entrusted concern relationships.) For 
another, the ill-treatment to which they were subject would normally have taken the 
form of ‘blame’ and ‘punishment’ behaviours rather than simple hostility. These 
behaviours are a special focus of moral evaluation, and are, in commonsense morality, 
tightly constrained by moral norms. The costs they impose on ‘offenders’ are likely to 
be more moderate, more predictable, and more sensitive to what the agent had control 
over, than the hostile treatment inflicted on outsiders who perform altruistic-desire-
frustrating actions. They are also more responsive to the behaviour of perceived 
offenders after they have offended. According to commonsense morality, the propriety 
of punishment of a given degree of severity normally depends somewhat on whether the 
offender apologizes and exhibits contrition. Being a party to the network potentially 
gives a person the option of moderating her ill-treatment by repenting (this requires that 
                                                 
160 This raises a somewhat tricky question about why the institution of morality would not itself 
have inhibited moralists from making life especially unpleasant for outsiders, since making life 
unpleasant for people is intrinsically frustrating to altruistic desires. I will assume, but won’t 
defend, the following answer to this question. The moral judgements of early moralists tended 
to prescribe or permit treating outsiders worse than moralists, because they tended to prescribe 
or permit actions that ‘improved’ people’s behaviour (i.e. made it more satisfactory to altruistic 
desires). Early moralists believed that treating outsiders relatively badly was likely to ‘improve’ 
their behaviour. Such treatment gave the outsiders an incentive to become moralists, and 
moralists tend to behave ‘better’ than non-moralists because, since they have committed to do as 
their moral trust relationships require, their reputations will be harmed if they do not. 
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she judges that she did wrong, which is only possible if she is a network member). So it 
would have been in the interest of those who are not willing to be scrupulous to be 
members of the network. 
I hypothesize that it would also have been in the interest of moralists that people 
who are not willing to be scrupulous should be members of the network (as long as 
those people meet certain minimal criteria, which include a minimal willingness to 
participate scrupulously conditional on being members). If someone became a member 
her behaviour was likely to ‘improve’ somewhat, in the sense that it would frustrate 
altruistic desires less, because her reputation was on the line. People wouldn’t trust her 
so well in other matters if she didn’t live up to her commitment to act only according to 
those rules conformity to which would best satisfy her altruistic desires. 
I also find it plausible to suppose that the policing and punishment of 
unscrupulous moralists tended to be either less effortful for other moralists, or more 
satisfying to moralists’ altruistic desires, than measures taken to deter altruistic-desire-
frustrating actions of outsiders to the network. The machinery of punishment, blame, 
forgiveness, repentance, and so on, facilitated by the moral trust network, provided a 
means of controlling altruistic-desire-frustrating behaviour that was peculiarly satisfying 
to altruistic desires associated with desert. Moralists—including unscrupulous ones—
are obliged to honour other moralists’ discursive entitlements, which means being 
somewhat forthcoming about their reasons for acting. This meant that moralists were 
likely to have more information for a given expenditure of effort about what other 
moralists did and why, which would have helped to achieve a tighter correlation 
between the imposition of costs and the actual performance of altruistic-desire-
frustrating actions. This would have been more satisfying to altruistic desires, and also 
would have lowered the costs of the cost-imposition itself, reducing both wasted effort 
and the social conflict that cost-imposition will sometimes produce. (I admit that this is 
a bit hand-wavey; I need to do more work to spell out the causal links I am positing 
here, and to explain the dependence of the ‘machinery’ of blame etc. on the institution 
of morality.) 
I have said that a person puts her reputation on the line when she becomes a 
moralist, and that people are induced to become moralists by the threat of ill-treatment. 
It might be objected that these two claims are in tension. Humans—modern ones 
anyway—do not in general think less of a human if she fails to live up to a commitment 
that she was coerced into making, so the reputation of a person who becomes a moralist 
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to avoid to ill-treatment cannot really be at stake. This is plausible if the mere threat of 
violence were all that induced potential moralists to make the commitment. But I think 
people would normally have had somewhat more complex motivations for joining the 
network than this—including perhaps desires to be part of society, desires for esteem, 
and desires not to be resented as freeriders (i.e. for failing to reciprocate others’ 
forbearance from frustrating altruistic desires, or for failing to commit to do so). If fear 
of violence and the like figured prominently rather than exclusively among people’s 
motivations for committing to join, alongside more ‘pro-social’ motivations of the sort I 
have mentioned, it seems plausible that they would have genuinely put some part of 
their reputation at stake by committing to live up to other moralists’ trust. 
So it is in the interest of moralists to let people with poor motivations to be 
scrupulous into the network, and in the interest of those people to join the network. This 
explains why our evolved dispositions to trust and commit as membership in the 
network requires would be dispositions to do so in a way that was highly indiscriminate 
with respect to trustworthiness and willingness to participate scrupulously. 
5.4.3 Trust Between Antagonistic Agents 
Surely if the animosity between the parties in the blackmail case I considered in 1.2.4 
made it implausible that the parties shared an entrusted concern relationship, the 
antagonistic relationship between Nazis and Jews in Auschwitz ought to make it 
implausible that they entrusted to each other concerns to accommodate each other’s 
altruistic desires. The fiduciary non-cognitivist must posit such trust relationships if she 
is to explain how they could be in moral disagreement, but this postulation is intuitively 
implausible. This is the third objection to fiduciary non-cognitivism’s explanation for 
moral universality.161 There is only so much I can say in response to the objection, 
which highlights a real and serious cost for the theory. However, I can at least point out 
two important differences between the blackmail case and the case of the mutually 
trusting Jew and Nazi. 
Two agents can be hostile toward each other, in a way that would prevent any 
personal relationship of trust from forming between them, and yet still trust each other 
in certain ways. Two soldiers A and B in the same army might utterly despise each 
other, to such an extent that each would never do the other the smallest personal favour 
if asked, nor ever miss a convenient opportunity to belittle or humiliate the other. Yet A 
                                                 
161 Lachlan Umbers has pressed this objection against my theory. 
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might nonetheless to some extent trust B to help A when B’s duty as a soldier required 
B to (and vice versa). Here A trusts B qua occupant of a certain role, to help A qua 
occupant of a certain role. I propose that the trust between a Jewish prisoner and a Nazi 
commandant in Auschwitz that allows them to be parties to moral disagreements is 
analogous. They share relationships of trust and commitment qua moralists, even if they 
do not share them in any personal capacity. There is no way to plausibly interpret the 
parties in the blackmail case as sharing a trust relationship in some non-personal 
capacity that would make their reported preferences in Restaurant (Blackmail II) 
voiceable, and the fiduciary non-cognitivist does not posit anything that would suggest 
otherwise, so the theory doesn’t seem to predict more implausible trust between 
antagonistic agents than it must in order to explain the metaethical data. 
Second, given the fiduciary non-cognitivist’s wider claims, the posited trust 
relationship between Jew and Nazi is in one respect more plausible than the postulation 
of a non-moral trust relationship between the parties in the blackmail case would be. 
According to the fiduciary non-cognitivist, neither the Jew nor the Nazi risks being 
obliged to make any significant special sacrifice by extending her trust and 
commitments to the other as a consequence. To be sure, each takes on some weak 
obligation to honour the other’s discursive entitlements. But outside of conversations, 
neither is obliged to do anything for the other that she is not also obliged to do for every 
other moralist. By contrast, an entrusted concern relationships between the parties in the 
blackmail case, of a sort that would make their reported preferences voiceable, would 
create pressure on the parties to go out of their way to accommodate each other’s 
weighted desires. This makes mutual trust between Jew and Nazi less psychologically 
implausible, since it is implausible to suppose that either party would be willing to do 
the other any special favours. (Similar considerations also probably account for some of 
the plausibility of the idea that there is trust in the soldier case: other soldiers, not just 
A, trust B to help A when B’s military duty requires it, and B will be concerned to live 
up their trust.) 
5.4.4 Moral Judgement Without Altruistic Desires? 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism almost certainly predicts that agents that wholly lack 
altruistic desires cannot be parties to the moral trust network. It is possible (depending 
on what we say about ‘simplicity desires’) that a hypothetical moralist without altruistic 
desires simply could not form discretion-licencing preferences; if so, she couldn’t help 
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but violate some moralist’s trust in almost any decision she faced. If the moralist could 
form discretion-licencing preferences based on her simplicity desire alone, her 
conformity to those preferences would have little chance of satisfying other moralists’ 
altruistic desires. The moral trust network exists as a means to improve the satisfaction 
of altruistic desires, and her inclusion in the network couldn’t be expected to further this 
end. So we should expect the terms of the moral trust relationship to exclude agents 
without altruistic desires from the set of agents whom moralists as such are required to 
trust. It is indeed somewhat plausible that the criteria would be more restrictive than 
this, excluding those who lacked a certain range of altruistic desires, or whose altruistic 
desires were not too vastly different in their relative strengths from those of ordinary 
human beings. 
This leads to our fourth objection, which is that there are cases of what seems to 
be moral disagreement in which one of the parties plausibly lacks altruistic desires. I 
shall consider a few candidate cases in a moment. Before doing so, let me remind the 
reader that, as I am using it, ‘altruistic desire’ is a technical term, whose precise 
meaning I have left open. It encompasses some desires that are not clearly altruistic in 
the ordinary sense, such as desires that people should get what they deserve, even if 
they deserve suffering, and permission desires, which may be satisfied when a person 
who would rather not help others forbears from helping them. The term could perhaps 
be stretched to accommodate desires connected with aesthetic disgust or with ideas of 
hygiene and pollution—this might be needed to account for apparently moral 
judgements forbidding such things as masturbation. The desires that I am calling 
‘altruistic’ must meet these two criteria however: they must be ‘universal’, and they 
must be fairly common among human beings. 
Altruistic desires are, I take it, adaptive, and susceptible to social, cultural, and 
environmental influences. For instance, in societies whose harsh environments make 
providing for non-productive members impossible, we should not be too surprised to 
find that people’s altruistic desires are frustrated to a lesser degree by the killing of 
disabled infants and the casting out of old and infirm members. The fiduciary non-
cognitivist will certainly wish to posit that this sort of variation, even in quite extreme 
cases, will not exclude agents from the moral trust network. This postulation doesn’t 
seem initially implausible. Even an agent whose altruistic desires differ quite 
significantly from the norm in their relative strengths will usually satisfy other 
moralists’ altruistic desires better by acting on her altruistic desires than she would by 
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acting on her partial and self-interested desires, and the influence of the moral trust 
network on members is, broadly speaking, to encourage them to give greater weight to 
their altruistic desires in their decisions. So we should expect the criteria for 
membership in the moral trust network to be permissive with regard to this sort of 
adaptive variation, even in fairly extreme cases. 
Thus I think that fiduciary non-cognitivism quite plausibly predicts that there 
would be moral disagreement between the missionary and the cannibals in R. M. Hare’s 
famous case.162 Admittedly, I can’t claim that it predicts that the missionary and the 
cannibals will be in moral disagreement on the question Hare describes, viz., whether a 
good man is one who is meek and mild, or one who is bold and burly and collects plenty 
of scalps. For one thing, I have not offered a fiduciary non-cognitivist account of 
goodness judgements. For another, I am sceptical of whether the cannibals’ judgement 
could be a judgement of moral goodness.163 However, there are sure to be moral 
disagreements of a narrowly normative sort in the vicinity. For instance, the cannibals 
judge that morality permits you to kill innocent people and collect their scalps, and the 
missionary judges that morality forbids this. There is no reason why the cannibals’ 
permission judgement could not be supported by their altruistic desires; they need 
merely have weak anti-homicide desires, and certain strong permission desires, which 
are satisfied when agents who wish to pursue the non-moral glory of killing and 
scalping do so. 
Hare’s description of the case gives us little reason to think that the altruistic 
desires of the cannibals differ vastly from the norm. Presumably in many matters the 
cannibals’ moral judgements will be reflective of fairly normal altruistic desires. They 
will probably judge that lying, cheating, and promise-breaking are wrong; they will 
disapprove of some theft; and their tolerance of killing for glory will probably be 
limited in certain ways (e.g. one should not kill those to whom one owes loyalty for 
their scalps). In short, Hare’s cannibals, if they existed, would presumably have been 
                                                 
162 Hare, Language of Morals, 148-9. 
163 Moral excellence plausibly cannot depend on one’s talent or physical abilities—things overs 
which one lacks control—in the way that non-moral excellence can (Susan Wolf, ‘Moral 
Saints’, Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 8 (1982): 434). Being such that one collects more scalps 
than the average is presumably judged to be a non-moral excellence, because people are limited 
in their ability to collect scalps by their natural abilities and talents. Likewise, being burly is 
presumably judged to be a non-moral excellence, because it is not in everyone’s power to be 
burly. 
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welcome members of the moral trust network,164 and so capable of being in moral 
disagreement with Hare’s missionaries. 
Can we imagine creatures that obviously lack altruistic desires making moral 
judgements or having attitudes of moral disapproval? A race of thoroughly sadistic 
aliens might disapprove of all altruism, and judge that altruism should be eschewed, but 
I find it hard to imagine that their disapproval might be moral disapproval, or that their 
normative judgement might be a judgement that all altruism is morally wrong. It does 
seem to me that their normative judgements might put them in disagreement with 
humans, and I am not sure how to explain this. But since the aliens’ judgements are 
apparently not moral judgements, this presumably cannot be a moral disagreement. 
Accounting for it is thus beyond the scope of this work. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have made a case for the existence of the moral trust network. I 
explained in a very rough and conjectural fashion the circumstances in which it could 
have come to exist, and how humans might have the evolved dispositions that they 
would have needed to have had for it to have persisted without anyone possessing more 
than tacit knowledge of it. I have argued that there are non-moral examples of trust 
networks that share features of the moral trust network that we might otherwise have 
thought exotic—that there are trust networks whose members are mostly strangers to 
each other, for instance. And I have argued that, for cognitivists and non-cognitivists 
alike, providing a wholly satisfactory explanation of moral approval and disapproval 
requires postulating the moral trust network or something similarly immodest. 
                                                 
164 The same is true a fortiori of other agents who, though evil, surely would have had altruistic 
desires that were more similar to our own than the cannibals’, such as Hitler and others who 
held high office in the Third Reich. Nazis’ moral judgements about matters unrelated to race, 
eugenics, genocide, and the role of the state in society, were not particularly distinctive. And 
their most distinctive moral judgements were in part explained by peculiar descriptive beliefs 
about race and biology. 
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6 
Moral Rules 
In this chapter I present an incomplete explanation for the apparent rule-based character 
of moral requirements and the value of simplicity in moral theorizing. These 
characteristics of moral thought and talk are, I propose, explained by the advantages for 
moralists of making it difficult to abuse trust without detection. 
Section 6.1 describes a method of abuse-detection. Parties to entrusted concern 
relationships can detect abuses of trust that are concealed by insincere voicing of 
preferences, by comparing such preferences to preferences voiced by the same party 
concerning similar situations in the past. All things being equal, it would serve 
moralists’ interests for the comparative method of abuse detection to be as feasible as 
possible. In 6.2 I propose that the comparative method of abuse detection is more 
feasible if (a) moralists’ voiceable preferences are preferences for conformity to norms 
rather than the performance of particular actions, and (b) moralists are somehow 
induced to prefer that they and others should follow simpler norms. This influence, I 
propose, is brought about by, at least in effect, including ‘simplicity desires’ (desires for 
conformity to simpler norms) among moralists’ weighted desires. Section 6.3 refines 
(a): it clarifies the nature of the norm-conformity decisions in which I am proposing that 
moralists have voices. 
In 6.4 I posit that moralists fundamentally have voices in one another’s choices of 
which comprehensive sets of norms to follow. They have voices in choices of which 
non-comprehensive sets of norms to follow only derivatively. I discuss various reasons 
why moralists would want to voice preferences for conformity to non-comprehensive 
norms. In 6.5 I give my long-postponed explanation of why bringing it about that 
moralists (in effect) have weighted simplicity desires would better facilitate the 
comparative method of abuse-detection. My explanation for the apparent virtuousness 
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of simplicity in moral reasoning is incomplete because I have, as of writing, failed to 
come up with a good account of why moralists would have simplicity desires, weighted 
or otherwise, or of how the terms of the moral trust network could be engineered so as 
to bring it about that they have such desires. Section 6.6 discusses the desiderata such an 
explanation must meet. 
6.1 The Comparability Desideratum 
One of the principal influences on the terms of the moral trust network will be the need 
to make abuses—chiefly actions done in defiance of discretion-licencing preferences—
as easy to detect as possible. Moralists, by exercising their discursive entitlements, can 
exert pressure on other moralists to voice preferences, so that their future deeds can be 
measured against their words. But a moralist may voice preferences insincerely, falsely 
presenting ‘extra-discretionary’ actions as licenced by her voiceable preferences, and so 
avoid discovery. In this brief section I shall describe a simple method for detecting 
abuses and comment on the prospects for its use by moralists. In the sections that follow 
I argue that the rule-based character of moral prescriptions and the importance placed 
on simplicity in moral theorizing are largely explained by the desirability, from 
moralists’ perspectives, of facilitating the use of this method. 
In entrusted concern relationships generally, it is sometimes possible to detect 
whether a voiced preference is voiceable by comparing that preference to preferences 
voiced by the same entrusting party in similar situations in the past. If John’s mother 
voiced a preference that John should play football, then made a bet with someone that 
John would go the year without breaking any bones, and subsequently voiced a 
preference that John should not play football, it would be reasonable to infer that her 
newly voiced preference was not genuinely accommodation-obliging. At least, this 
would be a reasonable inference if the contexts in which she voiced her differing 
preferences were in other respects very similar. For then we could infer that John’s 
mother’s new preference was explained either by a change in her weighted desires, or a 
change in her beliefs about the pecuniary advantages for her of John’s remaining 
uninjured; and, since changes in basic desires are far less common than changes in 
derived desires resulting from changes in beliefs, the latter is a much more likely 
explanation. Roughly the same method can sometimes be used to determine whether an 
entrusted party’s decision was made in conformity to his discretion-licencing 
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preferences: the decision can be compared to decisions he has made, and preferences he 
has voiced qua entrusted party, in similar situations in the past. 
It would clearly serve the interests of moralists for them to have opportunities to 
make these sorts of abuse-revealing comparisons to the greatest possible extent, all else 
being equal. And, as members of a dual-order fully connected network, whose weighted 
desires, for all I’ve said so far, consist solely of altruistic desires, members of the moral 
trust network have an advantage in this regard over parties to entrusted concern 
relationships that do not belong to larger networks. Moralists can fruitfully compare 
preferences voiced and actions performed by a particular agent with respect to similar 
sorts of decisions, regardless of the identities of the agent making and the patients 
affected by those decisions, and regardless of whether that member voiced or performed 
those preferences or actions qua first-order entrusted party (and the agent in one or both 
of the decisions), first-order entrusting party, second-order entrusted party, or second-
order entrusting party. This is because (i) her weighted desires (as I am presently 
supposing) consist of all and only her altruistic desires, and hence are universal; and (ii) 
the terms of her moral trust relationships guarantee harmony between her preferences 
qua first-order party and qua second-order party. 
As a result: 
For all moralists S, and 
all F such that F is a complete set of descriptive properties of an action, and 
all times t1, and 
all moralists B1, and 
all actions φ such that φ is F and φ is available to B1, and 
all moralists A1 such that A1 prefers qua first-order entrusting party that B1 should not-φ 
and A1 has not waived his demand that B1 should not-φ; 
if there is some moralist B2, and 
 some time t2 
 some action ψ such that ψ is F and ψ is available to B2, and 
 some moralist A2 such that A2 prefers qua first-order entrusting party that B2 
should not-ψ and A2 has not waived his demand that B2 should not-ψ, and 
 S is rational, and S’s weighted desires have not changed between t1 and t2; 
then  ([(S is B2 and S prefers at t2, qua first-order entrusted party, that B2 should 
ψ), or 
  S prefers at t2, qua first-order entrusting party, that B2 should ψ, or 
  S prefers at t2, qua second-order entrusted party, not to waive her demand 
that B2 should ψ, or 
  S prefers at t2, qua second-order entrusting party, that A2 should waive her 
demand that B2 should not-ψ] 
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 iff [(if S is B1, then S prefers at t1, qua first-order entrusted party, that B1 should 
φ), and 
  S prefers at t1, qua first-order entrusting party, that B1 should φ, and 
  S prefers at t1, qua second-order entrusted party, not to waive her demand 
that B1 should φ, and 
  S prefers at t1, qua second-order entrusting party, that A1 should waive her 
demand that B1 should not-φ)]. 
If a moralist voices or purports to act on preferences that she could not have if this 
biconditional were true, this is evidence that she is irrational, or that her basic desires 
have changed between t1 and t2, or that the preferences she has voiced or purported to 
act on are not her true voiceable preferences. Sometimes this last possibility will be the 
most likely. So if a moralist doesn’t practice what she preaches, or if she makes 
different demands of different people in the same circumstances, she potentially betrays 
unscrupulousness. Parties to more intimate and personal entrusted concern relationships, 
which are not part of larger trust networks, will not be able to glean evidence of 
unscrupulousness from such a wide variety of discordances among ostensible 
preferences. 
On the other hand, parties to such intimate and personal entrusted concern 
relationships will not need so many ways to compare their partners’ ostensibly 
voiceable preferences for evidence of abuse, because each party will know the other 
well and know her wants. And here we come to a major disadvantage of the moral trust 
network: it is, as I have said, a network of strangers. For any given moralist, there will 
often only be a small number of other moralists around who have had the opportunity to 
observe her actions and demands over time, and there may be no one around who knows 
her intimately. So those who observe her will frequently have no idea whether the 
preferences she voices or purports to act on are in tension with those she has voiced or 
purported to act on in the past. This problem is exacerbated by a general problem for the 
comparative method, which is that no two situations are exactly alike. Even at the best 
of times, a party to an entrusted concern relationship can usually find some 
consideration to cite that might explain an apparent discrepancy in the history of her 
actions and voiced preferences. 
6.2. ‘Norms’ and Simplicity 
One way in which to better facilitate the comparative method of abuse-detection would 
be to place some kind of constraint on the potential diversity of a moralist’s voiceable 
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preferences across all options in all contexts. I propose that this explains our evident 
disposition to treat simplicity as a virtue in moral theorizing. We are disposed to prefer 
simpler theories about right and wrong to complex ones, and the knowledge that we 
have this disposition makes it easier for others to infer from our public judgements in 
some cases what our judgements in different cases are likely to be, if we have reasoned 
well and judged sincerely. The terms of moral trust relationships have been shaped in 
such a way as to give us this disposition, because it serves the purpose for which the 
moral trust network was created for our abuses to be easily detectible via the 
comparative method. It will be a while before I can make clear what moral theorizing is 
according to fiduciary non-cognitivism, but I can make progress toward explaining our 
disposition to prefer simple theories by explaining how considerations of simplicity 
affect moralists’ voiceable preferences. Once I have done this, I will give a more careful 
explanation of the advantages of simplicity. 
Very roughly, as I anticipated in Chapter 4, I am going to propose that moralists 
have voices in other moralists’ decisions concerning which norms they are to conform 
to, rather than in their decision concerning which particular actions to perform. And I 
am going to propose that moralists will tend to have voiceable preferences that other 
moralists should conform to simpler norms, because their voiceable preferences are 
influenced by ‘simplicity desires’. Before I can flesh out these ideas, I must introduce 
some new terms, the most important being ‘fundamental entitlements’, and 
‘comprehensive norm-partitions’, and make some hypotheses about the decisions in 
which parties to entrusted concern relationships have voices. 
6.2.1 Fundamental and Derived Entitlements 
Before I can address them I need to make clearer what in general is involved in 
preferring one option to another, on my usage of these terms. When I formulated the 
Entrusted Concerns Hypothesis in 1.2.3, I said that, to be in robust non-cognitive 
disagreement with one another, parties to an entrusted concern relationship had to have, 
and merely had to have, preferences (based on the right kind of desires, and, as I would 
now add, on the right kind of doxastic attitudes) for mutually incompatible, jointly 
exhaustive options (in those decisions of the entrusted party in which the entrusting 
party had a voice). On this formulation, the options concerning which the parties to a 
robust non-cognitive disagreement have disagreeing preferences are extremely coarse-
grained. In most cases these options will have numerous ‘sub-options’—different ways 
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in which the entrusted party can realize them. For instance, the option John plays 
football may be realized by the sub-options John plays goal-keeper or John plays 
offence, assuming that it is up to John which of these positions he plays. I will call an 
option or sub-option that does not itself have any sub-options—i.e. that is not multiply 
realizable—an atomic option or sub-option. 
Parties to robust non-cognitive disagreements will typically find some sub-options 
preferable to others. It is possible, and indeed would be common, for some pair of 
incompatible options φ and ψ, for a party to both prefer some sub-options of φ to some 
sub-options of ψ, and vice versa. So let me clarify that, when I say that a person S 
prefers φ to ψ, where these are mutually incompatible and multiply realizable options, I 
mean that out of all the atomic sub-options of φ and ψ, the atomic sub-option S best 
prefers is a sub-option of φ. Person S prefers option φ to option ψ, where φ is multiply 
realizable but ψ is not, if and only if there is some atomic sub-option of φ that S prefers 
to ψ. This of course applies to voiceable preferences as well as all-things-considered 
preferences. 
I have allowed that entrusted concern relationships may give parties voices in 
some decisions and not others, and this ought to constrain the range of sub-options 
whose weighted utility (i.e. utility understood as weighted desire satisfaction) could 
potentially influence a voiceable preference for the options they realize. I will call an 
option (or sub-option) in whose a selection a party to an entrusted concern relationship 
has a voice a live option, or an option that is live for that party. Suppose that a party S to 
an entrusted concern relationship has a voice, as such, in a decision between options φ 
and not-φ, and that there is a decision d such that (i) S does not have a voice in d, and 
(ii) there is some option α such that α is available in d and α is an atomic sub-option of 
φ. Since α is not a live sub-option for S, I propose that the weighted utility of α cannot 
affect S’s voiceable preference between φ and not-φ. If (i) β is a live atomic sub-option 
of not-φ, and (ii), out of all the atomic sub-options of φ and not-φ, α has the highest 
weighted utility for S and β the unique second-highest, then S has a voiceable 
preference for not-φ over φ. It is thus the weighted utility of live atomic sub-options that 
determines a party’s voiceable preferences. 
I will now propose a distinction among entitlements to voices in decisions, a 
distinction between ‘fundamental’ and ‘derived’ entitlements. A party’s entitlement to a 
voice in a decision d is fundamental, in the ‘scope’ sense with which I am now 
concerned, if and only if d is a choice between live atomic sub-options. For all options φ 
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and ψ, a party S has a derived entitlement to a voice (or simply a derived voice) in a 
choice between φ and ψ if and only if (i) at least one of these options is multiply 
realizable; (ii) φ and ψ are mutually exclusive; (iii) there is some α such that α is an 
atomic option, and α is live for S, and either α is φ or α is a sub-option of φ; and (iv) 
there is some β such that β is an atomic option, and β is live for S, and either β is ψ or β 
is a sub-option of ψ. On this view, a party’s entitlements to voices in decisions 
supervene on, and are explained by, her entitlements to voices in decisions between 
atomic sub-options. Thus to specify which decisions a party has a voice in, the terms of 
an entrusted concern relationship need only specify which atomic sub-options are live 
for her. 
I shall now hypothesize that this (and this alone) is how the terms of entrusted 
concern relationships do specify the decisions in which parties have voices. This makes 
for a parsimonious theory of entrusted concern relationships. We need to postulate that 
parties have voices in choices among some atomic sub-options and not others in order to 
explain why a moralist might fail to have a voiceable preference for φ even if the atomic 
sub-option with the highest weighted utility for her is a sub-option of φ. Once we 
postulate this, we can explain parties’ voices in choices among non-atomic options as 
deriving from their voices in choices among atomic sub-options. We have no apparent 
need to postulate that entrusted concern relationships entitle parties to voices in choices 
among non-atomic sub-options via any other means. So simplicity favours the view that 
they never do. 
Fundamental entitlements explain derived entitlements. An entrusted party is 
obliged to accommodate a preference that he should φ, where his partner has voiced this 
preference in exercise of a derived entitlement, only because he is obliged to 
accommodate the preferences she voices in exercise of some fundamental entitlements. 
Likewise, a preference voiced by an entrusted party in exercise of a derived entitlement 
to a voice in a decision is only discretion-licencing because it is explained by his 
possession of discretion-licencing preferences that are voiceable in virtue of 
fundamental entitlements. 
6.2.2 ‘Norm-Partitions’ and Related Terms 
The following discussion of norm-partitions contains some repetition from 4.1.1. A 
norm-partition is a pair of an extension—a set of ‘action-circumstance pairs’—and a 
prescription function—a function from each action-circumstance pair in that set to a 
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prescription to perform the action in that circumstance or not perform it.165 An action-
circumstance pair is a pair of an action and a possible circumstance in which it is 
performed. An action-circumstance pair is ‘maximally specified’: action-circumstance 
pair 〈φ1, C1〉 and action-circumstance pair 〈φ2, C2〉 are numerically identical just in case 
every detail about the actions, and about the circumstances in which they occur, is 
exactly similar. The action and circumstance in an action-circumstance pair must be 
such that the agent is, in the circumstance, able to identify the action and has a choice to 
perform or not perform it. 
Norm-partitions make prescriptions. Any action that the prescription-function of a 
norm-partition requires (in its relevant circumstance) is one that the norm-partition 
requires, and any it forbids is one that the norm-partition forbids. A norm-partition 
cannot require two different actions in the same circumstance—this is a constraint on 
possible prescription functions. A norm-partition also cannot forbid all the actions that 
are available in a single circumstance. Thus, for all 〈φ, C〉 such that 〈φ, C〉 is an action-
circumstance pair, a norm-partition requires φ-ing in C if and only if it forbids not-φ-ing 
in C. 
Sometimes we may identify the prescriptions of a norm-partition in a 
circumstance or range of circumstances C by a property that is correlated with those 
prescriptions in C. For instance, we might say with respect to C that, according to norm-
partition N, stealing is forbidden, meaning that N forbids all acts of stealing in C. For all 
properties F, N forbids (requires) F actions necessarily if and only if N forbids 
(requires) all possible F actions; if N forbids (requires) F actions in C, but does not 
forbid (require) F actions necessarily, then N forbids (requires) F actions in C 
contingently. 
A norm is a norm-partition forbidding or requiring actions with a certain set of 
properties. When I talk of ‘norms’ I usually mean the complete set of prescriptions 
made by a relevant norm-partition. An agent follows a norm-partition, in a given 
moment or over a period of time, if she performs no action that it does not require of her 
in that moment or over that period. Thus she fails to follow the norm-partition if she 
either performs an action it forbids (or ‘defies’ the norm-partition), or because she acts 
                                                 
165 ‘Norm-partition’ is admittedly an infelicitous label. The idea behind it is that the prescription 
function of a norm-partition ‘partitions’ the set of action-circumstance pairs in its extension into 
required or forbidden subsets. This is not quite the case, however, for the prescription function 
may output only requirements, or only prohibitions, in which case the extension is not 
partitioned. 
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in a circumstance that falls outside of its extension. A comprehensive norm-partition is 
one whose extension is the set of all possible circumstances of action.  
Norm-partitions N and O make incompatible prescriptions in some circumstance 
C just in case either N requires an action in C that O forbids or N forbids an action in C 
that O requires (otherwise they make compatible prescriptions in C). N is incompatible 
with O just in case there is some circumstance in which they make incompatible 
prescriptions (if there isn’t, they are compatible). N entails or implies O just in case the 
extension of O is a subset of the extension of N, and N and O are compatible. 
A norm-partition can be more or less simple. Defining simplicity is notoriously 
difficult, and I must rely in what follows on our intuitive grasp of the concept. But 
among norm-partitions of the same extension, one norm-partition is typically simpler 
than another if it is possible to state in full which actions it requires and which it forbids 
in fewer words using the same natural language. 
6.2.3 A Restatement of the Proposal, and Two Desiderata Derived From the 
Comparability Desideratum 
I propose that moralists, qua parties to the first-order moral trust network, have 
fundamental entitlements to voices in, and only in, other moralists’ choices among 
which comprehensive norm-partitions they will conform to. (I use the term ‘conform to’ 
in a loose and intuitive way here; I consider below how best to precisify it.) And I 
propose that (i) moralists have desires that the comprehensive norm-partitions that 
moralists conform to should be simpler rather than more complex, and (ii) these desires 
are ‘effectively’ weighted for moralists. That is, these simplicity desires are not 
weighted, strictly speaking, because they are not basic desires. But they are insensitive 
to ordinary changes in moralists’ contingent beliefs, and the desires they are 
characteristically derived from are weighted, so we can loosely speak of moralists as 
having weighted simplicity desires. 
I want my theory of the terms of the moral trust network to predict the following: 
that any perfectly rational moralist will, at any given moment, voiceably prefer that all 
agents in all circumstances should conform to the same comprehensive norm-partition, 
where the complexity of this norm-partition would be diminished in proportion to the 
strength of her simplicity desire. In other words, I want to predict that two states of 
affairs hold, which I call ‘Simplicity’ (with a capital ‘S’) and Invariance. Simplicity 
obtains just in case rational moralists always have voiceable preferences for conformity 
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to simpler norms, and the simplicity of these norms tends to increase as in proportion to 
the strength of their simplicity desires. Invariance is the state of affairs that holds just in 
case, for all moralists A, either A is not perfectly rational, or there is some 
comprehensive norm-partition N such that, for all moralists B, A voiceably prefers that 
B should follow N (A and B may be the same person, in which case the voiceable 
preference is a discretion-licencing one). 
Simultaneously predicting both of these states of affairs will turn out to be 
difficult. Yet Invariance must obtain, or else Simplicity will not facilitate easier abuse-
detection via the comparative method—or not as well as it might have. The comparative 
method is most easily used if a rational moralist must have like voiceable preferences in 
like cases, regardless of the identities of the parties involved in the cases—that way an 
observed discrepancy among her voiced preferences in like cases will be evidence of 
abuse. If a perfectly rational party may have voiceable preferences for conformity to a 
comprehensive norm-partition prescribing a certain action in one case, and for 
conformity to a comprehensive norm-partition prescribing a different action in an 
exactly similar case, then a discrepancy in her voiced preferences in those cases won’t 
betray abuse, however simple those comprehensive norm-partitions may be. 
Note that, absent the influence of a simplicity desire, Invariance will automatically 
obtain. Or at least, if (i) a moralist has a voice in other moralists’ choices among which 
comprehensive norm-partitions to conform to, (ii) we assume that ‘conform to’ means 
‘follow’, and (iii) her voiceable preferences are based solely on her altruistic desires, 
then there will be some comprehensive norm-partition N such that she voiceably prefers 
that all moralists should follow N. This is because altruistic desires are universal. 
Whether or not an action satisfies them does not depend on the identities of the people 
and places involved, or their relationship to the desirer; it depends only on the action’s 
properties. 
If two moralists are in radically different circumstances, and if we continue to 
assume that their weighted desires consist solely of altruistic desires, mightn’t this give 
a moralist A reason to voiceably prefer that they should follow different norms that are 
‘tailored’ to their circumstances? I cannot see what such tailoring might involve. The 
very same comprehensive norm-partition will give prescriptions that maximize the 
satisfaction of A’s altruistic desires in every possible circumstance. Concerns of 
simplicity do not require that the norm-partition be compromised in such a way that 
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following it in some circumstances would not optimally satisfy A’s altruistic desires, 
while following it in others would. There is thus nothing to be gained by ‘tailoring’. 
6.3 ‘Conforming to’ Norms 
6.3.1 Three Precisifications Considered 
In order to predict Simplicity, I am, as I have already said, hypothesizing that moralists 
have voices in other moralists’ choices among which comprehensive norm-partitions 
they will conform to, and that they prefer that other moralists should conform to simpler 
rather than more complex norms because their preferences are influenced by their 
simplicity desires, which are desires that moralists should conform to simpler norms. 
But, given my aims, what should ‘conforming to’ a norm-partition mean here? This will 
affect what I say about the demands moralists can make of one another, and about the 
content of the simplicity desire. Here are four possibilities: (1) conforming to a norm-
partition N could mean following N; (2) it could mean following N for some period of 
time; (3) it could mean necessarily following N, on some suitable understanding of 
‘necessarily’. I will evaluate these proposals in a moment. Before proceeding, I should 
warn the reader that I will sometimes say that a moralist prefers, or has a preference for, 
a norm, as a shorthand for saying that she has a preference for conforming to that norm, 
on whatever precisification of ‘conform to’ is relevant.166 
(1) ‘Conforming to N’ as following N. Suppose that moralist A has a voice in B’s 
choice among which comprehensive norm-partitions to follow, and that A’s relevant 
simplicity desire is a desire that B should follow simpler norms. The problem with this 
idea is that it does not have the result that A will voice preferences that B should follow 
simpler norms. Or, less ambiguously, the problem is that it does not have the result that 
the comprehensive norm-partition N such that A has a voiceable preference that B 
should conform to N is simple. This is because B is bound to follow simple norms when 
he follows N, even if N is extremely complex. The simplicity desire is thus too easily 
satisfied. Whatever B does, there will be some extremely simple comprehensive norm-
partition that requires that action, and B will count as following that norm-partition. If B 
lights a cigarette, there is a very simple comprehensive norm-partition that prescribes 
maximizing expected cigarette-lighting in all circumstances, which B has succeeded in 
                                                 
166 This is partly to avoid complex locutions like ‘S has a preference for conformity to norms 
conformity to which would satisfy such-and-such desires.’ 
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following. A’s simplicity desire will have little effect on the norms she best prefers that 
B should follow. A will probably just form a preference for a very complex 
comprehensive norm-partition prescribing actions that would maximally satisfy A’s 
altruistic desires in all circumstances. If B does follows this comprehensive norm-
partition, he is also sure to follow some other extremely simple comprehensive norm-
partition prescribing whatever action B performs. So B’s norm-conformity choice will 
satisfy A’s simplicity desire very well regardless of the complexity of the norms that she 
demands he should conform to. 
(2) ‘Conforming to N’ as following N for a period of time. Now suppose that 
‘conform to’ means follow over a certain period of time (call this period d), and hence 
that A’s simplicity desire is a desire that B should follow simpler norms over d. This 
would partly address the problem that the last proposal faced. This is because it is not 
necessarily true that whatever B does over d there will be some perfectly simple 
comprehensive norm-partition such that B counts as following it. If B does a lot of 
different things over d, and responds to circumstances with similar features in a lot of 
different ways, the simplest comprehensive norm-partition he follows over d may not be 
very close in simplicity to the simplest comprehensive norm-partition he could have 
followed. So A’s simplicity desire probably will affect the simplicity of the norms that 
she demands that he should follow over d. It will be frustrated by B’s conformity to 
norms whose requirements are sensitive to a lot of distinct properties of circumstances 
and actions. 
Unfortunately, A’s simplicity desire will not always affect A’s preferences. For if 
A knows that B is only going to face the same sorts of choice situations over d (whether 
or not she knows what those choice situations are), she will be in much the same 
situation as we imagined her to be in when we were evaluating the view on which to 
‘conform to’ norms simply meant to follow them at a given moment. A will simply 
form a preference for the norms N whose prescribed actions would maximally satisfy 
A’s altruistic desires in all circumstances. N would presumably be very complex, but 
since B is in the same circumstances throughout d, N will always contingently require 
him to do the same thing throughout d. Thus if B does follows N over d, he is also 
bound to follow some other extremely simple norm-partition throughout d prescribing 
whatever action N contingently prescribed throughout d. A’s simplicity desire will be 
perfectly satisfied. So if A knows that B will be in the same circumstances throughout d, 
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whether or not she knows what those circumstances are, her simplicity desire will not 
affect her preference. 
Thus, seemingly, if I construe ‘conform to’ as ‘follow for a period’, Simplicity 
(which requires that rational moralists always have voiceable preferences for conformity 
to simpler norms in proportion to the strength of their simplicity desires) will not obtain. 
Nor, seemingly, will Invariance, for A will voiceably prefer that different moralists 
should follow norms of differing degrees of simplicity, depending on whether or not she 
believes that they will encounter the same sorts of circumstances throughout the 
relevant period. 
There is another problem with proposal (2), which it shares—as far as I can see—
with any proposal that allows A’s simplicity desire to significantly affect the content of 
her preferred norms. I call this the Uneven Compromise problem. But I will explain this 
problem in my discussion of proposal (3) rather than here, because the initial problem 
that I raised for (2) would make the Uneven Compromise problem harder to state clearly 
as an objection to (2). 
(3) ‘Conforming to N’ as following N necessarily. According to proposal (3), a 
moralist A has a voice in what comprehensive norm-partition another moralist B 
necessarily follows, and her simplicity desire (vis-à-vis B) is a desire that the norms that 
B necessarily follows should be simpler. B does not satisfy A’s voiceable preference if 
he follows her best-preferred norms but would not have followed them had his 
circumstances been different. 
Having a voice in what an agent necessarily does is apparently pointless. 
Presumably, if the agent necessarily follows norms N, then to demand that he should 
(necessarily) follow a different set of norms is to demand the impossible. So when we 
say that A has a voice in what norms B necessarily follows, the ‘necessarily’ must be 
understood in such a way that is possible for B to have ‘necessarily’ done otherwise. 
‘Necessarily’ here, in both instances, must mean ‘necessarily, holding some set of token 
facts of a certain type (call them F-facts) fixed’, and ‘possible’ must mean ‘possible, 
without holding any token set of F-facts fixed’. This might suggest that A’s voice 
concerning which norms B should necessarily follow is really a voice concerning what 
the token F-facts should be. But this is not what I want to say. Rather, her demands do 
not specify a value for the F-facts; they are simply demands that he should necessarily 
follow certain sets of norms, and the fact that ‘necessarily’ here means ‘necessarily, 
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holding some set of token F-facts fixed’ is what explains why she is not, strictly 
speaking, demanding something impossible. 
It must somehow be guaranteed that, if A is rational, the norms that A demands 
that B should follow are insensitive to F-facts: they must not give different prescriptions 
depending on the F-facts. The terms of the moral trust network could, I suggest, bring 
this about by stipulating that F-facts do not fall under admissible ground-types for 
members of the first order of the moral trust network. What are ‘F-facts’? I suggest that 
they are facts about the strengths of B’s trust-based desires, and about his actual or 
perceived trust-based obligations. 
(As a general matter, it makes sense that moralists’ norms should be insensitive to 
entrusted parties’ trust-based motivations. It is by influencing these motivations that 
moral judgements have the potential to change moralists’ behaviour. By demanding that 
a moral entrusted party should φ, a moralist seeks to convince him that his trust-based 
obligations require him to φ, and so bring it about that his trust-based motivations move 
him to φ. Demanding that a moralist should follow norms prescribing φ-ing iff you have 
a trust-based motivation to φ would thus be inefficacious. Demanding that he follow 
norms requiring φ-ing iff you don’t have a trust-based motivation to φ would be self-
undermining (and would have about it a whiff of the paradoxical). It would not serve the 
purpose of the moral trust network for its terms to allow that moral demands might be 
sensitive to entrusted parties’ judgements of trust-based obligation, or to their trust-
based motivations.) 
Unlike proposal (1), proposal (3) avoids making A’s simplicity desire too easy to 
satisfy. It is not always true that there is a simple comprehensive norm-partition that 
prescribes the actions that B would necessarily perform—that he would perform in 
every relevant possible circumstance. If A lights a cigarette in circumstances C but 
would have done a lot of very different things in a lot of circumstances that were very 
similar to C, then the comprehensive norm-partition that he necessarily follows (holding 
F-facts fixed) will probably not be as simple as it would have been (had he had a strong 
trust-based desire that moved him to follow a simple set of norms, say). Thus if A is 
rational, her simplicity desire will affect the content of her preferred norms. 
Unfortunately this proposal seems to place excessive demands on moral entrusted 
parties. It makes violating A’s trust too easy for B. He can follow A’s preferred norms 
to the letter, and yet violate her trust because he would have defied those norms in some 
counterfactual circumstance (even with his moral trust-based desires and altruistic 
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desires still intact). Trust violations would be too common. It would not make sense for 
moralists to trust each other to be so robustly accommodating, nor for entrusted parties 
to commit to be. 
To be sure, if A prefers that B should conform to comprehensive norm-partition 
N, B might avoid violations of A’s trust resulting from his counterfactually defying N, 
by forming discretion-licencing preferences that licence him to counterfactually defy N. 
B’s discretion-licencing preference, let’s say, would be a preference that B should 
follow a certain comprehensive norm-partition necessarily. If B necessarily follows this 
comprehensive norm-partition, then he doesn’t violate A’s trust by counterfactually 
transgressing N. As long as there is no point in time at which B counterfactually violates 
both his preferred norms and A’s, he will live up to A’s trust. But this still makes 
violating A’s trust too easy. Few of us are perfect, but far fewer are robustly perfect. B 
is bound at some point in time to be such that he lacks the trust-based motivation 
(specifically, the discretional desire) to counterfactually act on the most demanding 
prescriptions that his preferred norms and A’s preferred norms have in common, and 
then he will violate A’s trust, even if he has sufficient motivation to follow them in the 
actual world. 
The problem is worse than it appears on the characterization I have just given it, 
because I have ignored two facts. First, A will not be the only moralist making demands 
of B; all of B’s partners in the moral trust network are sure to be making conflicting 
demands of him. So if B ever defies his own preferred norms qua moral entrusted party, 
he is sure to violate someone’s trust. Second, it ignores the fact that, if B is undecided 
about what to do in some circumstance C—which according to fiduciary non-
cognitivism means having utilities that do not discriminate between comprehensive 
norm-partitions that give incompatible prescriptions in C—then he will violate 
someone’s trust regardless of the strength of his trust-based motivations, even if he is 
never in C. This is because C is a possible circumstance in which B cannot follow every 
other moralist’s preferred norms, and B lacks a voiceable preference that licences him to 
counterfactually resist following their norms in C. So proposal (3) has the result that B 
can violate trust merely by being undecided between norms. And being undecided 
between norms will be a common condition, because, as will become apparent later, the 
reasoning involved in forming voiceable moral preferences is difficult. 
Proposal (3) also faces the Uneven Compromise problem that I alluded to above. 
This problem apparently arises for any proposal that predicts that simplicity desires as 
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well as altruistic desires will affect moralists’ preferences. It is the main reason why 
Simplicity and Invariance are hard to predict simultaneously. Suppose that moralist A is 
forming voiceable preferences as to which comprehensive norm-partitions moralists B1 
and B2 should conform to, and that A’s preferences are being influenced by her desires 
that B1 and B2 should conform to simpler norms. The influence of this simplicity desire 
means that A will form preferences for norms conformity to which would not maximize 
the satisfaction of her altruistic desires. I’ll refer to the extent to which conformity to the 
prescriptions of a comprehensive norm-partition would satisfy a moralist’s altruistic 
desires as that norm-partition’s fit with her altruistic desires, or simply its fit. I will also 
call the extent to which conformity to a prescription of a norm-partition satisfies a 
moralist’s altruistic desires, that prescription’s fit with her altruistic desires. The 
influence of A’s simplicity desires compromises the fit of her preferred norms; it means 
that in forming her preferences she must make trade-offs between simplicity and fit. 
There will be different ways for A to achieve simplicity, for these compromises 
could be made to different ‘parts’ of the comprehensive norm-partition. The fit with her 
altruistic desires of various different prescriptions could be sacrificed to achieve a 
simpler comprehensive norm-partition. And it might serve A’s weighted desires better 
for B1 and B2 to follow, at a time t, comprehensive norm-partitions that are 
compromised in different ways, and which are thus mutually incompatible. This is 
because A might know that B1 and B2 will occupy different circumstances at t, and 
hence will only have to perform actions that are relevant to those circumstances. So it 
will serve A’s preferences for B1 to follow a comprehensive norm-partition whose 
prescriptions in B1’s expected circumstances perfectly fit with A’s altruistic desires, and 
which give compromised prescriptions only in circumstances that B1 is unlikely to find 
himself in at t. Likewise, it will serve her preferences for B2 to follow a comprehensive 
norm-partition at t whose prescriptions in B2’s expected circumstances perfectly fit with 
A’s altruistic desires, and which trades off fit for simplicity elsewhere. So, immediately, 
before t, A will have voiceable preferences that B1 and B2 should follow incompatible 
comprehensive norm-partitions. But of course, if this is possible, then Invariance will 
not obtain. I call this the Uneven Compromise problem, for it arises because, when 
compromising the fit of her preferred comprehensive norm-partition to improve 
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simplicity, A has the option, so to speak, of concentrating these compromises in some 
parts of it rather than others.167 
The problem applies intertemporally as well as between agents. As B1’s expected 
circumstances change, A’s preferences concerning which norms he should follow will 
change accordingly. So if A knows that at t1 B1 will be on board a sinking ship among 
children who will drown if he doesn’t help them on to a lifeboat, A might voiceably 
prefer, just prior to t1, that he follow norms requiring him to always maximize expected 
life-preservation; and if A knows that at a later time t2 B1 will have returned to his job 
as a journalist, and is in a position to expose corruption at the cost of his job, A might 
prefer, just before t2, that he conform to norms requiring him to always maximize truth-
telling. These might be the simplest comprehensive norm-partitions prescribing the 
actions, among those available to B1 at t1 and t2, that maximally satisfy A’s altruistic 
desires. 
This sort of temporal fluctuation in A’s preferences is not, strictly speaking, 
incompatible with Invariance, but its possibility would undermine the comparative 
method of abuse detection in the same way that possible failures of Invariance would. 
To facilitate this method, a rational moralist’s preferences ought to be fairly stable over 
time, so that changes in a moralist’s demands (etc.) over time in similar cases will be 
evidence of ‘double standards’. We might call this desirable state of affairs Temporal 
Invariance. 
Thus far I have described the Uneven Compromise problem in a way that is 
supposed to be neutral between proposals (1)-(3), so it may not be immediately clear 
that the problem applies to proposal (3). But when we cash out talk of ‘conforming to 
norms’ as ‘following norms necessarily’ the problem remains. A will voiceably prefer 
that B1 necessarily follow a comprehensive norm-partition that is optimized for his 
actual situation, and that B2 necessarily follow a comprehensive norm-partition 
optimized for his. 
This completes my survey of hypotheses concerning the kinds of decisions in 
which moralists have voices has such. All of these hypotheses have serious maladies. I 
will now consider which of them can be cured. 
                                                 
167 A dearth of vocabulary for describing the process of forming preference makes it is hard to 
avoid talking as though A were choosing which norms to prefer, though the process is in fact 
non-voluntary. 
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6.3.2 Solutions to the Problems Facing the Second Precisification 
Let’s start by addressing the Uneven Compromise problem. The problem is that, given 
all I’ve said so far, a moralist A will seemingly prefer that a moralist B should conform 
to different norms depending on his circumstances, because she will prefer that he 
conform to comprehensive norm-partitions that trade simplicity for fit only in their 
prescriptions concerning circumstances in which B is unlikely to find himself. 
We can solve this problem by postulating that no proposition bearing on the 
contingent likelihood that B finds himself in one circumstance rather than another falls 
under an admissible ground-type for A; in other words, all such propositions are 
fundamentally inadmissible. This forces A to form her preferences concerning what 
norms B should conform to as if she were in complete ignorance about B’s contingent 
circumstances—as if she were behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, we might say.168 Grounds 
bearing on the contingent likelihood that she will find herself in one circumstance rather 
than another are also fundamentally inadmissible for A. So, assuming the strength of her 
simplicity desire is the same for her qua entrusted party as it is for her qua entrusting 
party, and assuming she is rational, she will voiceably prefer that she should conform to 
the same norms that she prefers (qua entrusting party) that others should conform to. 
Given these postulations, the Uneven Compromise problem shouldn’t threaten 
Invariance. 
It is not available to the fiduciary non-cognitivist to hypothesize that the Uneven 
Compromise problem would be solved in exactly this way. As I mentioned above, 
moralists’ (‘effectively’ weighted) simplicity desires are derived. They depend on 
contingent beliefs. Some contingent beliefs must therefore be admissible behind the 
‘veil of ignorance’ if simplicity desires are to affect moralists’ voiceable preferences. I 
discuss simplicity desires further, though inconclusively, in Section 6.6. But the 
fiduciary non-cognitivist can, I suspect, posit that the Uneven Compromise problem 
would be solved by a slightly adulterated version of the ‘veil of ignorance’ solution 
adumbrated above. (In what follows, I shall largely ignore complications to the veil-of-
ignorance story arising from the derived character of simplicity desires.) 
The Uneven Compromise problem was a general problem, facing more than one 
version of my hypothesis that moralists have voices concerning other moralists’ choices 
                                                 
168 The phrase and the broad idea come, of course, from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 136-42. 
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of which norms to conform to. What of the problems specifically facing the particular 
versions? I am not aware of any way to solve the problem I pointed out for proposal (1), 
nor the problem proposal (3) gives rise to of making trust violations too easy. But I 
think that the maladies of (2) can be remedied to an extent that is sufficient to make (2) 
viable. 
The distinctive problem facing (2) was that it did not predict that a moralist’s 
simplicity desire would influence her preference in a constant and reliable way. Suppose 
that moralist A has a voice in which comprehensive norm-partition moralist B should 
follow over a period d, and A knows that B’s circumstances will remain the same 
throughout d. A’s simplicity desire will be satisfied perfectly well as long as B responds 
to his circumstances in the same way throughout d, for there is sure to be some very 
simple comprehensive norm-partition that he counts as having followed by so 
responding. So A’s simplicity desire will not dispose her to voiceably prefer that B 
should follow simpler norms over d, as long as the norms she prefers that he should 
follow on the basis of her altruistic desires alone are norms that always require him to 
respond to his unchanging circumstances in the same way, as they surely will be. 
Simplicity will thus not obtain, and since the effects of A’s simplicity desire on her 
voiceable preferences in different relationships will vary depending on her beliefs about 
the likelihood that other moralists will find themselves in the same circumstances 
throughout d, Invariance will not obtain either. 
To solve this problem I don’t need to say much that is new. My hypothesized 
solution to the Uneven Compromise problem has the consequence that grounds bearing 
on the likelihood that moralists would find themselves in some circumstances rather 
than others are inadmissible. To solve the Uneven Compromise problem, the only 
grounds that really need to be fundamentally inadmissible for moralist A when A is 
forming a voiceable preference concerning what moral entrusted party B should do at a 
future time t1 are those bearing on the probability that B will end up in some 
circumstances rather than others at t1. However there is little further cost in postulating 
that grounds bearing on the probability that B will find himself in one circumstance 
rather than another from t1 to a later time (t1+d), where ‘(t1+d)’ is the time that is later 
than t1 by period d, are also fundamentally inadmissible for A when A forms her 
preference about what B should do at t1. And once we do this, we push facts about 
whether B will be in the same circumstance from t1 to (t1+d) behind the veil of 
ignorance. A must always form her voiceable preferences as if she were in ignorance of 
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the likelihood that moralists would find themselves in the same circumstances 
throughout intervals of time that commence at the time of the decisions her preferences 
apply to, and that are no smaller than d. This being so, her simplicity desire will 
presumably always affect her preferred norms to some degree, and always to the same 
degree, if she is rational. 
Regardless of their contingent circumstances, moral entrusted parties will virtually 
always form their discretion-licencing preferences for options in the same sorts of 
decisions, behind the same sort of ‘veil of ignorance’. B will form preferences 
concerning which comprehensive norm-partitions to follow for the same interval d, and 
grounds bearing on the likelihood that he will be in one circumstance rather than 
another over the course of d are fundamentally inadmissible for him. So Simplicity and 
Invariance will obtain. 
Note that if we posit that precisification (2)’s problems would be solved by this 
means, we can posit a value for d that is as short as we like, as long as d is real-valued. 
A must form her preferences as if in ignorance of B’s contingent circumstances over d 
(or over the relevant d-long period, whenever its starting point might be), and if she 
were ignorant in this way, she would have no way of knowing how many different 
circumstances B would find himself in over d, even if d were a tiny fraction of a second. 
A must thus form her preference as if, for all she knew, B might change circumstances 
radically from one moment to the next, like a spirit possessing now one body, now 
another, just long enough to make a decision (with lasting consequences) in each new 
circumstance. 
Why would we want to postulate that d is brief? Here’s one reason: B might 
sometimes ‘change his mind’ qua moralist. Whether due to a change in his reasoning or 
a change in the strengths of his weighted desires, he might form discretion-licencing 
preferences to follow a comprehensive norm-partition that differed from the 
comprehensive norm-partition he preferred in the past. Suppose that at t1 B prefers to 
follow norms N1 over the period (t1 to (t1+d)), that at t2 B prefers to follow norms N2 
over (t2 to (t2+d)), and that t2 occurs before the time (t1+d) has elapsed. In the time 
between t2 and t1+d B is presumably obliged to follow both N1 and N2, which may be 
impossible. It would be unfortunate if B could easily violate trust in virtue of being 
obliged to follow incompatible norms as a result of ‘changing his mind’. One way to 
minimize this possibility is to make d too brief to allow these sorts of conflicting 
obligations to be at all consequential. 
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I hypothesize that the terms of the moral trust network realize Simplicity and 
Invariance in accordance with proposal (2) in conjunction with the remedy to (2)’s 
defects suggested above. These terms give moralists voices in one another’s choices of 
which comprehensive norm-partitions to follow over an exceedingly brief though real-
valued period of time, which I will henceforth refer to as ‘d’. They give weight to 
moralists’ desires that moralists should follow simpler comprehensive norm-partitions 
over these periods. And they make grounds concerning moralists’ contingent 
circumstances over those periods inadmissible. Because the period over which moralists 
must follow their preferred norms is so brief, I will generally ignore it henceforth when 
describing the choices in which moralists as such have voices; I will merely say that 
moralists have voices in choices amongst which comprehensive norm-partitions to 
follow. 
6.4 Preferences for Conformity to Non-comprehensive Norm-Partitions 
6.4.1 Derived Voices and Norm-Indecision 
I must postpone my explanation for the value of simplicity a bit longer. First, I need to 
examine the questions of whether and under what conditions a moralist may have a 
voiceable preference that anyone should follow a non-comprehensive norm-partition. 
My answers to these questions will have implications for the account I give of moral 
judgement and moral indecision. A new piece of terminology will be helpful in what 
follows: to avow norms or a norm-partition is to voice a preference for conformity to 
those norms or that norm-partition. 
Let us now return to the questions I broached at the beginning of this section. In 
6.2.1 I made some hypotheses concerning the supervenience of live options on live 
atomic sub-options. It is a consequence of these hypotheses that moralists have voices in 
moralists’ choices of which non-comprehensive norm-partitions to follow, among those 
that they presently can follow, because they have voices in moralists’ choices of which 
comprehensive norm-partitions to follow. To reiterate the relevant claims: the terms of 
entrusted concern relationships specify which decisions parties have voices in by 
specifying which atomic sub-options they have voices in; a party has a voice in any 
choice between two mutually incompatible options that are both realized by live atomic 
sub-options; and the weighted utility of non-live atomic sub-options is irrelevant to a 
determination of a party’s voiceable preferences among live options. For moralists, the 
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option of following a comprehensive norm-partition N is a live atomic sub-option of the 
option of following any non-comprehensive norm-partition that N entails. So a moralist 
has a voice—a derived voice—in any choice of a moralist between following one or the 
other of two incompatible non-comprehensive norm-partitions.169 
This means that, in a decision between performing actions φ and not-φ in a 
circumstance C, a moralist is entitled to voice a preference that another moralist should 
follow any norm-partition N that is entailed by her preferred comprehensive norm-
partition, and which requires either φ or not-φ in C. This is because she has a derived 
voice in the decision to follow or not follow N, and the decision to φ or not-φ in C is, 
among other things, a decision to follow or not follow N. (If a preference for following 
a non-comprehensive norm-partition has no bearing on any decision that is under 
deliberation, it can still be voiced, but only as a preference in a counterfactual or 
conditional choice.170) This is a major part of how I propose to explain the fact that 
moralists making public moral judgements don’t always do so by espousing 
comprehensive moral theories, but sometimes merely judge that some particular actions, 
or relatively small classes of actions with common properties (e.g. abortion), are right or 
wrong. 
Obligations to accommodate preferences for following non-comprehensive norm-
partitions are explained by obligations to accommodate preferences for following 
comprehensive norm-partitions. (That is, the range of choices in which moralists have 
obligations to accommodate preferences includes choices among non-comprehensive 
norm-partitions, because it includes choices among comprehensive norm-partitions—I 
am talking about the scope rather than the source of moralists’ obligations here.) I have 
said that, in general, an entrusted party’s obligation to accommodate a preference voiced 
by an entrusting party in exercise of a derived entitlement is explained by his (the 
entrusted party’s) obligations to accommodate the voiceable preferences she has in his 
choices among live atomic sub-options—specifically, those of her voiceable preferences 
                                                 
169 Bear in mind that to follow a non-comprehensive norm partition is to perform only actions 
that it requires. Thus whereas a moralist always has the option of following a comprehensive 
norm-partition, a moralist does not have the option of following a non-comprehensive norm-
partition if there is no action available to her that falls within its extension. 
170 Actually, it is probably better to regard all preferences concerning which non-comprehensive 
norms to follow in future choices as conditional, i.e. as preferences for follow norms N when in 
circumstances C. No one can know the agent’s future circumstances with perfect certainty, so 
voicing unconditional preferences for following non-comprehensive norm-partitions risks 
making demands of moralists that they cannot possibly live up to. 
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for the live atomic sub-options that explain the preference she voices in exercise of the 
derived entitlement. Suppose that a moralist B can follow a non-comprehensive norm-
partition N—i.e. an action that N requires is available to him—and another moralist A 
voices a (rational) preference that B should follow N. B is obliged qua A’s partner to 
follow N, assuming he is, because he is obliged to accommodate A’s voiceable 
preference in his choice of which comprehensive norm-partitions to follow, and the 
option of following the comprehensive norm-partition that A best prefers is an atomic 
sub-option of following N. 
Similarly, a preference voiced by an entrusted party for a non-atomic option is 
discretion-licencing, if it is, only derivatively, because B has a voiceable preference to 
choose some live atomic sub-option that explains it. Thus if B voices a preference not to 
follow N, and this preference is indeed voiceable, it is discretion-licencing because B 
has a fundamental voice in his choice of which comprehensive norm-partition he should 
follow, and, among all comprehensive norm-partitions, following the comprehensive 
norm-partition that he best prefers to follow is a sub-option of following N. 
The fact, noted above, that the weighted utility of non-live atomic sub-options is 
irrelevant to the determination of a party’s voiceable preferences among live options has 
the consequence that a moralist cannot necessarily scrupulously avow whichever non-
comprehensive norm-partition best satisfies her weighted desires. It implies that she 
cannot voice a preference for conformity to a non-comprehensive norm-partition that is 
not entailed by her best preferred comprehensive norm-partition (or norm-partitions—I 
explain what I mean by this in a moment). Were her preferences among non-
comprehensive norm-partitions not constrained in this way, she could simultaneously 
have voiceable preferences to follow multiple incompatible norm-partitions of varying 
extensions. 
One reason why it is important that a moralist should have voiceable preferences 
for conformity to non-comprehensive norm-partitions is that this means that she will 
probably have some preference she can voice even if she lacks a voiceable preference 
for conformity to any single comprehensive norm-partition. More often than not, a 
moralist will lack a voiceable preference for conformity to any single comprehensive 
norm-partition. In what follows I will explain why this is so, after I have explained why 
lacking a voiceable preference for conformity to any single comprehensive norm-
partition does not rule out having a voiceable preference for conformity to some non-
comprehensive norm-partition. 
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Voiceable preferences are based on expected weighted utilities. (The 
‘expectations’ that are relevant to the determination of a moralist’s expected weighted 
utilities qua member of the first-order moral trust network must be based on the 
probability of propositions only insofar as those propositions are admissible. Thus they 
cannot be affected by moralists’ beliefs about the contingent probabilities that moralists 
will find themselves in some circumstances rather than others at the moment of the 
demanded action, and over the ensuing period d.) Expected utilities—even perhaps 
rational ones—can plausibly be indeterminate, perhaps because credences can be 
indeterminate, and I shall assume that expected weighted utilities are no different.171 If a 
party to an entrusted concern relationship has indeterminate expected weighted utilities, 
these weighted utilities may fail to yield a ranking among two or more options that have 
the highest expected utility for her. This may result in her failing to have a voiceable 
preference for any single live atomic sub-option. But that doesn’t mean that she can’t 
have a voiceable preference among non-atomic options. She has a voiceable preference 
for any non-atomic sub-option if her best preferred live atomic sub-option is a sub-
option of that non-atomic sub-option, even if it is indeterminate which of her live 
atomic sub-options this is. 
Recall Stevenson’s football case. Suppose (implausibly) that John’s live atomic 
sub-options of the option (P) John plays football are all and only the following: (F) John 
plays forward, (D) John plays defence, and (G) John plays goalie. And suppose further 
that John voiceably prefers both F and D to G, but John lacks a voiceable preference 
between F and D because he has indeterminate expected weighted utilities. Finally, 
suppose that John’s best preferred sub-option of the option (~P) John does not play 
football, namely, (C) John joins the chess club, has a higher expected weighted utility 
than G, but a lower expected weighted utility than each of F and D. Thus (F > C > G) 
and (D > C > G). Does the fact that John lacks a voiceable preference between F and D 
mean that he lacks a voiceable preference for P over ~P? It does not. For John prefers P 
to ~P if and only if the sub-options he best prefers out of all the live atomic sub-options 
of P and ~P is a sub-option of P. And the sub-option he best prefers out of all his live 
atomic sub-options is, determinately, a sub-option of P, even if it is indeterminate 
                                                 
171 In the moral reasoning case, the credences whose indeterminacy might explain indeterminacy 
in a moralist’s expected weighted utilities would primarily be credences in a priori propositions 
about the implications of following certain norms. I give examples of such propositions in 4.2 
below. 
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whether this sub-option is F or D. So John has discretion to resist his mother’s 
preference that ~P, though he lacks discretion to resist her preference between F and D. 
The following is true for the same reason. Suppose that a moralist S has expected 
weighted utilities that fail to discriminate between her best-preferred options of 
following comprehensive norm-partitions. That is, there is some set of comprehensive 
norm-partitions (N1, …, Nn) such that (N1, …, Nn) has more than one member, and for 
all comprehensive norm-partitions Nx, Nx is in (N1, …, Nn) just in case there is no 
comprehensive norm-partition Ny such that conformity to Ny has determinately higher 
expected weighted utility for S than conformity to Nx. The options of following the 
members of (N1, …, Nn) are S’s best preferred live atomic sub-options. Consequently, S 
will, for any norm-partition O such that following O necessarily realizes the option of 
following N1, and …, and the option of following Nn, have a conditional voiceable 
preference for the option of following O when possible. Which is to say that S will, for 
any norm-partition O such that O is entailed by each of N1, and …, and Nn, have a 
conditional voiceable preference for following O when possible. 
Amongst these entailed non-comprehensive norm-partitions, I will call the non-
comprehensive norm-partition with the largest extension S’s maximal decided norm-
partition. Every moralist who has any voiceable preference at all has a maximal decided 
norm-partition. If she has a single, determinately best-preferred comprehensive norm-
partition, this will count as her maximal decided norm-partition. Intuitively speaking, a 
moralist’s preference for conformity to her maximal decided norm-partition is the 
‘strongest’, ‘most demanding’, and ‘most extensively discretion-licencing’ preference a 
moralist can scrupulously voice. On my usage, the norms entailed by a moralist’s 
maximal decided norm-partition are the norms that she ‘has’ and, collectively, are ‘her 
norms’. Any norm-partition that is compatible with a moralist’s maximal decided norm-
partition but which is not entailed by it is a norm-partition about which she is norm-
undecided; the option of following it is also one about which she is norm-undecided; the 
state of being undecided about a norm or option is one of norm-indecision. 
6.4.2 The Difficulty of Moral Reasoning, and its Practical Implications 
I have implied that moralists will find themselves in states of norm-indecision more 
often than not. This is partly because taking account of simplicity desires makes rational 
preference-formation more difficult. It means that a moralist cannot form her 
preferences among comprehensive norm-partitions in an entirely piecemeal way; she 
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must reason ‘holistically’. She cannot simply form her preferences by focusing on one 
area of conduct, then moving on to another, ignoring the results of her earlier 
ruminations, and ignoring areas of conduct that she has not considered yet. Rather, in 
forming preferences concerning any norm-partition, she must always be questioning 
whether or not there is a comprehensive norm-partition which entails it, and which is 
preferable to all rival comprehensive norm-partitions because it achieves a better overall 
trade-off between simplicity and fit. 
The enterprise of forming rational preferences among norm-partitions is difficult 
both because it requires trade-offs between (‘holistic’) simplicity and fit, and because it 
requires an imaginative effort to grasp all of the implications of following a norm-
partition whose extension is large. It may not immediately occur to someone who 
entertains a policy of always returning to people what they are owed that this would 
require returning an axe to its owner if he were insane and violent. It may not 
immediately occur to someone that a policy of maximizing happiness would in some 
circumstances require judicial murder. Thinking up sets of norms, forming a priori 
beliefs about their implications, and proportioning one’s expected weighted utilities for 
the options of following those norms to those a priori beliefs—this is what moral 
reasoning is all about according to fiduciary non-cognitivism. It is a difficult task, and 
one that many moralists would never complete to their satisfaction. Plausibly, it would 
not be uncommon for moralists to have expected weighted utilities that did not 
discriminate among their best-preferred comprehensive norm-partitions. 
On my theory, moral reasoning is means-end reasoning of an apparently unusual 
sort. One undertakes it as if one were in (almost) perfect ignorance about the contingent 
probabilities that the world at the time of action would be one way rather than another. 
It might be doubted that there is any way to instrumentally reason well in such a state of 
ignorance, or that, if there were, humans would have any hope of doing it well, given 
their cognitive limitations. It requires a consideration of an uncountably infinite range of 
possibilities. In a way this is not unusual—there is an uncountably infinite number of 
ways the world might be in any real-world choice situation. But usually, it might be 
thought, we can get away with taking account of only a small and finite subset of these 
possibilities—those that meet a certain threshold of probability, one that is larger the 
more time we have to deliberate. This plausibly allows us to make tolerably good 
choices most of the time despite our brains’ limited processing power. But for moralists 
the contingent probabilities of different ways the world might be are treated as being 
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completely unknown. So if a moralist limits the range of possible circumstances that she 
considers to a finite and manageable set, she cannot do this on the basis of their 
contingent probability. We might worry that she must choose the membership of the set 
in way that is utterly arbitrarily. 
I need to acknowledge that my account of moral reasoning raises problems of this 
sort, but I cannot attempt to solve them. This would be beyond my expertise, and would 
require too great a deviation from the main story I wish to tell. I do find it intuitively 
plausible that we can reason more or less well in situations of perfect uncertainty about 
the contingent facts. Suppose that you were forced to choose, in perfect ignorance of 
your future circumstances, and on the basis of purely self-regarding desires, some set of 
rules R such that (i) the complexity of R does not exceed a certain threshold, (ii) R can 
be stated without the use of proper nouns or indexicals, (iii) other agents would follow 
R in their interactions with you, and (iv) you would be forced to follow R in your 
dealings with others. It seems obvious to me that you could recognize that choosing 
some sets of rules, among those meeting criteria (i) and (ii), would be instrumentally 
better or worse for you than choosing others. Choosing rules requiring agents to 
maximally frustrate each other’s preferences would be worse than choosing rules 
requiring them to forbear from harming each other, for instance. 
Let us return to the topic of norm-indecision. It is plausible that moralists would 
be norm-undecided about which norms to follow in a good many circumstances, but 
what are the practical implications of this uncertainty? A moralist as such can’t demand 
that others perform any specific actions in these circumstances, not without abusing 
other moralists’ commitments to live up to her trust. She might be able to demand that 
other moralists avoid performing actions in these situations though, for her maximal 
decided norm-partition might at least forbid certain actions in the circumstance, even if 
it did not require any actions. What would the moralist herself be obliged to do if she 
were in these circumstances? There is nothing that she could do that would not involve 
a trust violation, except to (very quickly) form a voiceable preference and act on it. In 
principle, she could choose an option φ if all other moralists either preferred that she 
should follow norms requiring φ, or had waived their preferences that she should follow 
norms forbidding φ, or were norm-undecided about whether to follow norms forbidding 
φ in her circumstances. This will never happen in practice however. 
I will not present my account of moral uncertainty until Chapter 8. But, on the 
rough assumption that what I am calling norm-indecision is moral indecision, the 
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implications I have just noted at least seem to explain some elementary facts about our 
moral lives. If a moralist knows that she will in the future have to make a decision that 
she is presently morally undecided about, she will feel that she had better figure out 
what to do beforehand. If someone is unsure what morality requires of her in her present 
situation but must act regardless, this is not usually a circumstance that she will 
welcome. 
6.4.3 The Salience of ‘Norm-Principles’  
I’ll conclude this section by saying something about the reasons moralists would have 
for avowing various sorts of non-comprehensive norm-partitions. Two such reasons are 
obvious. First, a moralist may lack a voiceable preference for conformity to any specific 
comprehensive norm-partition (she may be in a state of norm-indecision); thus she 
could not scrupulously voice such a preference if she wanted to. Second, she may wish 
to be succinct and spare her audience a lot of information about her voiceable 
preferences that is probably not relevant to the decision under deliberation. This concern 
for relevance might lead us to expect that moralists would avoid avowing norms of any 
generality, and would instead just voice preferences for following those particular 
prescriptions of their norms that bore upon the present decision. But I think that there is 
a salient class of more general norm-partitions which moralists would often avow. 
I call these norm-partitions ‘norm-principles’. I am discussing them not because 
they are vitally important to a satisfactory characterization of the moral trust network, 
but mainly in order to gesture at an explanation for the role of principles in moral 
thought and talk—having a norm-principle roughly corresponds to having a moral 
principle (a basic moral principle, not a derived one).172 
A norm-principle is a norm-partition whose extension consists of all and only 
those actions with a certain non-disjunctive set of (non-‘gruesome’, non-
‘gerrymandered’) natural properties, and whose prescription function outputs only 
prohibitions, or only requirements. Norm-principles may be said to ‘subsume’ 
prescriptions made, and norm-partitions entailed, by (more general) norm-partitions that 
entail them. For all norm-principles L, all norm-partitions O, and all comprehensive 
                                                 
172 I shall not, in this dissertation, actually present an analysis of moral principles or judgements 
of moral principle, so what I say here is all I shall have to say on the matter. (I talked a great 
deal in Chapter 4 about ‘judgements of basic moral principle’, but this was just a way of 
signifying that I was talking specifically about judgements about what is necessarily right or 
wrong.) 
220 
 
norm-partitions N, L subsumes O with respect to N if and only if L entails O and N 
entails L. I will be particularly interested in what I call ‘maximally general norm-
principles’. For all norm-principles L, and all norm-partitions N, L is a maximally 
general norm-principle with respect to N if and only if N entails L, and there is no 
norm-principle L* such that (i) N entails L*, (ii) L* entails L, and (iii) L does not entail 
L*. Moralists can ‘have’ norm-principles. For all moralists S, and all norm-principles L, 
L is one of S’s norm-principles if and only if L is entailed by S’s maximally decided 
norm-partition. For all moralists S, and all norm-principles L, L is one of S’s maximally 
general norm-principles if and only if, for all N such that N is S’s maximally decided 
set, L is a maximally general norm-principle with respect to N. 
Moralists, I contend, would often have an interest in avowing maximally general 
norm-principles, rather than avowing particular prescriptions on the one hand or 
comprehensive norm-partitions on the other. Broadly speaking, moralists’ simplicity 
desires will lead them to prefer comprehensive norm-partitions whose prescriptions are 
such that the smallest number of norm-principles will suffice to subsume them all. Since 
general norm-principles (i.e. those with large extensions) can subsume more 
prescriptions, the fact that a comprehensive norm-partition entails a general norm-
principle (the more general the better) tends to speak in its favour. A moralist who 
wants to demand conformity to, or claim discretion to follow, a particular prescription 
in a case under deliberation, will often want to establish that the preference she voices is 
rational given her simplicity desire. This being so, she has an interest in communicating 
to other moralists the fact that she has a norm-principle (the more general the better) 
which gives that prescription. So we might expect her to voice a preference for 
following a maximally general norm-principle rather than merely for following the 
particular prescription that is most immediately relevant to the case. 
This does not involve communicating a large amount of information of doubtful 
relevance to her audience. For one thing, it is economical to avow a norm-principle; it 
involves communicating something simple: a set of natural properties and a prescription 
applying to all actions with those properties. For another thing, her audience will often 
be interested in knowing whether her voiced preference is rational, because if it isn’t, 
any moralists whose preferences oppose hers may be able to change her mind and/or 
discredit her by pointing out flaws in her reasoning. The generality of her norm-
principle (as well as its fit with her altruistic desires) bears upon its rationality, given 
that she has an effectively weighted simplicity desire. 
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Again, by arguing that moralists would often avow what I am calling ‘norm-
principles’, I hope to account for the evident importance of principles in moral talk. One 
specific phenomenon that I must explain is that, when a moralist supplies grounds for a 
particular moral claim she has made, she will often cite a principle that makes that 
prescription. Or else she will cite contingent facts that explain why a principle (perhaps 
unstated) makes that prescription in the present case—which is also a way of implicitly 
citing a principle. This contrasts with the practices of parties to entrusted concern 
relationships such as I discussed in Chapter 1, who will cite as grounds facts that 
explain why an option would serve their weighted desires, rather than why it is required 
by a principle. I think that parties to these sorts of entrusted concern relationships on the 
one hand, and moralists on the other, are all trying to do the same thing, however. They 
are trying to show that their demands or claims to discretion are supported by their 
weighted desires, the ultimate source of their trust-based entitlements. The difference in 
the moral cases is that moralists’ weighted desires include simplicity desires, and citing 
the general norm-principles that lie behind one’s demands and claims is a way of 
indicating that one’s voiced preferences are duly influenced by one’s simplicity desires. 
6.5 Advantages of Simplicity 
6.5.1 How ‘Simplicity’ Aids the Comparative Method of Abuse Detection 
I have explained how the terms of the moral trust network might bring about both 
Simplicity and Invariance, but I still need to explain the advantages of their doing so. To 
this end, I shall look at a case in which realizing Simplicity would plausibly make a 
difference to the likelihood that an entrusting party could detect abuse through a 
comparison of voiced preferences. I will consider how easily abuses could be detected 
in this case in the presence and in the absence of a justified expectation that voiceable 
preferences will be influenced by simplicity desires. To make the contrast cleaner, I 
shall assume throughout that moralists have voices in one another’s choices of which 
comprehensive norm-partitions to follow, rather than simply in their choices among 
actions, even though this would not really make sense if moralists did not have 
weighted simplicity desires. My explanation for the value of Simplicity relies mainly on 
facts about the amount of information that moralists communicate about their norms 
when they voice preferences—about the extent to which, by voicing a preference for 
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following a non-comprehensive norm-partition of a given extension, a moralist narrows 
down the range of more comprehensive norm-partitions she is likely to prefer. 
Suppose first that Simplicity does not obtain; a moralist’s norms are thus as 
complicated to describe as her preferences based on her altruistic desires alone are. It is 
now t2, and moralist Bob has just voiced a preference to follow norms requiring φ in his 
present circumstance C, in response to another moralist’s demand that he follow norms 
requiring not-φ. It will serve Bob’s private (i.e. non-altruistic) desires to choose φ. But 
the two options are such that a person might well prefer one or the other on the basis of 
her altruistic desires alone, depending on the relative strengths of those desires, so 
Bob’s preference may or may not have been biased by self-interest. 
A fellow moralist, Sue, wants to determine now whether Bob’s voiced preference 
is his genuine voiceable preference, or whether he is trying to get away with defying his 
discretion-licencing preferences. Sue has a fair degree of familiarity with Bob and the 
preferences he has voiced qua moralist. Nobody had any idea this morning, at t1, that 
Bob would end up in C. So if Sue had asked Bob this morning whether his norms 
required moralists to φ or not-φ in C, his answer would have been unbiased, and Sue 
would now be in a position to determine, with a high degree of confidence, whether the 
choice Bob made at t2 was biased.
173 And perhaps Sue did. More generally, perhaps Sue 
gathered enough information prior to t2, so that she might now determine what she 
wants to know. Our question is, how likely is this? 
The answer is, I think, that the information Sue needs is too specific for there to 
be much likelihood that she would have acquired it ahead of time. Sue might have asked 
Bob at t1 or earlier whether his norms requiring φ or not-φ in C, but why would she 
have? Sue might know of a precedent of Bob’s choice situation, whose ‘altruistically 
relevant’ features (i.e. those features that might make a difference to the extent to which 
different options would satisfy altruistic desires) were identical to those of Bob’s choice 
situation, in which Bob voiced a preference qua moralist. But this is surely highly 
unlikely. Sue might know of a near precedent, which differed slightly in its altruistically 
relevant features, in which Bob voiced a preference for norms forbidding the φ-like 
option. This is less improbable. But this knowledge by itself would not allow Sue to 
infer that Bob had been unscrupulous. Perhaps the slight differences in the case’s 
                                                 
173 Although of course, if Bob had earlier voiced a preference for following norms forbidding φ, 
he probably wouldn’t be trying to get away with φ-ing now. 
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altruistically relevant features was enough to explain the contrasting prescriptions of 
Bob’s norms. 
The only circumstances under which Sue would reliably be able to gauge Bob’s 
scrupulousness is if she had at hand a fully worked-out and well-supported theory about 
the strength and content of his altruistic desires. And of course she could have such a 
theory at hand. She could have acquired the data for such a theory by taking note of the 
preferences Bob voiced, and also by asking Bob how he would prefer that entrusted 
parties act in hypothetical cases, and on what grounds. Or someone else might have 
done this work, and communicated the theory to Sue. But such research and theorizing 
would require a big investment of time and effort, and it is doubtful that this would have 
seemed worthwhile to anyone. So Sue will probably be none the wiser as to whether 
Bob’s voiced preference was biased. The problem is not that Sue could not have 
acquired the information she now needs, but that the information she now needs is too 
specific for there to be much likelihood that she would have acquired it, whether by 
accident or design. 
It seems as though this problem would be partially overcome if Simplicity 
obtained. For then Sue would be justified in assuming that Bob’s norms (and those of 
moralists in general) were such that they could be subsumed under norm-principles that 
were relatively few in number and relatively general. The likelihood that Sue would be 
in a position to determine whether Bob’s voiced preference was biased would be greatly 
increased, because the facts she would need to have learned beforehand in order to do so 
would be far fewer in number, and of greater general interest. 
Suppose that Bob’s demand is biased; his norms really forbid φ. Because his 
norms are influenced by his simplicity desire, their prescriptions can be subsumed under 
a relatively small number of relatively general norm-principles. This is presumably true 
of the prohibition of φ. The norm-principles that capture the prescriptions of Bob’s 
norms most economically include a somewhat general norm-principle forbidding all 
actions with some property F, where φ has F. To learn that Bob’s voiced preference to 
follow norms requiring φ is biased, Sue would need only to have asked Bob before t1 
what norm he preferred that people conform to, with regard to any F-action, and for Bob 
to have explained his preference regarding that action by citing the norm-principle 
forbidding F. This is far more likely than that Sue would have asked about Bob’s 
preferences concerning the choice between φ and not-φ in C specifically, or some very 
similar choice, in which his private interests were not at stake. It is also not too 
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improbable that questions about F-actions might have arisen by accident—someone 
might have wanted to perform an F-action, and Bob might have opposed this, voicing a 
preference for following norms forbidding F. This is far more likely than that Bob’s 
choice happened to have had a precedent, where the earlier choice had the following 
properties: it was nearly exactly similar in its altruistically relevant properties to Bob’s 
choice at t2, it was a choice in which Bob’s private interests were not at stake, and it was 
a choice concerning which Bob voiced a preference. 
One reason why Sue is more likely to know Bob’s norms concerning φ before t1 is 
that whenever he voices a preference qua moralist, other moralists enjoy discursive 
entitlements to demand that he say more about the content of his norms as a whole. 
They have these entitlements, either as members of the first- or second-order moral trust 
network, because parties to entrusted concern relationships in general are entitled to 
demand that their partners explain why they have the preferences they have voiced, to 
establish whether those preferences are genuinely voiceable, and to scrutinize the 
reasoning behind them. If Bob’s preferences are influenced by his simplicity desire, 
then the explanation for his voiceable preference concerning any particular action will 
be a holistic one, to which all the prescriptions of his maximal decided norm-partition 
are potentially relevant. Thus, if Simplicity obtains, these familiar discursive 
entitlements allow moralists to demand that Bob say more about his norms as a whole. 
This increases the likelihood that Sue would have learned of Bob’s norms concerning φ 
if she had previously heard him voice a preference in an unrelated decision. 
In general, the obtaining of Simplicity would make it easier to narrow down Bob’s 
probable norms from the history of preferences he has voiced when his interests were 
not at stake, even if he never, before t2, voiced a preference for following norm-
principles forbidding actions with any of φ’s properties. This is because, if Simplicity 
obtains, the number of different comprehensive norm-partitions a rational moralist 
could plausibly prefer is vastly diminished (though the number might still be very large 
indeed). Concerns of simplicity would induce moralists to iron out quirks in their norms 
that would otherwise have been points of difference between their norms and those of 
others. Thus Sue could more successfully glean skerricks of evidence bearing on Bob’s 
scrupulousness if Simplicity obtained than if it did not. 
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6.5.2 Other Advantages 
Simplicity, I think, has advantages beyond making opportunities for abuse-revealing 
preference comparisons more common. It also tends to make the norms that moralists 
avow ‘fairer’, in certain respects, when they are avowed insincerely. It has the result 
that when moralists abuse trust by voicing preferences that are biased to favour their 
private interests, they cannot so easily tailor the bias (so to speak) so that it benefits or 
harms only some people and not others. This means that when abuses happen, they tend 
not to be as disproportionately beneficial to the abusive and costly to the scrupulous as 
they would have been did Simplicity not obtain. This tends to make unscrupulousness 
less attractive and scrupulousness more attractive. 
An unscrupulous moralist will typically want to appear to be acting in accordance 
with her norm-principles, so as not to make others hostile to her, even while performing 
actions that her true norm-principles do not permit. She will want to make public moral 
judgements that permit her to do things that serve her partial desires, by which I mean 
her desires specifically for the interests of her favoured parties (e.g. herself, her friends, 
her family) to be promoted, and for the interests of her disfavoured parties (e.g. her foes, 
her rivals, those she envies) to be thwarted. But she will also tend to want to publicly 
judge that altruistic-desire-frustrating actions are wrong and altruistic-desire-satisfying 
ones are permissible or required. This is both to preserve the appearance that her 
avowed norms are those she prefers qua moralist, but also to permit her to perform, 
without apparently exceeding her discretion, actions that better satisfy her altruistic 
desires: unscrupulous moralists have altruistic desires just as scrupulous ones do, so 
they would rather follow (and demand that others follow) altruistic-desire-satisfying 
norms, all things being equal. 
And she won’t want her moral proclamations to be too obviously adulterated to 
permit her to be partial toward herself and her favourites. Suppose that the altruistic 
desires of an autocratic ruler, King Boniface, urge him to always punish murder with 
death, while his partial desires urge him not to execute his favourite, Sir Valiant, for 
committing murder. To create the appearance that his true norm-principles require 
sparing Valiant, it wouldn’t do for Boniface to avow norms requiring him to spare 
murderers just in case they are named ‘Valiant’. This would make his bias too obvious. 
Being named ‘Valiant’ is not an altruistically relevant property; there is thus no set of 
altruistic desires that Boniface might have on the basis of which he would rationally 
prefer that murderers named ‘Valiant’ should be spared, and that murderers with other 
226 
 
names should be executed. Rather Boniface will want to identify some highly 
distinctive altruistically relevant feature of Sir Valiant’s case that could, for some 
possible set of altruistic desires, explain why Boniface would judge it permissible to 
spare Valiant from execution. For instance, suppose that Valiant is very courageous: he 
once led a cavalry charge against a force three times as large as his. Boniface could 
publicly judge it permissible to spare murderers of ‘exceeding valour’, specified to be 
Sir Valiant’s level of valour and nothing less. This would allow him to spare Valiant 
(and so satisfy his partial desires) but few other murderers, if any (and so satisfy his 
altruistic desires), while acting in accordance with his moral claims. 
Boniface could use the same strategy to spare all of his favourites from 
punishment. Suppose that Lady Charity and Lord Fidelio are also favourites of 
Boniface, and also took part in the murder Valiant committed. Boniface might avow 
norms according to which Charity’s extraordinary charity and Fidelio’s extraordinary 
loyalty pardon their involvement. He could do this sort of thing quite a bit without 
making the idea that his avowed norm-principles were those he genuinely preferred on 
the basis of his weighted desires too incredible, if those desires did not include a 
simplicity desire. But if it could justifiedly be presumed that he had a weighted 
simplicity desire, the credibility of this idea would be less in proportion to the presumed 
strength of that desire. The quirky exceptions to Boniface’s general norm-principle that 
murder should be punished with death are just the sorts of things we should expect a 
simplicity desire to militate against. So if Boniface is presumed to have a weighted 
simplicity desire, his aim of avowing norm-principles that might plausibly be his 
genuine norm-principles will incline him to either abandon all exceptions to the general 
norm-principle, or include a single broad exception that will require him to spare all 
three murderers. If he chose the latter course, the property that made murder pardonable 
would probably be less distinctive than the properties of extraordinary valour, charity, 
and loyalty that Valiant, Charity, and Fidelio exhibit, for it would have to be ones 
shared by all three murders (or murderers). So Boniface’s norm-principle concerning 
sparing murderers will probably apply to many people, not just his favourites. 
From the point of view of members of the moral trust network, this is, on balance, 
a ‘good thing’. Simplicity forces those who would avow norm-principles designed to 
promote the satisfaction of their partial desires, to more heavily sacrifice the tendency of 
these norm-principles to promote the satisfaction of their altruistic desires, and this 
makes being unscrupulous less attractive. If Boniface wants to claim that it is right to 
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spare Valiant, Charity, and Fidelio from execution, he will probably have to claim that it 
is right to spare a lot of murderers whom he would rather were executed. 
There is admittedly a drawback here: if Boniface’s altruistic desires are not 
eccentric, then this course, if chosen, will probably lead to a greater net frustration of 
most moralists’ altruistic desires, not merely his. And of course it is the purpose of the 
moral trust network to prevent such frustrations. But here are three reasons to think that 
the effect of Simplicity I have been describing is advantageous for moralists despite this 
problem. 
First, Boniface will be inclined, when choosing which property of murderers 
spares them from execution, to pick some property such that sparing murderers with that 
property does not frustrate altruistic desires too much. Both his own altruistic desires 
and his desire that his avowed norms be credibly genuine require this. So the increase in 
altruistic-desire-frustration caused by knavish moralists like Boniface when Simplicity 
obtains shouldn’t be too great. 
Second, there is some plausibility in the idea that the moral trust network will not 
persist unless moralists are able to trust one another to reciprocate their sacrifices. So it 
may be worth diminishing moralists’ incentives to shirk reciprocation, even if this 
means that altruistic-desire-frustration will be worse when they do. A compromised 
moral trust network may be better than none at all. 
Third, when moralists insincerely avow norms as Boniface does, there is at least 
an upside, of a self-regarding sort, for other moralists who are affected by their actions. 
Moralists, and those to whom they are partial, will sometimes enjoy the favourable 
treatment that unscrupulous moralists would, absent Simplicity, only have granted to 
themselves and those to whom they were partial. Suppose that a moralist S among 
Boniface’s subjects, or a friend of S’s, commits murder. It would serve S’s partial 
desires for her or her friend to be spared from execution. If Simplicity obtains, there is a 
chance that she or her friend will enjoy the same indulgence that Boniface extends to his 
favourites, because she or her friend may happen to possess the not-too-unusual 
property that excuses murder according to Boniface’s moral proclamations. Thus 
Simplicity means that benefits that would only have been enjoyed by the unscrupulous 
and their favourites would be spread to many others, whether or not they were 
unscrupulous or had unscrupulous friends. This diffusion of benefits would lower the 
relative cost of being scrupulous. 
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6.6 The Difficulty of Explaining Simplicity Desires 
Thus far I have explained why the terms of the moral trust network would be so 
contrived as to bring it about that moralists prefer conformity to simpler norms—which 
roughly means explaining why such a contrivance would serve moralists’ interests. I 
have also given part of an explanation of how this contrivance would work. First, 
moralists have desires that they and others should conform to simpler comprehensive 
norm-partitions, and the terms of the moral trust network count these desires as 
(effectively) weighted. Second, to ensure that the result of counting these desires as 
weighted is that moralists actually voice preferences for following simpler norms, and 
to ensure that their preferred norms do not fluctuate wildly as their beliefs about future 
circumstances change (the Uneven Compromise problem), the terms of the trust 
network give moralists voices only in one another’s choices concerning which norms to 
follow over a certain interval of time d, and make potentially Invariance-undermining 
facts about future circumstances fundamentally inadmissible for moral reasoners. 
But my explanation for the importance of simplicity in moral theorizing will not 
be complete until I explain why moralists have simplicity desires in the first place. As of 
writing, I have failed to do so. In this section, I make some brief comments on why 
providing such an explanation is difficult, and on some of the costly implications an 
adequate explanation would likely have for fiduciary non-cognitivism 
The simplicity desire cannot be a basic desire that people should follow simpler 
norms. For my theory to be adequate, the desire must be a desire that humans almost 
invariably have, and I take it that basic desires only exist with this sort of reliability if 
they are the product of evolution. It seems that no satisfactory evolutionary explanation 
can apparently be given for the existence of a basic simplicity desire. For such an 
explanation to be plausible, simplicity desires would presumably have to have conferred 
adaptive advantages on their possessors. But while this would plausibly have been true 
at some stages in the history of our species, it would probably not have been true at the 
time required by an explanation for the desires’ existence. 
The adaptive advantages would presumably be these: having strong simplicity 
desires makes one easier to trust qua moralist, and hence less likely to come under 
suspicion of abuse, and hence less likely to suffer the consequences of being thought to 
have violated trust (poor reputation, ostracism, punishment, and so on). But for these 
advantages to explain humans’ possession of simplicity desires, the moral trust network 
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would have to have been ‘up and running’ without the aid of any basic simplicity desire 
for many generations. Yet the terms of the moral trust network are the way they are, and 
so have features that would plausibly confer a fitness advantage on moralists with 
strong simplicity desires, only because they are designed to exploit moralists’ simplicity 
desires, as a means, chiefly, of reducing the epistemic obstacles to trust among 
moralists. So even if humans have evolved to possess basic simplicity desires (a view I 
would rather not be committed to), the existence of the moral trust relationship cannot 
plausibly depend on their possessing basic simplicity desires. Moralists must have, or 
must once have had, simplicity desires that are not basic, and so not explained by any 
special evolutionary story. 
Derived desires, of course, depend for their rationality on beliefs—frequently on 
contingent beliefs. If derived desires based on contingent beliefs are to influence 
moralists’ voiceable preferences, then the facts that these beliefs are about must fall 
under admissible ground-types. So if the simplicity desires I posit are derived desires, as 
it seems they must be, some contingent facts will have to be admissible—there must be 
chinks and perforations in the veil of ignorance. This may or may not be a problem 
depending on the facts in question, for admissible ground-types can often be cunningly 
engineered to block inferences from contingent propositions that might threaten 
Invariance. But it is certainly a complication. 
Any story I tell to explain moralists’ simplicity desires must meet the following 
three desiderata. First, simplicity desires must be desires for following simpler norms; 
they can’t merely be desires for voicing preferences or having voiceable preferences for 
following simpler norms. This is a perhaps obvious, but it is worth stressing. It is very 
easy to think of reasons why a moral entrusted party would want to voice preferences to 
follow simpler norms: he wants to be trusted by other moralists; he doesn’t want 
moralists to think that his avowed norms have been skewed so as to seemingly licence 
extra-discretionary actions; he wants his norms to be well-known so that when he acts 
on them in cases in which doing so serves his partial desires, he will not come under 
suspicion. It is tempting to think that these motivations would result in his having 
preferences for conformity to simpler norms, but they would not—at least not 
straightforwardly. 
Second, the explanation must predict that a moralist will have the same norms qua 
entrusted and entrusting party, if she is rational and scrupulous. Here is a hypothesis that 
I have explored, which seemingly lacks the resources to meet this desideratum. A moral 
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entrusted party wants to avow simpler norms for the reasons given above. But he also 
wants to follow simple norms so that he can in the future avow simple norms without 
appearing to have abused trust by violating them in the past. It is these desires to follow 
simple norms so that he can avow them with an appearance of sincerity that are his 
simplicity desires. This story is odd and contrived, but perhaps it can be got to work. 
However, the described desire seems peculiar to entrusted parties. There is no reason to 
think that our moralist will have a desire qua entrusting party that other moralists should 
follow norms that are as simple as the norms that he desires to follow qua entrusted 
party, given the provenance of the latter desire. 
Finally, an account of moralists’ simplicity desires should predict that the strength 
of these desires will not vary too much over time. For such variation would lead to 
variation in moralists’ norms, and if these are too mutable, moralists’ capacities to 
detect abuses via the comparative method will be undermined. 
Conclusion 
The apparent rule-like character of moral requirements is, I have argued, explained by 
the following facts. Abuses of discretion, concealed by insincere voicings of preferences 
can sometimes be discovered through a comparison of voiced preferences past and 
present. Such comparisons provide better evidence of insincerity, where it exists, if 
variation among people’s voiceable preferences is inhibited somehow. One way in 
which the terms of the moral trust network can inhibit variation in moralists’ voiceable 
preferences is by (i) entitling them to voices only in moralists’ choices of which 
comprehensive norm-partitions to conform to, (ii) counting their desires that moralists 
should follow simpler norms among their weighted desires, assuming that they have 
such desires, and (iii) counting as fundamentally inadmissible any propositions a 
consideration of which might lead to their having voiceable preferences for moralists to 
conform to different comprehensive norm-partitions depending on their contingent 
circumstances. If the terms of the moral trust network have these features, moralists will 
tend to have voiceable preferences for conformity to simple principles that vary little 
from decision to decision. Thus I can explain the apparent rule-like character of moral 
requirements as resulting from the need to detect abuses of trust in a network of 
strangers. Or rather, I can do so if I can explain why moralists have would have 
‘simplicity desires’, something I have so far failed to do. 
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7 
Moral Motivation 
I’ll now take a short break from theory-building to trumpet one of the main advantages 
of my theory. The theory plausibly has weaker commitments in the philosophy of mind 
than most non-cognitivist moral psychologies, because it can explain the changes in 
motivation produced by moral reasoning without relying on the thesis that people’s 
higher-order non-cognitive attitudes (i) can effect changes in their lower-order non-
cognitive attitudes, and (ii) reliably do so in the right circumstances. Most contemporary 
non-cognitivists seem to be wedded to this thesis—to the view that our higher-order 
non-cognitive attitudes, as I shall put it, have heft in determining our lower-order 
attitudes; they are committed to what I will call the Heft thesis. By ‘higher-order non-
cognitive attitudes’ (or ‘higher-order attitudes’ for short) I mean non-cognitive attitudes 
toward having other (‘lower-order’) non-cognitive attitudes—desires to have desires, for 
instance. Contemporary non-cognitivist theories have not typically entailed Heft, but 
they have relied on it for their plausibility. This reliance is on Heft unfortunate, and 
gives us reason to prefer fiduciary non-cognitivism to its non-cognitivist rivals. 
As I have suggested, the main reason for non-cognitivists’ reliance on Heft seems 
to be that it gives them a way to explain the changes in moral motivation that sometimes 
result from substantive moral reasoning. By ‘substantive moral reasoning’ I have in 
mind the sort of moral reasoning that is associated with the term ‘reflective 
equilibrium’, that is not merely deductive, and that—to use familiar but metaethically 
loaded language—chiefly involves devising moral principles and testing them against 
intuitions about cases. 
My main concern in this chapter will be to point out some of the disadvantages of 
a commitment to Heft, so that my theory’s advantage on this point will be more evident. 
I will first discuss some ways in which non-cognitivists have relied on Heft, giving 
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special attention to their accounts of substantive moral reasoning. Then I will examine 
the reasons for this reliance in the case of substantive moral reasoning. Thirdly, I point 
out some of the costs that come with commitment to Heft. Finally, I will spell out how 
fiduciary non-cognitivism eschews this commitment. 
7.1 Examples of Expressivists’ Commitment to Heft 
Let us consider some of the ways in which proposed expressivist theories have made 
use of higher-order attitudes, and why this makes their plausibility dependent on Heft. 
Simon Blackburn’s early work on expressivist semantics relied on the thesis to explain 
consistency and inconsistency among moral statements.174 
Later theorists have also proposed accounts of the non-cognitive attitudes 
involved in moral judgement as higher-order attitudes. Allan Gibbard distinguishes 
moral from non-moral normative judgements by positing that the former are non-
cognitive attitudes of ‘accepting’ norms prescribing feelings of guilt and resentment.175 
Mark Schroeder suggests that expressivists should posit that wrongness judgements are 
attitudes of being for blaming for actions. The complexity of the proposed attitude-type 
is meant to provide a means to accommodate the various ways of negating a wrongness 
judgement report.176 It is not clear whether Schroeder is thinking of blame as an attitude 
or an action.177 If the former interpretation is correct, Schroeder is proposing that moral 
judgements be construed as attitudes toward other attitudes. 
                                                 
174 For instance, when characterizing mental states expressed by disjunctive sentences, 
Blackburn posited a non-cognitive mental state of being tied to a tree between two other mental 
states. This state has the following property: necessarily, someone who is tied to a tree between 
the state expressed by sentence P and that expressed by sentence Q and comes to have the state 
expressed by ~P is ‘committed’ to having the state expressed by Q. The states between which 
one may be tied to a tree include non-cognitive attitudes. (Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism, 
192-3; Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics, 140.) Blackburn is thus committed to the view that 
the state of being tied to a tree is a hefty attitude, assuming that he thinks that people regularly 
succeed in making ‘(P or Q), ~P, therefore Q’-type inferences in cases in which P and Q express 
non-cognitive attitudes. 
175 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 52. 
176 Schroeder, Being For, 58-9. 
177 For the former reading see Neil Sinclair, ‘Moral expressivism and sentential negation’, 
Philosophical Studies 152, no. 3 (2011): 409; for the latter, Schwartz and Hom, ‘Why the 
Negation Problem,’ 839-40. As Schwartz and Hom point out, Schroeder’s claim that his 
proposed moral attitudes are motivating suggests the ‘action’ interpretation. The attitude 
interpretation is supported by Schroeder’s claim (Being For, 58) to be borrowing from 
Gibbard’s account of moral judgement in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, where Gibbard clearly 
has in mind attitudes toward norms prescribing attitudes (guilt, anger, etc.); and also by 
Schroeder’s entertainment of the idea ‘that it is impossible to both blame for murdering and 
blame for not murdering’ (Being For, 73), which would make more sense on an ‘attitude’ 
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These proposals—assuming the ‘attitude’ interpretation of Schroeder—would 
have odd implications if they were not conjoined with Heft. Blackburn would be unable 
to explain how people actually make successful deductive moral inferences. Gibbard 
and Schroeder would be left with a view of moral thought and talk as a practically 
irrelevant activity, on which people reasoned and argued about when to feel guilt and 
anger, or when to blame; and then felt guilt and anger, or blamed, in exactly the way 
they always had regardless of the outcomes of their thinking and arguing. 
Expressivists’ accounts of substantive moral reasoning tend also to depend on 
hefty higher-order attitudes. Expressivists have not given as much attention to 
substantive moral reasoning as they have to deductive reasoning, perhaps because 
expressivism is a semantic (or metasemantic) thesis, and the semantic claims of 
expressivists depend only on their accounts of deductive reasoning. But when they do 
discuss substantive moral reasoning, expressivists tend to propose that it involves 
bringing lower-order moral attitudes into a better fit with higher-order attitudes of some 
sort. These higher-order attitudes are typically said to constitute normative judgements 
of a higher-order sort. On some views the normative judgements are (higher-order) 
moral judgements; on others they are, or are at least analogous to, normative epistemic 
judgements. 
Blackburn holds that some sets of moral attitudes are better than others, and that 
the value of moral attitudes is determined by 
moral criteria, judged from within a moral perspective. That is, when I wonder how I 
might improve, I have to think about it deploying my current attitudes—there is no 
standing aside and apart from my present sensibility. … [W]hatever flaws I suspect are 
judged as flaws in the light of other concerns (Neurath’s boat). … I might certainly 
suspect flaws other than sheer inconsistency: immaturity, lack of imagination, bias, 
coarseness, and so on.178 
Blackburn thinks that the higher-order moral judgements involved in evaluations of our 
moral attitudes are not immediately judgements about those attitudes, but rather are 
fundamentally judgements about ourselves—about how we may be made better or 
worse. A few passages from Ruling Passions suggest that Blackburn endorses Heft,179 
                                                                                                                                               
reading. However we interpret Schroeder, his being for blaming for formulation was only 
proposed to illustrate a general strategy for solving the negation problem, not as a considered 
and specific view of how expressivists ought to characterize moral judgements. 
178 Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 313; cf. 318. 
179 See also Blackburn’s suggestion that we can ‘cleanse ourselves’ of ‘unfair’ non-cognitive 
attitudes (Ruling Passions, 309-310), his answer to his ‘Question 8’ (313-314), and what might 
234 
 
the most evocative of which is his approving180 characterization of a view of normative 
deliberation that he attributes to David Hume and Adam Smith: 
We can start by presenting the rival theories of deliberation in terms of the Platonic model 
of a person as a ship. For Hume or Smith, the ship is worked by a crew, each representing 
a passion or inclination or sentiment, and where the ship goes is determined by the 
resolution of conflicting pressures among the crew. After one voice has prevailed, various 
things may happen to the losers: they may be thrown overboard and lost altogether, or 
more likely they may remain silenced just for the occasion, or they may remain sullen and 
mutinous, or they may continue to have at least some effect on the ship’s course. Some 
crew members may be more stable and durable, long-serving and forceful than others. 
Some, such as those labelled “prudence” and “industry”, may largely have a second-order 
role, to encourage or silence other, first-order crew members, such as “sloth” or 
“gluttony”.181 
This passage describes a number of ways in which desires can affect other desires. 
Among these, the possibility that desires might be ‘thrown overboard’ by other desires 
seems to be the sort of influence posited by Heft. 
In Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Gibbard writes, ‘Some norms govern the 
acceptance of norms. These include norms of coherence and they include norms that go 
beyond sheer coherence.’182 Gibbard calls ‘norms that govern the acceptance of other 
norms higher order norms’, and later, ‘epistemic norms’.183 The normative judgements 
one regards as rationally required (in a broad sense of rationality) under certain 
circumstances will be those which the higher order norms one accepts prescribes in 
those circumstances.184 Gibbard thinks that the theory of reflective equilibrium may be 
thought of as a system of higher order norms.185 He doesn’t think that the only way in 
which we come to form or change our normative judgements is by forming lower-order 
norm-acceptance attitudes that ‘satisfy’, as it were, our higher order norm-acceptance 
attitudes (i.e. that are prescribed by the higher-order norms one accepts).186 But those of 
a moralist’s moral judgements that she regards as rational will be those that are 
prescribed by her higher order norms. 
                                                                                                                                               
perhaps be construed as a suggestion that second-order desires ‘drive’ our ‘selection’ of first-
order desires (255). 
180 Blackburn presents the Humean and Smithian view of deliberation as a foil to the Kantian 
view that he opposes. Ruling Passions, 245ff. 
181 Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 245. 
182 Gibbard seems to be using ‘coherence’ in the sense associated with coherentism. Gibbard, 
Wise Choices, 168. 
183 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 168, 181. 
184 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 169. 
185 Gibbard, Wise Choices, 169. 
186 See his discussion of the conditions under which ‘existential commitments’ arise. Gibbard, 
Wise Choices, 168-9. 
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According to James Lenman, ‘Moral inquiry … is, fundamentally a practical 
activity addressed to practical problems.’ The basic practical problem is ‘that of 
bringing the desires, aspirations and commitments we bring with us to the enterprise 
into desirable forms of coherence’, understood both intrapersonally and 
interpersonally.187 Such attitudes ‘are liable to conflict’ with each other. Intrapersonally, 
[f]irst-order desires … can hardly do otherwise than conflict pervasively. But the project 
of reaching and reflectively endorsing an adequately coherent set of higher-order 
reflective commitments about which of my desires should constitute my will, while never 
complete, is one in which we can and constantly do readily engage. (That’s why the 
authority of higher-order volitions is neither mysterious nor arbitrary.)188 
Lenman seems to be making the following two points, among others: that we should not 
be surprised by the existence of what I am calling hefty higher-order attitudes, because 
we need them to keep our unruly and contrary desires in order; and that getting them in 
order is the central aim of moral inquiry. It isn’t very clear here, or in the surrounding 
discussion, whether the first-order desires he talks of are moral judgements or just 
desires of any old kind, nor whether the higher-order ‘commitments’ are meant to be 
moral judgements or something more analogous to epistemic norms. In another work, 
Lenman writes of accepting ‘relatively high-order moral and rational norms … 
governing the choice and revision of relatively low-order moral or rational norms’,189 
which implies that moral judgements themselves admit of variations in ‘order’. By 
holding that higher-order norms may be norms of morality or rationality, Lenman 
seemingly combines elements of Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s accounts. 
As before, these proposals perhaps do not definitely entail Heft, but would have 
odd implications if Heft were not true. Blackburn, Gibbard, and Lenman would be left 
with views on which a person’s judgements about which moral judgements it was moral 
and/or rational for her to hold under her circumstances would have no effect on which 
moral judgements she actually held. For these theorists, non-deductive moral reasoning, 
setting aside the changes of mind that it sometimes brings about, seemingly consists in 
measuring our moral attitudes (or our moral character, insofar as it is determined by 
those attitudes) against such higher-order judgements. So unless higher-order attitudes 
have heft, moral reasoning will be ineffectual. 
                                                 
187 James Lenman, ‘What is Moral Inquiry?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Vol. 81 (2007): 77. 
188 Lenman, ‘What is Moral Inquiry?’, 78. 
189 James Lenman, ‘Noncognitivism and Wishfulness’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 
(2003): 268. 
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7.2 Impediments to Abandoning a Commitment to Heft 
Blackburn’s early account of inconsistency among moral judgements as involving a 
mismatch between higher- and lower-order non-cognitive attitudes has been generally 
abandoned.190 Jeremy Schwartz and Christopher Hom seem to have shown how 
expressivists can account for the various ways of negating wrongness judgements 
without positing that they are attitudes of being for blaming for, or any similar 
construction involving higher-order attitudes.191 If expressivists had an account of 
substantive moral theorizing that didn’t rely on Heft, they would be well on their way to 
unshackling themselves from Heft entirely. What are the obstacles to providing such an 
account? 
The difficulty can be summarized in the following three points. First, substantive 
moral reasoning is the sort of reasoning whereby we arrive at, and change, our basic 
moral judgements. By ‘basic moral judgements’ I mean moral judgements that are not 
derived. A person S has a derived moral judgement that an action of type F has moral 
status W just in case S holds this judgement because she judges that actions of type G 
are W, and has a contingent belief that F actions are G actions. 
Second, non-cognitivists (and hence expressivists) have good reason to accept the 
thesis that basic moral judgements are basic non-cognitive attitudes. By ‘basic non-
cognitive attitude’, I mean a non-cognitive attitude that is not derived, i.e., that does not 
depend (for its rationality, if it is rational) on its possessor’s beliefs. Call the thesis that 
basic moral judgements are basic non-cognitive attitudes the Basic Judgement-Basic 
Attitude Thesis. I don’t believe I have come across an instance of an expressivist 
explicitly committing herself to this thesis. But I assume that they do, and it makes 
sense that they should, because doing so allows them to explain why people’s basic 
moral judgements tend not to change as a result of changes in their contingent beliefs. 
Note that, given that substantive moral reasoning is reasoning that produces changes in 
our basic moral judgements, the Basic Judgement-Basic Attitude thesis has the 
implication that substantive moral reasoning produces changes in our basic non-
cognitive attitudes. It is reasoning that can create, alter, and kill off fundamental 
motivations. 
                                                 
190 Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics, 122; Being For, 10n.3. 
191 Schwartz and Hom, ‘Why the Negation Problem’. 
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This brings us to our third point: some precisification of Heft, in conjunction with 
the hypothesis that we have higher-order attitudes concerning which non-cognitive 
moral attitudes we should have, seems to be the best explanation available to non-
cognitivists of how substantive moral reasoning could change moralists’ basic non-
cognitive attitudes. (By ‘moralists’ I mean people who make moral judgements.) After 
all, the non-cognitivist is hardly in a position to maintain that our beliefs about, say, the 
‘coherence’ (in the ‘systematicity’ sense rather than the ‘rational consistency’ sense) of 
our basic moral judgements, are by themselves capable of reliably changing those basic 
moral judgements. If non-cognitivists conceded that beliefs had the power to reliably 
change basic non-cognitive attitudes, they would risk granting to their cognitivist rivals 
just what the latter needed to explain why moral judgements motivate. 
7.3 Problems with Heft and the Theory of Moral Reasoning it Supports 
Expressivists’ reasons for committing to Heft, then, are not frivolous. But the 
commitment is costly, and the account of substantive moral reasoning that becomes 
available upon committing to it is not altogether satisfactory. I will point out a strange 
implication of this account before considering some problems of the thesis itself. This 
implication is mainly owing to the Basic Judgement-Basic Attitude Thesis (which my 
theory of moral psychology denies). Observe that it is quite possible for a moral theorist 
to waver between accepting act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, now accepting one 
theory, now the other, in a fairly short space of time (as she reads the arguments for and 
against these theories, perhaps).192 Act and rule utilitarianism are comprehensive 
theories which make vastly diverging prescriptions. If the Basic Judgement-Basic 
Attitude Thesis is true, such a reasoner is undergoing an almost wholesale change in her 
basic moral motivations with each oscillation. This at least seems odd. A person’s basic 
motivational states are plausibly among the things that ‘make her who she is’; so if she 
wavers between basic moral judgements, and the Basic Judgement-Basic Attitude 
Thesis is true, it is almost as though her identity were in flux. But intuitively a change of 
mind between comprehensive theories need not be accompanied by a change in identity. 
Admittedly, a person’s fundamental moral judgements also plausibly reflect ‘who 
she is’—a Kantian who thought it better that the heavens should fall than that a single 
                                                 
192 Blackburn might simply deny this, since he thinks that ‘there is a speed limit on change of 
values.’ Ruling Passions, 67. But it seems plausible that a compelling argument can change a 
person’s moral beliefs fairly quickly. 
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injustice should be done plausibly couldn’t become a utilitarian without becoming a 
different person. But act and rule utilitarianism are theories that appeal to people with 
the same sorts of concerns and preferences (a concern for welfare, a relative lack of 
concern for desert, a preference for simplicity and systematicity). They thus appeal to 
the same sorts of person. Intuitively and phenomenologically, the change of mind 
involved in wavering between these theories is more superficial, more akin to a change 
in descriptive beliefs. These appearances are at odds with the view that a change of 
basic moral judgements always involves a change of basic non-cognitive attitudes.193 
My proposed moral psychology has the resources to explain the difference in our 
intuitions about the psychologies of the moral reasoner who sways between act and rule 
utilitarianism, and the moral reasoner who sways between Kantian deontology and act 
utilitarianism. It posits that the non-cognitive attitudes involved in basic moral 
judgements are preferences derived largely from stable basic altruistic desires, in 
conjunction with descriptive beliefs of a largely a priori nature. Changes in these beliefs 
might lead a reasoner to rationally change her preferences, but her basic desires 
constrain the sorts of preferences she could rationally arrive at. A radical change of 
basic judgements, such as we imagined the Kantian undergoing, would surprise us, 
because it would indicate either irrationality or a change in her (partially identity-
constituting) basic desires. 
What are the problems of Heft itself? Let us start by observing that it is not true in 
general that if I have a higher-order non-cognitive attitude my first-order attitudes will 
change in such a way as to satisfy it (or fulfil it, or realize it, etc.). I desire not to desire 
to eat salty food, and yet the latter desire persists. I may continue to add salt to my 
cooking, or I may not, but if I stop, it is against the urgings of the desire to eat salty 
food, and not because that desire has vanished. Not only is Heft not true in general, but I 
cannot think of any instance from my own experience that would clearly support it. By 
contrast, I can think of instances, even within the last few hours, when my beliefs 
changed in response to my evidence, or my derived desires changed in response to 
changes in my beliefs. So, if phenomenology and introspection provide good evidence 
                                                 
193 A non-cognitivist can apparently avoid the force of this objection by positing that moral 
judgements are intentions or planning states rather than more obviously desire-like attitudes. 
For, people’s intentions do seem to be very mutable, and can seemingly undergo dramatic 
changes without any attendant changes in the identities of their possessors. But the view that 
moral judgements are intentions risks proving too much: given the fickleness of intentions, why 
would we be surprised if the Kantian I described turned utilitarian? 
239 
 
as to the existence or non-existence of desires, the mental occurrences described by Heft 
must be at best exotic and elusive. Changes of mind about matters of basic moral 
principle, though much less common than changes in descriptive belief, do not seem to 
be nearly as rare as instances of higher-order attitudes spawning and killing off lower-
order attitudes. So Heft is lacking in support from experience. 
I admit that there is some intuitive plausibility in the idea that we can wilfully 
repress, stifle, or drive from our thoughts desires that we would rather not have. This 
idea may also enjoy the support of phenomenology and introspection. But the 
plausibility of this idea gives no succour to Heft, which says that higher-order attitudes 
destroy rather than merely quell or silence non-cognitive attitudes. Nor does the idea 
suggest an alternative to Heft that would support expressivist theories as they are 
currently formulated. Existing expressivist theories postulate that moral judgements are 
non-cognitive attitudes, not that they are unrepressed non-cognitive attitudes. This 
postulation could be altered of course. But even if it were, the claim that when we come, 
though substantive moral reasoning, to reject an old basic moral judgement, we are 
merely driving from our thoughts an attitude that we still hold, and that is liable to 
resurface and spring back into action if our resistance slackens, is not very plausible.194 
It is possible that all we are really doing when we repress a desire—assuming we ever 
do—is effortfully focusing our attention away from those facts or stimuli in response to 
which it would move us to act. The idea that we are playing similar tricks on ourselves 
when we reject a basic moral judgement is likewise not very plausible. 
Let us turn to the question of whether a good explanation of Heft can be supplied, 
given that it is true. Partisans of Heft might claim that its truth is explained by the fact 
that having a frustrated higher order attitude is rationally incoherent, and that we have a 
psychological faculty for ridding ourselves of rational incoherence. I cannot see any 
intuitive plausibility in the idea that having a frustrated higher-order attitude is 
rationally incoherent. It is not true in general that having a frustrated non-cognitive 
attitude is rationally incoherent—what makes higher-order attitudes different? And note 
                                                 
194 At least, it is not plausible if the quelled attitude was a highly theoretical moral judgement, 
like a judgement that rule utilitarianism is true. It is more plausible if the attitude was a 
judgement of a strongly intuitive (but perhaps theoretically suspect) sort, like the (pro-moral-
luck) judgement that, among equally risky actions, an action is worse or more blameworthy if it 
happens to cause actual harm. But there is no reason why we should expect quelled attitudes to 
be exclusively non-theoretical judgements; theoretical moral judgements can obviously be 
rejected. 
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the following consequence of the idea, as it applies to desires at least. Any desire I have 
and can satisfy would be better served by the absence from my motivational set of 
competing desires. So, whenever I desire to φ and can φ, I will, if I am rational, have a 
derived second-order desire not to desire not to φ. If I am rationally required not to have 
frustrated second-order desires, then coherence will require me not to desire to not φ. 
Generalizing, coherence will, roughly speaking, require me not to have any opposing 
desires among options that are available to me. This would be surprising. 
A similar observation actually supports the thesis that there is a kind of higher-
order attitude such that one cannot rationally hold that attitude unless it is satisfied, at 
least in a wide range of circumstances. Alejandro Perez Carballo has pointed out that a 
rational agent who prefers to perform an action φ rather than not-φ, and knows that she 
will φ just in case she prefers to, will prefer that she prefers φ to not-φ, rather than that 
she prefers not-φ to φ, because this will mean that she φs.195 Thus, given that an agent 
knows, for a range of choice situations, that she will perform any given action just in 
case she prefers to, rationality requires her not to have frustrated second-order 
preferences, as long as those preferences are preferences among options in those choice 
situations. 
Observe, however, that this does not provide any support for Heft. Heft posits that 
higher-order attitudes can, and reliably do, effect changes in their possessors’ lower-
order attitudes. If Carballo’s argument supported Heft, it would imply that having a 
(second-order) preference to prefer φ would make it the case that one was rationally 
required to have a (first-order) preference to φ (in relevant cases). In fact Carballo’s 
argument implies no such thing, and it is natural to interpret it as implying that having a 
(first-order) preference to φ would make it the case that one was rationally required to 
have a (second-order) preference for preferring φ (in relevant cases). The rationally 
required second-order preference is one that is explained by and derived from the first-
order preference. It has no heft in determining whether the agent has the first-order 
preference she must have if it is to be satisfied. 
Expressivists could claim that Heft is explained by a requirement to satisfy one’s 
higher-order attitudes that is not a mere requirement of coherence, but which qualifies 
as a rational requirement on a more expansive conception of rationality. A prima facie 
                                                 
195 This is only a crude summary of Carballo’s argument. See Carballo, ‘Rationality & Second-
Order Preferences’, esp. 4-6. 
241 
 
problem with this suggestion is that judgements of rationality that go beyond 
judgements of mere coherence seem to be straightforwardly normative; presumably 
expressivists will want to give them an expressivist construal. This being so, the 
capacity of the proposed rational requirement to explain our purported tendency to 
satisfy our higher-order attitudes itself stands in urgent need of explanation. To posit 
that we have a mental (or neurological) faculty for ridding ourselves of irrationality of 
this more expansive sort, and hence that we can discover the workings of this faculty 
through normative theorizing (construed in non-cognitivist fashion), would certainly be 
audacious. 
Expressivists could maintain that Heft is not explained by any kind of rational 
requirement. Rather, they could just posit that we have a psychological or neurological 
faculty of some sort that, most of the time, brings it about that our higher-order attitudes 
are satisfied. A problem with this hypothesis is that moral reasoning seems to be a 
rationally evaluable activity. If I judge that the case for utilitarianism is stronger than 
the case against utilitarianism, I seem to be rationally required to form a utilitarian 
moral judgement—some variation on the judgement that an action is wrong just in case 
it fails to maximize happiness. Failing to do so would seem to be irrational in something 
like the way in which failing to proportion my descriptive beliefs to my evidence is 
irrational. But if the expressivist maintains that we have no rational requirement to 
satisfy those of our higher-order non-cognitive attitudes that normally explain the 
changes in our basic moral judgements that result from substantive moral reasoning, she 
cannot explain this appearance. 
Expressivists avoid this problem if they extend their expressivist analyses of 
normative judgements to judgements of rational coherence, as well as judgements of 
rationality in its more expansive and obviously normative senses. Such expressivists, 
qua metaethicists, do not need to explain why it is incoherent to judge that the case for 
utilitarianism is stronger than the case against utilitarianism and yet reject utilitarianism, 
for they will take this to be a first-order normative question rather than a metaethical 
one. But there are metaethical questions in the vicinity to which we can demand that an 
expressivist of this stripe should provide answers. Why does the described mental state 
have roughly the same non-normative quality of dissonance and unresolvedness that we 
find in the mental state of a person who judges that the case against Francis Bacon’s 
authorship of Hamlet outweighs the case for it, yet remains a staunch adherent of the 
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Baconian theory? Why are people so apt to judge that the former mental state is 
irrational, in a suitably narrow sense? 
The Heft-committed expressivist who takes coherence to be a first-order 
normative matter will, when trying to answer these questions, face difficulties similar to 
those facing expressivists who seek to actually establish the incoherence of having 
unsatisfied higher-order attitudes. For instance, if I desire to eat salty food despite 
desiring to desire not to, why does my mental state not seem dissonant in the same way 
that the Baconian theorist’s does? 
7.4 Fiduciary Non-cognitivism’s Divorce from Heft 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism dispenses with the need for Heft because, as I explained in 
the last chapter, it views substantive moral reasoning as a tightly constrained kind of 
instrumental reasoning. If a moralist’s motivations change as a result of substantive 
moral reasoning about matters of basic principle, this will usually be because (i) her 
voiceable preferences will have changed, typically as a result of changes in her 
instrumental reasoning or in her a priori beliefs about the implications of following 
relevant norms; and (ii) her discretional desires will urge her to act differently than 
before, because they will move her to act on her new voiceable preferences. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism avoids a commitment to Heft because it rejects the 
Basic Judgement-Basic Attitudes thesis. I observed in Section 7.2 that non-cognitivists 
had the following reason to accept this thesis: it allows them to explain why people’s 
basic moral judgements tend not to change as a result of changes in their contingent 
beliefs. But fiduciary non-cognitivism explains this too while rejecting the thesis, by 
positing that all propositions a consideration of which might lead to such variations in 
basic judgement are fundamentally inadmissible. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivists can realistically aspire to free themselves from most 
commitments concerning rational choice, rational motivation, and the rationality of 
desires, beyond those posited by decision theory and austere versions of the Humean 
Theory of Motivation.196 This is in large part because they can realistically aspire to 
explain substantive moral reasoning as a species of instrumental reasoning. 
                                                 
196 They are, however, committed to the existence of indeterminate utilities (see 6.4.1 and 8.2), 
and the hypothesis that infinitesimal (or at least ‘near-infinitesimal’) credences exist and have 
significance in rational decision-making (3.3.3). 
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8 
Moral Uncertainty 
The phenomenon of uncertainty about matters of basic moral principle raises a 
metaethical puzzle. I shall argue here that fiduciary non-cognitivism has a more 
satisfactory solution to this puzzle than certain cognitivist views, specifically those that 
hold that we typically do not need an ulterior motive to act on our basic moral 
judgements. I describe the puzzle I have in mind in Section 8.1. Section 8.2 presents 
fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of moral uncertainty. Section 8.3 explains how 
fiduciary non-cognitivism solves the puzzle.  
8.1 A Puzzle About Acting Under Moral Uncertainty 
The conjunction of the following two appearances is difficult to explain. First, rational 
people often seem to act on basic moral principles which they hold with imperfect 
certainty. (I should stress here, more emphatically than usual, that I have in mind 
rationality in the sense of having attitudes that are broadly coherent, or attitudes that are 
performing their functional roles properly, and not some more richly normative sense.) 
It is not uncommon for rational people to act on their moral judgements. But uncertainty 
about basic moral principles, in some degree, is surely ubiquitous among rational 
people; few if any could avow basic moral principles with the same confidence with 
which they asserted propositions about very simple arithmetic, for instance. So it is 
plausible that rational people not uncommonly act on imperfectly certain judgements of 
basic moral principle. Second, judgements of basic moral principle seem to be the 
upshot of reasoning about final ends, not instrumental reasoning. They seem to be or to 
define some subset of our ultimate concerns; and typically rational people don’t seem to 
need any ulterior motive to act on them. 
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It is hard to account for these appearances because it is hard to explain why it can 
be rational to act on judgements of basic moral principle if those judgements are not 
completely certain, and the actions do not serve some ulterior motive of the agent. It 
seems that we can sensibly ask the performer of such an action (call it φ) why she 
performed it given that she was, say, only ninety-nine per cent certain that the principle 
she acted on was true, and yet it is not clear what she can say in response. It is natural to 
suppose that she might say something like, ‘I wanted to do the right thing, and φ-ing 
seemed most likely to be right.’ But this would be at odds with the stipulation that she 
did not perform the action out of ulterior motives—it would suggest that she was acting 
to serve a further end of doing the right thing de dicto.197 What else could she say 
though? Perhaps she does not need to say anything. Perhaps the question is confused, 
like asking someone why she chose an option given that she preferred it. It doesn’t 
sound like a confused question though. After all, it wouldn’t make much sense for her to 
act on a moral judgement that she thought was false, and she isn’t completely sure that 
her judgement isn’t false, and yet she is acting on it anyway, without an ulterior 
motive—this seems to require explanation. And suppose that the agent answered the 
question thus: ‘I didn’t need a reason for acting on my highly confident though not-
quite-certain moral judgement. I just did it.’ This statement would hardly assure us of 
the agent’s rationality if it had not been established by stipulation. 
Of the two of appearances that I cited above, the most doubtful is the appearance 
that judgements of basic moral principle are the upshot of reasoning about final ends, 
and that we typically act on them as such, i.e., for non-instrumental reasons. This is 
unobvious to many philosophers. But the explanation for the rationality of acting on 
uncertain judgements of basic principle that suggests itself if we reject this appearance 
faces a challenge of its own concerning action under moral uncertainty. The explanation 
I have in mind is as follows: we have a standing desire to do the right thing, whatever 
that may turn out to be. This motivates us, as we would expect, to choose actions that 
we judge to be permissible and eschew actions that we judge to be impermissible, and 
motivates us more strongly the more confident our judgements of permissibility and 
impermissibility are. Call this the Instrumental Explanation. A consideration of certain 
                                                 
197 A desire to do the right thing in the de dicto sense is a general desire to do the right thing, 
whatever that may turn ought to be. By contrast, a desire to do the right thing in the de re sense 
is an underived desire, for each thing that is in fact non-derivatively right, to do that thing. Cf. 
James Dreier, ‘Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 61, no. 3 (2000): 621-2. 
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kinds of cases suggests that this explanation either predicts that moralists will behave in 
ways that are intuitively surprising, or it posits that they are far less concerned to do the 
right thing than we would intuitively expect. 
Suppose that a woman is considering having an abortion.198 She wants to have an 
abortion, for intuitively non-frivolous reasons. She is highly confident that abortion is 
permissible, confident enough to avow that this is so, but has a small degree of 
confidence—say, one per cent—that abortion is impermissible, and indeed morally 
indistinguishable from killing an innocent adult. She is virtually certain that not having 
an abortion is permissible. It seems that if the instrumentalist explanation is true, we 
should expect her not to have the abortion. After all, from her point of view the moral 
desirability of having an abortion ought to be similar to that of demolishing a building 
(for similarly non-frivolous reasons) when one has a one per cent credence that a human 
being is inside.199 But I take it that this is not how we expect her to behave given the 
state of her moral judgements. 
If someone judges that abortion is permissible, we expect her to have an abortion 
if she wants one, even if she is not completely certain that abortion is not gravely 
wrong. A woman who wants to have an abortion, who agonizes about whether or not 
abortion is wrong, and finally decides that it is not, will typically take this to settle the 
matter of whether she will have an abortion. She will not continue to forbear from doing 
so, ‘just to be on the safe side’, because she thinks that there is a hundredth chance that 
she is mistaken. A defender of the Instrumental Explanation could maintain that her 
theory does not predict that the woman will forbear from having an abortion by 
hypothesizing that people’s de dicto desires to do the right thing are not normally strong 
enough to induce them to avoid actions because they have such small probabilities of 
being immoral. But if this is so, why are we not surprised by the strength of a person’s 
moral motivations if she refrains from demolishing a building because she has a 0.01 
credence that someone is inside it, and she judges that it is wrong to kill? 
I think that this problem is surmountable. A defender of the Instrumental 
Explanation can avoid making false predictions in the abortion case by giving an 
                                                 
198 I adapt this example, and the point about ‘demandingness’ that it illustrates, from Christian 
Barry and Patrick Tomlin, ‘Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 2 (2016): 900, 907. Barry and Tomlin use the example 
to support a normative rather than a metaethical argument. 
199 This example is adapted from Alexander A. Guerrero, ‘Don’t Know, Don’t Kill’, 
Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 68. 
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account of permission judgements and moral motivation that is similar in important 
respects to the fiduciary non-cognitivist account. I shall discuss this further when I have 
explained how fiduciary non-cognitivism approaches the case in Section 8.3. 
Cognitivists who reject the Instrumental Explanation will probably want to posit 
requirements of rationality that explain why rational agents sometimes act on 
imperfectly certain judgements of moral principle without ulterior motives. These 
requirements must, of course, be the sorts of rational requirements whose violation 
would indicate a failure of coherence, or a failure of the agent’s attitudes to perform 
their functional roles. This is, after all, the sort of rationality that I was talking about 
when I described our explanandum, and these are the sorts of rational requirements that 
can most plausibly figure in an explanation of thought and behaviour. Requirements of 
rational coherence, or of the functional role of attitudes, are ones that we expect (in the 
descriptive sense) all agents to be influenced by to some degree. By contrast, principles 
of rationality of a more ‘expansive’ and straightforwardly normative sort are ones that 
we will only expect agents to be guided by if they happen to accept those principles, and 
we will not normally be justified in assuming that rational agents accept them. 
A few philosophers have proposed principles of rationality governing actions 
under uncertainty about basic moral principles, and normative principles more 
broadly.200 But these principles of rationality tend to be quite normative and revisionary, 
and are thus ill-suited to an explanation of the tendency of ordinary rational agents to 
act on imperfectly certain judgements of basic moral principle. It seems unlikely that 
they are proposed as requirements of rationality in the ‘coherence’ or ‘functional role’ 
senses. They tend to prescribe maximizing expected conformity to the true basic 
normative requirements (think of ‘conformity’ here as a graded notion: violating 
weighty principles is a greater failure of conformity than violating less weighty 
principles), or some variation on this idea.201 Such ‘maximizing’ proposals tend to 
require the woman in the abortion case to forbear from having an abortion just as the 
                                                 
200 Ted Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Andrew Sepielli, ‘What To Do When You Don’t Know What To Do’, in Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics, Volume 4, ed. Russ-Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 5-28; Ralph Wedgwood, ‘Akrasia and Uncertainty’, Organon F 20, no. 4 (2013): 484-
506. 
201 Proposals include ‘maximizing expected objective value’ (Sepielli, ‘What to Do’, 11-12), 
‘maximizing expected choiceworthiness’ (Wedgwood, ‘Akrasia and Uncertainty’, esp. 493-
497), and ‘maximizing expected degree of moral rightness’ (Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty, e.g. 
his ‘PR4’, 82). 
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Instrumental Explanation does, at least assuming that moral principles have the 
authority in decision-making that they seem to have. That moralists should maximize 
expected conformity to the true moral requirements may or may not be a good 
normative principle, but it is too revisionary to figure in an explanation of ordinary 
moral thought and talk. It is unlikely that the folk tacitly accept it, and that this 
acceptance explains why they act on uncertain judgements of basic moral principle and 
expect others to do the same. 
Suppose that a hypothesized principle of rationality was devised in such a way as 
to ensure that it prescribed acting on uncertain judgements of basic moral principle in all 
and only those circumstances in which the folk expect people to act on such 
judgements. And suppose that the explicitly hypothesized principle was a principle of 
rationality of a sort that is relevant to my argument (e.g. a principle of coherence). This 
sort of explanation would still be inadequate unless a plausible argument could be 
supplied as to why it was a requirement of coherence or of the proper functioning of 
attitudes. 
Michael Smith is the only philosopher I am aware of who rejects the Instrumental 
Explanation and who has explicitly posited a requirement of coherence that is relevant 
to an explanation of commonsense expectations about how people will act under 
uncertainty about basic moral principles. The requirement does not directly concern 
which actions one should perform or intend under such uncertainty. Rather it concerns 
which basic desires it is rational to have under such uncertainty. Uncertain evaluative 
judgements cause rational people to desire to act on them, though the desires will be 
weaker the more uncertain the judgements are.202 This explains why rational people act 
on uncertain judgements of basic principle. 
According to Smith desirability judgements are judgements about what we would 
advise ourselves to do if our desires were better informed, more coherent, and more 
unified. Coherence requires you to desire to act on your desirability judgements because 
to do otherwise is to have desires ‘that you yourself disown’.203 And the strength of the 
desires coherence requires you to have is proportionate to the confidence of your 
judgements; Smith thinks that a comparison of cases in which the strengths of your 
desires are and are not proportionate in this way could be described which would 
                                                 
202 Michael Smith, ‘Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation’, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 5 (2000): 313, 315. 
203 Smith, ‘Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation’, 311-12 (quote is on 312). 
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intuitively establish this.204 I lack the intuitions about coherence that Smith appeals to 
here, but I’m sure some readers of Smith will respond differently. Some sort of 
argument against Smith is thus in order. I’ll argue that Smith’s theory fails to explain 
our expectation that the woman in the abortion case would have an abortion upon 
deciding that this was permissible. 
Smith thinks, roughly, that a coherent moralist’s motivation to act on a 
hypothesized moral requirement will vary directly with her understanding of the 
importance of that hypothesized requirement, if her confidence in it is positive and real-
valued.205 And he claims that his theory predicts this.206 So it seems at least possible that 
his theory predicts that the woman in the abortion case who judges that she may have 
the abortion would, assuming she is coherent, be strongly motivated to avoid doing so 
even though her confidence that abortion is wrong is very low. After all, she judges that 
the hypothetical requirement to forbear from abortion, if it exists, is very important. (I 
assume that her high confidence that abortion is morally optional would not make it 
rational for her to conceive a basic desire of any strength to have an abortion.) 
Perhaps Smith’s theory doesn’t predict this. When reading Smith, I have let 
myself be guided by the idea that rational requirements governing basic desire in cases 
of moral uncertainty are supposed to be analogous to rational requirements governing 
derived desire in cases of descriptive uncertainty. That is, we are to ‘proportion’ our 
basic desires to our ‘expected importance’ assessments in much the same way in which 
we are to proportion our derived desires to our expected utility assessments in 
instrumental reasoning. But perhaps this analogy is misleading; perhaps the relationship 
between rational motivation and ‘expected importance’ assessments is not as 
straightforward as the analogy would suggest. I suppose that the way to settle the matter 
is to consult once again our intuitions about coherence. Here I am at a disadvantage, for, 
as I have said, I lack Smith-friendly intuitions—I don’t see anything incoherent about 
lacking a basic (de re) desire to do the thing that you would advise yourself to do if your 
desires were more ‘coherent’ and ‘unified’, even absent uncertainty about the 
hypothetical advice. So it is hard for me to know which direction Smith-friendly 
                                                 
204 Smith, ‘Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation’, 315. 
205 See Smith, ‘Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation’, 309. I am taking some liberties in this 
interpretation, for Smith only talks about value judgements, not judgements of requirement and 
permissibility. 
206 Smith, ‘Evaluation, Uncertainty, and Motivation’, 314. The qualifications from my previous 
footnote apply here also. 
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intuitions point in the abortion case. But insofar as Smith-friendly intuitions are 
explained by the principle that it is incoherent to have desires ‘that you yourself 
disown’, they should not yield any clear verdict in the abortion case. It is simply not 
clear what desires the woman in the abortion case ‘disowns’. So I tentatively conclude 
that Smith’s theory makes no determinate prescription about  what the woman ought to 
do, and so fails to explain our expectation that she will go through with the abortion. 
8.2 Moral Uncertainty for Fiduciary Non-cognitivists 
8.2.1 A Refinement of My Account of Entrusted Parties’ Obligations and 
Entitlements 
In Subsection 8.2.2 I will set out fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of uncertainty 
about basic moral principles and its consequences. But first I need to revise my position 
on what, as a general matter, entrusted parties must do to discharge their obligations to 
accommodate their partners’ weighted desires, and what they must do to avoid 
exceeding their discretion when they choose not to accommodate their partners’ 
weighted desires. (The revision is not very relevant to 8.2.2, but significantly affects my 
claims in Section 8.3.) The revision is motivated chiefly by intuitions about the 
propriety of acting on voiced or voiceable preferences that are irrational or based on 
false beliefs. Briefly, if an entrusted party acted on his voiceable preference in defiance 
of his partner’s, it does not seem that he would strain her trust if did so knowing that her 
preference depended on false beliefs or poor reasoning. And it does seem that an 
entrusted party might seriously strain his partner’s trust if he resisted her preference to 
act on a very poorly reasoned voiceable preference of his own. The revision aims to 
accommodate these appearances. It hypothesizes a potential disparity between the 
things an entrusted party must do to discharge his ‘entrusted concern’ to accommodate 
his partner’s weighted desires, and the things his partner voiceably prefers that he 
should do. And it hypothesizes a potential disparity between the things an entrusted 
party must do to avoid exceeding his discretion, and the things he voiceably prefers to 
do. 
I call the conjunction of the hypotheses that I make here the ‘Disparity 
Hypothesis’, in contrast to the simple ‘Parity Hypothesis’ whose truth I have assumed 
so far. The Parity Hypothesis is the view that entrusted parties have discretion to act on 
their voiceable preferences, and are obliged to accommodate their partners’ voiceable 
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preferences, whether or not those preferences are rational and well-informed (though 
acting on irrational discretion-licencing preferences or sincerely voicing irrational 
preferences will presumably involve some sort of conventional impropriety and often 
harm one’s reputation). 
The Disparity Hypothesis is my more considered view of the nature of entrusted 
parties’ obligations and entitlements. I think that the Parity Hypothesis, though 
incorrect, is accurate enough for many purposes, which is one of the reasons I have 
delayed introducing the Disparity Hypothesis until now. Considering its subject matter, 
the material of this subsection belongs in Part I—perhaps even in Chapter 1. But I was 
reluctant to include it earlier because it would not have had a great bearing on any of my 
arguments in Part I, and because doing so would have tested the patience of readers who 
were concerned to see some metaethical payoff from my theories about trust 
relationships and trust networks. Taking account of the Disparity Hypothesis 
consistently throughout this thesis would have required correcting some of my 
arguments and hypotheses in Chapter 3. But I think that, given Chapter 3’s complexity, 
it was acceptable to assume the truth of the simpler Parity Hypothesis in that chapter, 
and that this was in keeping with the other simplifying assumptions I made there 
(specifically in 3.3.3). 
The Disparity Hypothesis will employ a few variations on the idea of ‘expected 
weighted utility for a person’. The expected weighted utility of φ for S by T’s lights is—
in a sense I will need to clarify—T’s assessment of the summed probability-weighted 
utilities of the outcomes of φ, where utilities are understood in terms of the satisfaction 
of S’s weighted desires, and probabilities of outcomes are determined by lines of 
epistemic support that take into account only propositions that are admissible for S (or 
as I shall say, these probabilities are ‘constrained by S’s admissible ground-types’). The 
expected weighted utility of φ for S by T’s lights is a value describing or representing 
an actual mental state—a rationally evaluable mental state belonging to T. And it will 
be a different kind of mental state depending on whether or not S and T are the same 
person. 
If S and T are different people, the expected weighted utility of φ for S by T’s 
lights will represent a cognitive state. It will be something like T’s belief about how 
‘voiceably preferable’ φ ought to be for S, given S’s basic desires, and in light of the 
actual facts (not S’s beliefs). More precisely, its value will be the X such that T believes 
that the summed probability-weighted utilities of the outcomes of φ, where utilities are 
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understood in terms of the satisfaction of S’s weighted desires, and probabilities are 
constrained by S’s admissible ground-types, is most likely to be X. This belief will 
typically be based on T’s beliefs about the content and strength of S’s weighted desires, 
as well as his credences concerning the various possible states of the world conditional 
on φ, ignoring any facts that fall under ground-types that are inadmissible for S. (It 
might not though—S might have arrived at it by some more direct means, e.g., through 
testimony, without the aid of any psychological theorizing on his part.)  
By contrast, the expected weighted utility of φ for T by T’s lights will represent a 
non-cognitive state broadly reflecting T’s admissible credences in the possible outcomes 
of φ and the weighted utilities for T of those outcomes. Loosely, it represents the degree 
to which T voiceably prefers φ. This mental state is rationally evaluable, given T’s other 
attitudes, by its conformity to the prescriptions of decision theory—or rather, to a 
circumscribed kind of decision theory in which the probabilities involved are T’s 
admissible credences and the utilities are understood in terms of the satisfaction of T’s 
weighted desires rather than all-things-considered desire satisfaction. The option with 
the highest expected weighted utility for T by T’s lights is necessarily the option for 
which T has a voiceable preference. I shall take this to be analytic.207 When, in previous 
chapters, I talked about a person’s ‘expected weighted utilities’, I always meant by this 
the expected weighted utilities for her by her lights. 
To reiterate, the expected weighted utility of φ for T by T’s lights is not a belief. It 
is, for all I shall say, possible for there to be an expected weighted utility of φ for T by 
T’s lights, with some value X, even if (i) T has no beliefs about the summed probability-
weighted utilities of φ’s outcomes, where utilities are understood in terms of the 
satisfaction of T’s weighted desires, and probabilities are constrained by T’s admissible 
desire-types; or (ii) T rationally believes that the sum of these probability-weighted 
utilities has some value other than X. 
The final idea I need to introduce is that of the expected weighted utility of φ for a 
person S relative to a body of evidence E. This is the value X such that, according to E, 
the summed probability-weighted utilities of the outcomes of φ, where utility is 
understood in terms of S’s weighted desire satisfaction, and probabilities are constrained 
                                                 
207 I am admittedly unsure whether it is better to treat this as analytic or as a requirement of 
coherence. Potentially at stake here is the success of our explanation for the possibility of 
having irrational (e.g. cyclical) combinations of voiceable preferences, and hence, perhaps, the 
possibility of holding inconsistent judgements of basic moral principle. 
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by S’s admissible ground-types, is most likely to be X. It is equivalent to the expected 
weighted utility of φ for S by the lights of a hypothetical person (not S) who is perfectly 
rational and logically omniscient, and whose evidence is E. ‘Evidence’ must be 
understood in an expansive way here, one which includes all the considerations and 
appearances that may epistemically support or undermine a belief, including such things 
as intuition and introspective appearances. 
The Disparity Hypothesis makes two main claims. First, in general, an entrusted 
party B is obliged, not to accommodate his partner A’s preferences, but rather to 
perform the action with the highest expected weighted utility for A, relative to B’s 
evidence. ‘B’s evidence’ here includes B’s evidence about the content and strength of 
A’s weighted desires, as well as his evidence about the probabilities of outcomes of 
available options. Note that the highest expected weighted utility for A, relative to B’s 
evidence is not the same as the highest expected weighted utility for A by B’s lights. The 
latter represents an actual mental state of B, the former does not. We might say that the 
former represents a mental state that B would have, holding his evidence fixed, if he 
were perfectly rational and logically omniscient. 
The preferences that A voices when she scrupulously makes demands of B will 
nonetheless, if they are rational, be based on A’s evidence, not on what A takes B’s 
evidence to be. A’s sincerely voiced preferences will be for the options that have the 
highest expected weighted utility for A by A’s lights, i.e., for her voiceably preferred 
options. It makes sense for A to voice such a preference, even though her preferred 
option may not be the option B is obliged to choose, because part of the purpose of A’s 
voicing the preferences she voices will normally be to give B evidence about what it 
would take to best satisfy her weighted desires. This will be evidence about the content 
and strength of her weighted desires, as well as about the probable outcomes of 
options.208 
Second, it is B’s weighted desires and evidence that determine whether he has 
discretion to resist A’s demands—or, more accurately, to resist performing the action 
                                                 
208 I think that the terms of entrusted concern relationships must ordinarily include norms of 
some sort requiring the parties to cooperate in the epistemic project of determining what would 
best satisfy the entrusting party’s weighted desires (and perhaps also the entrusted party’s). 
Parties engage in verbal exchanges involving the voicing of opposing preferences, demanding 
and giving grounds for preferences, partly as part of this shared project. These norms do not 
derive from any trust-based obligations I have posited so far; rather, they are explained by the 
fact that it serves both parties’ interests for the entrusted party to have accurate relevant means-
end beliefs. 
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that has the highest expected weighted utility for A relative to B’s evidence. B has 
discretion to φ in defiance of A’s demands only if φ has the highest weighted utility for 
B, relative to B’s evidence. This means that B only has discretion to act on his voiceable 
preferences when they the preferences he would have if he were rational: if his relevant 
preferences were coherently proportioned to his weighted desires and credences, and his 
relevant credences were coherently proportioned to his evidence. When B voices a 
preference to φ in defiance of A’s demands, part of his purpose will typically be to 
communicate that φ-ing has the highest expected weighted utility for him relative to his 
evidence, and hence that he has discretion to φ. 
Why am I positing that rational expected weighted utilities relative to entrusted 
parties’ evidence, and not voiceable preferences, are fundamental to the determination 
of what entrusted parties are obliged and have discretion to do? As I have 
foreshadowed, some such postulation seems necessary to explain certain commonsense 
expectations about what would strain an entrusting party’s trust. 
Imagine the following series of events involving the dramatis personae of 
Football (Mother and Son): John’s mother sincerely voices a preference and explains 
why she has it; John later realizes that her preference depended on an error in her 
instrumental reasoning or an inaccuracy in her beliefs about the probabilities of 
outcomes; John does not accommodate the preference; John’s mother complains about 
his failure to accommodate the preference; John points out the error or inaccuracy; she 
acknowledges the error or inaccuracy. It seems to me that we would now expect John’s 
mother to withdraw her complaint entirely.209 But if John were obliged to accommodate 
his mother’s preferences, and not instead to do what, given his evidence, it would take 
to satisfy the weighted desires on which they are based, it would be harder to explain 
this. His failure to accommodate her ill-founded preference would have been a strain on 
her trust, and she might still have ‘held it against him’, so to speak. My first postulation 
avoids this odd implication. 
Now imagine a different series of events. (Assume that John and his mother both 
have the same evidence relevant to John’s decision and that this evidence does not 
change throughout the story.) John acts on a preference of his own in defiance of his 
mother’s; his mother demands to know why he did not act on her preference; John 
                                                 
209 Which is not to say that she will not have some other complaint about his action, as she 
might if he didn’t do what by his lights would have had the highest expected weighted utility for 
her.  
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explains his preference to her; John’s mother points out an error in the reasoning behind 
the preference, revealing that, given his evidence, he should not have expected his 
action to serve his weighted desires as well as her preferred action would have. 
Intuitively, John’s choice to defy his mother’s preference so that he could act on a 
preference that was poorly thought through is the sort of thing that might strain his 
mother’s trust, especially if the error were the result of laziness in deliberation. 
Properly accounting for these appearances would require some rather detailed 
theorizing. It might require, for instance, postulating that entrusted parties 
conventionally have ‘excuses’, of varying strength, for exceeding their discretion in 
some circumstances—for instance, if they acted on voiceable preferences that were 
irrational, but were the result of reasoning of that met certain standards. The strain an 
entrusted party placed on his partner’s trust by exceeding his discretion would vary 
inversely with the strength of his excuses.210 Such detailed theorizing is beyond the 
scope of this work. But the most rudimentary lesson of the example is one that my 
theory of entrusted concern relationships must account for: viz., if an entrusted party 
acts on his voiceable preference, and that preference is the result of poor reasoning, he 
can strain and perhaps violate trust. My second postulation—that it is the expected 
weighted utilities that it would be rational for an entrusted party to have given his 
evidence that determine what he has discretion to do, and not his voiceable 
preferences—allows me to accommodate this appearance. 
I don’t think that this argument clearly shows that my second postulation is 
superior to the following rival hypothesis: an entrusted party B exceeds his discretion 
and strains his partner B’s trust if he acts on a voiceable preference in defiance of his 
obligation to accommodate A’s weighted desires, and that preference is not the 
voiceable preference B would have had if he were perfectly rational and well-informed. 
My postulation implies, by contrast, that an entrusted party does not strain trust if he 
acts on a preference that was rational given his evidence, even if doing so satisfied his 
weighted desires poorly relative to alternatives. The rival hypothesis seems simpler than 
my proposal: we can sum it up by saying that entrusted parties have discretion to do 
only what would best satisfy their weighted desires, without invoking the complicated 
idea of ‘expected weighted utilities for X relative to Y’s evidence’. 
                                                 
210 I have independent reason to posit the existence of excuses for failing to accommodate 
entrusting parties’ demands. I must do so if I am to plausibly explain, in some contexts, why 
trust relationships permitting third-party disagreement exist. See Appendices B and C. 
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However, I think it would be surprising if this rival hypothesis were correct. 
Entrusted concern relationships that worked in accordance with this rival proposal 
would generally serve parties’ interests less well than they might have. I presume that, if 
an entrusted party has discretion to do only what would best satisfy his weighted 
desires, his discretional desires will urge him to either yield to his partner’s wishes, or 
choose the option with the greatest probability of maximally satisfying his weighted 
desires. But an entrusted party’s weighted desires would tend to be less well satisfied if, 
instead of aiming to do what had the highest expected weighted utility for him relative 
to his evidence, his practical reasoning were aimed at choosing the option with the 
greatest probability of maximally satisfying his weighted desires. 
This is suggested by the consideration of a sort of example that will be familiar to 
moral philosophers. Frank Jackson famously describes the following case:  
Jill is a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient, John, who 
has a minor but not trivial skin complaint. She has three drugs to choose from: drug A, 
drug B, and drug C. Careful consideration of the literature has led her to the following 
opinions. Drug A is very likely to relieve the condition but will not completely cure it. 
One of drugs B and C will completely cure the skin condition; the other though will kill 
the patient, and there is no way that she can tell which of the two is the perfect cure and 
which the killer drug.211 
Assume, as seems obvious, that the complete cure would be somewhat better than the 
incomplete cure, and that killing the patient would be disastrous. Jill will tend to do 
more good over time if, in choices like these, she chooses the option with the greatest 
expected value (in this case, drug A) than if she chooses the option with the greatest 
probability of realizing the best outcome (tied here between drug B or C). A policy of 
choosing the options with the greatest probability of realizing the best outcomes is 
insensitive to the risks that may come with those options. 
An entrusted party will sometimes face choices analogous to Jill’s, in which the 
option that has the best chance of maximally satisfying his weighted desires is risky, 
and he would tend to better satisfy his weighted desires over time if his decision-making 
were sensitive to these risks. Thus, if it is to the advantage of parties to an entrusted 
concern relationship for the entrusted party to be allowed to better satisfy his weighted 
desires over time, all else being equal, then it would be surprising if entrusted parties 
                                                 
211 Frank Jackson, ‘Decision-Theoretic Utilitarianism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection’, 
Ethics 101, no. 3 (1991): 462-3. A similar example is the ‘mineshafts’ case (Derek Parfit, On 
What Matters Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 159; the example comes 
originally from Donald Regan). 
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had and only had discretion to choose the options that best satisfied their weighted 
desires, instead of having and only having discretion to choose the options with the 
highest expected weighted utility for them, either by their lights, or relative to their 
evidence. 
I think it is typically to the advantage of parties to entrusted concern relationships 
for the entrusted party to be allowed to better satisfy his weighted desires over time, all 
else being equal. An entrusted party’s discretion to act on his weighted desires is 
typically meant to make his commitment to accommodate his partner’s weighted desires 
less burdensome, in a way that is not too irksome to his partner. Given that an entrusted 
party is sometimes going to be defying his partner’s preferences, his partner will 
generally prefer that he should well satisfy his weighted desires when he does so, 
because these will be desires that she is comparatively willing that he should indulge. 
And the entrusted party will, on the whole, ‘want’ his weighted desires to be well-
satisfied, because they are his desires. Thus we should expect that, at least in normal 
entrusted concern relationships, an entrusted party enjoys discretion to choose the 
option with the highest expected weighted utility for him, either by his lights, or relative 
to his evidence. Our intuition that entrusted parties can strain trust by acting on ill-
considered voiceable preferences indicates the latter possibility. 
This concludes my description and defence of the Disparity Hypothesis. It is not 
clear whether I should hold that the Disparity Hypothesis is necessarily true of all 
entrusted concern relationships, or whether I should hold that it is merely true of almost 
all actual ones. But for the sake of specificity, I’ll adopt the former position. 
The hypothesis barely affects my account of the mental states involved in non-
third-party robust non-cognitive disagreement.212 The hypothesis implies that an 
entrusting party A and her partner B, the fundamental determinants of which of B’s 
actions would strain or violate A’s trust are the expected weighted utilities for B, 
relative to B’s evidence, and the expected weighted utilities for A, relative to B’s 
evidence, of the options available to B. But the hypothesis does not imply that these are 
the things that put an entrusted party in robust non-cognitive disagreement with his 
partner. It is a clash of their voiceable preferences (rational or not) that puts two people 
                                                 
212 It affects this account at all only insofar as it affects what things count as entrusted concern 
relationships, and hence what things count as voiceable preferences. 
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in robust disagreement, and not a mismatch among the options that, for each party, have 
the highest expected weighted utility for her relative to the entrusted party’s evidence. 
Appearances seem to require this. Suppose that two people report mutually 
unsatisfiable preferences about what one of them is to do. Subsequent discussion, in 
which neither party provides the other with new information about the probable 
outcomes of available options or about her basic desires, reveals an error in the 
reasoning behind one party’s preferences. This discovery leads to a change in that 
party’s preferences, with the result that the two parties report mutually satisfiable 
preferences. We will presumably lack an intuition that they disagree after the change of 
preference, but the change of preference will not change our intuition that the parties 
robustly disagreed before the error was discovered, if we had such an intuition. And yet 
presumably the parties’ basic desires and evidence—including their evidence about each 
other’s basic desires—will not have changed, just the reasoning behind one party’s 
preferences. On the assumption that they disagreed in virtue of sharing an entrusted 
concern relationship, this means that the expected weighted utilities for the entrusted 
party, relative to his evidence, and the expected weighted utilities for the entrusting 
party, relative to the entrusted party’s evidence, will not have changed. These utilities 
supervene on the entrusted party’s weighted desires and evidence, and do not depend on 
the quality of anyone’s reasoning. Positing that the parties’ voiced preferences were 
what put them in disagreement, and not the utilities just described, is the most 
straightforward way to explain our intuitions about the parties’ disagreement before and 
after the change of preference. 
As I have acknowledged, taking proper account of the Disparity Hypothesis 
would require amendments to several part of this dissertation. I will only address one of 
these. It seems more important that I should make the relevant corrections to my 
metaethical theory, and my claims about its predictions, than that I should revise my 
arguments for the general empirical theses concerning trust networks that I defended in 
Chapter 3. At present I am content to take the position that those claims were only a 
sketch for a rigorous account of the workings of dual-order fully connected networks 
and the reasons for their existence. But I do want to establish that my commitment to 
the Disparity Hypothesis does not greatly undermine my explanation for moral 
disagreement. I undertake this task in Appendix E. 
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8.2.2 Confidence and Indecision in Matters of Basic Moral Principle 
What is fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of uncertainty about basic moral 
principles, and the practical implications of such uncertainty? Regarding uncertain 
moral judgements whose uncertainty is owing to uncertainty about basic principles, I 
cannot give a full account of what mental states these uncertain judgements consist in, 
only an account of their non-cognitive components. There are two phenomena that I 
need to explain, which I will call ‘confidence’ and ‘indecision’. 
Confidence is analogous to degree of cognitive belief. Loosely and intuitively, 
one’s confidence in a moral judgement is how likely one thinks it is to be true. A 
person’s confidence in a moral judgement may depend on her credences concerning 
descriptive facts, as well as on her state of mind regarding basic moral principles; I 
shall, of course, only be concerned with the latter. Here are a few platitudes about 
confidence that my account of it must save. A person can have degrees of confidence in 
moral judgements that she does not herself hold; indeed, she will typically have degrees 
of confidence in moral judgements that are incompatible with those she holds herself. 
Necessarily, she will have a higher degree of confidence in a moral judgement she holds 
than in any moral judgement that is inconsistent with it, if she is rational. A moralist’s 
degrees of confidence in moral judgements, insofar as they are explained by her state of 
mind regarding basic principles, normally depend greatly on the state of her moral 
reasoning. 
Indecision is, intuitively, a state of uncertainty resulting in an absence of moral 
judgement. If a moralist is undecided about whether some action φ is wrong, she does 
not judge that φ-ing is wrong or permissible. If she must choose between φ-ing and not-
φ-ing in the near future, her indecision will characteristically lead to inaction and 
prolonged deliberation, or, if prolonged deliberation is not possible, to a choice that she 
will make unhappily and reluctantly. People can apparently be undecided about the 
morality of actions as a result of uncertainty about contingent non-moral facts, and as a 
result of having a certain state of mind regarding basic moral principles; I am only 
concerned with indecision insofar as it is explained in the latter way. Like confidence, 
indecision (where it has this latter sort of explanation) generally depends on the state of 
one’s moral reasoning. Indecision is related to confidence in at least the following way: 
if a moralist is undecided about whether or not φ-ing is wrong, her confidence that φ-ing 
is wrong will be not be clearly higher or lower than her confidence that φ-ing is not 
wrong. 
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The general metaethical problem I described above—the problem of explaining 
why it is sometimes rational to act on basic moral principles of which you are not 
completely certain—is a problem related to confidence, not indecision. A person who is 
undecided about the morality of φ-ing is in no immediate danger of acting on an 
uncertain judgement that she ought to φ, for she has no such judgement. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism’s account of the non-cognitive attitudes involved in 
indecision about basic principles can be sketched quickly, so I shall carry out this task 
before turning my attention to confidence. Moral indecision involves norm-indecision. 
Recall my account of norm-indecision from 6.4.1: for a moralist S so be norm-
undecided about φ-ing is to be such that (a) S’s expected weighted utilities fail to 
discriminate among two or more of S’s best preferred comprehensive norm-partitions, 
and (b) these best preferred comprehensive norm-partitions include norm-partitions both 
forbidding and requiring φ. (The Disparity Hypothesis doesn’t require any alteration of 
this account, beyond a clarification that ‘S’s expected weighted utilities’ are S’s 
expected weighted utilities for S by S’s lights.) 
What follows is only an approximation of an account of indecision. A full 
statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for indecision would need to take 
account of the weird possibility that an agent might be in different states of norm-
indecision in the various roles she occupies in the first and second orders of the moral 
trust network. Such an account would be relatively lengthy and complicated, and would 
achieve a greater level of thoroughness than is called for at present. 
Suppose that C is a set of circumstances. C may be dispositionally non-specific to 
any degree. 
Indecision about requirement. A person S is in a state of indecision about whether or 
not φ-ing in C is necessarily required iff there is some C* such that C* is a 
dispositionally-specific circumstance that entails C, and S is norm-undecided between 
norms forbidding and norms requiring φ-ing in C*. 
Indecision about permissibility. A person S is in a state of indecision about whether or 
not φ-ing in C is necessarily permissible iff there is some C* such that C* is a 
dispositionally-specific circumstance that entails C, and the agent in C* is pre-trust 
disposed to φ, and S is norm-undecided between norms forbidding and norms requiring 
φ-ing in C*. 
This account of indecision, in conjunction with the rest of my theory of moral 
psychology, predicts the platitudes about indecision that I listed above. First, indecision 
results in an absence of moral judgement. Someone who is norm-undecided between 
norms requiring or forbidding φ-ing in a dispositionally specific circumstance C* lacks 
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a voiceable preference between conforming to norms requiring or forbidding φ-ing in 
C*. The expected weighted utilities for her, by her lights, fail to discriminate between 
these options because these utilities are indeterminate. This means that she lacks a 
voiceable preference for conformity to any norm-partition whose extension includes C*, 
and hence that she lacks any moral judgement such that holding that judgement involves 
having such a voiceable preference, including the judgements that φ-ing in C is wrong, 
required, or (if the agent in C* is pre-trust disposed to φ) permissible. 
Second, indecision will characteristically lead to inaction and prolonged 
deliberation, or to a reluctant forced choice.213 The platitude I need to explain here is 
that an agent who expects to find herself in dispositionally non-specific circumstance C 
in the near future, and who is undecided about whether φ-ing in C is wrong or 
permissible, will prevaricate, engage in prolonged deliberation, and so on. There is a 
problem here: I can easily explain why someone would exhibit inaction etc. if she (i) 
expected to find herself in dispositionally specific circumstances C*, where C* entails 
C, and (ii) was undecided about whether or not φ-ing in C is wrong because she was 
undecided about whether or not φ-ing in C* is wrong. She lacks a discretion-licencing 
preference to φ or not-φ in C*, and so would violate trust qua moral entrusted party if 
she did so. So, as long as inaction is possible and by her lights permissible, we should 
expect her to delay action, and try her best to form a voiceable preference, to avoid such 
a violation.  
But it is apparently possible for a moralist to (i) expect to find herself in 
dispositionally specific circumstance C*, where C* entails C, (ii) have a voiceable 
preference for following norms forbidding or requiring φ-ing in C, and (iii) be 
undecided about whether or not φ-ing in C is wrong because she is undecided about 
whether or not φ-ing in dispositionally specific circumstance C′ is wrong, where C′ 
entails C, and C* and C′ are different circumstances. In this case my theory does not 
predict inaction etc., because the moralist has a voiceable preference that is applicable 
to the circumstance she expects to find herself in. 
However, we should expect this sort of situation to be very unusual, given the 
hypotheses about the nature of altruistic desires that I made in 4.1.4 with the aim of 
explaining the importance of permissibility judgements in light of my claim that they 
are reducible to requirement judgements. There I posited that the extent to which an 
                                                 
213 I touched upon this topic, with respect to norm-indecision, in 6.4.2. 
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action satisfies altruistic desires may often depend on whether the agent is pre-trust 
disposed to perform it, but will rarely depend other features of her dispositional 
circumstances (e.g. strength of pre-trust preferences, which specific sub-option she is 
pre-trust disposed to choose or perform). These further features are, by and large, not 
altruistically relevant. So, among those C-entailing dispositionally specific 
circumstances in which the agent is pre-trust disposed to φ, it will rarely be the case that 
a moralist will be undecided about whether or not φ-ing is wrong in some of those 
circumstances but not others. And among those C-entailing dispositionally specific 
circumstances in which the agent is pre-trust disposed to not-φ, it will rarely be the case 
that a moralist will be undecided about whether or not φ-ing is wrong in some of those 
circumstances but not others. So my account of indecision does not completely save the 
platitude that moral indecision about an action that is in the offing will lead to inaction 
etc., but does predict that it will hold to a large extent. 
A moralist who expects to find herself in dispositionally specific circumstance C* 
in the near future, and who is norm-undecided between norms forbidding and norms 
requiring φ in C*, lacks a discretion-licencing preference to φ or not-φ in C*, and so 
would expect to violate trust qua moral entrusted party if she did so. So, as long as 
inaction was possible and by her lights permissible, we should expect her to delay 
action to minimize the chance of a violation. Indeterminacy in the expected weighted 
utilities (for a moralist, by that moralist’s lights) of conforming to different 
comprehensive norm-partitions can, I suppose, sometimes be resolved by thinking 
harder about the implications of conforming to them. Thus we should expect her to 
engage in moral reasoning in an effort to resolve her indecision. 
A moralist who is undecided about whether φ-ing in C is permissible lacks a 
discretion-licencing preference to φ in C, and so would violate trust qua moral entrusted 
party if she did so. So, as long as inaction is possible and by her lights permissible, we 
should expect her to delay action to avoid such a violation. Indeterminacy in the 
expected weighted utilities of conforming to different comprehensive norm-partitions 
can, I suppose, sometimes be resolved by thinking harder about the implications of 
conforming to them. Thus we should expect her to engage in moral reasoning in an 
effort to resolve her indecision. 
On my account, moral indecision necessarily involves norm-indecision, and 
norm-indecision depends on the state of one’s moral reasoning, or the reasoning 
whereby one arrives at voiceable preferences qua moralist. So my account saves the 
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third platitude about moral indecision, namely, that such indecision depends on the state 
of one’s moral reasoning. The fourth platitude concerns the relationship between 
indecision and confidence. I will say how my account of indecision saves this platitude 
when I have given my account of confidence. I turn to this latter task now. 
Holding a basic moral judgement necessarily involves having a voiceable 
preference for conformity to some specific norm-partition. I will call a norm-partition 
that stands in this relation to a moral judgement J, N(J). I propose that a moralist’s 
degree of confidence in a basic moral judgement J is roughly the expected weighted 
utility for her, by her lights, of following N(J), whenever following N(J) is possible. (I 
shall sometimes omit this ‘whenever possible’ qualification in what follows.) That is to 
say, it is the expected weighted utility for her, by her lights, of her best preferred live 
atomic sub-option of following N(J), whenever following N(J) is possible. A live 
atomic sub-option of following N(J) is any option of following a comprehensive norm-
partition entailing N(J). So a moralist’s confidence in J is roughly the expected weighted 
utility for her, by her lights, of following her best-preferred comprehensive norm-
partition among those entailing N(J). 
This is only rough, because a utility is not a good candidate to be a degree of 
confidence. To be analogous to degrees of belief in the way that appearances require, a 
degree of confidence in a moral judgement ought to be a point between a maximum and 
a minimum value.214 A judgement with the minimum value (to which, in deference to 
conventional treatments of degrees of belief, we may assign the number zero) is one in 
which a moralist couldn’t be any less confident, if she were rational. A judgement with 
the maximum value (conventionally, one) is one in which the moralist couldn’t be any 
more confident, if she were rational. I want to say that a moralist’s degree of confidence 
in J is greater the higher the expected weighted utility of following N(J) is for her by her 
lights, but I also want it to necessarily fall between (or on) these two points (again, if 
she is rational). 
I tentatively propose the following. A moralist S has a confidence of zero in J just 
in case there is no comprehensive norm-partition M such that, if S were perfectly 
rational and logically omniscient, following M would have an expected weighted utility 
for S by S’s lights that was lower than the expected weighted utility that following N(J) 
                                                 
214 Krister Bykvist and Jonas Olson, ‘Expressivism and Moral Certitude’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly 59, no. 239 (2009): 205; Andrew Sepielli, ‘Uncertainty for Non-cognitivists’, 
Philosophical Studies 160 (2012): 202. 
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actually has for S by S’s lights, holding S’s basic desires fixed. S has a confidence of 
one in J just in case there is no comprehensive norm-partition M such that, if S were 
perfectly rational and logically omniscient, following M would have an expected 
weighted utility for S by S’s lights that was higher than the expected weighted utility 
that following N(J) actually has for S by S’s light, holding S’s basic desires fixed. These 
upper and lower bounds for S’s confidence levels would change if S’s basic altruistic 
desires, or the basic desires from which her simplicity desires were derived, changed. 
Let us see how well this account of confidence in judgements of basic moral 
principle saves the platitudes about confidence that I listed earlier, insofar as they apply 
to judgements of basic principle. First, the account allows that a person can have 
degrees of confidence in a judgement that she doesn’t hold herself. This is because a 
person’s degree of confidence in moral judgement J is merely the normalized expected 
weighted utility for her by her lights in the norm-partition N(J) that one must hold if one 
is to accept J; the option of following a norm-partition will have an expected weighted 
utility for S by S’s lights even if that norm-partition is not one she holds—even if, that 
is, it is not entailed by her maximal decided norm-partition. 
Second, the account predicts that a rational moralist will have a higher degree of 
confidence in a moral judgement she holds than in any inconsistent moral judgement. 
Suppose for reductio that a rational moralist S holds a moral judgment J, that there is 
some moral judgement ~J that is inconsistent with J, and that S is more confident in ~J 
than she is in J. This means that N(~J) has a higher expected weighted utility for S by 
S’s lights than N(J) does. This in turn means that S’s best-preferred comprehensive 
norm-partition out of those entailing N(~J) has a higher expected weighted utility for S 
by her lights than S’s best-preferred norm-partition out of those entailing N(J). For S to 
hold J is for her maximal decided norm-partition to entail N(J). A moralist’s maximal 
decided norm-partition is the most extensive norm-partition that is entailed by the 
conjunction of the comprehensive norm-partitions that she best prefers, and between 
which the expected weighted utilities for her by her lights fail to discriminate. So if S 
holds J, S’s best-preferred comprehensive norm-partition among those entailing N(J) 
must be entailed by the conjunction of the best preferred norms between which the 
expected weighted utilities for S by her lights fail to discriminate. So there cannot be 
any comprehensive norm-partition that S prefers to her best-preferred comprehensive 
norm-partition entailing N(J). Thus, contrary to our initial supposition, S’s best-
preferred comprehensive norm-partition out of those entailing N(~J) cannot have a 
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higher expected weighted utility for S by her lights than her best preferred 
comprehensive norm-partition out of those entailing N(J). 
Third, my account predicts that a moralist’s confidence in judgements of basic 
moral principle will depend on the state of her moral reasoning. This is obvious, since 
the expected weighted utilities for a moralist by her lights in different norm-partitions 
will depend on the state of her moral reasoning—her current grasp of the various more 
or less simple comprehensive norm-partitions that entail it, and of the prescriptions of 
those norm-partitions in various circumstances. 
Finally, I shall address the platitude concerning the relationship between 
confidence and indecision that I omitted to address when I gave my account of the 
latter. The platitude is this: if a moralist is undecided between two inconsistent moral 
judgements about φ-ing in C, her confidence in one judgement will not be clearly higher 
or lower than her confidence in the other. My theory predicts only that this proposition 
will hold in most instances, not that it will always hold. 
My account of indecision says that for a moralist S to be undecided between a 
judgement that φ-ing in (perhaps dispositionally non-specific) circumstance C is wrong 
and a judgement that φ-ing in C is permissible is for the expected weighted utilities for 
S by S’s lights to fail to discriminate between norms forbidding and norms requiring φ-
ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to φ in C. My account of confidence says, 
roughly, that a moralist S’s confidence in the judgement that φ-ing in C is wrong is the 
normalized expected weighted utility for S by her lights of norms forbidding φ-ing in C 
when you are pre-trust disposed to do so and φ-ing in C when you are not pre-trust 
disposed to do so, and that her confidence in the judgement that φ-ing in C is 
permissible is the normalized expected weighted utility for her by her lights of norms 
requiring φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to φ in C. 
If it were not the case that judging that φ-ing in C is wrong involves having a 
voiceable preference for following norms forbidding φ-ing in C when you are not pre-
trust disposed to do so—if it only involved preferring norms forbidding φ-ing in C when 
you are pre-trust disposed to do so, i.e., a preference that actually clashes with the 
preference involved in judging that φ-ing in C is permissible—my account would 
predict the platitude. This is because if you are undecided about φ-ing in C when you 
are pre-trust disposed to do so, then, necessarily, the expected weighted utility for you 
by your lights of conforming to norms requiring φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust 
disposed to do so will not be determinately higher or lower than that of conforming to 
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norms forbidding φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to do so. So neither of 
these options will clearly have a higher expected weighted utility for you by your lights. 
Since confidence is normalized expected weighted utility for a moralist by her lights, 
this means in turn that your confidence that φ-ing is permissible and will not clearly be 
higher than your confidence that φ-ing is wrong, nor vice versa. 
Let us now drop our false supposition. Judging that φ-ing in C is wrong involves 
having a voiceable preference for following norms forbidding φ-ing in C when you are 
pre-trust disposed to do so, and when you aren’t. The option of following such norms 
cannot have a higher expected weighted utility for a rational moralist by her lights than 
the option of following norms forbidding φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to 
do so. This is because the former norms are ‘stronger’—which is to say, they are 
compatible with fewer, or ‘rule out’ more, comprehensive norm-partitions. More 
specifically, the former norms are strictly stronger than the latter: the former rule out 
every comprehensive norm-partition that the latter rule out, plus some that the latter do 
not rule out. The expected weighted utility for a moralist by her lights of following a 
norm-partition is the expected weighted utility for her by her lights of following her best 
preferred comprehensive norm-partition compatible with that norm-partition. Thus if 
norm-partition N1 is strictly stronger than norm-partition N2, N1 cannot have a higher 
expected weighted utility for a moralist by her lights than N2, and may have a lower 
expected weighted utility for her by her lights, because it may rule out her best-
preferred comprehensive norm-partition compatible with N1. So the norm-partition 
forbidding both φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to and φ-ing in C when you 
aren’t pre-trust disposed to may have a lower expected weighted utility for a moralist 
by her lights than the norm-partition merely forbidding φ-ing in C when you are pre-
trust disposed to. 
This means that, even though neither of the expected weighted utilities for a 
rational moralist by her lights of norms forbidding and norms requiring φ-ing in C when 
you are pre-trust disposed to will be clearly higher than the other if she is undecided 
about whether φ-ing in C is permissible, the expected weighted utility for her by her 
lights of norms forbidding both φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to and φ-ing 
in C when you aren’t pre-trust disposed to may be determinately lower than that of 
norms requiring φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to. Thus a moralist who is 
undecided about whether φ-ing in C is permissible may have more confidence in the 
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judgement that φ-ing in C is permissible than she has in the judgement that φ-ing in C is 
wrong. 
This will occur when the moralist’s best-preferred sub-option of following the 
norm-partition forbidding φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to is the option of 
following a comprehensive norm-partition that both forbids φ-ing in C when you are 
pre-trust disposed to and requires φ-ing in C when you aren’t pre-trust disposed to 
(more carefully, it at least requires this on some precisification of C—I ignore this 
complication in what follows). For it is norms that make this latter requirement that are 
ruled out by norms forbidding both φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to and φ-
ing in C when you aren’t pre-trust disposed to, but not by norms merely forbidding φ-
ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to. 
It ought to be fairly unusual for a moralist to prefer norms both forbidding φ-ing 
in C when you are pre-trust disposed to and requiring φ-ing in C when you aren’t pre-
trust disposed to to norms forbidding both φ-ing in C when you are pre-trust disposed to 
and φ-ing in C when you aren’t pre-trust disposed to. At least, this is the implication of 
the hypotheses about the nature of altruistic desires that I made in 4.1.4 with the aim of 
explaining the salience of permissibility judgements. So my theory does predict that a 
moralist who is undecided about the permissibility of φ-ing in C will probably be such 
that she is not clearly more confident in the judgement that φ-ing in C is permissible 
than she is in the judgement that φ-ing in C is impermissible. 
It’s not clear to me how much of a cost my theory faces in failing to entirely save 
this platitude. In fact, it is not clear to me that this ‘platitude’ is, on reflection, 
platitudinous. Perhaps when a moralist is undecided about the permissibility of φ-ing in 
C, and she finds the judgement φ-ing in C is required just in case you wouldn’t have φ-
ed in C if left to your own devices more plausible than the judgement φ-ing in C is 
wrong, we don’t expect her to necessarily have the same confidence in the judgement 
that φ-ing in C is permissible as she has in the judgement that φ-ing C is wrong. Perhaps 
we would not be surprised in this case if she had a determinately lower confidence in 
the judgement that φ-ing in C is wrong than she had in the judgement that φ-ing in C is 
permissible. I find this sort of case quite difficult to grasp intuitively, and hence difficult 
to form clear intuitions about. I am inclined to doubt that those cases in which fiduciary 
non-cognitivism fails to save the ‘platitude’ amount to compelling counterexamples to 
the theory. 
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8.3 A Fiduciary Non-cognitivist Solution to the Puzzle 
I will now turn my attention to the metaethical problem of moral uncertainty that I 
described at the start of this chapter. How do I explain the rationality of acting on moral 
judgements in which you are not completely certain? A simple and approximately 
correct answer to this question is as follows: the fiduciary non-cognitivist endorses the 
Instrumental Explanation.215 Moralists tend to act on their moral judgements, not 
because these somehow constitute their final ends, but for instrumental reasons. Acting 
on them ought to be a somewhat reliable way to satisfy their basic altruistic desires, but 
more importantly, it is by their lights the most likely means to satisfying their 
discretional desires. When moralists rationally act on moral judgements that they hold 
with imperfect confidence, it is typically their discretional desires that explain this. On 
my theory, moralists’ discretional desires are, or are analogous to, desires to ‘do what is 
right’ in the de dicto sense.216 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism happily avoids the problem that I argued besets the 
version of the Instrumental Explanation that I discussed in Section 8.1. It does not 
predict that a woman who reaches the conclusion that abortion is permissible will 
nonetheless forbear from having one because she thinks that there is a tiny chance that 
she is wrong. Discretional desires do not prompt their possessors to maximize expected 
conformity to moral requirements. They prompt moralists to act on their discretion-
licencing preferences—or, more accurately, the discretion-licencing preferences they 
would have if they were rational, though in practice this will usually lead to the same 
choices. 
Rational moralists’ voiceable preferences depend on their degrees of belief as well 
as their desires—chiefly their credences in a priori propositions concerning the 
                                                 
215 Fiduciary non-cognitivism’s explanation doesn’t quite qualify as a version of the 
Instrumental Explanation, because it doesn’t predict that a rational moralist’s motivations will 
vary depending on her confidence in her moral judgements. 
216 Michael Smith famously argued that the view that de dicto desires to do the right thing play 
an important role in moral motivation implies that (good) moralists make a fetish of acting 
morally, when intuitively they are reliably moved to do the right thing out of more intelligible 
motivations, such as (underived) desires to help people and relieve suffering (Smith, The Moral 
Problem, 75-6). This seems a good argument, not against the idea that a distinctively moral 
desire to do the right thing is explanatorily important, but against metaethical theories that fail to 
give an account of the content and provenance of this desire that makes it intelligible. It is not a 
good argument against fiduciary non-cognitivism, because discretional desires do not seem 
fetishistic. A desire to live up to the trust of one’s fellow human beings is a perfectly intelligible 
one. (I have only addressed one facet of Smith’s fetishism argument here, the one that strikes 
me as the most initially convincing as an objection to fiduciary non-cognitivism.) 
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implications of following different comprehensive norm-partitions (e.g. beliefs about 
whether, in some particular cases, utilitarian norms require hanging the innocent). It 
might be thought that, if a moralist’s voiceable preferences hinged on very low 
credences in such propositions, and if a great frustration of altruistic desires were at 
present at stake, her discretional desires might urge her to act on the norms that she 
would prefer if those propositions were false. This is not the case. A moralist’s 
discretional desire will almost never prompt her to defy her norms. They urge her to 
choose the live atomic options with the unique highest expected weighted utility for her 
relative to her evidence. The live atomic options such that she believes they are most 
likely to have the unique highest expected weighted utility for her relative to her 
evidence, and those that she voiceably prefers, will almost always be the same. (If she is 
undecided about what to do in her present circumstances, she will lack a voiceable 
preference among her options, and she will probably also lack a belief, of any of the 
options among which she is undecided, that that option has the unique highest expected 
weighted utility for her relative to her admissible evidence. In such circumstances her 
discretional desire will not prompt her to choose any particular option.) 
According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, even though the woman in the abortion 
case judges that it is merely permissible to have an abortion, she would ‘in principle’ 
violate trust if she forbore from having an abortion given that she wanted to. This is 
because, if she judges that abortion is permissible, she has a voiceable preference to 
follow norms requiring her to have an abortion if she is pre-trust disposed to. So her 
discretional desires will urge her to act on her pre-trust disposition. (In fact it is doubtful 
that she could violate trust by failing to act on her pre-trust disposition. This is because, 
given her voiceable preferences, no desire of hers to defy her pre-trust disposition could 
be a trust-based desire for her, at least qua moralist; and if it were a non-trust-based 
desire, and were strong enough to move her to action, it would determine the direction 
of her pre-trust disposition instead of opposing it. But what is important for my 
argument is that the distinctively moral motivation I have posited would not move a 
rational moralist to act on moral judgements other than those she holds, which is to say, 
it would not move her to act on norms that were not entailed by her maximal decided 
norm-partition.) 
I have said that cognitivist defenders of the Instrumental Explanation can avoid 
making the wrong prediction in the abortion case by availing themselves of something 
like the non-cognitivist’s solution. Here’s what I have in mind. The cognitivist could, 
269 
 
like the fiduciary non-cognitivist, analyse permission judgements as requirement 
judgements of a special kind. These would be judgements that agents ought to do what 
they would want to do if moral propriety were not taken into account. On this view, to 
judge that abortion in circumstances C is permissible is to judge that an agent ought to 
have an abortion in C if she ‘pre-morally’ prefers to.217 The cognitivist could then posit 
that our de dicto moral motivation is a standing desire to act in accordance with moral 
requirements, including the special requirements that permission judgements are 
concerned with. On this view, the de dicto moral desire of the woman in the abortion 
case would presumably not move her to act on her tiny credence that abortion was 
wrong, because she would have a far greater credence that not having an abortion in her 
‘conative circumstances’ was ‘wrong’, in a sense that was relevant to the satisfaction of 
the de dicto desire. 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that fiduciary non-cognitivism has an adequate account of 
moral uncertainty. Fiduciary non-cognitivism accommodates the most obvious facts 
about moral indecision and moral uncertainty. Moreover, it avoids an under-recognized 
problem facing cognitivists who hold that moral judgements are the result of reasoning 
about final ends, and that we commonly conform to them as such, without any ulterior 
motive. 
 
                                                 
217 If Michael Smith analysed permission judgements in this way, he could, I concede, avoid my 
criticism that he fails to explain our intuitions about the abortion case. 
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9 
Moral Forgetting 
Consider the following utterances:218 
(1) Sorry I took your umbrella. I forgot that stealing was wrong. 
(2) Is it good to give to international aid when your own family is in need? I’ve been 
racking my brains, but I can’t remember. 
(3) You know that feeling you get when you can’t quite remember something that you 
desperately need to remember? That’s how I felt when Carla asked me whether it 
would be morally wrong for her to go through with the abortion. I knew the answer, 
but it had just slipped my mind! It was driving me crazy. 
As these examples illustrate, claiming to have forgotten a moral truth can sound absurd. 
This demands an explanation. My chief concerns in this chapter will be to show that 
explaining our intuitions about utterances like (1)-(3), and related examples, is no easy 
feat, and that fiduciary non-cognitivism is among those theories that can well explain 
these intuitions. As we shall see, certain versions of moral non-cognitivism are 
peculiarly well placed to explain these phenomena. There are reasons to doubt that 
fiduciary non-cognitivism is among them, but I shall be argue that they are 
unconvincing. This chapter draws inspiration from observations and arguments made by 
Gilbert Ryle in his 1958 essay, ‘On Forgetting the Difference Between Right and 
Wrong.’219 
                                                 
218 A version of this chapter was previously published under the title ‘Forgetting Your Scruples’ 
in Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 2889–2911. 
219 The present paper aims to improve on Ryle’s argument chiefly in the following two respects. 
First, Ryle sets out to explain why it sounds absurd to say that one has forgotten ‘the difference 
between right and wrong’, which gives the impression that he is talking about a very general 
kind of moral forgetting, involving a wholesale loss or deterioration of moral knowledge. In fact 
the puzzle is far broader than this, for many quite specific reports of moral forgetting, such as 
(1)-(3), seem absurd. Ryle’s characterization of the problem thus makes it seem less troubling 
than it is. I address the broader puzzle. Second, I consider a wider range of rival explanations. 
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In what follows, whenever I talk of losing beliefs or other attitudes ‘through’ 
forgetting, I always mean that the loss is an instance of forgetting, not that it is a 
consequence of forgetting (something else). By ‘moral forgetting’ I always mean the 
loss of moral belief through forgetting. My use of ‘absurd’ is, I hope, close to the core 
folk usage. To be absurd, a thing must at least be odd; it must either resist intelligibility 
(for reasons other than complexity, indistinctness, or a lack of background information) 
or be ridiculous; it need not be conceptually impossible. 
In the preceding chapters I have tried to be agnostic on the question of whether or 
not words like ‘true’, ‘believe’, ‘assert’, and ‘proposition’ should be given a 
deflationary construal, as many expressivists would have it. Thus I have avoided using 
these terms in connection with moral judgements and utterances. In this chapter it would 
be difficult to avoid using these folk terms. I shall be trying to elicit rather elusive 
pretheoretical intuitions about moral judgements, and this would be harder if I had a 
very limited ordinary-language vocabulary at my disposal. Moreover, for somewhat 
complex dialectical reasons, I face less pressure in what follows to limit my vocabulary 
in this way.220 So I shall no longer avoid using the ‘cognitivist-sounding’ terms in moral 
contexts. 
In Section 9.1 I explore our intuitions about moral forgetting and defend a certain 
characterization of our explanandum. In 9.2, I evaluate several candidate explanations. 
9.1 What Needs to Be Explained? 
Our intuitions about (1)-(3) belong to a class of intuitions about moral forgetting for 
which a common explanation seems desirable. To explain these intuitions, we must try 
to identify this class. Our responses to (1)-(3) seem to justify the generalization that 
                                                                                                                                               
Ryle does not (seriously) consider some cognitivist-friendly explanations for the phenomenon 
that present-day moral philosophers will find relatively credible, such as the argument from 
intuition (Section 9.2.3). 
220 It seems that the versions of non-cognitivism that are best equipped to explain the 
phenomena are ones that embrace deflationism. If a version of non-cognitivism couldn’t explain 
talk of moral beliefs and truths, but correctly predicted that talk of moral forgetting would sound 
puzzling, this correct prediction might seem merely fortuitous rather than truly explanatory. So 
a policy of considering only those metaethical theories that seem best equipped to explain our 
intuitions about moral forgetting arguably permits me to consider only versions of non-
cognitivism that are conjoined with deflationism about most ‘realist-’ or ‘cognitivist-sounding’ 
terms (or which can vindicate their use in moral contexts in other ways). If I consider only these 
theories, there is no need for me to avoid using the controversial terms. 
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reports of moral forgetting seem absurd. I’ll take this as a first-pass statement of our 
explanandum, and consider to what extent it must be revised. 
Although I’ll be defending a particular statement of our explanandum in this 
section, it is not my plan to take this as fixed in Section 9.2, and rank candidate 
explanations according to their success at predicting it. The statement is revisable in 
principle. Most of the explanations I consider will make some predictions that are at 
odds with it, and I won’t count these predictions as defects without investigation. 
9.1.1 Behavioural and Phenomenological Symptoms of Forgetting in Moral Contexts 
For all my first-pass statement says, our explanandum might be merely linguistic, a 
puzzle about why sentences or speech acts reporting moral amnesia sound absurd. But I 
think it would be surprising if this were the case, and indeed there is evidently nothing 
particularly linguistic about our explanandum. Forgetting affects what we do and feel as 
well as what we say. And, just as reports of moral forgetting seem odd, so too do 
described cases in which a subject’s loss of moral belief is accompanied by the 
distinctive behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting. 
Forgetting itself does not have a phenomenology, nor, typically, any immediate 
external symptoms. But efforts to remember and prevent forgetting are associated with 
distinctive behaviours and feelings. When we are worried that we are going to forget 
things, we repeat them to ourselves to commit them to memory, and test our recollection 
of them. We leave reminders for ourselves. We tie strings around our fingers. When 
something we urgently need to remember has slipped our minds we sometimes have a 
frustrated ‘tip-of-one’s-tongue’ feeling, we ‘rack our brains’, we express and exhibit 
frustration. When we recall a forgotten truth, we have a feeling of having recovered 
something lost, which is quite different from (for instance) any feelings associated with 
re-adopting a belief that one had earlier rejected. 
Imagining cases in which these behaviours and feelings are associated with efforts 
to maintain or re-form moral beliefs produces a sense of incongruity. Moral reminders 
seem odd—it would be bizarre if Carla left a reminder on her fridge door that abortion 
is permissible, reasoning that this is information she would like to have at hand if she 
decided she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. It would be bizarre to repeat moral 
truths to oneself in order to memorize them, and quiz oneself to test one’s recollection. 
And the behaviours and feelings reported by the speakers of (2) and (3) in connection 
with their efforts to re-form their lost moral beliefs seem similarly bizarre. 
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Apparently, all indicators of actual or potential moral forgetting (as opposed to 
mere moral belief-loss) are apt to puzzle us. Our explanandum is thus not merely 
linguistic. It seems that we want to explain why moral forgetting seems absurd, not just 
why reporting moral forgetting seems absurd. 
9.1.2 Forgetting Morally Relevant Non-normative Facts 
However, there appears to be a large and important class of counterexamples to this 
characterization of our explanandum. The following utterances do not sound absurd: 
(4) I forgot that John was such a bad man. 
(5) I should thank Ellie again for helping me get this job. I keep forgetting what a good 
deed that was. 
(6) Yes, you told me what Jessica did, but that was three days ago. I can’t remember 
whether or not what she did was immoral. 
What distinguishes these sensible-sounding utterances from puzzling reports of moral 
forgetting like (1)-(3)? It seems likely that the reason why (4)-(6) sound sensible has 
something to do with what these utterances communicate to us about the sorts of facts 
the speakers have forgotten. 
We naturally infer from (4)-(6) that the speakers have forgotten what they take to 
be morally important non-normative facts about the things whose moral status they 
claim to have forgotten. For instance, it might be natural to suppose that the speaker of 
(4) has forgotten about some of John’s behavioural dispositions, that the speaker of (5) 
keeps forgetting the inconvenience that Ellie had to put up with in helping the speaker 
get her job, and that the speaker of (6) has simply forgotten what Jessica did. By 
contrast, we are not inclined to infer that the speakers of (1)-(3) have forgotten morally 
important non-normative facts about stealing, giving to charity when one’s family is in 
need, or abortion, respectively. 
Suppose that a person believes both that some object x has some non-normative 
property F, and that x’s being F makes x have some moral property M. Presumably, if 
she forgot that x is F, then she might cease to believe that x is M as a result. She might 
rationally reject this moral belief, or the moral belief, having lost the rational support 
which would have kept it in existence, might just cease through some non-rational 
process. Be it rational or non-rational, I shall call this kind of cessation of moral belief 
Loss of moral belief Resulting from Non-normative Forgetting (LRNF). 
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We should not expect LRNF to seem absurd, and I suggest that (4)-(6) do not 
seem absurd because, unlike (1)-(3), we take them merely to be reports of LRNF. I 
hypothesize that some utterances which have the appearance of reports of moral 
forgetting are actually reports of LRNF; that is, some sorts of utterance which have the 
form of reports of moral forgetting are characteristically used to report LRNF, and are 
interpreted as reports of LRNF by competent language-users. Utterances (4)-(6) are 
utterances of this sort. I hypothesize that there are certain properties (certain types of 
content, linguistic cues, and the like) that an apparent report of moral forgetting may 
possess which conventionally indicate that it is a report of LRNF, and that (4)-(6) have 
these properties. 
Though I’ve called such utterances ‘apparent’ reports of moral forgetting, I don’t 
wish to deny that they may actually be reports of moral forgetting. But if they are 
genuine reports of moral forgetting, and do not seem absurd, it is because LRNF 
sometimes counts as moral forgetting—that is, losing a moral belief that p as a result of 
forgetting what one takes to be a morally relevant non-normative fact can count as 
forgetting that p. Whether or not it can is a conceptual question that I shall not address. 
We can now refine our explanandum. We do not want to explain why moral 
forgetting seems absurd, because this may not be true. We want to explain why moral 
forgetting that is not LRNF seems absurd. 
9.1.3 Inverted-Commas Moral Forgetting 
Familiarly, there is a distinction to be made between inverted-commas moral beliefs and 
non-inverted-commas (or ‘genuine’) moral beliefs. The former are psychological beliefs 
about the moral beliefs of other people. They are so called because they can properly be 
expressed by ordinary moral sentences with the moral terms in inverted commas. The 
inverted commas need not be explicit (or even ‘conscious’). For instance, ‘Ashley won’t 
come to the party because she’s too virtuous’ may express, among other things, the 
belief that Ashley would be considered virtuous to a certain degree by some salient 
persons.221 
Reports of inverted-commas moral forgetting do not generally sound absurd. We 
would not be puzzled if an anthropologist, discussing the moral code of a foreign 
culture with another anthropologist, were to ask, ‘Is it wrong to marry any of your 
                                                 
221 For influential discussions, see Hare, Language of Morals, 124-6, and 167 (on the 
‘unconscious’ inverted-commas use of value terms). 
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uncles, or just consanguine uncles? I’ve forgotten.’ Does this mean I should revise my 
statement of our explanandum to exclude inverted-commas moral forgetting? This 
example does not give me much reason to. There is little temptation to regard the 
anthropologist’s utterance as a report of moral forgetting, because we are not inclined to 
think that her lost belief was a moral belief. 
Some inverted-commas cases are more ambiguous, however. Suppose that an old-
fashioned school teacher has taken it upon herself to provide her young pupils with 
moral instruction. Her method is simply to testify that a particular set of moral 
principles is true. The children take her moral principles seriously; they denounce other 
children who violate them, and feel guilty when they themselves violate them. Observe 
that we can, without puzzlement, imagine the children memorizing, remembering, and 
forgetting the teacher’s moral principles. We can, without puzzlement, imagine the 
teacher quizzing a child on the content of a previous lesson—‘Is it morally wrong to 
covet?’—and the frustrated child replying, ‘I can’t remember!’ 
It is clearly compatible with the description of this case that the only beliefs the 
teacher ever succeeds in instilling in her students through her moral instruction are 
inverted-commas moral beliefs—e.g. beliefs about the moral opinions of the teacher. 
Their apparently moral emotions and motivations might derive in more or less complex 
ways from their desire for the teacher’s approval. Indeed not only is an inverted-
commas interpretation of the case available, it also seems very natural, and I submit that 
this explains why the case is not puzzling. But even if it were stipulated that the instilled 
beliefs were inverted-commas moral beliefs, it would not obviously be wrong to think 
that they were moral beliefs on a folk understanding. They bear considerable 
resemblance to paradigm instances of moral belief, and the resemblance may be 
sufficiently close that they fall under the folk concept of moral belief. If so, the case is a 
counterexample to the claim that moral forgetting seems absurd. So I shall revise my 
statement of our explanandum to exclude inverted-commas moral forgetting. 
Here is our new statement in full: moral forgetting seems absurd, setting aside 
LRNF and inverted-commas moral forgetting. Since I’ll have little more to say about 
LRNF and inverted-commas cases, I won’t generally bother to include this qualifying 
clause when I state our explanandum. Also, when I talk about moral belief it can be 
assumed that I have in mind only non-inverted-commas moral belief, and that when I 
talk about moral forgetting I have in mind only moral forgetting that is not merely 
LRNF, or inverted-commas moral forgetting. 
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This is my final statement of our explanandum. I’ll now see how well it fares 
against a few challenges. 
9.1.4. Rhetorical Reports of Moral Forgetting 
It might be thought that the naturalness of utterances like the following shows that it is 
not true in general that moral forgetting seems absurd: 
(7) Through years of exposure to corporate pressures and the incessant call of the rat 
race, he simply forgot that other people count. 
However, I think that (7) sounds natural only because we don’t take it literally. 
Ironic and metaphorical reports of moral forgetting have some currency in polemical, 
moralistic discourse. Some examples from the Internet: 
Mr Ammiano in his concern about trampling the rights of the LGBT community seems to 
have forgotten that the OTHER students have rights as well. Don’t the girls in a locker 
room have the right to NOT be exposed in front of members of the opposite sex?222 
If we had not forgotten that it is wrong to steal, we would not be faced today with a 
kleptocratic government ….223 
In such reports, the speaker typically presents moral forgetting as an explanation for 
actions, attitudes, or utterances which she opposes or finds regrettable for the very 
reason that they violate or contradict the supposedly forgotten moral requirements. Thus 
rhetorical reports of moral forgetting rarely attribute amnesia to the speaker herself at 
the time of utterance. If (7) seems natural because the story it tells seems natural when 
taken literally, and not because we interpret (7) as rhetorical, then this story should not 
seem absurd when we retell it (or imagine it) from the point of view of the forgetter 
before he has recovered from his amnesia, as in the following: 
(8) Through my years of exposure to corporate pressures and the incessant call of the 
rat race, I’ve simply forgotten whether or not other people count.  
This example lacks the polemical overtones of (7), and it sounds much less natural than 
(7). Moreover, if we imagine the speaker racking his brains and experiencing tip-of-
one’s-tongue feelings as he tries to recall whether or not other people count, the 
                                                 
222 Elena McCall, ‘California Passes a Bill That Forces Schools to Allow Coed Locker Rooms 
and Showers’, Conservative Blogs Central (blog), May 11, 2013, 
http://conservativeblogscentral.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/california-passes-bill-that-forces.html, 
accessed 22 May, 2015. 
223 David Blount, ‘Priest Advocates Shoplifting’, John Hawkins’ Right Wing News, December 
22, 2009. http://www.rightwingnews.com/religion/priest-advocates-shoplifting/, accessed 22 
May, 2015. 
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described forgetting seems quite absurd. Thus (7) doesn’t seem to be a counterexample 
to our explanandum. 
As the contrast between (7) and (8) suggests, among reports of moral forgetting, 
we are more than usually willing to interpret third-person reports as rhetorical. It is 
mainly for this reason that all of the reports of moral forgetting that I cite in support of 
our explanandum elsewhere in this chapter are first-personal. This does not mean that 
third-person reports are not puzzling, only that more care must be taken when devising 
third-person examples to discourage non-literal interpretations. Such discouragement 
may come in several forms. We are less likely to interpret a third-person report of moral 
forgetting as rhetorical if the reporter herself admits, especially at the time of utterance, 
to being ignorant of the forgotten truth; if the forgotten truth is unobvious; if the tone of 
the report is dispassionate; if the forgetter’s doubt is emphasized; or if the report 
somehow contrasts the forgetting with the sort of blitheness or self-deception that is 
called forgetting in rhetorical reports. 
Here are some absurd-seeming third-person reports of moral forgetting that take 
advantage of these facts to varying degrees. 
(9) Things would certainly be easier if we ended the pregnancy. But I’m not sure 
whether abortion is wrong, and Carla can’t remember. 
(10) I told him to think about what he was doing, but he didn’t want to hear. It saddened 
me. The Eddie I knew would never have had an affair with a married woman. He 
always knew that it was wrong. Well, except for that time with Laura, but on that 
occasion I think he’d just forgotten. Eddie’s pretty forgetful. 
(11) Jane’s husband repeatedly urged her to protest against the death penalty in her 
speech at the Civil Rights Society luncheon. But Jane prevaricated, and gave 
excuses for avoiding the issue. The truth was that she doubted that her husband 
really knew whether capital punishment was wrong, and she didn’t know herself 
because she couldn’t remember. 
9.1.5 Moral Forgetting Caused by the Forgetting of Moral Arguments 
One reason why the seeming absurdity of moral forgetting is surprising, and why it 
stands in particular need of explanation, is that our moral beliefs often have a theoretical 
character, and are the result of careful thought and argument. We might expect to be 
puzzled if a person lost through forgetting a belief that was directly supported by her 
present observations, sensations, or intuitions. But theoretical beliefs do not generally 
have this sort of direct support, so we should not expect their loss through forgetting to 
puzzle us. 
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Perhaps, though, this characteristic of moral beliefs makes the generalization that 
moral forgetting seems absurd a bit too surprising, inviting scepticism. Investigation 
may reveal that reporting moral forgetting does not seem absurd if the context informs 
us that the lost moral belief was theoretical rather than directly intuitive. 
This idea will reappear in 9.2, when I consider a couple of explanations for our 
intuitions about moral forgetting that do not predict that cases involving the loss of 
theoretical moral beliefs through forgetting will seem absurd (or so I argue). At this 
point I want to consider a particular version of the idea which seems to me relatively 
promising as a challenge to our explanandum. Observe that there doesn’t seem to be 
anything puzzling about forgetting arguments for moral claims. It might therefore seem 
unlikely that we would be puzzled by cases in which a person forgets a moral truth 
because she forgets an argument establishing it. If so, our explanandum must be further 
qualified. 
Admittedly, some apparently straightforward tests of the hypothesis that moral 
forgetting resulting from the forgetting of moral arguments is not puzzling seem to 
support that hypothesis. For instance: 
(12) I forgot that abortion was wrong because I forgot the argument on the basis of 
which I believed that abortion was wrong. 
I don’t have a strong intuition of absurdity when I read (12), but I also feel that I have 
only a superficial grasp of its meaning. The sentence hardly makes the reported 
psychological events vivid. We would do better to consider a more colourful example. 
The following example first illustrates what it means to forget a philosophical 
argument on the basis of which one holds a moral belief, and then illustrates how things 
might be if, having forgotten the argument, one were to lose the belief through 
forgetting. 
(13) Don Marquis has an argument which shows that killing people is wrong because it 
deprives them of their future experiences and projects. Hence killing unborn people 
is also wrong.224 This is the argument that made me realize, years ago, that abortion 
is wrong. Unfortunately I don’t have a good memory for philosophical arguments, 
and I’ve been embarrassed more than once in debates with defenders of abortion by 
my inability to remember why we should believe that abortion is wrong. Things 
recently reached a new low, however. Some acquaintances of mine were arguing 
about the ethics of abortion. I was called upon to give my opinion on the subject, 
but I found, to my frustration, that I didn’t know what to tell them. This time, not 
                                                 
224 Cf. Don Marquis, ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 183-202, 
189-92. 
279 
 
only I had I forgotten Marquis’s argument, but I’d forgotten that abortion was 
wrong too. 
This report of moral forgetting seems absurd, despite the speaker’s admission that she 
had forgotten the argument supporting her lost moral belief. So I don’t see any reason to 
weaken our explanandum by excluding cases in which the forgetting of moral 
arguments is available, or made salient, as a potential explanation for moral forgetting. 
9.1.6 Complexity 
Complex truths are generally easy to forget, so it might seem unlikely that the forgetting 
of complex moral truths would seem absurd. When testing this idea, we must be wary of 
using examples in which someone is unable to remember whether or not some complex 
moral principle is true, where the principle is picked out by its name or some identifying 
feature other than a full statement of its content. For we may be tempted to think the 
subject has merely forgotten the truth of the principle as a result of forgetting what the 
principle says, and this would be an instance of LRNF. Similarly, we must avoid 
examples in which someone has forgotten the moral status of an action in some 
complicated case, where this would naturally be explained by her inability to recall 
details of the case itself. 
I think the following example avoids these problems: 
(14) Mark wanted to know about the Doctrine of Triple Effect.225 I explained it to him 
in the following way. Suppose that (a) an agent A expects that an action φ would 
have both a good outcome and a lesser evil outcome; (b) this lesser evil outcome is 
such that it would be wrong to intend it; (c) A φ-s, taking both the expected good 
outcome and the expected lesser evil outcome to be conditions of her action, but 
not intending either; and (d) A’s φ-ing does in fact cause the good outcome. 
According to the Doctrine of Triple Effect, A’s φ-ing is not necessarily wrong, 
even though A does not intend the good, and would not have φ-ed had she not 
expected to bring about the evil. Mark found this very interesting, and wondered 
about the truth of the doctrine. Was A’s action necessarily wrong? Mark was 
inclined to think that it wasn’t. As for me, I was at a loss. I just couldn’t remember. 
Given her confident grasp of the case in question, and despite its complexity, the 
speaker’s moral forgetting seems very odd. This is consistent with my current 
formulation of our explanandum.226 
                                                 
225 What follows only approximates Kamm’s doctrine. See Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics: 
Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
118. 
226 The naturalness of the following seems to lend credence to the complexity worry: ‘I believe 
that the Doctrine of Triple Effect is true, but it’s a complex doctrine and I can’t remember all 
the details of it.’ This is not a clear counterexample to our explanandum, however. The speaker 
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9.1.7 Memory Disorders 
It would be very surprising if the generalization that moral forgetting seems absurd held 
even for cases involving people with memory disorders, such as Alzheimer’s sufferers 
and stroke victims. And yet it may hold even in these cases. Consider the following 
exchange between an old man and a care worker. 
A What’s all this rubbish doing here? 
B It’s from your daughter’s visit this morning. 
A I don’t remember that. 
B It’s your birthday. Your daughter and her family came, and you all sang and ate 
cake. 
A My birthday? How old am I then? 
B Eighty-seven. 
A Good Lord! Eighty-seven! What did Kate give me? 
B She gave you this card, and a hat, and a calendar. Look. 
A [Examines the gifts.] What rubbish! 
B That’s not what you said when she gave them to you. You were all smiles and 
thank-yous. Then when she left you threw them away. 
A Well, I suppose I was being polite. 
B Polite or not, you shouldn’t deceive people. 
A Most people think it’s alright to lie to spare someone’s feelings. 
B But are they right? 
A Hmm. Actually, I can’t remember. 
A evidently has a memory disorder, yet his report of moral forgetting seems puzzling. 
So I am not inclined to view memory disorder cases as counterexamples to our 
explanandum. 
On the other hand, I had much more trouble than usual devising a memory 
disorder case that elicits the typical intuition. There are many that do not, and while I 
suspect that this can be explained away, I lack the space here to establish this. I thus 
take the matter of whether memory disorder cases support our explanandum to be in 
doubt (more so than usual). When considering explanations for the puzzle of moral 
forgetting in the next section, I won’t count a ‘failure’ to predict that memory-disorder 
cases are puzzling as a defect of a candidate explanation. 
                                                                                                                                               
may have a moral belief whose normative content is exactly p, where p’s resemblance to the 
Doctrine of Triple Effect is imperfect but close enough that she counts as believing the Doctrine 
in virtue of having this moral belief. This being so, she may have forgotten some details about 
what the Doctrine says without having lost any moral beliefs through forgetting. Thus we can 
interpret her as speaking truly and literally without supposing that she has experienced (non-
LRNF) moral forgetting. 
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9.2 Explanations 
I’ll now evaluate some explanations for the puzzle of moral forgetting. The explanations 
are roughly organized into two groups: those in subsections 9.2.1-4 emphasize 
epistemic considerations; those in 9.2.5-7 emphasize connections between our moral 
beliefs and our cares and concerns. Most of the explanations assume a commonsense 
cognitivist metaethic; exceptions are indicated. 
9.2.1 Commonsense Moral Scepticism and the Factivity of ‘Forget’ 
Though not plausible, the following explanation for the apparent absurdity of reports of 
moral forgetting is worth considering because it is bound to suggest itself to anyone 
who gives any thought to the issue, and can be something of a distraction. ‘Forget’ is 
factive: one cannot forget or remember that p unless p. Moreover, to forget is plausibly 
to lose knowledge, not merely true belief: one cannot forget that p unless one knows that 
p. This being so, it might be thought that the reason why reports of moral forgetting 
sound odd is that they imply that the forgetter possessed moral knowledge. This 
implication seems absurd (we are to suppose) because the idea that anyone actually 
possesses moral knowledge defies common sense. The phenomenon of widespread and 
intractable moral disagreement is clear and compelling evidence that none of our moral 
beliefs is true save by accident. Our moral beliefs are merely ‘personal opinions’, not 
knowledge, and, though we may sometimes pretend otherwise, we all basically 
understand this.227 
The most obvious problem with the commonsense moral scepticism explanation is 
that moral knowledge does not seem absurd. Compare: 
(15) I knew that abortion was wrong. 
(16) I knew that abortion was wrong, but then I forgot. 
(15) sounds fine; (16) sounds absurd. The hypothesis that we are all moral sceptics deep 
down fails to explain our differing responses to these examples. 
                                                 
227 This hypothesis is only a candidate for an explanation of our intuitions about reports of 
moral forgetting. But it might also point toward a certain sort of explanation for the non-
linguistic phenomena. Why are we puzzled by cases in which people rack their brains in order 
to recover lost moral beliefs, or try to preserve their moral beliefs by memorizing or leaving 
reminders? It might be said that this is because common sense tells us that we have no reason to 
think our moral beliefs true, and hence no reason to regret or prevent their loss. 
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9.2.2 Too Obvious to Forget 
It’s not surprising that (1) strikes us as ridiculous. How could anyone forget something 
as obvious as the fact that it’s wrong to steal? Perhaps it is the obviousness of moral 
truths that explains why it seems absurd to say that one has forgotten them. 
This is another thought that a casual reflection on our problem might give rise to, 
but which clearly cannot be right. It isn’t obvious whether or not abortion, capital 
punishment, euthanasia, or killing animals for food are wrong. Yet (16) seems absurd, 
and retains this appearance when we substitute ‘capital punishment’ etc. for ‘abortion’. 
Anyway, if reports of moral forgetting sound absurd because the requirements of 
morality are obvious, I cannot see why reports of uncertainty regarding these 
requirements should not seem absurd. Yet there does not seem to be anything absurd 
about being uncertain whether or not even stealing is wrong. 
9.2.3 Intuition 
Consider the following argument: 
P1 We assume that all basic moral beliefs are supported purely by intuition. 
P2 The loss through forgetting of any belief that we assume is supported purely by 
intuition seems absurd. 
C So the loss of all basic moral beliefs through forgetting seems absurd. 
By ‘basic moral beliefs’ I mean moral beliefs that do not depend for their rationality or 
justification on beliefs about contingent matters. The phrase ‘supported purely by 
intuition’ in P1 and P2 is not meant to rule out a role for reasoning in the formation of 
the beliefs in question. I’m assuming that the role of theoretical reasoning is not to 
support beliefs, but to identify relationships of support between considerations and 
beliefs. 
Observe that it’s not immediately clear whether C predicts, as our explanandum 
does, that all moral forgetting that is not LRNF or inverted-commas moral forgetting 
will seem absurd. However, setting aside inverted-commas cases, it is plausible that the 
vast majority of (apparent) reports of moral forgetting that do not seem to imply the loss 
through forgetting of basic moral belief will be those we interpret as reports of LRNF, 
which do not seem absurd anyway. So C may well be general enough to explain the 
phenomena. At any rate, I shall confine my attention to determining the adequacy, not 
of the generality of C, but of the argument for C. 
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Why accept P1? Most of the time at least, we arrive at our moral views by 
consulting our intuitions. So perhaps we assume that people’s moral beliefs are based on 
intuition because it is generally safe to do so. Why accept P2? There is some plausibility 
in the idea that beliefs that are supported by intuition cannot (normally) be lost through 
forgetting because they are being continually ‘propped up’ by those intuitions. Since 
both P1 and P2 have some credibility, we have here a candidate for a cognitivist-
friendly explanation of our intuitions about reports of moral forgetting. 
P1 is not obviously true. Don’t we sometimes form basic moral beliefs on the 
basis of testimony?228 If so, why do we assume that basic moral beliefs are supported by 
intuition? And even if we do typically assume this, why don’t we drop the assumption 
when we are presented with a case of moral forgetting, rather than interpret it in a way 
that seems absurd?  
P2 appears to be false. Plausibly, if P2 is true, then the loss through forgetting of 
any belief that we know (rather than assume) is supported purely by intuition also seems 
absurd. But some beliefs that we know to have been formed purely on the basis of 
intuition can apparently be lost through forgetting, without this seeming absurd. I have 
in mind beliefs in propositions that are not themselves intuitively plausible, but which 
we hold because they are entailed by other propositions that are intuitively plausible. 
Consider the case of Eric, a native English-speaker who is persuaded that sentences like 
‘Jack went to the party with Jill and I’ are ungrammatical by the following intuitive 
argument: 
P1* ‘Jack went to the party with I’ is ungrammatical. 
P2* If ‘Jack went to the party with I’ is ungrammatical, then sentences like ‘Jack went 
to the party with Jill and I’ are ungrammatical. 
C* Sentences like ‘Jack went to the party with Jill and I’ are ungrammatical. 
P1* and P2* are, I trust, intuitively plausible to native speakers. Eric himself accepts 
them purely on the basis of intuition, and accepts C* purely on the basis of a deduction 
from them. Years pass, and Eric is heard to say, 
(17) Is it “Jack went to the party with Jill and I,” or “Jack went to the party with Jill and 
me”? I’ve forgotten. 
                                                 
228 It would be quite unusual for a cognitivist to deny this. A non-cognitivist might be tempted 
to, however. This is because, firstly, it is hard for a non-cognitivist to explain how moral truths 
could be communicated from one person to another in a rational way. It is not obvious that there 
is any rational process by which we can communicate desire-like attitudes to one another. 
Second, it’s not clear that denying that we form moral beliefs on the basis of testimony has a 
significant cost (cf. McGrath, ‘Skepticism About Moral Expertise’, 2011). 
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Eric’s report does not seem odd, even when we bear in mind that his reportedly 
forgotten belief was supported purely by intuition. 
Cases like Eric’s are germane because many of our moral beliefs have this sort of 
derived intuitive justification. Consider the case of Derek, who is persuaded that the 
distinction between killing and letting die has no moral relevance when he is presented 
with the following pair of examples from James Rachels: 
a woman [A] wants her uncle dead, and she gives him poison in his coffee. Another 
woman [B], who also wants her uncle dead, is about to give him poison when she sees 
him unknowingly drink poison from another source. She watches him die, withholding 
the antidote in her pocket.229 
Derek reasons as follows: 
P1ʹ A’s conduct is no worse than B’s. 
P2ʹ If A’s conduct is no worse than B’s, then killing is no worse than letting die. 
Cʹ Killing is no worse than letting die. 
Derek accepts P1ʹ and P2ʹ purely on the basis of intuition, and accepts C* purely on the 
basis of a deduction from these premises. Years pass, and Derek is heard to say, 
(18) Is killing worse than letting die? I’ve forgotten. 
This report of moral forgetting would seem odd in any non-inverted-commas context, 
and it seems odd in Derek’s. Like C*, Cʹ is not, considered by itself, very intuitively 
plausible, though it is implied by intuitively plausible premises. But it is still puzzling 
when someone who believes Cʹ on the basis of an inference from these intuitive 
premises reports that he or she has forgotten Cʹ. Perhaps Derek could have non-
rationally ceased to believe Cʹ as a result of forgetting his argument for Cʹ, but there 
seems to be something wrong with describing such a cessation of moral belief as 
forgetting. 
The argument from P1 and P2 to C is thus unsatisfactory, and I can’t think of an 
improved version of this argument that would avoid the problems I’ve raised. 
9.2.4 Speaker Subjectivism 
According to speaker subjectivism, a (simple, indicative) moral sentence is a report 
concerning the psychology of the speaker. To illustrate, let me introduce T, a toy 
                                                 
229 James Rachels, ‘Killing and Letting Die’, in Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition, eds. L. 
Becker and C. Becker (New York: Routledge, 2001), vol. 2, 948. 
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speaker subjectivist theory. T explains the meaning of (19) by postulating that it is 
identical to that of (20): 
(19) Abortion is wrong. 
(20) I disapprove of abortion. 
Speaker subjectivism is normally taken to be a purely semantic thesis. But there is an 
obvious way in which a speaker subjectivist might complement her semantics with a 
moral psychology: she might hold that moral beliefs are the mental states expressed by 
moral sentences. For example, an adherent of T might hold that for a person to believe 
(19) is just for her to believe that she disapproves of abortion. 
If speaker subjectivism is true, and if the mental states that are reported by moral 
sentences can easily be discovered through introspection, it looks as though we can 
explain why moral forgetting seems absurd. T explains the meaning of (21) by holding 
that it is identical to that of (22): 
(21) I’ve forgotten whether or not abortion is wrong. 
(22) I’ve forgotten whether or not I disapprove of abortion. 
Thus if T is true, (21) presumably sounds ridiculous for the same reason that (22) does. 
That is, because it is generally harder to forget easily introspectable facts about one’s 
own psychology than it is to forget facts about the external world, and (less importantly) 
because there is not usually any point in telling people that one has forgotten a fact that 
one could rediscover through a moment’s introspection. 
A proponent of T who coupled her semantics with a moral psychology in the 
manner described above could provide a parallel explanation for the seeming absurdity 
of cases in which distinctively mnemonic behaviours and feelings follow from a loss of 
moral belief. She need merely point out that to apparently lose a belief about what one 
disapproves of through forgetting seems bizarre even when this appearance is generated 
solely by a description of the behaviours and feelings caused by the belief-loss. 
Unfortunately, the speaker subjectivist hypothesis is not a satisfactory and 
adequately general explanation for the phenomena. T holds that (23) has the same 
meaning as (24): 
(23) I spent days trying to decide whether or not abortion is wrong. 
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(24) I spent days trying to decide whether or not I disapproved of abortion.230 
In ordinary language, (24) can be interpreted in two ways, one literal, the other non-
literal (but more natural). I’ll stipulate that T gives the literal interpretation of (24) as its 
translation of (23). On this reading (24) is a report that the speaker spent days engaging 
in psychological inquiry in order to find out whether or not she disapproved of abortion. 
Facts about your psychology that you can only discover through days of inquiry are 
facts that you can easily forget—at least, there is in general no unusual obstacle to your 
forgetting them. Such facts will not be easily introspectable; they will be more akin to 
the facts a professional psychologist would postulate to explain your thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviour. 
It is thus doubtful that speaker subjectivism can offer a good explanation for the 
absurdity of many reports of moral forgetting, such as: 
(25) I spent days trying to decide whether or not abortion is wrong. But when I finally 
knew the answer, I was summoned to sit on a jury, and had to turn my attention to 
other moral problems. By the time the trial was over, I really needed to decide 
whether or not to terminate my pregnancy, but I found I couldn’t remember 
whether or not abortion was wrong. 
T would translate (25) thus: 
(26) I spent days trying to decide whether or not I disapproved of abortion. But when I 
finally knew the answer, I was summoned to sit on a jury, and had to turn my 
attention to other moral problems. By the time the trial was over, I really needed to 
decide whether or not to terminate my pregnancy, but I found I couldn’t remember 
whether or not I disapproved of abortion. 
Admittedly, (26) does sound very odd, for a variety of reasons. But if T is true, and if 
we bear in mind that the speaker’s belief about her attitude to abortion is theoretical 
rather than directly introspective—as we must do if the first sentence of (26) is to make 
sense—then there shouldn’t be anything to be puzzled about in the speaker’s admission 
that she lost this belief through forgetting. 
Now, as a matter of fact there is something puzzling—a residual oddness—about 
this admission even when we bear in mind the theoretical nature of the belief, just as 
there is a residual oddness about the utterance, ‘I forgot that I hate my stepfather’, even 
when we know that the speaker only ever believed that he hated his stepfather on the 
basis of his psychologist’s testimony. But this is surely due to the fact that it is quite 
                                                 
230 This translation may be inadequate given the past tense; (24) should perhaps read, ‘I spent 
days deliberating on the question of whether or not I (then) disapproved of (and now disapprove 
of) abortion.’ Alterations of this sort will not importantly affect my argument. 
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unusual for people’s beliefs about their affective states to have this sort of inferential 
justification. If T were true, however, having an inference-based belief about what one 
approves of ought to be a very ordinary condition, no less ordinary than that of holding 
a moral belief that one does not find obviously true. So forgetting what one approves of 
presumably ought to be a common and familiar occurrence, and not a puzzling one. An 
adherent of T cannot point to the residual oddness of the report of psychological 
forgetting in (26) to explain the puzzling character of (25) unless she can explain why 
this residual oddness is present. 
Recall that (24), in ordinary speech, has an alternative interpretation. If someone 
utters (24) she normally means that she spent days engaging, not in psychological 
inquiry, but in a kind of mental activity that commonly has as one of its outcomes the 
formation in the subject of a new attitude of approval, disapproval, or tolerance toward 
something. This mental activity is ordinarily called ‘moral reasoning’, but I shall call it 
approval-pumping.231 As a piece of ordinary speech, (24) would normally be taken to 
mean, in my terminology, 
(27) I spent days engaging in approval-pumping vis-à-vis abortion. 
It might be wondered whether a speaker subjectivist could plausibly give (27) 
instead of (24) as her translation of (23). To know this, we must have some idea what 
approval-pumping is for a speaker subjectivist. I assume that a speaker subjectivist 
would favour a characterization of approval-pumping similar to that which a pure 
expressivist or an emotivist might offer. That is, she would view it a is a fundamentally 
non-cognitive mental activity. She would not hold, as other cognitivists might, that 
approval-pumping is a kind of doxastic reasoning, and that the changes in a person’s 
approval states that it leads to are the result of changes in her moral beliefs. A speaker 
subjectivist is in no position to claim that our moral beliefs alter what we disapprove of, 
when she also claims that those beliefs are about what we disapprove of. 
This being so, the speaker subjectivist who gave (27) as her translation of (23) 
would incur a high cost. Observe that replacing the first sentence of (25) or (26) with 
(27) yields, 
(28) I spent days engaging in approval-pumping vis-à-vis abortion. But when I finally 
knew the answer…. 
                                                 
231 ‘Moral reasoning’ suggests much about the nature of this approval-affecting activity which is 
not metaethically neutral, and which might be misleading in the present context (e.g. it suggests 
that the activity is a kind of reasoning).  
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‘Knew the answer’? What could this mean? If speaker subjectivism is true, approval-
pumping is not a search for answers (answers to what?), and its output is just an 
approval-type attitude, not knowledge. The corresponding parts of (25) and (26) make 
good sense, but (28) is baffling. Such implications give us reason to reject this version 
of speaker subjectivism. It looks as though speaker subjectivism is incapable of 
providing a general explanation for the puzzle of moral forgetting unless it is modified 
in ways that greatly diminish its plausibility. 
9.2.5 Too Important to Forget 
Moral facts often matter a great deal to people, and it can be surprising when someone 
forgets a fact that matters to her. Perhaps this explains why moral forgetting is puzzling. 
This explanation obviously needs refinement. People forget things that matter to 
them all the time—this is why forgetting is often frustrating. It’s not normally a 
puzzling phenomenon. Moreover, part of the reason why forgetting facts that matter to 
us is comparatively unusual, and hence surprising to the extent that it is, is that we often 
make a greater conscious effort to remember such facts—for instance, by mentally 
reminding ourselves of them, or leaving external reminders, or memorizing. Yet this 
sort of conscious effort would itself seem bizarre in a case involving moral belief. 
However, there are some important non-normative truths whose forgetting is quite 
robustly puzzling. The following would sound very strange in almost any context: 
(29) I forgot that God exists. 
Remembering whether God exists also rarely seems to require or involve effortful self-
reminding or memorizing. And it is plausible that this is because it matters a great deal 
to people whether or not God exists. (30) might seem to provide proponents of the ‘too 
important’ explanation with grounds for thinking that a successful refinement of that 
explanation is waiting to be discovered. 
Unfortunately, a crucial premise of the ‘too important’ explanation is false. It is 
not plausible that, in every puzzling case of moral forgetting, the forgotten moral fact 
mattered greatly to the forgetter (or that we assume that it did). A person may have an 
opinion about whether or not some moral claim p is true, and yet not care much whether 
or not p. This is not a puzzling state of affairs. Yet we would still find it odd if she 
subsequently claimed to have forgotten whether or not p. Consider: 
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(30) I let Carla know that the abortion question had never mattered to or interested me, 
but she still insisted on hearing my opinion on it. Unfortunately I couldn’t tell her 
whether or not abortion is wrong, because I’d forgotten. 
The first sentence of (31) is not particularly puzzling, but the report of moral forgetting 
sounds absurd in the familiar way. 
Perhaps we doubt that the speaker of (31) is sincere when she claims not to care 
about the ethics of abortion, so let me make the same point again, appealing to different 
evidence. It is surely not true that almost every moral question matters to almost 
everyone. There are countless obscure moral questions that few people have thought 
important enough to have formed opinions on. Yet it still sounds odd when someone 
reports having forgotten the answer to such a question. Consider: 
(31) Tim and I both agreed that it’s permissible to kill in self-defence even when one’s 
attacker is an innocent person acting under hypnosis. But when Tim asked me if it 
would be permissible for a murderer to kill an innocent, hypnotized aggressor in 
self-defence, I was at a loss. I just couldn’t remember. 
It is not very plausible that (32) is puzzling because we presume that the reportedly 
forgotten fact mattered greatly to the speaker. Why would we presume that the question 
of whether a murderer may kill a hypnotized aggressor in self-defence ever mattered to 
the speaker, when it apparently matters to hardly anyone else?232 
9.2.6 A ‘Companion in Absurdity’ 
Even if the ‘too important’ explanation fails, the fact that (29) (‘I forgot that God 
exists’) strikes us as very odd may give encouragement to those who hope to provide a 
satisfying explanation for the puzzle of moral forgetting from a commonsense 
cognitivist perspective. It seems plausible that whatever it is that explains why (29) is 
puzzling may also explain why moral forgetting is puzzling. 
This idea is plausible, I think, because moral beliefs and fundamental religious 
beliefs seem to be, in similar ways, different from most mundane non-normative beliefs. 
For instance, moral and religious beliefs are often ‘deeply held’; they amount to 
‘convictions’ rather than mere beliefs with unusual frequency. A person’s fundamental 
moral and religious beliefs are, it may be thought, ‘part of who she is’, not (merely) 
                                                 
232 There is a moralized variation on the ‘too important’ explanation, according to which moral 
forgetting is puzzling because it is evidence of a lack of concern about moral truth, and we think 
that moral truths ought to matter to people. This variation faces the same counterexamples as the 
original. It predicts, implausibly, that we will be puzzled by cases in which someone believes a 
moral truth p but does not care greatly whether p, however obscure p may be. 
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parts of her representation of the world.233 It seems acceptable for a person’s moral or 
religious beliefs to be influenced to a degree by her personality and feelings—to a 
greater degree than her beliefs about geography and physics anyway. And it’s not wildly 
implausible to suppose that the adoption of genuine and reasonable moral and religious 
beliefs can involve an element of practical choice (the voluntary adoption of a stance, or 
the making of a commitment), rather than a simple weighing-up of evidence. 
This is all very impressionistic. It is far from clear that there is any property, of 
the sort just mentioned, that is indeed possessed by all relevant moral and religious 
beliefs, and that explains our responses to (29). And the ‘companions in absurdity’ 
explanation (or proto-explanation) that hypothesizes that there is such a property is 
actually less promising than it at first appears, for any such property would have an 
explanatory rival. There is at least one property of beliefs in the existence of God that 
suffices to explain our intuitions about (29), but which is probably not shared by all of 
those moral beliefs whose loss through forgetting would puzzle us. 
I think we normally assume that believing in God’s existence involves having 
faith in God. Having faith in God seems to involve, inter alia, believing that God is 
entitled to obedience and reverence. The distinctive features of belief in God’s existence 
that look as though they might explain our responses to both (29) and cases of moral 
forgetting are almost all distinctive features of faith in God. But of course it is possible 
to have a belief in God’s existence that involves no element of faith at all—for instance, 
one might believe in God because one thinks the universe looks designed, and yet not 
think we owe God anything. 
The following case is designed to elicit our intuitions about the loss through 
forgetting of non-faith belief in the existence of God (or at least of God-like entities). 
(32) If there’s a God, he doesn’t deserve our devotion. Why worship an omnipotent 
being who let the Holocaust happen? The problem of evil seems to rule out any 
God resembling that of the Abrahamic religions. Is the universe nonetheless the 
creation of an omnipotent intelligent being? I don’t know—I’ve forgotten. 
The report of forgetting in (32) doesn’t seem to indicate a loss of faith, but it still sounds 
very odd. Forgetting whether or not God exists would normally involve forgetting 
                                                 
233 Incidentally, the hypothesis that the foregoing considerations explain why moral forgetting 
seems absurd is, I think, only as plausible as the ‘too important’ explanation (Section 2.5). For 
surely, if someone’s moral belief that p is deeply held, or is a part who she is, then it is 
important to her whether or not p. Yet, as I have argued, the forgetting of a moral truth can seem 
puzzling even if that truth was apparently not important to the forgetter. 
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whether or not the universe was created by an omnipotent intelligent being, and (32) 
suggests that forgettings of the latter sort are puzzling even when they involve no loss of 
faith. Why then should we think that (29) is puzzling because, like moral beliefs, 
fundamental religious beliefs are ‘deeply held’, or may reasonably be influenced by our 
feelings or personalities, or involve some sort of practical commitment?234 We have 
little reason to assume that the belief the speaker of (32) claims to have lost had any of 
these properties (even when we ignore the speaker’s claim that it was lost through 
forgetting). 
Why does (32) sound puzzling? Perhaps because, if it were true that the universe 
was created by an omnipotent intelligent being, this would be an astounding and 
momentous truth, and thus a difficult one to forget. But this is only a conjecture. I don’t 
think I’m obliged to provide an explanation for our responses to (32). What matters for 
my purposes is, first, that it is plausible that whatever explains why (32) is puzzling also 
explains why (29) is puzzling and, second, that it is not very plausible that whatever 
explains why (32) is puzzling also explains why moral forgetting is puzzling. It’s hard 
to think of a common distinctive feature of moral beliefs and non-faith beliefs about 
omnipotent creators that might explain why the loss of both through forgetting is 
puzzling. 
9.2.7 Traditional Non-cognitivism 
I give the label traditional non-cognitivist to a non-cognitivist who accepts what in 
Chapter 7 I called the Basic Judgement-Basic Attitude thesis—who holds that basic 
moral judgements do not depend on cognitive attitudes for their rationality. Perhaps the 
most straightforward explanation a traditional non-cognitivist can offer for the puzzle of 
moral forgetting, and the explanation I’ll focus on, is psychological. There are many 
non-cognitive attitudes that plausibly cannot be lost through forgetting. The traditional 
non-cognitivist can explain our puzzle by identifying moral beliefs with any of these 
attitudes. This sort of explanation is not available to the cognitivist because cognitive 
attitudes can be lost through forgetting (information can be forgotten). 
On this account, what exactly is going on when we judge that a case of moral 
forgetting seems absurd? Take a species of traditional non-cognitivism that holds that a 
                                                 
234 Of course, it’s not uncommon for non-faith beliefs about God’s existence to be ‘deeply held’ 
(e.g. in the case of passionate atheism). But a confident general assumption that they are ‘deeply 
held’ seems unjustified.  
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moral belief is a certain sort of desire. If this is correct, when a person reports moral 
forgetting, she is reporting the loss through forgetting of a desire. In doing so she 
betrays conceptual confusion, for desires cannot be lost through forgetting. The 
utterance’s appearance of absurdity is explained by our grasp of the relevant concepts. 
To explain why we are puzzled when behaviours and feelings associated with forgetting 
are exhibited or experienced in connection with the loss of moral belief, a defender of 
this non-cognitivist theory need merely point out that such behaviours and feelings also 
seem incongruous in connection with the loss of desires. It would be very odd to rack 
one’s brains in order to re-form a lost desire, and to feel relief upon succeeding; and it is 
not clear that the idea of a conative analogue of memorizing and leaving reminders 
makes any sense. 
I’ll now consider two objections to the traditional non-cognitivist explanation for 
the puzzle of moral forgetting. A non-cognitivist cannot avail herself of my proposed 
explanation if she identifies moral beliefs with non-cognitive attitudes of a sort that can 
be lost through forgetting. Are there any such attitudes? Among the more familiar non-
cognitive attitudes, it seems intuitively clear that attitudes such as desire, preference, 
liking, and approval cannot be lost through forgetting. But I’m not sure about intentions. 
Suppose that Alice goes to the store to buy milk, but, upon arriving, is unable to 
remember what she went there for. She has evidently lost an intention, and it seems that 
this loss might be an instance of forgetting. This case is not puzzling. Moreover, I am 
not puzzled when I try to imagine Alice racking her brains in an effort to re-form this 
intention. 
I’m thus not sure that non-cognitivists who, like Allan Gibbard,235 identify 
normative beliefs with intention-like attitudes can explain why moral forgetting seems 
puzzling. If intentions can be lost through forgetting, and if postulating that moral 
beliefs are intention-like provides the traditional non-cognitivist with important 
advantages, then the traditional non-cognitivist explanation may be in trouble. This is a 
real worry, which I can’t fully assuage at present. But the oft-cited advantages of 
identifying moral beliefs with intention-like attitudes when it comes to explaining how 
there can be relations of rational incoherence and disagreement among moral 
judgements,236 do not seem to be unique. A person can have incoherent combinations of 
                                                 
235 Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. 
236 For an introductory discussion, see Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics, 88-91. 
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preferences, just as she can have incoherent combinations of intentions.237 And, as I 
argued in Chapter 1, Charles Stevenson’s cases of ‘disagreement in attitude’, which are 
often taken to be paradigms of non-cognitive disagreement, can plausibly be interpreted 
as disagreements in preference rather than disagreements in intention. So I’m not 
convinced that the possibility that intentions can be lost through forgetting significantly 
undermines the traditional non-cognitivist explanation. 
Let us turn to the second objection.238 If traditional non-cognitivism is correct, 
there is a species of thought and talk involving non-cognitive attitudes and their 
expression that, in its superficial features, quite closely resembles thought and talk 
involving cognitive attitudes and their expression. There is, for instance, a non-cognitive 
state of mind superficially resembling cognitive uncertainty. There are speech acts 
relating to the expression of non-cognitive attitudes that superficially resemble the 
information-conveying and information-requesting speech acts of asserting and 
questioning. There is a way of expressing non-cognitive attitudes that resembles the 
insincere expression of cognitive attitudes. Many more such examples could be cited. 
Furthermore, to a remarkable extent, our ordinary concepts do not discriminate 
between these non-cognitive states of mind and communicative behaviours, and their 
cognitive analogues. Our concept of uncertainty applies promiscuously to both moral 
and non-normative uncertainty, despite the underlying psychological differences 
between these mental states. The same goes for our concepts of assertion, questioning, 
sincerity, and so on, mutatis mutandis. 
Given this, and given what we know about desire-like attitudes (setting aside 
intentions), we might expect moral thought on a traditional non-cognitivist view to have 
an analogue of forgetting among its features. Forgetting is, among other things perhaps, 
the non-rational loss of knowledge. Desire-like attitudes can be, and seemingly are, lost 
over time via non-rational processes. Most traditional non-cognitivists will want to say 
that some of our desire-like attitudes constitute knowledge. So most traditional non-
cognitivists will probably want to hold that moral knowledge can be lost non-rationally. 
But if ‘cognitive-seeming’ concepts such as uncertainty are as elastic, and as 
undiscriminating with respect to underlying psychological differences, as non-
                                                 
237 See also Baker and Woods, ‘How Expressivists’, esp. 404-409, for an argument that 
someone who simultaneously likes and dislikes something, or approves and disapproves of 
something, exhibits incoherence of a sort appropriate for expressivists’ explanatory purposes. 
238 Thanks to a referee for raising the following objection. 
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cognitivists will want to maintain they are, why doesn’t this way of losing moral 
knowledge count as forgetting? Is the concept of forgetting less elastic and 
undiscriminating? Absent an explanation, traditional non-cognitivism, in conjunction 
with its typical commitments, seems to falsely predict that moral forgetting should not 
seem absurd. 
However, I think that traditional non-cognitivists can supply such an explanation. 
Non-cognitivists are not committed to the view that our ‘cognitive-seeming’ concepts 
are undiscriminating with respect to the superficial features of our moral psychologies. 
And traditional non-cognitivism predicts that forgetting and its nearest moral-
psychological analogue will differ superficially. For, as I have already pointed out, we 
are puzzled when we imagine cases in which the cessation of desire-like attitudes, apart 
from intentions, produces the distinctive behavioural and phenomenological symptoms 
of forgetting. This suggests that the non-rational loss of desire-like attitudes does not in 
fact characteristically generate these symptoms. These symptoms are surface features of 
forgetting. Traditional non-cognitivists can thus plausibly and consistently maintain that 
the nearest moral analogue of forgetting is just too different from paradigmatic 
forgetting in its surface features to be subsumed under the concept of forgetting without 
undermining the distinctiveness and integrity of that concept. 
I have assumed in the foregoing discussion that the cognitive-seeming features of 
moral thought and talk fall under the same concepts as their cognitive analogues, just as 
they appear to. Some non-cognitivists may reject this assumption and deny the 
appearances. They may hold, for instance, that there is no such thing as moral 
uncertainty strictly speaking, or that moral uncertainty and non-normative uncertainty 
fall under distinct ‘uncertainty-like’ concepts. But non-cognitivists who deny the 
appearances must still explain them, and they must still explain why the concept of 
forgetting bucks the trend—why this concept does not appear to apply to its closest 
moral-psychological analogue. Such non-cognitivists thus face a version of the 
objection I have just responded to. I suspect that they can offer a similar response, but I 
will not attempt to show this. 
Doesn’t the traditional non-cognitivist explanation face more obvious and serious 
problems than the two I have considered? Doesn’t the hypothesis that moral beliefs are 
desire-like lead to nasty semantic or meta-semantic problems? Doesn’t it make 
accounting for the phenomenon of moral uncertainty extremely difficult? I won’t argue 
otherwise here. But while these apparent defects do diminish the independent 
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plausibility of the traditional non-cognitivist explanation, they are inherited wholly from 
traditional non-cognitivism itself. And if the general problems of traditional non-
cognitivism are to count against the non-cognitivist explanation, then traditional non-
cognitivism’s general advantages must be allowed to count in favour of that 
explanation. Since traditional non-cognitivism is still, after much scrutiny, regarded as a 
defensible view in metaethics, its advantages (other than its success at predicting our 
explanandum) presumably go a fair way toward making up for its defects. My policy in 
this chapter, with few exceptions, has been to ignore the general advantages and 
disadvantages of putatively defensible metaethical theories in my evaluation of the 
independent plausibility of explanations for the puzzle of moral forgetting that 
presuppose them.239 If philosophers are right to regard these theories as defensible, this 
policy should not have severely distorted my evaluations, and it has allowed me to focus 
more narrowly on the issue of moral forgetting than I could have done otherwise.240 
The traditional non-cognitivist explanation for the puzzle of moral forgetting is 
the best among those I’ve considered (and the fiduciary non-cognitivist explanation that 
I consider in the next subsection does not improve upon it). It saves all the phenomena, 
without apparently generating any novel and very serious problems. Explaining our 
intuitions about moral forgetting is a desideratum that all metaethical theories must 
strive to meet, and one that deserves more attention than it has received. Traditional 
non-cognitivism’s success at meeting it is a hitherto under-appreciated reason to prefer 
traditional non-cognitivism to its cognitivist rivals. 
9.2.8 Fiduciary Non-cognitivism 
It might not be clear that the non-cognitivist theory that I have defended in this thesis 
can, like traditional non-cognitivism, explain our explanandum. There are two apparent 
reasons for doubt. 
First, unlike traditional non-cognitivism, fiduciary non-cognitivism rejects the 
Basic Judgement-Basic Attitude thesis. On the fiduciary non-cognitivist account, the 
                                                 
239 I arguably strayed from this policy when I compared the relative merits of non-cognitivist 
theories that identify moral beliefs with intention-like states and those that do not (despite the 
fact that theories of both sorts may be considered defensible). This was because it looked as 
though the former might enjoy an unusually clear and decisive advantage over the latter. 
240 My objection to the version of the speaker subjectivist explanation that I considered at the 
end of Section 2.4 was based on the assumption that its defects were novel, not inherited from 
any putatively defensible speaker subjectivist theory. This being so, I was not in a position to 
assume that these defects were balanced by other advantages. 
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non-cognitive component of a judgement of basic principle is not a basic non-cognitive 
attitude. It is a preference that depends for its rationality on cognitive attitudes 
(admissible credences) of a predominantly a priori sort. A priori beliefs can be lost 
through forgetting—a person can forget what single number 7×8 equals, for instance. 
The loss through forgetting of the cognitive attitudes on which a moralist’s voiceable 
preference depends would normally result in a cessation of the preference. It is not clear 
that such a cessation would not count as an instance of forgetting. For this reason, it is 
not clear that fiduciary non-cognitivism predicts that a loss of basic moral belief through 
forgetting would puzzle us. 
I don’t think it is a problem for fiduciary non-cognitivism’s explanation of the 
puzzling character of moral forgetting that voiceable preferences depend on beliefs that 
can be lost through forgetting. For one thing, with the possible exception of intentions, 
non-cognitive attitudes that depend for their rationality on cognitive attitudes that can be 
lost through forgetting cannot apparently be lost through forgetting themselves. If a 
person forgets that there is beer in the fridge, and so loses her preference to go to the 
fridge, it is intuitively incorrect to say that this loss of preference was an instance of 
forgetting. She might rack her brain in an effort to recover her belief about whether 
there was beer in the fridge, but she would not rack her brain in an effort to recover her 
lost preference. 
For another thing, although I have been calling the cognitive attitudes that 
voiceable preferences are based on ‘beliefs’, this was a rather loose way of talking. 
They are not genuine beliefs at all. Moralists’ admissible credences are credences 
concerning the consequences of following norms in the actual world, but they are based 
on a profoundly impoverished body of evidence, one that excludes all considerations 
bearing on the circumstances a moral entrusted party will find herself in at a time of 
action. They thus do not qualify as justified beliefs or knowledge, and consequently 
their non-rational cessation cannot count as forgetting. (At least this is provisionally 
true—I can’t be sure that the admissible credences on which simplicity desires depend 
cannot be lost through forgetting, because I have failed to produce an account of the 
provenance of simplicity desires, and producing one would require making new 
postulations about admissible ground-types.) So if a loss of cognitive attitudes on which 
a basic moral judgement depended resulted in a loss of the basic moral judgement, it 
could not be the case that the former loss would be an instance of forgetting, and so 
would ‘infect’ the latter loss in such a way as to make it an instance of forgetting too. 
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Here is a second apparent reason to doubt that fiduciary non-cognitivism can 
provide a cost-free explanation of the puzzle of moral forgetting. I have not given a full 
account of what moral beliefs, qua mental states, consist of for fiduciary non-
cognitivists. It is possible that, on the most plausible version of fiduciary non-
cognitivism, moral beliefs consist of combinations of cognitive and non-cognitive 
attitudes. The cognitive attitudes, I assume, would be beliefs whose truth would explain 
why the moral believer’s voiceable preferences made the prescription that they did 
about the actions in question. So if a utilitarian judged that stealing in circumstances C 
was wrong, this judgement would consist of a voiceable preference for conformity to 
norms requiring happiness-maximization, and a cognitive belief that stealing in C would 
not maximize happiness. (Or rather, these are the attitudes that would realize the 
judgement in her case; it is probably best to think of a judgement that stealing in C is 
wrong as the disjunctive set of pairs of voiceable preferences and cognitive beliefs that 
would realize the judgement.) The cognitive component of a basic moral belief would, I 
assume, be an analytic triviality. For instance, a utilitarian’s belief that happiness-
maximization is necessarily required would consist of a voiceable preference for 
conformity to norms requiring happiness-maximization, and a cognitive belief that 
maximizing happiness is necessarily happiness-maximizing. 
Suppose that, for the fiduciary non-cognitivist, moral judgements are composed of 
cognitive and non-cognitive attitudes in the way I have described. Cognitive attitudes 
can be lost through forgetting, and if a cessation of moral belief resulted from the loss 
through forgetting of its cognitive component, it is not clear that this cessation would 
not be an instance of forgetting. 
My response to this problem is predictable, because it is not unobvious, and 
because it echoes a point I made on behalf of the intuition explanation in 9.2.3.241 It is 
not desirable that fiduciary non-cognitivism should predict that all prima facie cases of 
moral forgetting seem absurd, in part because these include case of LRNF, and LRNF 
does not seem absurd in general. If fiduciary non-cognitivism predicts that the loss 
through forgetting of the contingent-belief component of a derived moral belief can 
result in the loss through forgetting of the moral belief, this is not obviously any cost to 
fiduciary non-cognitivism. It would be a problem if fiduciary non-cognitivism predicted 
that we would not be puzzled by cases in which a moralist lost through forgetting the 
                                                 
241 The point concerned whether or not ‘C’ sufficed to predict our explanandum. 
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cognitive component of a basic moral belief, and reported having lost the basic moral 
belief through forgetting. This would contradict our explanandum. But the version of 
fiduciary non-cognitivism under consideration does not make this prediction. It says that 
the cognitive component of a basic moral belief is a very obvious analytic belief. Thus 
the case ought to puzzle us merely in virtue of the fact that it asks us to imagine that 
someone might lose such a belief through forgetting. 
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Conclusion 
If we are prepared to make certain assumptions and overlook a few omissions, fiduciary 
non-cognitivism broadly meets the nine desiderata that I listed in the Introduction 
(namely, ‘Disagreement’; ‘Justification, criticism, and demands for grounds’; ‘Moral 
uncertainty’; ‘Moral reasoning and changes of motivation’; ‘The existence of morality’; 
‘Ubiquity of moral thought and talk’; ‘Rule-like character of moral requirements’; 
‘Moral forgetting’; ‘Moral approval and disapproval’). 
The theory explains the robustness of moral disagreement—though I have only 
shown this for disagreements of basic principle, and not in cases of purely hypothetical 
or past-tense disagreement—by positing that moral judgements involve voiceable 
preferences of parties to a dual-order fully connected network, and by giving an account 
of moral judgement which ensures that the voiceable preferences involved in permission 
and prohibition judgements about the same action are mutually unsatisfiable. 
It explains the use of moral judgements to justify and criticize, and explains our 
entitlement to demand that people give the grounds for their moral judgements. Parties 
to dual-order fully connected networks can, in general, voice preferences in order to 
defend or object to actions. They have discursive entitlements to demand that other 
members should explain why they have the voiceable preferences they do. More 
specifically, members of the moral trust network have similar entitlements to demand 
that other moralists reveal the ‘norm-principles’ that explain their judgements. The 
explanations will be less satisfying to other moralists if the norm-principles lack 
generality, or would not plausibly be compatible with any simple comprehensive norm-
partition that also entailed the moralist’s previously avowed norms. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism can account for uncertainty about basic moral 
principles. Moral indecision is a state of having two or more best-preferred 
comprehensive norm-partition between which one’s expected weighted utilities qua 
moralist fail to discriminate. A moralist has less than perfect confidence in a norm if the 
expected weighted utility for her (behind the ‘veil of ignorance’) of conforming to her 
best-preferred comprehensive norm-partition among those entailing the norm is lower 
than a certain value N. N is the value such that, if she were perfectly rational and 
logically omniscient, conformity to her best-preferred comprehensive norm-partition 
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would have an expected weighted utility of N for her. It is often rational to act on a 
moral judgement which one holds with imperfect confidence, according to fiduciary 
non-cognitivism, because doing so will normally be the best way to satisfy one’s 
discretional desires qua moralist. 
Unlike most non-cognitivist theories, fiduciary non-cognitivism explains the 
changes in moral motivation that not uncommonly result from substantive moral 
reasoning without committing to the thesis (‘Heft’) that higher-order non-cognitive 
attitudes reliably cause changes in lower-order ones. Moral reasoning is instrumental 
reasoning affecting voiceable preferences. When it produces new voiceable preferences, 
our discretional desires reliably motivate us to act on them. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism makes the existence of morality less surprising than 
other non-cognitivist theories do. It posits that our moral practices and thoughts are 
similar in kind to other more localized practices and thoughts that are plausibly found in 
clannish families and communities for instance; and holds that the same sorts of factors 
that explain the existence of these localized practices explain the existence of the moral 
trust network. The theory does have significant commitments in evolutionary biology, 
but these appear to be somewhat smaller than those of rival theories like Gibbard’s, 
because it explains many facts about moral thought and talk by pointing out the 
instrumental advantages of the ‘institution’ of morality, rather than by giving them a 
biological explanation. My failure to explain moralists’ simplicity desires is admittedly 
a serious problem for my theory, but it is not clear to me that rival non-cognitivist 
theories can provide a good (presumably evolutionary) explanation of the virtuousness 
of simplicity in moral theorizing either. 
I have gamely striven to explain the ubiquity of moral thought and talk by arguing 
that, in certain environments, there is a way in which humans might have evolved 
dispositions to extend their trust and commitments to other humans almost 
indiscriminately, in the way that the existence of an all-encompassing moral trust 
network requires. More convincingly, I have also argued that we must posit something 
like the moral trust network if we are to give a wholly satisfactory explanation of the 
phenomena of moral approval and disapproval. 
According to fiduciary non-cognitivism, moral requirements are apparently rule-
like in character because abuses of trust by parties to the moral network will be easier to 
detect if moralists only have voices in moralists’ choices of which rules or norms to 
follow, and are somehow induced to prefer that moralists should follow simpler rather 
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than more complex norms. The simplifying influence on moralists’ preferred norms is a 
weighted desire, possessed by almost all moralists, that moralists should follow simpler 
norms. This is another feature of my theory that is undermined by my failure to explain 
why moralists would have such desires. 
Like most traditional non-cognitivist theories, fiduciary non-cognitivism correctly 
predicts that we will be puzzled by cases that invite us to think that someone has lost a 
basic moral judgement through forgetting. Such judgements, according to fiduciary non-
cognitivism consist in or are based on attitudes whose loss through forgetting is either 
impossible (desire-like attitudes) or would be very surprising (admissible credences, 
trivial analytic beliefs). 
As I more or less noted above, fiduciary non-cognitivism explains the phenomena 
of moral approval and disapproval in light of Philippa Foot’s observation that 
approbation seems to require a certain kind of social context, by postulating the 
existence of a trust network linking all moralists. 
These virtues notwithstanding, my theory and my argument for it are deficient in 
crucial respects. Chief among these are my aforementioned failure to explain why 
moralists have simplicity desires, and my commitment to the possibility and 
significance for rational decision-making of infinitesimal (or perhaps just near-
infinitesimal) credences. Though I have argued that fiduciary non-cognitivism’s 
commitments in evolutionary biology are smaller than is typical for a non-cognitivist 
theory, they are still weighty. Some of my evolutionary conjectures seem far-fetched 
from the philosopher’s armchair, and I haven’t yet attempted to assess them empirically. 
I have not established whether the trust relationships on which fiduciary non-
cognitivism relies can exist in the absence of normative judgements of the sort that the 
theory seeks to explain; nor have I established whether, if they cannot, relying instead 
on some surrogate for trust (say, ‘reliance’) in my theorizing will result in an adequate 
theory. I have not examined the possibility and implications of public defection from the 
moral trust network; such an inquiry might reveal serious difficulties for my theory. 
Fiduciary non-cognitivism about morality will be much less plausible if a fiduciary non-
cognitivist construal of other kinds of normative and evaluative thought and talk turns 
out to be implausible, and I have not attempted to show that this is not the case. 
My endorsement of the Disparity Hypothesis in 8.2.1 raises a set of problems for 
my theory that I haven’t properly acknowledged yet, nor indeed properly fathomed. The 
Disparity Hypothesis, it will be recalled, holds that as a general matter, an entrusted 
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party is obliged to perform the action with the highest expected weighted utility for his 
partner relative to his (the entrusted party’s) evidence, not to accommodate her 
voiceable preferences; and that he is entitled to resist doing so only if it is to perform the 
action with the highest expected weighted utility for him relative to his evidence, not the 
action that satisfies his voiceable preference. This makes pressing a number of questions 
concerning the relationship between an entrusted party’s voiceable preferences and his 
estimations of what has the highest expected weighted utility for him relative to his 
evidence. When an entrusted party takes advantage of his discretion to resist his 
partner’s demands, should we expect him to choose the option that he voiceably prefers, 
or the option such that he a believes that it has the highest expected weighted utility for 
him relative to his evidence? Can these two options differ if he is rational? Would the 
second possibility have the result that the practical deliberation of moralists involves an 
implausible amount of introspection and theorizing about their own psychologies? 
Moral reasoning is a difficult enterprise, and a moralist will often have a very low 
confidence that the option that had the highest expected weighted utility for him by his 
lights was the option with the highest expected weighted utility for him relative to his 
evidence. Might such a moralist be too afraid to act on his norms for fear that he was 
exceeding his discretion? I have ideas as to how to address these questions—some 
involve the liberal postulation of what in 8.2.1 I called ‘excuses’ for acting on false 
estimations of what would best satisfy weighted desires—but of course I have not 
defended them here. 
These are all problems for my theory specifically. Among the phenomena that 
metaethicists in general seek to explain, there are a host that I have not addressed in this 
work, and it remains to be seen whether fiduciary non-cognitivism can account for 
them. I have not shown the fiduciary non-cognitivism can supply an adequate account 
of moral language or deductive reasoning. I have not provided a full account of what 
simple, prescriptive moral judgements are, and have said nothing about other kinds of 
moral judgement (e.g. evaluative judgement). I have not attempted to explain the 
phenomena of forgiveness, praise, and blame. 
These deficiencies and omissions all suggest directions for future research. And of 
course they are important to an evaluation of my theory. I do not think they warrant its 
rejection. As I suggested in my introduction, the profusion of evident problems facing 
my theory is partly explained by its degree of detail and explicitness, and by my efforts 
to provide a deep and unified explanation for almost all of its postulations. I do not 
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believe that any rival non-cognitivist moral psychology is similarly detailed and 
explicit, or has been so thoroughly explained. It is quite possible that attempts to explain 
and make precise these rival theories to the same degree will reveal a similar profusion 
of problems. Until this work is done, the greater overall success of fiduciary non-
cognitivism at meeting my nine desiderata argues for the superiority of that theory to its 
non-cognitivist rivals. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Debt 
I said in my characterization of entrusted concern relationships in 1.2.2 that an entrusted 
party strains his partner’s trust by refusing to yield and relieves strain by yielding, and 
that if he places too much strain on her trust over time, he will eventually violate it. This 
means that the more strain an entrusted party has accumulated, the more solicitous he 
must be in accommodating his partner’s preferences. Given this, and given my claim 
that yielding by an entrusting party allows her partner to defy her accommodation-
obliging preference without straining her trust, why would an entrusting party ever want 
to yield? Surely it would serve her interests better to let her partner strain her trust 
without giving him her blessing. That way, she could expect greater deference from him 
in the future. 
However, I suggest there are ways in which the entrusting party can yield that 
involve no such sacrifice of influence. What I am calling ‘strain’ need not be the only 
constraint on the extent to which an entrusted party can resist his partner’s preferences 
without violating her trust. An entrusted party can, I posit, possess a thing that I will call 
debt, which is like strain in that, the more of it the entrusted party accumulates, the less 
scope he has to resist his partner’s demands without violating her trust; but unlike strain 
in that the entrusted party’s level of debt is the outcome of negotiation and agreement 
by the parties. Once the parties have reached a common understanding of what the 
entrusted party owes the entrusting party, then any strain the entrusted party has put on 
his partner’s trust ceases. Their trust relationship is then in better shape. Respectively, 
entrusted and entrusting party have a clearer idea of what is expected, and what to 
expect, of the entrusted party. 
An entrusted party who intends to resist his partner’s preference might 
communicate to her an offer to acknowledge that he would thereby acquire a certain 
amount of debt to her, if she will assent to his resisting her preference. His primary 
motivation for doing this would normally be that he wants to preserve his relationship 
with his partner, and so wants to avoid uncertainty about what is expected of him. 
Under these circumstances, yielding by the entrusting party is a way for her to at once 
assent to his resisting her preferences, and to acknowledge that this is indeed the amount 
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of debt that he will accrue by doing so. In fact, acknowledging the level of debt that the 
entrusted party would accrue by resisting her preferences would, given that he has 
already conditionally recognized this debt himself, be equivalent to yielding. For she 
would bring it about that his resisting her preference would not strain her trust, thereby 
eliminating her trust-based entitlement that he should accommodate her preference in 
this instance. Once this mutual conditional acknowledgement had been reached, the 
entrusted party could choose to either accommodate her preference or resist it and incur 
a debt, and the entrusting party would not have a voice in this decision. Her situation is 
indistinguishable from the situation an entrusting party is in if she has yielded. 
Appendix B. ‘Excuses’ to Resist Preferences 
I argued in 3.1.4 that the common entrusted party in a uniform weighted desires network 
does not significantly strain his partners’ trust by acting on his discretion-licencing 
preferences in defiance of their preferences. This is how things would need to be to 
guarantee that situations in which he has no choice but to violate trust never eventuate, 
on the following assumption: that an entrusted party B strains an entrusting party A’s 
trust equally when he exercises his discretion to resist A’s preference, regardless of his 
circumstances. 
I am now going to propose that we drop this assumption. The terms of an 
entrusted concern relationship may place distinctive conditions on the circumstances 
under which resisting an accommodation-obliging preference strains A’s trust. I propose 
that B may have excuses to resist such a preference, and that, if so, he does not strain 
A’s trust by so resisting, or he strains it to a lesser degree. More specifically, I propose 
that, often, the common entrusted party in a uniform weighted desires network (and in 
many similar networks featuring multiple entrusting parties and a common entrusted 
party, and in which the Uniform Weighted Desire-Types solution is in effect) has an 
excuse to resist an entrusting party A1’s preference if there is some entrusting party A2 
in the network such that A2’s preference opposes A1’s and A2 has not waived. Call this 
a conflict excuse—the idea behind this label being that an entrusted party may resist an 
entrusting party’s preference without straining her trust if this preference ‘conflicts’ 
with that of another entrusting party. 
Having this conflict excuse should affect not the entrusted party’s behaviour in 
any way that is novel to us. The excuse merely permits him to act on his discretion-
licencing preference in defiance of A1’s preference without straining A1’s trust—it 
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does not, for instance, permit him to yield to A1’s preference without violating the trust 
of any other entrusting parties whose preferences oppose A1’s. According to my 
characterization of uniform weighted desires networks, acting on his discretion-
licencing preferences is pretty much all that the common entrusted party in a uniform 
weighted desires network does anyway, as such (at least if it is large). So why postulate 
that common entrusted parties can have conflict excuses? The reason is that this allows 
us to posit that, in relevant networks, absent a conflict excuse, a common entrusted 
party will significantly strain his partners’ trust when he acts on his own preference in 
defiance of theirs. This means that when all of his partners who have not yielded or 
waived are unanimous in their preferences, a common entrusted party cannot resist 
these preferences without straining those partners’ trust. This arrangement will be 
advantageous in many uniform weighted desires networks and other similar networks, 
especially if they are small, because it will give the entrusting parties some power to 
thwart the entrusted party when his preferred options would frustrate the weighted 
desires of everyone else in the network (bracketing waiving parties). So assuming that 
conflict excuses are a possible feature of entrusted concern relationships, they ought to 
be common in such networks. 
Postulating the possibility of excuses is not, I think, very costly. I suggested in 
Appendix A that ‘strain’ exists only absent an understanding between an entrusted party 
and his partner about what the former owes the latter. It can be replaced with ‘debt’ of 
an agreed magnitude, through the voluntary concessions, acknowledgements, and 
indulgences of the parties. I am now merely postulating that the terms of entrusted 
concern relationships might include rules governing what sorts of understandings may 
be reached, concerning the entrusted party’s debt, consequent upon his resisting his 
partner’s preferences in certain circumstances. We can think of a rule granting an 
entrusted party conflict excuses as a rule prescribing the immediate substitution of a 
debt increase of zero for any strain he causes when his partners’ preferences are not 
unanimous. 
My postulation of the possibility of conflict excuses is theoretically motivated. As 
I will explain in Appendix C, it allows me to more credibly postulate that networks 
similar to uniform weighted desires networks would exist in quite small groups. This in 
turn allows me to give a better explanation of our intuitions about third-party 
disagreement in cases like Football (Parents I). 
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Appendix C. Explaining Third-Party Disagreement in Football (Parents I) 
I’ll consider here why we might tacitly attribute to John and his parents in Football 
(Parents I) a network of trust relationships that would permit third-party disagreement 
about what John should do. I will assume that John’s is a stereotypical nuclear family 
whose members all live under one roof, and that John’s parents are married. Something 
like the base conditions for a fully connected network obtain here. John’s family 
members would have common desires for the promotion of the family’s welfare, status, 
and shared values (or, if the word ‘values’ is inappropriate here, their ‘more distinctive 
shared concerns’). These common desires (call them W) might vary in strength among 
the members of John’s family. And John is not the only member of his family who 
could satisfy or frustrate these common desires through his actions. This means that 
John and his parents (and his siblings, if he has any) would have some incentive to form 
a fully connected network. Let’s suppose for the moment that they would form such a 
network, and consider what features it would have, and whether we should expect the 
members to be capable of having third-party disagreements. 
In addition to their first-order fully connected network, it would be advantageous 
for John’s family if the preferences they voiced were subject to more rather than less 
scrutiny, which a second-order fully connected network, entitling each party to a voice 
in the others’ waiving choices, would facilitate. So they would have some incentive to 
form a second-order network. This would be somewhat desirable from the point of view 
of each member. If John’s father urged John to stay on the football team by voicing a 
preference that he should do so, John’s mother would probably like to be able to voice a 
contrary preference, and to demand to know the reasoning behind her husband’s 
preference, without being ignored by him. Enjoying this entitlement would more than 
compensate John’s mother for the chore of having to explain her voiced preferences on 
demand. 
At least under some circumstances, we would intuitively expect the entrusted 
parties in this network to significantly strain their partners’ trust by resisting their 
preferences. So these entrusted parties would, I propose, have conflict excuses for 
resisting trust (see Appendix B), to ensure that they would never find themselves in 
situations in which they could not avoid violating trust as a result of accumulated strain. 
The relationships shared by the members of these two fully connected networks as 
such need not be the only entrusted concern relationships they share. I’m inclined to 
think that there would be different and more complex entrusted concern relationships, of 
308 
 
a more personal nature, between pairs of family members, whose terms would not be 
wholly determined by the requirements of any larger trust network.242 John’s parents are 
presumably romantically attached and sexually intimate to some degree, and it seems 
possible that they would be able to apply trust-based pressures to each other in these 
roles, by voicing preferences based on desire-types other than those that were weighted 
for them qua John’s partner. This is compatible with the possibility that a fully 
connected network would exist among the members of John’s family, in which 
everyone’s weighted desire-types were identical. 
Despite the advantages I have mentioned for John’s family of forming a dual-
order fully connected network, the hypothesis that John’s family members would do so 
lacks plausibility. If it were true, John would presumably have an influence in his 
parents’ decisions equal to John’s parents’ influence in his (as long as we are 
considering only the sort of influence wielded by entrusting parties, and not the capacity 
to make authoritative commands, which presumably only John’s parents have). This 
seems prima facie implausible given the presumed disparity of power between John and 
his parents, and at any rate seems contrary to our ordinary assumptions about children’s 
relationships with their parents. 
John’s preference might decide whether or not his father could yield to his wife’s 
preference in some matter even if he (the father) had a strong pre-trust desire to yield; it 
might decide whether John’s father would strain his wife’s trust at all by resisting her 
preference. Imagine John’s father responding to a demand of his wife by saying, ‘I 
would do it, but the boy doesn’t want me to.’ This would seem unusual. It would seem 
unusual too if John’s father thought he had to get John on his side before urging John’s 
mother to make some choice. But this would make perfect sense if John’s family had 
formed a fully connected network, and unanimity of preferences were required among 
the partners of a common entrusted party before the latter could yield or face significant 
pressure to yield. 
However, the Four Relationships Hypothesis does not require that the common 
entrusted party whose decisions are in dispute be an entrusting party himself. So we can 
drop the assumption that John has a voice in his parents’ decisions—or one that is on a 
par with their voices in his decisions anyway—and still potentially explain the intuition 
                                                 
242 However, the decisions in which these more personal trust relationships granted entrusting 
parties voices might have to be circumscribed in certain ways to prevent interference with the 
dual-order fully connected network. 
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of disagreement elicited by Football (Parents I). Suppose that we make this move. I 
contend that it is still plausible that the trust relationships necessary for third-party 
disagreement would exist amongst John and his family. It is still plausible that a 
network of trust relationships would exist that functioned to encourage the satisfaction 
and inhibit the frustration of the family’s common desires. It would merely be a less 
‘fully connected’ one, for it would omit to give John a voice in his parents’ decisions. 
I hypothesize that there would be a special set of entrusted concern relationships 
N among John’s family members whose function was to promote the satisfaction of 
their shared desires W. I’ll label the relationships in N using the following notation: 
E〈A, B, nth, N〉 refers to the nth-order entrusted concern relationship in N, in which A is 
the entrusting and B the entrusted party. Qua members of N, John and his parents would 
share the following trust relationships: E〈Mother, Father, 1st, N〉, E〈Father, Mother, 1st, 
N〉, E〈Mother, John, 1st, N〉, E〈Father, John, 1st, N〉, E〈Mother, Father, 2nd, N〉, and 
E〈Father, Mother, 2nd, N〉. Notice that John is not the entrusting party in any of these 
relationships. 
Before I specify why I think these relationships would exist, let me comment on 
two distinctive features that I think N would have. The weighted desires of all the 
parties in these relationships are, I hypothesize, all W-type desires, as we would expect 
given the function of N—but with one exception. The set of John’s weighted desire-
types in E〈Mother, John, 1st, N〉, E〈Father, John, 1st, N〉 would probably be larger than 
W. (The set would, of course, be the same in both of these relationships—this is needed 
to rule out (2)-type situations.) More precisely, it would probably be a proper superset 
of W, including desire-types that were more self-regarding than those in W. I propose 
this to account for the intuitive fact that John might cite his enjoyment of football as a 
ground for his discretion-licencing preference to play football, as he does in Football 
(Mother and Son). It is not clear that a desire for John’s enjoyment would be among the 
family’s shared ends. 
This would make sense given John’s situation. Because John’s reasons for being 
part of N are different from those of his parents, it is not important that his weighted 
desire-types should be identical to those of the other members. Unlike his parents, John 
is not a member of N chiefly in order to secure the satisfaction of desires he holds in 
common with the rest of his family. Rather he is a member because his parents have 
power over him and can make life difficult for him if he is not willingly responsive to 
their desires. He does not commit to satisfying any particular set of desires (his or 
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theirs) to ensure that they reciprocate, and so does not need to commit to satisfying 
desires of the same types that they commit to satisfy. 
There is admittedly a minor drawback in John’s having a peculiar set of weighted 
desire-types. Uniformity of weighted-desire types facilitates, and provides occasions 
for, the scrutiny of preferences. For instance, it is somewhat desirable that John’s father 
should have the same weighted desire-types as his wife does in E〈Mother, Father, 1st, 
N〉, because this means that, when his wife gives the reasoning behind her 
accommodation-obliging preference, there is a stronger presumption that the same 
reasoning will give him a preference for the same option. This means that when she 
voices a preference, she challenges him to find a flaw in her reasoning, with the result 
that errors in the reasoning of both parties will potentially be exposed. The same is true, 
mutatis mutandis, of all entrusted concern relationships among the members of N. 
Hence it would be desirable for John’s mother to have the same weighted desire-types 
as John does in E〈Mother, John, 1st, N〉, for instance. John’s having a peculiar set of 
weighted desire-types means that the reasoning behind his mother’s accommodation-
obliging preferences is relatively unlikely to apply to his discretion-licencing 
preferences, and expressed disagreements between John and his mother are relatively 
unlikely to expose bad reasoning. But this is only a small disadvantage. 
Let’s now turn to the second distinctive feature of N. In general, because N is 
presumably very small, and because an entrusted party who resists accommodating the 
unanimous preferences of the other entrusting parties in N significantly strains their 
trust, members of N who want to change other members’ behaviour will not have to 
resort to trying to change the reasoning behind their discretion-licencing preferences. 
They will often be able to exploit one another’s accommodative desires (i.e. their 
desires to avoid straining trust) as a means of influencing behaviour. Achieving 
unanimity of preferences among the partners to a common entrusted party who have not 
waived will often be a feasible goal here. It will be feasible because the set of entrusting 
parties in N is so small. Indeed, John’s parents are probably the only entrusting parties 
in N.243 They are probably also the only parties in N who share second-order entrusted 
concern relationships. This means that their second-order relationships will be of a 
‘personal’ sort, in which resisting preferences results in strain, and in which entrusted 
                                                 
243 If there are other children in the family, they will probably only participate in N as entrusted 
parties, as John does. 
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parties are free to yield without having to worry about whether their partners are 
‘unanimous’. If this is right, and if John’s parents disagree about what John should do, 
the parent X who disagreed with John would often be able to induce the parent Y who 
‘agreed’ with John to waive, by exploiting Y’s desire not to strain X’s trust, and perhaps 
by signalling her willingness to be similarly acquiescent herself in future waiving 
choices if Y would waive in the present case. They could thus use their voices in their 
second-order relationships to end their disagreement concerning what John should do, 
so that one of them could make effective demands of him. (Indeed we should 
pretheoretically expect them to do something like this: disagreeing parents typically 
prefer to reach a common position concerning their child’s decisions, so as to avoid 
making incompatible demands of the child.) Overall, we should expect the entrusted 
concern relationships among the members of N to allow for a lot more practical 
negotiation than we would find in large fully connected networks, as opposed to mere 
scrutiny of reasoning. 
Let me now summarize why I think that the relationships that I have posited 
would in fact exist. John’s parents would share two first-order entrusted concern 
relationships (E〈Mother, Father, 1st, N〉 and E〈Father, Mother, 1st, N〉) in which their 
W-type desires were weighted because they have a common interest in satisfying their 
W-type desires, and each would be willing to commit to give greater weight to W-type 
desires in her decisions if the other would reciprocate. They would entrust to John their 
concerns that he should satisfy their W-type desires, and would use their power over 
him to induce him to commit to do so (hence E〈Mother, John, 1st, N〉 and E〈Father, 
John, 1st, N〉). The sets of John’s weighted desire-types in these relationships might not 
equal W, but they would be the same in both relationships. John’s parents would also 
share two second-order entrusted concern relationships entitling each to a voice in the 
other’s waiving choices qua John’s partner. They would do this partly so that they 
would have discursive entitlements that would aid each in scrutinizing the demands the 
other made of John, but also because it would frequently be especially advantageous to 
one party if she could get the other party to waive, and these relationships would 
facilitate reciprocal waiving: each parent X might be willing to waive in a decision of 
John’s that mattered relatively little to X, in the expectation that the other parent would 
waive in a future decision that mattered more to X (hence E〈Mother, Father, 2nd, N〉 
and E〈Father, Mother, 2nd, N〉). I hypothesize that we ‘tacitly’ assume that these 
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relationships exist when we are presented with Football (Parents I), and that this 
explains the appearance that John’s parents disagree. 
Appendix D. Explaining Third-Party Disagreement in Penny’s Case 
This appendix assumes knowledge of Chapters 1-3 and Appendix B, and appeals to the 
idea of non-cognitive disagreement about conditional decisions, the possibility of which 
I consider in 4.2. 
As I observed in 3.2.2, explaining why the conditions for third-party disagreement 
would be met in Marriage (Imperatives) seems a less straightforward matter than 
explaining why they would be met in Photographs. Simply positing a dual-order fully 
connected network among Penny’s family members seems unsatisfactory. Something 
needs to be said about how such a network—or whatever network we posit—would 
reflect the presumed disproportionate power that Penny’s mother has over Penny, or if it 
did not accommodate this power, why she and Penny would nonetheless be members of 
it. 
One way to avoid predicting that everyone in Penny’s extended family would 
have an equally influential voice in Penny’s choice of spouse would be to make the 
following five postulations. First, Penny can significantly strain her mother’s trust by 
resisting her preferences, but has conflict excuses for resisting them. Second, the fully 
connected network does not give members a voice in Penny’s choice of what to do 
when this involves going against her mother’s wishes. Third, the network nonetheless 
gives members voices in Penny’s mother’s waiving choices qua entrusting party to 
Penny. Fourth, any preferences voiced by the members of the network, apart from 
Penny’s mother, concerning what Penny should do are, insofar as they are directed at 
Penny, tacitly conditional. They concern what Penny should do given that this doesn’t 
involve going against her mother. 
Before continuing, I should clarify that these are the only voiced preferences that 
we need to posit would be tacitly conditional in this way. Insofar as they are directed at 
Penny’s mother, these members’ voiced preferences concern her waiving choices qua 
first-order entrusting party to Penny—not in the matter of what Penny should do when 
this does not involve going against her mother, but simply in the matter of what Penny 
should do. In the first-order entrusted concern relationship between Penny and her 
mother in which Penny is the entrusted party, both parties have voices in the matter of 
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what Penny should do, and not in her choices of what to do when this does not involve 
going against her mother’s wishes. 
The final postulate is that the admissible ground-types for all parties in the 
network would rule as inadmissible any proposition a positive credence in which could 
make it rational for her to hold, for all φ, a voiceable preference concerning whether 
Penny should φ that differed from her preference concerning whether Penny should φ 
given that Penny would defy her mother’s wishes by φ-ing. I suggest that they would do 
this by ruling facts about whether Penny’s mother has yielded fundamentally 
inadmissible. This would not be an unusual sort of arrangement: facts concerning the 
actions that parties to a fully connected network might perform as such often need to be 
inadmissible in such networks if instances of the Reaction Problem are to be avoided. 
If we suppose that Penny’s aunt sincerely voices a preference for Penny to marry 
Mr. Lloyd, and Penny’s mother sincerely voices a preference for Penny to marry Mr. 
Toff, these five postulations have the following implications. Penny’s aunt and mother 
disagree about whether one of them should waive (depending on Penny’s preference 
qua first-order entrusted party in each relationship); Penny either disagrees with her 
mother about whom she should marry, or disagrees with her aunt about whom she 
should marry, if this doesn’t involve going against her mother’s preference; she cannot 
disagree with both of them. At least this is true if we assume that everyone has relevant 
voiceable preferences. 
It is a further question whether Penny’s aunt and mother are in third-party 
disagreement—that is, whether they disagree about something that Penny should do. I 
suggest that they at least disagree on the conditional question of whom Penny should 
marry if it doesn’t involve going against her mother’s wishes. Penny’s mother prefers 
that Penny should marry Toff unconditionally—i.e. whether or not Penny would go 
against her mother’s wishes by doing so—so she prefers that Penny should marry Toff 
when this means going against her mother’s wishes. This preference and Penny’s aunt’s 
are mutually unsatisfiable, and the requisite trust relationships exist between them and 
Penny for this to put them in third-party disagreement according to the Four 
Relationships Hypothesis. 
Having to posit that the aunt and mother only disagree on a conditional 
question—the question of whether Penny should marry Lloyd if doing so does not 
involve defying her mother—seems to be a cost. For one thing, it is costly in general to 
posit that someone is implicitly saying something conditional when her utterance is, on 
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the surface, unconditional. For another, it is costly to posit the an arrangement of trust 
relationships as elaborate as that I have described among Penny and her relatives. 
Finally, my postulation does not obviously lend itself to a plausible construal of 
Marriage (Imperatives), where the aunt clearly knows that Penny would defy her 
mother by marrying Lloyd but tries to get her to do it anyway. 
However, that case, which has the aunt and mother barking conflicting commands 
at Penny, is quite silly and stylized. In a more natural version of the case the following 
would not seem implausible: that the aunt is not really urging Penny to defy her mother, 
but rather simultaneously urging Penny to marry Lloyd if her mother does not oppose it, 
and urging Penny’s mother not to oppose it. This proposition is consistent with my 
account of the trust relationships among Penny and her relatives. Moreover, I think that 
this account provides at least a defensible explanation of our intuitions about Marriage 
(Imperatives), fanciful as that case is. For it is somewhat plausible that Penny’s aunt is 
getting carried away and exceeding propriety by demanding that Penny defy her mother. 
The interpretation of the case I am defending allows for the possibility that the aunt’s 
demand is being presumptuous while still correctly predicting disagreement between 
mother and aunt. 
How does the arrangement of trust networks in Penny’s family that I have 
hypothesized better reflect the underlying power relationships among the members? It at 
least means that the mother’s influence on her daughter’s choice will never have to 
compete with the influence of other first-order entrusting parties in the network. As 
soon as she has a (rational) preference in Penny’s choice of whom to marry, other 
extended family members lose their voices in the decision. This means that Penny’s 
mother’s demands of her daughter are more likely to be efficacious, especially since 
Penny can significantly strain her mother’s trust by failing to accommodate her 
preferences. It doesn’t mean that Penny’s mother can make special, unusually stringent 
demands of her daughter: Penny’s mother’s preferences must be based on the same 
weighted desires that all her preferences are based on in the first-order network.244 
Of course, I am not wedded to this interpretation; it is just one of a disjunction of 
possibilities that I am committed to. If we are prepared to accept that Penny’s aunt and 
                                                 
244 There would plausibly be a more personal entrusted concern relationship between Penny and 
her mother that was not part of any fully connected network, and that would allow Penny’s 
mother to voice preferences based on different desires. But this relationship and the fully 
connected network among Penny’s extended family would presumably give Penny’s mother 
voices in different sets of decisions, among those facing her daughter. 
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mother have roughly equal voices in Penny’s decision, we can get by with positing that 
the two disagree in virtue of their membership of a simple dual-order fully connected 
network. We can then explain the disagreement between aunt and mother without 
positing that it is about a conditional decision of Penny’s. We can also, in a weak and 
limited way, allow that Penny’s mother has a more influential voice in Penny’s decision 
than her aunt does: we can posit that Penny can significantly strain her mother’s trust 
(and not her aunt’s) by not yielding to her preferences, absent conflict excuses. 
Appendix E. Third-Party Disagreement and the Disparity Hypothesis 
In this appendix I shall try to show how fiduciary non-cognitivism’s explanation of 
moral disagreement can be made compatible with the Disparity Hypothesis (8.2.1). As 
far as I can see, I will have accomplished this once I have made certain revisions to my 
account of waiving, and shown that my theory of third-party disagreement plausibly has 
the virtues I have claimed for it once I have made these revisions. 
The Disparity Hypothesis requires a revision of my account of waiving because 
waiving affects entrusted parties’ obligations, and the Disparity Hypothesis concerns the 
nature of entrusted parties’ obligations. I can’t ignore these required revisions (as I shall 
ignore the revisions the Disparity Hypothesis requires for my account of yielding) if I 
want to explain moral disagreement, because my explanation of third-party 
disagreement in general relies heavily on the idea of waiving.  
The necessary revision is fairly straightforward. As I posited in 3.3.3, for all φ, an 
entrusting party A can waive her demand that her partner B should φ just in case A 
voiceably prefers that B should φ. On my revised account, as long as she continues in 
her waiving stance, 
(i) if B lacks a voiceable preference to not-φ, and B not-φs, and φ-ing is the action 
with the highest expected weighted utility for A relative to B’s evidence, then B 
does not strain A’s trust by not-φ-ing (even if B does not know that A has waived); 
and 
(ii) if a suitable occasion arises, and if A thinks that it will make a difference to 
whether or not B φs, A must communicate to B that she has waived with respect to 
B’s φ-ing. 
Given this account of waiving, we should expect to have an intuition of third-party 
disagreement in cases in which Conditions One to Five hold. If S, T, and U share the 
relationships and have the voiceable preferences they must have, according to the Four 
Relationships Hypothesis, for S and T to disagree about whether U should φ, then a 
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state of affairs will exist that deserves to be called a non-cognitive disagreement 
between S and T about whether U should φ. 
The Four Relationships Hypothesis crucially requires a guarantee of ‘harmony’—
a correlation between the voiceable preferences of each party to a third-party 
disagreement in each other’s waiving choices, and their voiceable preferences 
concerning the entrusted party’s action. The changes I have made to my account of 
waiving do not seem to undermine the possibility of guaranteeing harmony, or so I shall 
now argue. 
Before we take into account constraints on their admissible ground-types, if S 
prefers that U should φ, and T prefers that U should not-φ, then each will tend to prefer 
that the other should waive, for this will tend to make it more likely that U will do as 
she prefers. If T waives, for instance, then, whenever T thinks that it will make a 
difference to whether U φs and has a suitable opportunity, T must let U know that he 
has waived. T’s telling U that she has waived will generally make a difference to 
whether U φs only when U does not disprefer T’s preferred option (not-φ), and in that 
case it will tend to increase the likelihood that U φs. This is because, if U knows that he 
would not violate T’s trust by φ-ing if φ-ing did not have the highest expected weighted 
utility for U relative to U’s evidence, his discretional desires qua T’s partner will not 
urge him to avoid φ. So S will tend to prefer that T should waive. T will tend to prefer 
not to waive for the same reason that S prefers that he should waive—it will raise the 
probability that U will frustrate his voiceable preference. 
Constraints on admissible ground-types will turn these tendencies into guarantees 
of harmony. Any proposition p such that S’s belief in p might explain why S would, 
despite preferring that U should φ, rationally prefer that T not waive his preference that 
U should not-φ, would be made inadmissible for S by the terms of her trust 
relationships. A similar pruning of T’s admissible ground-types will guarantee that T 
prefers not to waive. 
Part of my explanation in 2.2.2 for the appearance that a third-party non-cognitive 
disagreement is a disagreement about the actions of the third party was roughly as 
follows. According to the Four Relationships Hypothesis, if S and T disagree about 
whether U should φ, there is necessarily at least one disagreement between them 
concerning whether one of them should waive qua entrusting party to U. Whose waving 
choice(s) this concerned depended on what U preferred to do. I argued that since it was 
their incompatible preferences about U’s choice that guaranteed that they shared at least 
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one such disagreement (and since their disagreeing thoughts were ones to which U was 
obliged to give consideration), their situation deserved to be called a disagreement about 
what S should do. 
I have not yet acknowledged it, but my postulation in 3.3.3 that an entrusting 
party may enter a waiving stance concerning an entrusted party’s decision even if the 
entrusted party’s preference opposes hers, requires me to give a slightly different 
explanation of why S and T’s disagreement is about the third party’s choice. An 
explanation that is compatible with the 3.3.3 postulation cannot appeal to the idea the 
parties are robustly in non-third-party disagreement only because of their opposing 
preferences concerning the third party’s actions. My new account of waiving inherits 
this feature of the 3.3.3 version, so I still need to provide an alternative explanation.  
The 3.3.3 postulation means that if S and T have opposing preferences concerning 
what U should do, and the network of trust relationships required by the Four 
Relationships Hypothesis obtains among the trio, then there will always be two 
disagreements between S and T—a disagreement about whether S is to waive, and a 
disagreement about whether T is to waive. To be sure, if (e.g.) S and U prefer the same 
option, then the disagreement about whether S should waive will be more pressing and 
practically significant than the disagreement about whether T should waive, because it 
is the disagreement whose outcome has a more immediate prospect of changing U’s 
behaviour. But both disagreements will exist. S will still want T to waive, because this 
means that if U comes to prefer T’s preferred option, U may still choose the option with 
the highest expected weighted utility for S by U’s lights, out of a desire to live up to S’s 
trust. T will want to refrain from waiving because she will prefer that, if U comes to 
prefer T’s preferred option, U chooses that option, which is more likely if U thinks that 
he must do so on pain of exceeding his discretion. So whenever S and T have 
incompatible preferences concerning U’s decision, they will both disagree about 
whether S is to waive and about whether T is to waive, regardless of S’s preferences. 
Thus I can no longer claim that it is the opposition of preferences concerning U’s 
action, and not their preferences concerning each other’s waiving choices, that robustly 
put S and T at odds, and that this is why they may be said to disagree about U’s action. 
Their opposition of preferences concerning each other’s waiving choices is robust with 
respect to changes in U’s preferences. However I think I can still claim that it is the 
opposition of preferences concerning U’s action that ‘really’ puts S and T at odds, and 
hence that it is natural that we should think of them as disagreeing about U’s actions. 
318 
 
Obviously, each only prefers that the other should yield because there is a chance that 
this will help to bring it about that U’s choices better satisfy her weighted desires—the 
constraints on their weighted desire-types rule out any other grounds they might have 
for their voiceable preferences concerning each other’s waiving choices. As before, it 
makes sense for the parties to talk as if they disagreed about U’s choices, rather than 
about each other’s waiving choices, because (a) it is their voiceable preferences 
concerning U’s choice that ‘really’ put them at odds, and (b) talking to each other about 
U’s choice is an economical way to simultaneously negotiate their two disagreements 
about each other’s waiving choices. 
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